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The essays in this volume examine a number of questions presented by 
narration and narratives in Kafka’s fiction. They originated as papers dis-
cussed at a symposium in May 2006 that formed part of the research 
project Narrative Theory and Analysis directed by Jakob Lothe at the 
Centre for Advanced Study in Oslo. The arguments (which have been 
revised in light of discussions then and since) relate both to the pecu-
liarities of Kafka’s story-telling and to general issues in narrative theory. 
The decision to select Kafka’s work for discussion in the context of the 
research project was, if not inevitable, at least unsurprising, given that it 
has frequently attracted the attention of critics interested in the nature of 
narrative, arguably because of rather than despite the challenges his stories 
present to the general categories narrative theorists make it their business 
to develop. Since general narrative theory and Kafka’s idiosyncratic fic-
tions are both complex and contentious topics, some prefatory remarks 
are called for to outline the context in which the issues addressed in the 
individual contributions emerged.
 even to use the term “narrative theory” might be considered to invite 
misunderstanding, for there are not one but many competing accounts 
of what narration and narratives entail. For purely pragmatic reasons, we 
have decided to take as a starting point the basic understanding of narra-
tive as rhetorical communication (a view offered by the theorist James 
Phelan, a member of the research project team) not because the con-
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tributors would all necessarily subscribe to this theoretical model but 
because it addresses a number of the key components of narrative that 
were much debated during the research project and that have for long 
played a role in Kafka criticism. The terms and concepts are not meant to 
provide “preset molds into which narratives will inevitably fit—or must 
be made to fit—but rather . . . available tools for opening up the work-
ings of individual narratives” (see James Phelan’s discussion in chapter 1). 
Phelan’s general definition of narrative asserts that
narrative can be fruitfully understood as a rhetorical act: somebody tell-
ing somebody else on some occasion and for some purpose(s) that some-
thing happened. In fictional narrative, the rhetorical situation is doubled: 
the narrator tells her story to her narratee for her purposes, while the 
author communicates to her audience for her own purposes both that 
story and the narrator’s telling of it. (2007, 3–4)
While this definition is cast in the simplest of terms, each of the ele-
ments is susceptible to complex elaboration and to considerable variation 
in perception, as the contributions to the present volume demonstrate. 
The essays reflect the complexity of the issues surrounding the “some-
body” doing the telling, the attitude of the narrator to what is told, the 
perceived purpose(s) of the telling, the implied or actual reader, the pro-
gression of events, and the progression of the telling. As these elements 
are interconnected to a high degree, an increased or decreased emphasis 
on any one of them will have an impact on the others. Where purpose is 
perceived to be important, for example, the narrator doing the telling is 
likely to assume a different profile in the mind of the reader than would 
be the case in narratives that do not convey a clear sense of authorial or 
narratorial purpose. Similarly, where historical “occasion” is considered 
to be important (as in Benno Wagner’s chapter on “Building the great 
Wall of China”), the critic’s understanding of narration will differ mark-
edly from that of critics who believe Kafka’s understanding of life to 
have been categorically a-temporal.1 As the range of emphases in these 
chapters makes clear, Kafka’s mode of narration still appears as stubbornly 
enigmatic to today’s readers as it did when he began to write, almost 
exactly a century ago. As the essays also demonstrate, Kafka’s narratives 
still present a considerable challenge to, as well as a great resource for, 
narrative theory and analysis.
 Of the various elements identified by Phelan, the questions surround-
ing the “somebody” who tells have long been of particular interest to 
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Kafka’s commentators. In the development of Kafka criticism, the great 
editor and philologist Friedrich Beißner deserves credit for having been 
the first to focus attention effectively on the question of narration in 
Kafka’s fiction in a trenchant public lecture given in 1952, subsequently 
published under the title Der Erzähler Franz Kafka (“The narrator Franz 
Kafka”).2 The lecture was prompted by Beißner’s irritation at the prac-
tice, which had become widespread during the Kafka vogue of the early 
post-war years, of interpreting Kafka’s fictions as encoded illustrations of 
various ideological positions (existential, religious, philosophical, psycho- 
analytic) dear to the hearts of the many interpreters who made the 
assumption that the stories were told by an authoritative narrator speak-
ing from a position distinct from and superior to those of his characters. 
Beißner, by contrast, contended that Kafka always narrated from a single 
perspective (“Kafka erzählt . . . stets einsinnig” [1983, 37]), and that the 
narrative perspective, even when expressed in the third person, was always 
co-extensive with that of the protagonist: “There is no place for the nar-
rator other than in the soul of his central figure: he narrates himself, he 
transforms himself into Josef K. and into the land-surveyor K.” (1983, 
38). According to Beißner, the narrator becomes one not simply with the 
protagonist but also with the events and circumstances of the story:
The narrator is identical not only with the main figure (and this is the 
case even where Kafka narrates in the third person) but also with what is 
narrated. The distance between event and narration is cancelled [“aufge-
hoben”]. . . . Kafka allows the narrator no space beside or above the fig-
ures and no distance from events. . . . There is only the sequence of events 
that is narrating itself (paradoxically in the past tense). (1983, 41–42)3
A concomitant effect of this technique is to eliminate any distance 
between the reader and the protagonist: “If we understand things cor-
rectly, Kafka transforms not only himself but also the reader into the 
main figure” (Beißner 1983, 42).
 A further consequence of the narrator’s identification with the self-
enclosed condition of the protagonist, in Beißner’s view, is that narrative 
progression at the level of event effectively does not take place. Although 
the figure might believe that he is moving toward some goal, the unfold-
ing of the narrative typically reveals the underlying and unchanging stasis 
of his situation. As Beißner put it with characteristic clarity in his next, 
equally influential lecture on Kafka, “Der Dichter Franz Kafka” (“Kafka 
the poet”), Kafka’s enduring theme, was “the failure to arrive or the failure 
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to reach a goal” (Beißner 1983, 63; emphasis in the original). As Beißner 
realized, this theme was also relevant to the question of narrative pro-
gression at the level of communication between author or narrator and 
reader. If the stories are told from within an isolated consciousness, the 
reader, although forced by the narrative techniques into an attitude of 
identification, can have no assurance of entering that consciousness effec-
tively. Just as the stories told by figures within the stories usually do not 
achieve the intended effect on the other figures to whom the stories are 
told, the author’s stories too may fail to reach their goal/reader.4 Kafka 
himself recognized this danger when he wrote to Felice Bauer that if his 
“rather wild and senseless” story “Das Urteil” (“The Judgment”) con-
tained “innere Wahrheit” (“inner truth”) this was something that could 
only be affirmed or denied by each individual reader (KLF, 87).
 For Beißner this narrative constellation marked the end-point of a 
great historical arc that began with the homeric epic, in which the poet-
narrator derived his nigh-on omniscient authority from a unified world-
view encompassing the actions of gods and mortals alike that he shared 
with his audience and his characters. In Kafka’s fiction, by contrast, a 
radically different, modern view of the world had found its appropri-
ate form of expression, an enclosed, “monadic” experience of isolated 
subjectivity in which no “windows” existed through which individuals 
might gain access either to the inner world of other subjects or to some 
Archimedean point of objectivity. Kafka’s remark that he was concerned 
above all with the “Darstellung meines traumhaften inneren Lebens” 
(KAF, 10: 167) (“representation of my dreamlike inner life”) was taken by 
Beißner to be the key to understanding the structure of Kafka’s fiction, 
for within that “dreamlike inner life” no distinctions are tenable between 
the perspectives of the protagonist, the narrator, and even, ultimately, the 
author. If ever the narrator failed to abide strictly by the “principle” of 
identification with the protagonist, he committed what Beißner regarded 
as a compositional error or a breach of his own rule of narration. Beißner 
cited as evidence for this view the fact that Kafka left as one of the para-
lipomena of Der Proceß (The Trial) a draft chapter in which Josef K. is 
described from the perspective of an outside observer as the protagonist 
returns to waking consciousness after dreaming of a sequence of events in 
which he was a passive participant. Such a break between dreamt experi-
ence and a reflective consciousness that recognized the “unreal” nature 
of dream events could not possibly be acceptable, Beißner maintained, to 
an artist as concerned as Kafka was with artistic consistency and coher-
ence, because “Das traumhafte innere Leben erscheint nicht einheitlich 
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genug” (1983, 45) (“the dreamlike inner life does not appear sufficiently 
unified”).
 The isolation on which Beißner placed such stress was certainly an 
important element both in Kafka’s experience of life and in his ideal con-
ception of writing. In October 1921, for example, he characterized his 
situation thus:
Alles ist Phantasie, die Familie, das Bureau, die Freunde, die Straße, alles 
Phantasie, fernere oder nähere, die Frau die nächste, Wahrheit aber ist 
nur daß Du den Kopf gegen die Wand einer fenster- und türlosen Zelle 
drückst. (KAF, 11:192)
(All is imaginary, family, office, friends, the street, all imaginary, far away 
or close at hand, the woman the closest; the truth, however, is only this, 
that you are beating your head against the wall of a windowless and 
doorless cell.) (KD, 395; translation modified)
A week later, having taken part half-heartedly in a game of cards his 
parents were playing, Kafka observed that his whole life had been one of 
almost complete isolation:
Dieses grenzland zwischen einsamkeit und gemeinschaft habe ich nur 
äußerst selten überschritten, ich habe mich darin sogar mehr angesiedelt, 
als in der einsamkeit selbst. Was für ein lebendiges schönes Land war im 
Vergleich hiezu Robinsons Insel. (KAF, 11:193)
(I have seldom, very seldom, crossed this borderland between loneliness 
and community, I have even settled down there more than in loneliness 
itself. What a fine bustling place was Robinson Crusoe’s island in com-
parison.) (KD, 396; translation modified)
The distinction Kafka drew here between living in this “borderland” and 
the elusive complete isolation he longed for as the pre-condition of total 
immersion in writing is helpful when it comes to understanding the 
position of the narrator or narrators in his fiction. Just as he was suf-
ficiently involved in communal life at least to make a show of taking an 
interest in his parents’ card game (a minor but telling example of a life 
lived in fact in the service of many other lives despite the subjective sense 
of alienation and the great cost to his own well-being), Kafka’s narrative 
stance is not as solipsistic as Beißner claimed it was. As has often been 
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pointed out, there are too many instances of what Beißner considered to 
be breaks in perspective for them to be mere artistic infelicities. even if 
Beißner were correct in supposing that the fictions were the expression 
of a single personality, this would not necessarily entail the singularity of 
perspective (Einsinnigkeit) he insisted on, for being “of two minds” is not 
only a familiar enough experience,5 but Kafka had a particularly strong 
sense of the multi-occupancy of the self:
Jeder Mensch trägt ein Zimmer in sich. Diese Tatsache kann man sogar 
durch das gehör nachprüfen. Wenn einer schnell geht und man hin-
horcht, etwa in der Nacht wenn alles ringsherum still ist, so hört man 
z.B. das Scheppern eines nicht genug befestigten Wandspiegels oder der 
Schirm. (KAF, 6:44)
(every human being carries a room within himself. One can even test 
this fact with the ear. If someone walks quickly and one listens attentively, 
at night, say, when everything around is quiet, one hears for example the 
rattle of a mirror that is not properly fixed to the wall or the screen.)
 Although Beißner’s argument that Kafka’s narrator always identifies 
unreservedly with the protagonist was crucial in directing attention to 
the issue of narrative perspective and modes in Kafka, many subsequent 
critics, including the contributors to this volume, stress the element of 
irony in his presentation of events, and argue that the repeated and con-
trasting patterns created by the narrated images show a shaping con-
sciousness at work that invites us to look at things from a perspective 
(or perspectives) distinct from the protagonist’s.6 There is also external 
evidence that the author Kafka at times far exceeded the quietly ironic 
distance detectable in his narrators. When reading aloud the first chapter 
of The Trial, for example, it is reported by Max Brod that Kafka was so 
convulsed with laughter that he could scarcely finish the reading (1996, 
156). Reading “Die Verwandlung” (“The Metamorphosis”) to friends, by 
contrast, had two quite different effects on Kafka, with laughter following 
hard on the heels of a “frenzied” recitation, possibly to release the ten-
sions generated by the oral delivery: “ein schöner Abend bei Max. Ich 
las mich an meiner geschichte in Raserei. Wir haben es uns dann wohl 
sein lassen und viel gelacht” (F, 320) (“A pleasant evening at Max’s. I read 
myself into a frenzy with my story. But then we did let ourselves go, and 
laughed a lot” [KLF, 209]).
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 On another occasion Kafka contrasted his own detached view of the 
death of a character with the sympathetic response he expected his man-
ner of narrating to elicit from the reader:
Auf dem Nachhauseweg sagte ich Max, daß ich auf dem Sterbebett 
vorausgesetzt daß die Schmerzen nicht zu groß sind, sehr zufrieden sein 
werde. Ich vergaß hinzuzufügen und habe es später mit Absicht unterlas-
sen, daß das Beste was ich geschrieben habe, in dieser Fähigkeit zufrie-
den sterben zu können, seinen grund hat. An allen diesen guten und 
stark überzeugenden Stellen handelt es sich immer darum, daß jemand 
stirbt, daß es ihm sehr schwer wird, daß darin für ihn ein Unrecht und 
wenigstens eine härte liegt und daß das für den Leser wenigstens meiner 
Meinung nach rührend wird. Für mich aber, der ich glaube auf dem Ster-
bebett zufrieden sein zu können, sind solche Schilderungen im geheimen 
ein Spiel, ich freue mich ja in dem Sterbenden zu sterben, nütze daher 
mit Berechnung die auf den Tod gesammelte Aufmerksamkeit des Lesers 
aus, bin bei viel klarerem Verstande als er, von dem ich annehme, daß er 
auf dem Sterbebett klagen wird, und meine Klage ist daher möglichst 
vollkommen, bricht auch nicht etwa plötzlich ab wie wirkliche Klage, 
sondern verläuft schön und rein. (KAF, 11:63–64)
(On the way home told Max that I shall lie very contentedly on my 
deathbed, provided the pain isn’t too great. I forgot, and later purposely 
omitted, to add that the best things I have written have their basis in 
this capacity of mine to meet death with contentment. All these fine 
and very convincing passages always deal with the fact that someone is 
dying, that it is hard for him to do, that it seems unjust to him, or at least 
harsh, and the reader is moved by this, or at least he should be. But for 
me, who believe that I shall be able to lie contentedly on my deathbed, 
such scenes are secretly a game, indeed in the death enacted I rejoice in 
my own death, hence calculatingly exploit the attention that the reader 
concentrates on death, have a much clearer understanding of it than he, 
of whom I suppose he will loudly lament on his deathbed, and for these 
reasons my lament is as perfect as can be, nor does it suddenly break off, 
as is likely to be the case with a real lament, but dies beautifully and 
purely away.) (KD, 321)
yet this is not in fact how Kafka always responded to his own descrip-
tions of painful subjects. When, late one night, he re-read to himself a 
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passage from Der Verschollene (The Man Who Disappeared), for example, 
Kafka confessed to being so moved that he feared his sobbing might 
wake his parents in the next room (KLF, 72).
 The views Kafka expressed at different times about the point or pur-
pose of his writing were equally contradictory. In one particularly black 
moment, he described writing as a sweet reward for “service to the devil,” 
devilish both because it unleashed powers that nature otherwise held in 
check and because it led to a narcissistic withdrawal from normal life:
Und das Teuflische daran scheint mir sehr klar. es ist die eitelkeit und 
gen ußsucht, die immerfort um die eigene oder auch um eine fremde 
gestalt—die Bewegung vervielfältigt sich dann, es wird ein Sonnensys-
tem der eitelkeit—schwirrt und sie genießt. (Br, 385)
(And what is devilish about it seems very clear to me. It is the vanity and 
addiction to pleasure which constantly flutters around its own figure and 
enjoys it—or around some other figure, the movement then multiplies, it 
becomes a solar system of vanity.)
yet there were other times when he felt writing to be a form of Erhebung 
(“elevation”) that permitted things to be seen from a new, freer point of 
view:
Merkwürdiger, geheimnisvoller, vielleicht gefährlicher, vielleicht erlö-
sender Trost des Schreibens: das hinausspringen aus der Totschläger-
reihe Tat—Beobachtung, Tat—Beobachtung, indem eine höhere Art 
der Beobachtung geschaffen wird, eine höhere, keine schärfere, und je 
höher sie ist, je unerreichbarer von der “Reihe” aus, desto unabhängiger 
wird sie, desto mehr eigenen gesetzen der Bewegung folgend, desto 
unberechenbarer, freudiger, steigender ihr Weg. (KAF, 11:210)
(The strange, mysterious, perhaps dangerous, perhaps saving comfort that 
there is in writing: it is a leap out of the murderers’ row, action-observa-
tion, action-observation, that is made possible by the creation of a higher 
type of observation, a higher, not a keener type, and the higher it is and 
the more out of reach of the “row,” the more independent it becomes, 
the more obedient to its own laws of motion, the more incalculable, the 
more joyful, the more ascendant its course.) (KD, 406–7)
At such moments, Kafka felt confirmed in the belief that writing was 
“nArrAtion And nArrAtives in KAfKA”  9
the purpose or even the mission that it had been given to him to fulfill, 
whatever it might cost him:
Die ungeheuere Welt, die ich im Kopfe habe. Aber wie mich befreien 
und sie befreien ohne zu zerreißen. Und tausendmal lieber zerreißen, als 
sie in mir zurückhalten oder begraben. Dazu bin ich ja hier, das ist mir 
ganz klar. (KAF, 10:179)
(The tremendous world I have in my head. But how to free myself and 
free it, without being torn to pieces. And a thousand times rather be torn 
to pieces than retain it in me or bury it. That, indeed, is why I am here, 
that is quite clear to me.) (KD, 222)
yet such affirmations of his purpose or calling as a writer exist alongside 
a sense of the self as a non-identical, multiple and even dispersed being 
from whom singleness of purpose or viewpoint is hardly to be expected:
er lebt in der Diaspora. Seine elemente, eine frei lebende horde, umsch-
weifen die Welt. Und nur, weil auch sein Zimmer zur Welt gehört, sieht 
er sie manchmal in der Ferne. Wie soll er für sie die Verantwortung tra-
gen? heißt das noch Verantwortung? (KAF, 11:176)
(he lives in dispersal, in diaspora. his elements, a horde that lives freely, 
fly around the world. And only because his room also belongs to the 
world does he sometimes see them in the distance. how is he to bear the 
responsibility for them? Can that still be called responsibility?)7
 Seen in relation to Phelan’s definition of narration as a purposive 
communicative act, the extra-textual evidence Kafka provided about his 
writing is too contradictory to support any simple view. For Kafka, writ-
ing stories involved, on the one hand, cutting himself off utterly from oth-
ers, ideally in some deep dungeon where he was provided only with the 
means to write (KLF, 156), and in consequence feeling guilt that writing 
might merely be an act of vain self-reflection and self-indulgence.8 On 
the other hand, despite this view of his writing as non-communicative 
behavior, Kafka did actually publish a number of stories during his life-
time (and was punctilious in demanding that the printer should adhere 
precisely to his at times idiosyncratic punctuation, which had both a 
rhythmic and psychological purpose), dedicated stories occasionally to 
real people, read some stories aloud, and believed, at good moments, that 
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it was the purpose of his being “here” to get the “tremendous world in 
his head” down on paper and thus make it accessible to others. In a late 
letter to Max Brod in which he apologized for writing so few letters 
recently, explaining that he had done so out of “strategic” consideration 
for his friend’s feelings, Kafka even insisted that art alone, because it is 
free of such personal constraints, could enable truthful communication to 
take place: “Manchmal scheint mir überhaupt das Wesen der Kunst, das 
Dasein der Kunst allein aus solchen ‘strategischen Rücksichten’ erklärbar, 
die ermöglichung eines wahren Wortes von Mensch zu Mensch” (Br, 
172), (“Sometimes it even seems to me that such ‘strategic considerations’ 
alone explain the essence of art, the existence of art, the making possible 
of a true word from one human being to another”).9 Circumstantial evi-
dence suggests, then, that the author Kafka at least wanted to communi-
cate through his writing, even if the narratives themselves are profoundly 
enigmatic and frequently raise severe doubts about the very possibility of 
communication. Whatever the external evidence of authorial intention 
or self-understanding, however, what matters to the textual critic is the 
actual practice of narration found in the stories themselves. Accordingly, 
the evidence considered in the essays in the present volume is for the 
most part intra- or inter-textual, assuming “a recursive relationship (or 
feedback loop) among authorial agency, textual phenomena (including 
intertextual relations), and reader response” (Phelan 2007, 4).
 Of the various elements cited in James Phelan’s rhetorical defini-
tion of narrative, the question of authorial purpose receives particular 
attention in three contributions to this volume, those by James Phelan, 
Anniken greve, and Benno Wagner. Phelan’s analysis of the rhetorical 
strategy in “The Judgment” aims to advance both our practical under-
standing of the dynamics of the story and our theoretical understanding 
of narrative progression, narrative judgment, and narrative speed. Phelan 
views progression as the “interaction of two kinds of change over time: 
that experienced by the characters and that experienced by the audi-
ence in its developing responses to the characters’ changes,” and he views 
those readerly responses as the result of three kinds of judgment: inter-
pretive, ethical, and aesthetic (see James Phelan’s discussion in chapter 1). 
According to Phelan, the interaction of the two kinds of change arouses 
three kinds of readerly interest, which develop and interact across the 
span of the narrative: the mimetic (interest in characters as possible peo-
ple and the events as occurring in a recognizable possible world); the the-
matic (interest in the characters and situations as representative of ideas, 
attitudes, ethical values, political positions, and so on); and the synthetic 
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(interest in the characters, situations, and arrangement of events as arti-
ficial constructs). Tracking these interests, Phelan suggests, is a good way 
to discover a narrative’s purposes. As Phelan notes, this model displaces 
thematic interpretation from its usual position at the center of critical 
commentary and directs critical attention instead to the ethical, affective, 
and aesthetic dimensions of reading. Phelan uses this model to explain 
why a story like “The Judgment,” which changes its speed and which 
has an unbridgeable “hermeneutic gap” at the very point where the 
action reaches its climax, is not only amenable to so many, often widely 
divergent, thematic interpretations, but actually has its narrative and ethi-
cal force enhanced rather than diminished by the deliberate, stubborn 
inscrutability of its final turning point. Just as important, Phelan uses 
“The Judgment” as the basis for some theoretical generalizations about 
the interaction of narrative speed and readerly judgments and for revi-
sions of some of his previous generalizations about surprise endings.
 In her analysis of “The Metamorphosis,” Anniken greve argues, 
along similar lines, that Kafka’s narrative techniques create both the dif-
ficulty and the necessity of confronting the issue of authorial purpose. 
From the first paragraph of the story onward, the reader is faced with 
a perplexingly contradictory text that resists assimilation to any of the 
familiar codes we are tempted to apply in an effort to make some sense of 
its strangeness. On the one hand, some features of the story point toward 
the genre of a realist family drama in which one member finds himself 
in unexpected conflict with the rest of the family. yet the fictive event 
that precipitates the conflict is incompatible with our entire experience 
of the kinds of things that can happen in the world where family dramas 
take place. The author articulates the reader’s resistant, habitual assump-
tions about the world through the reaction of the protagonist (“What has 
happened to me?”), only to cut off the obvious escape route out of the 
dilemma by the very same means (“It was no dream”). equally, the pull 
of the extraordinary event toward the story’s generic assimilation (and 
hence naturalization) as fairy tale, legend or myth is frustrated by the 
absence of any supernatural power whose intervention might otherwise 
have caused the laws of the natural world to be suspended. The result 
is an effect defined by greve as “ontological fuzziness” (see Anniken 
greve’s discussion in chapter 2). The rhetorical design appears calculated 
to induce conflict and confusion in the mind of the reader; greve con-
cludes that it compels us to search for some implied philosophical and 
ethical purpose to account for the story’s pulling-apart and re-assembly 
of the world as we thought we knew it.
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 According to the analysis offered by Benno Wagner, the underlying 
purpose guiding Kafka’s choice of narrative technique in “Building the 
great Wall of China,” a later, fragmentary story with an intra-diegetic 
narrator, was a political one. In opposition to Karl heinz Bohrer’s insis-
tence (2005) on the strict separation of literary art from culture (under-
stood as the expression of social consensus), Wagner argues that Kafka’s 
story needs to be examined in its historical context, as a literary response 
to the mobilization of culture undertaken in support of the german 
and Austrian national cause during the First World War. Wagner describes 
Kafka’s narrative method as the construction of a kind of echo-chamber 
in which multiple allusions to the stereotypes used in war-time discourse 
reveal the enterprise of defending german culture from the encircling 
“barbarians” to be as fragmentary, as contradictory, and hence as inef-
fectual as the conception and execution of the great Wall of China (as 
re-invented within this fiction). Kafka’s aim, Wagner argues, was to free 
the reader from the manipulative rhetorical designs of the war’s cul-
tural advocates by exposing the fragmentary and groundless nature of all 
“grand narratives” purporting to link the attainment of national unity to 
the destruction of other nations.
 If the essays by Phelan, greve, and Wagner all argue that Kafka 
achieves his authorial purpose by engaging in a form of deliberately dif-
ficult, even obstructive, communication designed to provoke disturbed 
reflection in the reader, the next three chapters, by gerhard Neumann, 
gerhard Kurz, and J. hillis Miller, focus on communication as a problem 
in itself, a problem of which Kafka was acutely aware:
Ich suche immerfort etwas Nicht-Mitteilbares mitzuteilen, etwas Uner-
klärbares zu erklären, von etwas zu erzählen, was ich in den Knochen 
habe und was nur in diesen Knochen erlebt werden kann. (M, 249)
(All the time I am trying to convey something unconveyable, to explain 
something inexplicable, to tell about something I have in my bones and 
which can only be experienced in these bones.) (KLM, 220)
In all three essays, the emphasis is on the deficiency of communication 
apparent in the internal acts of narration performed by various characters 
in Kafka’s first and last novels, The Man Who Disappeared (discussed by 
Neumann and Kurz) and Das Schloß (The Castle) (discussed by Miller).
 In his analysis of “The Stoker” (originally intended to be the open-
ing chapter of The Man Who Disappeared but published separately when 
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Kafka realized he would not complete the novel), gerhard Neumann 
elaborates on the significance of a detail noticed only in passing by the 
protagonist Karl Roßmann, namely an unoccupied writing desk in an 
empty cabin in the bowels of the ship on which he has sailed to New 
york. Neumann reads this detail as a hint by the author that “The Stoker” 
is a story lacking the kind of narrator who might act as a single source of 
narrative coherence and authority and thus help the reader to grasp the 
hidden originating event of the action that lies beyond the reach of the 
characters’ verbal recall.10 Neumann’s suggestion that we are dealing with 
an auctor absconditus in Kafka’s work recalls Beißner’s early observation 
that “the action (Vorgang) narrates itself ” (1983, 42), but with the differ-
ence that the narrator now appears far more detached from events than 
in Beißner’s conception of the narrator as the co-sufferer along with the 
protagonist (and the reader) of the unfolding action. Neumann sees Kafka 
rather as allowing the narrator to shed responsibility almost entirely for 
relating events by having him act simply as the unseen recorder of a 
whole series of stories being told and retold, either to themselves or 
to one another, by the figures of his narrative. Although the narrator 
may have vacated his seat at the writing desk in the cabin below deck, 
his hovering presence can still be detected in the ironies built into this 
sequence of retellings, as, for example, when Karl is obliged to listen to 
what he regards as a distorted account of his life just after he in turn has 
assumed that he can narrate the experiences of the ship’s stoker more 
effectively than the man himself.
 The aspect of communication dealt with by gerhard Kurz is not so 
much the problem of an un-tellable experience at the heart of personal 
narrative (though this does play a part) as the problem of a story’s arrival, 
or rather failure to arrive, at its intended destination. Kurz examines in 
some detail the scene in which a young serving girl, Therese, who is as 
much a refugee in the hotel Occidental as Karl Roßmann, tells him 
about her own experiences of abandonment, wandering, and exclusion in 
America. Although Therese’s story about her mother’s death has greater 
poignancy than most narratives within the novel, it is embedded in a 
context of irony, which reveals the failure of even this story to capture 
the interest of Karl, in whom Therese believes she has found a sympa-
thetic listener. even similarity of fate, it appears, is no guarantee that the 
telling and hearing of life-stories will facilitate genuine communication.
 That non-communication is the rule rather than the exception in 
human interaction, both in Kafka’s fictional universe and arguably else-
where, is a view strongly supported by J. hillis Miller’s analysis of the 
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irremediably isolated condition of K. and of all the other characters he 
encounters in his fruitless efforts to enter the Castle. The darkness envel-
oping the mysterious Castle on the hill at the moment when K. first 
pauses at the bridge before crossing over to the village has its human 
counterpart in the impenetrability of every individual in the novel. The 
many lengthy stories they tell to and about one another or about the 
Castle do little or nothing to lighten that darkness, for they all offer 
interpretations that are contradictory and unverifiable. If the disappear-
ance of narratorial authority was signaled in “The Stoker” by the unoc-
cupied writing desk, the “strange, disembodied power of narration” 
that “stages”11 events in The Castle appears to have only marginally less 
restricted access to what is going on inside K. (the only character to 
whom it has any such access) than the characters have to one another 
or to the facts of many situations. According to Miller, the incomplete-
ness of the novel (the manuscript breaks off mid-sentence) is of a piece 
with its lack of overall narrative progression, “as it wanders this way and 
that, always starting over again from the beginning and never getting any 
closer to the Castle.” The overall effect is an illusion of movement cen-
tered on stasis. Thus, Miller’s reading of the novel suggests that, provided 
the notion of “purpose” is kept flexible enough to encompass the expres-
sion of a particular experience of the world, Phelan’s definition of the 
constitutive elements of narrative is helpful in understanding the features 
of even such strangely inconclusive tales as The Castle.
 As the fragments of The Man Who Disappeared and The Castle con-
firm, narrative progression, in the basic sense of writing stories with a 
beginning, middle, and end, was a lifelong problem for Kafka. Many diary 
entries show that he was unusually dependent on inspiration or the occur-
rence of a narrative idea or Einfall, a term which in his case remained 
close to its root sense of a “falling into” his imagination of a figure, situ-
ation, or image capable of initiating a narrative, which means of course 
that “purpose” could, at best, only enter the process of writing once the 
writing had begun. As Malcolm Pasley, one of the main editors of Kafka’s 
complete works, demonstrated from the evidence of the manuscripts, 
Kafka normally did not compose his stories on the basis of a pre-existing 
plan.12 The physical organization of the manuscripts, such as the closely 
spaced lines, which militated against inter-linear corrections, confirms 
Max Brod’s report that Kafka’s chosen method of composition was to 
write as if going through a tunnel, following the figures wherever they 
led, without any prior knowledge of where this might end (1966, 114). 
As a result, many of Kafka’s stories were abandoned in a fragmentary 
state because he simply did not know where they were meant to go next. 
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On one occasion Kafka did try to ensure that he was not left with yet 
another fragment by writing the last chapter of his second novel, The 
Trial, immediately after he had ended the first chapter, but the novel 
remained a fragment nevertheless, because Kafka’s linear method of writ-
ing within each chapter did not produce the sense of narrative progres-
sion and Zusammenhang (“connectedness” or “coherence”) that would 
carry him in a compelling way from the beginning to the pre-conceived 
yet ambiguously open ending.
 What went into a story by Kafka came into being, then, not before-
hand but at the very moment he wrote it down, and what he wrote 
down he seldom corrected, so important was it to him that each word 
should generate the next in an unbroken stream of connectedness. he 
once characterized the immediacy of the relation between inspiration 
and writing thus:
Die besondere Art meiner Inspiration in der ich glücklichster und 
Unglücklichster jetzt um 2 Uhr nachts schlafen gehe . . . ist die, daß ich 
alles kann, nicht nur auf eine bestimmte Arbeit hin. Wenn ich wahllos 
einen Satz hinschreibe z. B. er schaute aus dem Fenster so ist er schon 
vollkommen. (KAF, 9:27)
(The special nature of my inspiration, in which I, the most fortunate 
and unfortunate of men now go to sleep at 2am . . . is such that I can 
do everything, and not only what is directed to a definite piece of work. 
When I arbitrarily write a single sentence, for instance, “he looked out 
of the window,” it already has perfection.) (KD, 38)
This gift was a double-edged sword, however, for the inspiration that 
could yield such “perfect” sentences was also the source of much misery, 
abandoning Kafka to long periods of utter barrenness because it was 
quite simply not in his power to summon up inspiration or even deter-
mine its duration by an act of will. Thus, stories that began promisingly 
enough would often come to a sudden halt. When this happened to 
Kafka during the writing of The Man Who Disappeared, he simply landed 
Karl Roß mann with the unsolved problem of progression by abandoning 
him in the dark at the unprotected edge of an unfinished building and 
breaking off the manuscript at that point; fortunately for Karl, it occurred 
to Kafka later how he might have him called away from the abyss and 
taken back along the unlit corridor that had led him to its edge (Schil-
lemeit 2007, 145).
 As the chapter by Beatrice Sandberg demonstrates, Kafka’s writing 
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impulse could be frustrated not only by stories suddenly stopping in 
their tracks, but also by the “special nature of his inspiration,” which cre-
ated problems with beginnings. he once complained that things which 
“fell into” his imagination did so not from the “root” but “somewhere 
about the middle” (KD, 12); later, he wrote of having to struggle with 
beginnings and endings like a fisherman who gets hold of a long, heavy, 
and unwieldy “sea-snake” around the middle. Sandberg considers the range 
of strategies Kafka developed to deal with this particular quirk of his 
imagination, the most important of which was intertextual allusion to 
some well-known, often mythical, “well made” story with a familiar shape 
that gave him the freedom to create the sudden reversals, deviations, or 
inconsistencies that conveyed the resistance of the stories he pulled up 
from his unfathomable inner self to any attempt to accommodate them 
within traditional narrative patterns.
 In his chapter on “In der Strafkolonie” (“In the Penal Colony”), 
Jakob Lothe argues that, whether formally completed or not, there is a 
sense in which every story Kafka wrote begins “somewhere in the mid-
dle,” for this is the existential situation in which all of Kafka’s characters 
find themselves, without full or possibly even any access to the point at 
which “their” story could be said to originate and without knowledge 
of what might evolve out of any situation in which they find themselves. 
Beginnings that pitch the characters in medias res favor a form of narration 
that consists in the unfolding and elaboration of a dilemma. Regardless 
of the (generally only implied, not narrated) preceding chain of events 
that placed them in the given situation, what each character is faced with 
is the question of justification (Rechtfertigung), a haunting question for 
Kaf ka himself, as a much quoted diary entry attests: “Kämest du, unsicht-
bares gericht!” (KAF, 9:106) (“Were you to come, invisible judgment!”) 
(KD, 31).13 here as elsewhere, Kafka’s narrative techniques ensured that 
neither his characters nor his readers could evade the dilemmas he placed 
them in by withdrawing to a position of observational neutrality, while 
at the same time denying them any firm ground on which to make the 
ethical choices the fictional events demand of them.
 The issue of narrative progression provides the central focus for the 
last two contributions to this volume. Stanley Corngold examines the 
unfolding of the narrative and the mental movements of the first-person 
narrator in one of Kafka’s later stories, “Forschungen eines hundes” 
(“Investigations of a Dog”), while Ronald Speirs considers narrative 
progression in connection with both physical and mental movement, 
a persistent and unusually prominent feature of Kafka’s narratives from 
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Betrachtung (Contemplation), his first published collection of prose, onward. 
The feature of “Investigations of a Dog” that particularly interests Corn-
gold is the peculiar “looping” movement by which the story proceeds, 
a pattern that reflects competing tendencies in the mind of the dog-
narrator as he feels compelled both to confront and to avoid facing an 
early, overwhelming experience of music, something he first encountered 
when he came across a group of dancing, hovering dogs. For Corngold, 
the obsessively circling movements of this story, going off in one direc-
tion only to be pulled back reluctantly in another, illustrate the charac-
teristic self-referentiality of narration in Kafka as it seeks a lost, haunting 
point of origin.14
 The subject of the chapter by Ronald Speirs is the role played by 
movement in three areas: the “something that happened”; the source of 
narration for Kafka; and the feature relating the sequence of words, sen-
tences, and paragraphs to the succession of mental and physical events 
being described. The conflict noted by Corngold between forward-
moving and retarding or deviating impulses is already to be found in 
Betrach tung, a collection of very short narratives in which it is possible for 
the protagonists neither to realize, at one extreme, the impulse for pure 
movement that is articulated in “Wish to Become a Red Indian” nor, at 
the other extreme, to withdraw completely from the hectic motion of 
the surrounding world into a condition of isolated stasis. Although Kafka’s 
stories are frequently marked by narrative irony, it is problematic, Speirs 
argues, to characterize Kafka as a writer who sets out to narrate with a 
“purpose,” since, by his own evidence, the dynamic force that found a 
shape in his stories lay largely beyond his control, much as the fictional 
figures often find themselves having to submit to an irresistible restless-
ness that will carry them to their destruction (as in the case of georg 
Bendemann), forcing the reader to leap across unbridgeable “hermeneu-
tic gaps.” If, on the one hand, Kafka can at times be seen as using move-
ment and stasis to narrate the conflicts in his “dreamlike inner life” in 
an ironically reflective manner, it is equally possible to see the narrative 
dynamism at work in his writing (as he himself did repeatedly, despite his 
metaphysical reflections on the inherent stasis of the human condition), 
as an irresistible creative force that used him as the vehicle for its own 
expression.
 What emerges from the essays in this volume is that Kafka’s narra-
tive practice(s) cannot be captured by a single theoretical approach. As 
the implied author of his stories and novels adopts the lowest of pro-
files, whether hidden behind an intra-diegetic, first-person narrator or 
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employing a variant of free indirect discourse to describe events largely 
from the perspective of a protagonist, or simply “staging” the events dis-
passionately, discerning the meaning or purpose of the “something [that] 
happened” depends to an unusual, perhaps unique degree on the percep-
tions and preconceptions of the reader.15 The limited, often erroneous 
efforts of Kafka’s characters to grasp their own predicament offer little 
assurance to his readers, professional or otherwise, that they will fare any 
better. The “system of partial construction” employed by the builders of 
his great Wall of China seems, so far, to be the best we can hope for.
notes
 1. See, for example, the influential essay by Beda Allemann, “Stehender Sturm-
lauf: Zeit und geschichte im Werk Kafkas” (first published in 1962), which puts at 
the center of attention Kafka’s aphoristic observations on the relation between the 
time before time in the garden of eden and the mortal existence of human beings 
trapped forever at the threshold of expulsion, where they must live separated from 
the unchanging peace originally enjoyed by Adam and eve, never to be released to 
live wholly within a temporal world. Allemann’s emphasis on the notion of “ste-
hender Sturmlauf ” (“charging on the spot”) has been taken up, elaborated on, and 
interpreted in contrasting ways by numerous critics interested in narrative progres-
sion in Kafka, notably Klaus Ramm (1979), gerhard Neumann (1968), and Stanley 
Corngold (1986).
 2. Beicken (1979, 36), for example, follows Beißner’s account of the situation 
of the modern narrator. even in the most recent Kafka-Handbuch, edited by Jagow 
and Jahraus (2008), Beißner’s fundamental importance for the development of a 
“philological” reading of Kafka is still acknowledged (343), whether in the form of 
elaborations on his central concept of Einsinnigkeit (e.g., by Beißner’s pupil Martin 
Walser, with his emphasis on artistic autonomy rather than psychological expression 
[1961]) or in disagreement with him, as when Klaus Ramm argues that Kafka “nei-
ther narrates from the perspective of the protagonist nor presents his standpoint as 
the standpoint of the protagonist” (1979, 102).
 3. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations in this introduction have been sup-
plied by the editors.
 4. For examples of such failures of communication within the narratives, see the 
chapters by Kurz, Miller, and Neumann in the present volume.
 5. Thus the central argument in Walter Sokel’s major study, Franz Kafka: Tragik 
und Ironie (1964), is that Kafka’s entire narrative world is structured not by a singular 
perspective but by conflict between two aspects or dimensions of the self. See also 
his essay of 1984 on “Narzißmus, Magie und die Funktion des erzählens,” where 
narration as a communicative act is expressly set against the “magic” of withdrawal 
into a solipsistic world of self-indulgent Belustigungen (“amusements”).
 6. See, for example, Richard Sheppard’s study of The Castle (1973) in which the 
patterns of repetition, parallelism and inversion are likened to Brecht’s technique of 
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distancing. The narrator’s critical posture toward the protagonist is also central to the 
studies by henel (1967), Kobs (1970), and Pascal (1982).
 7. The shifting narrative perspectives analyzed in gerhard Neumann’s chapter on 
“The Stoker” may be rooted in this “dispersed” sense of identity. See also the com-
ments by Ronald Speirs on the very early story about a shopkeeper’s return from 
work. The metaphor of the “rhizome” in the study by Deleuze and guattari (1986) 
elaborates this idea in the context of an “anti Oedipal” reading.
 8. Kafka repeatedly referred in his letters to Felice to an incident in which Flau-
bert, observing a family out for a walk, commented “ils sont dans le vrai.” The 
conflicts in Kafka between the compulsion to write and his guilt about writing, and 
the imprint of these conflicts on his method of narration, are a central concern of 
Stanley Corngold’s Lambent Traces (2004).
 9. By “strategic considerations” Kafka was referring to his having become in-
creasingly reluctant to write letters because correspondence brought with it not 
only the danger of being less than entirely honest (out of tact) but also the risk of 
having one’s feelings distorted by the “ghosts” that play with words during their 
epistolary transmission.
 10. For an analysis of the elusiveness or instability of meaning generated by Kaf-
ka’s narrative techniques, see Neumann’s influential essay of 1968, “Umkehrung und 
Ab lenkung: Franz Kafkas ‘gleitendes Paradox.’” Neumann’s close reading of short 
texts gives a more detailed account of paradox as a linguistic effect than that pro-
vided by Politzer (1961).
 11. For a study that puts the metaphor of the “staging” of behavior and events at 
the center of the analysis of narration, see James Rolleston’s study Kafka’s Narrative 
Theater (1974).
 12. See Malcolm Pasley, “Der Schreibakt und das geschriebene: Zur Frage der 
entstehung von Kafkas Texten” (1978). The essays by Pasley (1978) and Schillemeit 
(2007), which are based on their work on Kafka’s manuscripts as editors of the criti-
cal edition, have demonstrated convincingly the intimate connections between the 
processes of writing and the progress of narration in Kafka’s texts.
 13. For an exploration of this topic from a variety of perspectives, see Sandberg 
and Lothe (2002).
 14. Arguably, the most radical version of the view that Kafka’s narratives are con-
cerned entirely with the act of narration itself, which struggles incessantly with the 
impossibility of knowing how to begin or how to proceed beyond the arbitrarily set 
beginning marked by the first words on the page, is that developed by Klaus Ramm 
both in his monograph, Reduktion als Erzählprinzip bei Kafka (2006) and in his con-
tribution to the Kafka-Handbuch edited by hartmut Binder (1979). here “Reduk-
tion” refers to the reduction of writing to concern with its own processes. The stud-
ies by Corngold (2004) and Koelb (1989) also concentrate on the self-reflexivity of 
Kafka’s “linguistic imagination.”
 15. See, for example, David Constantine’s chapter “Kafka’s Writing and Our 
Reading” (2002, 9–24), the chapter “Reading Kafka” in Speirs and Sandberg (1997, 
17–28), and Schmidt’s survey of approaches to the “Türhüterlegende” (2007).
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This chapter seeks to open up some two-way traffic between Kafka the 
narrative artist and the rhetorical theory of narrative. More specifically, 
I seek to identify the narrative logic underlying what I take to be the 
irreducible strangeness of Kafka’s “Das Urteil” (“The Judgment”) and 
then to use the results to expand the explanatory power of rhetorical 
theory. I choose “Das Urteil” as my case study for three reasons. First, 
although I do not view the story as representing the quintessence of 
Kafka’s narrative practice, it was a significant milestone in his career. “Das 
Urteil” is widely acknowledged to be, in Frederick Karl’s words, “the 
first of [Kafka’s] mature works” (1991, 434), and Kafka himself regarded 
the eight-hour writing session on the night of September 22–23, 1912, 
which ended with his completion of the story, as one of the formative 
experiences in his development as a writer. Second, the story has received 
extensive, insightful comments from critics, thus relieving me of the bur-
den of producing an original reading of the story and allowing me to 
focus on explaining the underlying sources of its strangeness, which I also 
take to be a source of its power. In other words, like many other critics, 
I want to respect and hold onto the story’s strangeness rather than trying 
to master it—even as I offer an account of its underlying logic. Third, in 
some recent work, I have been examining the interconnections between 
the concepts of progression and judgment, and Kafka’s story provides 
an especially good location from which to extend and test that work. 
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With respect to progression, “Das Urteil” opens up issues about how we 
determine narrative speed and about the nature of surprise endings. With 
respect to judgment, “Das Urteil” invites a consideration of the connec-
tion between the complexities of interpretive and ethical judgments of 
the characters and their actions, on the one hand, and the ethics of Kaf-
ka’s storytelling itself, on the other. Let me, then, start down my two-way 
highway—or winding country road—by saying more about my version 
of the rhetorical approach to narrative.
 This approach conceives of narrative as a purposeful communicative 
act. In this view, narrative is not just a representation of events, a fusion 
of story and discourse, but is also itself an event—one in which someone 
is doing something with a representation of events, and that doing some-
thing involves a design on an audience. In this way, the approach attends 
to both the consciousness designing the communicative act, the implied 
author, and his or her intended or authorial audience. As the reference 
to the implied author suggests, my version of the approach has its roots 
in Wayne C. Booth’s work. In The Rhetoric of Fiction (1961/1983), Booth 
argues that prevailing modernist dogmas about novelistic practices such 
as “showing is better than telling” are inadequate by demonstrating that 
the effectiveness of any technique depends on how well it helps authors 
accomplish their purposes—or to put it another way, narrative technique 
is always a means to an end, and it needs to be assessed not according to 
an abstract rule but according to how well it serves its specific purpose. In 
developing this argument about overt commentary by authorial narra-
tors, Booth also realized that the author’s use of any technique (showing, 
telling, reliable narration, unreliable narration, etc.) has rhetorical conse-
quences; that is, it influences the implied author’s relation to his audience. 
My version of the rhetorical approach follows Booth’s lead in seeing 
that relationship between the implied author and the authorial audience 
as lying at the center of the experience of narrative, but my version 
expands upon Booth’s work by developing some new concepts, which 
are designed to analyze the multiple dimensions of that relationship.
 The approach also recognizes that the concept of an authorial audi-
ence (proposed and developed by Peter J. Rabinowitz [1976, 1987/1998]) 
is a valuable heuristic, a hypothetical ideal reader who is able to be the 
implied author’s perfect audience. This concept has some similarities with 
Iser’s concept of the implied reader, but the two approaches are far from 
interchangeable, and that disparity points to a larger difference between 
the rhetorical approach and Iser’s phenomenological approach. The con-
cepts are similar because they both refer to hypothetical audiences that 
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are implied by the text. But the concepts are ultimately distinct because 
they are connected to different accounts of the activity of reading. For 
Iser, the main activity of reading consists in filling in the gaps that liter-
ary texts inevitably contain, with actual readers filling in those gaps in 
different ways. For the rhetorical theorist, the main activity of reading is 
responding to the text as it has been designed by its implied author. From 
the rhetorical perspective, Iser is describing only one kind of textual 
design (namely, one with gaps that are designed to be filled in different 
ways). Rhetorical theory posits that some gaps are designed to be closed 
in a determinate way, that some are designed to be closed in a variety 
of ways, and that still others are designed to resist our capacity to fill 
them. Indeed, I shall argue that “Das Urteil” has a central gap of this last 
kind. Like Rabinowitz, I am interested in how actual readers can become 
members of the authorial audience. To put this point another way, the 
heuristic construct of the authorial audience identifies a role the actual 
reader seeks to take on. Thus, when I use the first-person plural pronoun 
here to describe how Kafka’s audience responds to the story, I am refer-
ring to Kafka’s authorial audience.
 More formally, the rhetorical theorist defines narrative as somebody 
telling somebody else on some occasion and for some purpose(s) that 
something happened. The concept of narrative progression attends to the 
two main participants in the rhetorical action—the somebody who tells 
and the somebody else who is told—and to the means by which they 
communicate. Focusing on the dynamics of progression is a particularly 
effective way of getting at the trajectory of the implied author-authorial 
audience relationship over the course of the narrative.
 This definition of narrative helps us see that the rhetorical situation 
in fictional narrative is doubled: an implied author communicates to the 
authorial audience by means of a narrator’s communication to a (charac-
terized or uncharacterized) narratee. In addition, narrative, whether fic-
tional or nonfictional, is a double-layered phenomenon in another sense: 
it involves both a dynamics of character, event, and telling and a dynam-
ics of audience response. The phrase “somebody telling . . . that some-
thing happened” gets at the first layer: narrative involves the report of a 
sequence of related events during which the characters and/or their situ-
ations undergo some change. As I have discussed elsewhere,1 the report 
of that change typically proceeds through the introduction, complica-
tion, and resolution (in whole or in part) of unstable situations within, 
between, or among the characters. These dynamics of instability may be 
accompanied by a dynamics of tension in the telling—unstable relations 
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among authors, narrators, and audiences—and the interaction of the two 
sets of dynamics (as in narratives that employ unreliable narration) may 
have significant consequences for our understanding of the “something 
that happened.”
 Narrative judgments are crucial components of the second layer of 
progression. The dynamics of audience response depend on two main 
readerly activities: observing and judging. (In this respect, narrative is dif-
ferent from lyric, which invites us to participate in rather than judge a 
speaker’s emotions or attitudes.) As observers, we perceive the characters 
of the narrative both as external to ourselves and as distinct from their 
implied authors. Consequently, we make interpretive and ethical judg-
ments about them, their situations, and their choices. Furthermore, our 
interpretive and ethical judgments are integral to our emotional responses 
as well as to our desires concerning future events. In addition, this trajec-
tory of judgment and response is intertwined with another kind of judg-
ment—an aesthetic judgment about the overall quality of our experience, 
both as it is happening and once it is complete. Finally, because read-
erly dynamics involve interpretive, ethical, and aesthetic judgments that 
develop over time and that thus can themselves be revised, the readerly 
side of progression often involves a process of configuration and recon-
figuration—that is, a process of forming a hypothesis about the trajectory 
of the narrative and about how its parts contribute to that trajectory and 
then revising that hypothesis in light of new judgments.
 In sum, from the rhetorical perspective, narrative involves the inter-
action of two kinds of change over time: that experienced by the char-
acters and that experienced by the audience in its developing responses 
to the characters’ changes. Moreover, these two layers of progression, the 
textual dynamics rooted in instabilities and tensions, and the readerly 
dynamics rooted in observation and judgment, are reciprocally influen-
tial. even as the audience’s trajectory through the progression depends 
on textual dynamics, the author constructs those dynamics with one eye 
on how they will affect the reader—as a moment’s reflecton on narra-
tives with surprise endings such as “Das Urteil” indicates. Analyzing the 
interactions between progression and judgments allows one to develop 
an understanding of a narrative’s underlying logic and of a narrative’s 
rhetorical purposes. Such analysis reveals (1) the principles upon which 
the author constructs the narrative’s unfolding in time and (2) the inter-
pretive, ethical, and aesthetic underpinnings of its audience’s responses.2
 Before I turn to Kafka’s story, I want to touch on three other con-
sequences of this rhetorical conception of narrative. (1) Since judgment 
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is itself such a necessary part of human life, narratives often represent 
characters making judgments. Consequently, the readerly dynamics of 
progression often lead us to judge characters’ judgments. “Das Urteil” 
often puts us in this position. (2) Just as there is an ethics of the told (that 
is, an ethics that applies to the characters and their interactions), there is 
also an ethics of the telling (that is, an ethical dimension to the interac-
tions among authors, narrators, and audiences). (3) The system of insta-
bilities and tensions in combination with characterization and narrative 
technique helps define the relation among three broad components of 
readerly interest that I call the mimetic, the thematic, and the synthetic. 
The mimetic component, what Aristotle called “imitation,” involves our 
interest in the characters and events; the thematic involves our interest 
in the characters and events as a means to explore ideas or beliefs about 
the world; and the synthetic involves our interest in characters and events 
as artificial constructions of an authorial design. Different narratives will 
establish different relations among these three components as they pur-
sue their different purposes. The larger point here is that the rhetorical 
approach does not assume, as much other criticism does, that the goal of 
interpretation is to establish thematic meaning. Instead, it is interested 
in the thematic as one of the components of readerly interest and one 
of the possible purposes of narrative as a rhetorical action. In addition, 
by displacing thematic interpretation from the center of the critical 
enterprise and focusing on progression, judgment, and the underlying 
logic of narrative, the rhetorical approach can, in a case such as “Das 
Urteil,” help explain why the narrative is amenable to so many thematic 
interpretations.3
Progression, speed, and Judgment in “das urteil”
Since there has been so much good commentary on the story, I will work 
from a helpful summary by henry Sussman of what that commentary has 
established and then suggest how a rhetorical approach can extend and 
refine this baseline understanding. In a section titled “The Aesthetics of 
Confusion” within a broader essay on Kafka’s aesthetics, Sussman writes 
that “onto georg Bendemann’s best-case scenario of his role in his fam-
ily, his forthcoming marriage, his business success, and his empathy for 
his friend, Kafka seamlessly splices, within the continuity of the narrative, 
his father’s very different account of the events and arenas in georg’s 
life. The ‘hinge’ or ‘graft’ between the counternarratives is a fulcrum for 
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confusion existing at least in potentia for the duration of Kafka’s fiction” 
(2002, 135). From the perspective of rhetorical theory, Sussman’s over-
view of the story is fine as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. 
Indeed, because it posits a standoff between georg’s best-case scenario 
and herr Bendemann’s counternarrative, it ends up flattening the story, 
sacrificing its strangeness to an account of confusion as unresolvable 
ambiguity. Focusing on progression and judgment leads to a revision of 
Sussman’s account, a revision that seeks to preserve strangeness in three 
main ways: (1) by giving the speed of the narrative its due; (2) by dis-
tinguishing more clearly between what is determinate in the story and 
what remains in an interpretive gap; and (3) by accounting for the conse-
quences of that gap for our overall experience of the story. The results of 
this analysis will lead me in turn, first, to consider first, the traffic going 
the other way—that is, how Kafka’s story complicates some ideas of rhe-
torical theory—and second, to assess the ethics of Kafka’s telling.
 Looking globally at the progression of “Das Urteil,” we can discern 
three recognizably distinct stages. Stage one consists of georg Bende-
mann sitting at his writing desk and reflecting on his relationship with the 
friend to whom he has just written a letter. Stage two consists of georg’s 
conflictual conversation with his father, a conversation that culminates in 
his father’s condemning him to death by drowning. Stage three consists 
of georg’s acceptance of and immediate capitulation to his father’s judg-
ment. Thus, we move from a stage where georg is alone, to one where 
he interacts with his father, and then back to one where he is alone. In 
addition to highlighting this movement, identifying the three stages also 
helps us recognize the relation between the story’s strangeness and its 
narrative speed, and indeed looking at that relation can help lead us to 
a richer understanding of narrative speed from a rhetorical perspective. 
Identifying the three stages of “Das Urteil” helps us see that it begins at 
a leisurely pace in stage one, rapidly accelerates in stages two and three, 
and then slows down again in the final sentences. It will be helpful to 
sketch this movement, first in broad terms so that we can grasp the over-
all pattern, and then to move to a closer analysis of its details. That closer 
analysis will benefit from an engagement with Jan Baetens and Katherine 
hume’s recent theoretical discussion of narrative speed, a discussion that 
itself arises from hume’s initial proposals (2006, 2005).
 My initial description of the story’s speed is more than impressionistic 
because it is based on the interaction of textual and readerly dynamics in 
each of the stages. The first stage is leisurely in spite of its revealing two 
instabilities, because the initial one, about georg’s relation to his friend, 
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appears to get resolved within this first stage, and because the next, more 
substantial, instability, involving dissonance between georg’s ethical char-
acter and his own understanding of that ethical character, does not get 
complicated until stage two.
 Furthermore, the interpretive and ethical judgments evolve slowly, in 
part as a result of Kafka’s handling of temporality in the first stage. We 
meet georg after he has just finished his letter, and, after reading about a 
third of the story, we learn, through the narrator’s statement, that he has 
been sitting at the desk for a long time. In the space between the two 
statements describing georg at his desk, Kafka’s narrator does not call 
attention to time passing in the narrative present but rather engages in 
a narration about the past, reviewing georg’s perceptions of his friend, 
georg’s self-flattering comparisons between their respective situations, 
and the contents of the letter itself. While this material introduces the 
dissonance between georg’s judgment of himself and our judgment of 
him, the movement into the past works as a brake on the story’s pace. 
Kafka’s strategy allows for the gradual evolution of our judgments about 
georg even as it defers any complication of the instability until the 
review of the past is complete.
 Once georg goes to talk with his father, however, the pace of the 
narrative accelerates rapidly because (1) the instabilities get complicated 
with each line of dialogue and (2) each new complication requires new 
interpretive and ethical judgments. As a result, Kafka’s authorial audience 
is likely to have difficulty handling the accelerated pace. At the end of 
the second stage, the speed shifts into yet a higher gear as the progres-
sion takes a sharp and sudden turn to its climax in herr Bendemann’s 
judgment of georg. The breakneck pace continues as the story hurtles 
on to the third stage, which begins with georg’s surprising acceptance 
of the judgment. Just as important, when herr Bendemann delivers his 
judgment at the end of stage two, the authorial audience’s struggle to 
keep up with the necessary interpretive and ethical judgments can meet 
with only partial success because Kafka builds into that moment a major 
interpretive gap. Consequently, we follow georg in his headlong rush to 
the river with only partial comprehension of the reasons for his behavior, 
something that further contributes to the story’s speed: events are hap-
pening faster than we can comprehend them.
 Once georg is on the verge of drowning himself, Kafka slows the pace 
again by focusing on his last actions and last words, allowing the audience 
to take in the deliberateness of georg’s act. This slowing down does not 
allow us to close the interpretive gap but instead emphasizes both the 
PhelAn, “Progression, sPeed, And Judgment in ‘dAs urteil’”  29
radical change the story has represented and the strangeness associated 
with that change. Among other things, the final sentence of the story, 
“In diesem Augenblick ging über die Brücke ein geradezu unendlicher 
Ver kehr” (KAF, 1:52) (“At that moment the traffic going over the bridge 
was nothing short of infinite” [KSS, 12]), in introducing for the first time 
a narrative perspective other than georg’s, underlines that strangeness by 
way of contrast between what has just happened and the everyday quality 
of what it describes.
 In light of this general sketch of the story’s progression, I identify 
much of the story’s power and strangeness as stemming from its combin-
ing shifts in speed with the unfillable gap between the end of stage two 
and the beginning of stage three. If the claim holds up, then Kafka has 
discovered something remarkable: a way to make a significant interpretive 
gap surrounding the climax of a narrative enhance rather than detract 
from an audience’s interpretive, ethical, and aesthetic experience. In other 
words, though the climactic events do not finally yield to our efforts to 
comprehend them, their recalcitrance enhances the story’s power. I call 
this kind of recalcitrance “textual stubbornness,” and I will have more to 
say about it as the analysis proceeds. Let us turn now to a longer—and 
slower—look at the story’s progression.
 Because Kafka uses analepsis so extensively in stage one, a major 
function of georg’s eight paragraphs of reflections is exposition, and that 
exposition reveals that, according to his own judgments, he has made his 
way in the world very well indeed. Although his mother died two years 
previously, he has become the dominant force in the increasingly suc-
cessful family business, and he has recently become engaged to Frieda 
Brandenfeld, “einem Mädchen aus wohlhabender Familie” (KAF, 1:42) 
(“a young woman from a well-to-do family” [KSS, 5]). Indeed, the only 
apparent problem in georg’s life that emerges from these reflections is 
his inability to speak openly and honestly to his childhood friend. But 
georg himself, in order to please Frieda, decides to write to the friend, 
and thus, as noted above, that instability appears to get resolved.
 Nevertheless, Kafka’s handling of the narration brilliantly reveals that 
underneath this superficial instability is a more substantial one, involving 
georg’s relation to himself. As many critics have pointed out, Kafka uses 
georg’s perspective to show that while georg appears to make reason-
able judgments about the difference between his situation and that of his 
friend, those judgments are ultimately self-serving. John M. ellis offers 
a perceptive summary of this effect: “The superficial impression of the 
breadth of [georg’s] human sympathy for his friend is overshadowed by 
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a contrary impression of narrowness in georg’s judgments of value, for 
judgments of his friend’s life are made rigidly on the basis of georg’s val-
ues” (1977, 78). ellis’s subsequent general summary is over the top, but it 
effectively captures both the instability within georg and the discrepancy 
between his self-judgments and those that Kafka guides his audience to 
make. “There is, after all, something destructive in georg’s ‘considerate-
ness’ toward his friend; it seems to provide the opportunity for an orgy 
of denigration of him, a very full series of imaginings of his helplessness, 
wretchedness and even disgrace which are very flattering to georg” (ellis 
1977, 79).4
 This dimension of the first stage of the progression becomes more 
prominent when we reflect on what it reveals about georg’s investment 
in this correspondence. he speaks to Frieda about their “besondere Kor-
respondenzverhältnis” (KAF, 1:42) (the “special relationship of correspon-
dence between them”), when all the evidence is that their correspondence 
in recent years has been anything but special. georg writes only about 
“bedeutungslose Vorfälle” (KAF, 1:42) (“insignificant events”) while his 
friend expresses his sympathy about the death of georg’s mother “mit 
Trockenheit” (KAF, 1:41) (“with dryness”). More significantly, after fin-
ishing the letter, georg sits at his desk lost in thought for a long time. 
We infer that the correspondence is fulfilling some purpose for georg 
beyond the maintenance of the friendship itself, namely, the shoring up 
of his own self-esteem as he is poised to take his next step into adulthood 
with his marriage to Frieda. Thus, as we come to the end of the first stage 
of the progression, Kafka opens up a substantial distance between georg’s 
interpretive and ethical judgments and those of his authorial audience.
 As the progression moves into the second stage and picks up speed, 
Kafka guides us to see that georg’s approach to his father is similar to 
his way of thinking about his friend. That is, Kafka shows georg to be 
acting in a way that he regards as showing legitimate concern for his 
father, but Kafka also allows us to see that georg is ultimately self-serving 
and condescending. here, too, georg’s approach initially appears to serve 
him well, as he blunts his father’s skepticism about the existence of his 
friend by saying that his father is much more important and by helping 
him get undressed and then carrying him to the bed and covering him 
up. however, once herr Bendemann rises from the bed and escalates his 
verbal assault on georg, a new element enters the progression. georg 
loses not only the upper hand in the conflict but also full control over his 
own mind. After his father makes his strongest accusations, namely, that 
because Frieda lifted her skirts, georg decided to betray his friend, pro-
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fane his mother’s memory, and put his father in bed, the narrator reports: 
“Vor einer langen Weile hatte er sich fest entschlossen, alles vollkom-
men genau zu beobachten, damit er nicht irgendwie auf Umwegen, von 
hinten her, von oben herab überrascht werden könne. Jetzt erinnerte er 
sich wieder an den längst vergessenen entschluß und vergaß ihn” (KAF, 
1:50) (“A long time ago he had firmly decided to observe everything 
very exactly so as to avoid being taken by surprise in some devious way, 
from behind or from above. Now he remembered that long forgotten 
decision once again and forgot it” [KSS, 10]). This pattern of a disparity 
between georg’s intentions and his actual agency continues, as he blurts 
an insult at his father—“Komödiant!” (KAF, 1:50) (“Play actor!” [KSS, 
10])—and as his efforts to mock his father ironically turn into a confir-
mation of his father’s accusations.
 In the authorial audience, we are able to make two related interpre-
tive judgments. First, as herr Bendemann attacks georg’s conception of 
his relationship with his friend, georg begins to lose the sense of self 
shored up by that conception. Second, as this sense of self breaks down, 
georg begins to feel guilty, though the exact nature and extent of that 
guilt is not yet clear. Significantly, just before herr Bendemann’s judg-
ment, georg accuses his father of lying in wait for him, “Du hast mir 
also aufgelauert!” (KAF, 1:52) (“And so you’ve been lying in ambush for 
me!” [KSS, 12]), but the accusation implicitly reveals both his powerless-
ness and his guilt. Before I consider our ethical judgments of georg here, 
it will be helpful to consider our interpretive and ethical judgments of 
herr Bendemann—and of his judgments.
 Kafka claimed that he was thinking of Freud in writing the story, and 
indeed much of the father-son dynamic can be explained as an Oedipal 
struggle (see, for example, hughes [1995]). But from the rhetorical per-
spective what is more significant is that, even as Kafka gradually increases 
our distance from georg’s interpretive and ethical judgments, he keeps 
us even more distant from most of herr Bendemann’s judgments. Once 
herr Bendemann stands on the bed and goes on the attack, he reveals 
himself to be not a loving but a jealous and vengeful father. In addi-
tion, as Russell Berman perceptively points out (2002), herr Bendemann 
contradicts himself. he contends, first, that georg has no friend in St. 
Petersburg and, later, that georg and the friend have been in constant 
correspondence. herr Bendemann attacks georg both for wanting to 
marry and for delaying the marriage. Finally, he berates georg for both 
his childishness and his ambitions with the business and with his mar-
riage. The resulting interpretive and ethical distance between herr Ben-
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demann and Kafka’s audience is compounded by Kafka’s restricting the 
focalization to georg, so that we never see herr Bendemann from the 
inside. At the same time, Kafka effectively uses the dialogue (1) to show 
that herr Bendemann does have what Sussman calls a counternarrative 
to georg’s account of his life and (2) to suggest that two of herr Bende-
mann’s motives are to rebel against georg’s neglect of him and to shake 
georg out of his complacent self-satisfaction.
 When we get to herr Bendemann’s ultimate judgment of georg, 
Kafka does not give us enough guidance to make a clear interpretive 
judgment of herr Bendemann’s motives or of its basis in georg’s behav-
ior. Why should this father, who claims to love his son, condemn that 
son to death? Not even the accusations the father makes warrant such a 
harsh judgment. The psychoanalytic explanation, namely that herr Ben-
demann is a version of Laius striking back against Oedipus, strikes me as 
insufficiently responsive not only to the strangeness of the story but also 
to the particular form that the striking back takes, since georg/Oedipus 
could easily sidestep or repel this verbal strike by rejecting the judgment. 
Is there some other knowledge that either herr Bendemann or georg 
has that we don’t that makes the judgment appropriate? Why the judg-
ment, and then why the acceptance of it? These questions hover over 
this moment in the progression, and because they remain unanswerable, 
Kafka introduces a permanent gap in the progression.
 Let me clarify the claim I am making about the nature of this inter-
pretive gap and thus clarify what I mean by textual stubbornness. This 
gap is significantly different, for example, from the one that exists regard-
ing herr Bendemann’s fate after he delivers the judgment. That gap—
specifically, whether georg’s hearing him crash onto the bed is a sign of 
temporary collapse or of death—is an issue about whether one event or 
another occurs in the fabula, and it is a gap that underlines the compul-
sion georg feels to act on his father’s judgment. georg hears the crash 
but is too intent on taking his own life even to wonder what the crash 
signifies. In other words, Kafka’s decision to leave this gap in the textual 
dynamics contributes to the effectiveness of our interpretive and ethical 
judgments of georg and thus to the story’s progression as a whole. The 
gap is not an instance of stubbornness but of determinate ambiguity. 
That is, we can adequately fill in the gap: there are only two possibilities, 
and though they are substantially different, their consequences for our 
understanding of the protagonist’s action are not. By contrast, the gap 
surrounding herr Bendemann’s judgment is not a gap in the fabula—the 
event occurs—but a gap in readerly dynamics that leaves us in a position 
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of being unable to fully interpret the judgment, meaning, in turn, that we 
cannot make a clear ethical judgment of it, of herr Bendemann, or of 
georg in his acceptance of it. This gap is an instance of stubbornness 
because we cannot comprehend the event within the logic of the narrative 
to this point, and yet the event remains crucial to the overall progression.
 One way in which Kafka maintains stubbornness is to block a con-
ventional judgment that georg is overreacting to his father’s condem-
nation by showing georg regaining his agency, even as the pace of the 
progression slows. Although, as Ronald Speirs has noted (1987), georg is 
initially driven out of the house by an impersonal force referred to only 
by es (it), once he is hanging from the bridge, his agency returns. georg 
thinks about when he should let go, and he utters his declaration of love 
for both of his parents. The slower pace, the return of georg’s agency, 
the affirmation of his love for his parents—all these elements underline 
the point that he accepts the judgment, and that conscious acceptance 
unsettles our ethical judgment of georg. We can conclude neither that 
he should nor that he should not have accepted his father’s judgment, 
even as the story puts pressure on us to judge georg’s decision.
 At the same time, the interpretive gap and georg’s acceptance of his 
father’s judgment have another significant effect on the progression, spe-
cifically on the relation between its mimetic component, on the one 
hand, and its thematic and synthetic components, on the other. Although 
John ellis rightly points out that even the first paragraph of the story 
does not fully conform to the tenets of straightforward realism, the domi-
nant signals of the first stage of the progression are those that activate our 
interest in its mimetic component, and the story rewards our efforts to 
read such things as the psychology of the characters. But one consequence 
of the textual stubbornness is to move the story from a straight mimetic 
account to one in which the thematic and the synthetic become more 
prominent. The gap encourages us to read the story as a parable rather 
than as a psychological study. In such readings, georg and herr Bende-
mann function as types whose interactions we can explain less by refer-
ence to plausible psychological behavior of autonomous individuals than 
by reference to Kafka’s working out of the relations among certain ideas. 
But it is important to see that while the move to a greater emphasis 
on the thematic and the synthetic encourages such readings, it does not 
resolve the story’s textual stubbornness. Instead, it is the textual stubborn-
ness itself that allows for the proliferation of such readings. “Das Urteil” 
is a parable of guilt that includes elements of father-son struggles going 
back to Oedipus. It is a story about the power of patriarchy, about both 
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the necessity and the inevitable imperfections of judgment. And it is many 
other things as well. These thematic readings can be very insightful, and, 
indeed, I have learned from many of them. But to the extent that they 
claim to close the interpretive gap at the climax of the story, they over-
reach. even if we say that “Das Urteil” belongs to the genre of the parable 
and that parables are often enigmatic, we cannot convert the stubborn-
ness of Kafka’s story into a more conventional textual difficulty, because 
the location of the unbridgeable gap at the climax of the story moves it 
beyond the enigmatic to the inscrutable. All of these considerations have 
consequences for our aesthetic judgments of the story, but I will defer 
that discussion until after I look at the traffic going in the other direc-
tion—that is, between “Das Urteil” and the rhetorical theory of narrative.
What Kafka Can do for rhetorical theory
Traffic in this direction stops at four stations: at the first, a principle of 
rhetorical theory gets reinforced; at the second, rhetorical theory offers 
some new generalizations about narrative speed; at the third, rhetorical 
theory learns something new about progressions with surprise endings; 
and at the fourth, rhetorical theory adds to its understanding of textual 
stubbornness. The principle at the first station is that rhetorical theory 
wants to work in an a posteriori fashion. Although the theory has con-
structed a large warehouse of terms and concepts (and I have given you 
just a small sample in this chapter), it regards them not as forming preset 
molds into which narratives will inevitably fit—or must be made to fit—
but rather as providing tools for opening up the workings of individual 
narratives. “Das Urteil” reinforces this lesson because it does not fit any 
predetermined rhetorical mode, and, indeed, the challenge it presents 
to the rhetorical critic is to uncover its logic while also preserving its 
strangeness.
 At the same time, rhetorical theory is not averse to offering general-
izations after it has done its a posteriori work on a number of narratives. 
To eschew generalization altogether is, in effect, to be anti-theory. It is 
also to suggest that what one learns from the analysis of one narrative 
cannot apply to the analysis of another. The delicate matter of course is 
to engage in appropriate generalization, to develop theoretical conclu-
sions that help us work on new narratives without leading us to take the 
high Priori Road. I shall keep this point in mind as I move on to the 
next three stations on this side of the road.
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 Station two. Attending to speed in “Das Urteil” helps rhetorical the-
ory extend the recent work of Jan Baetens and Katherine hume (2006), 
who have offered a helpful overview of narrative speed as involving both 
textual and readerly components. This dual concern with text and audi-
ence means that their findings are of special interest to rhetorical theory. 
On the textual side, Baetens and hume identify speed effects as occur-
ring at the story level (where there are references to and descriptions of 
speed), at the discourse level (where effects fall along a spectrum that 
has elliptical syntax at one end and pauses in the narration of events in 
favor of description at the other),5 and at the narration level (where the 
typography or the oral delivery of the text affects the speed). On the 
readerly side, Baetens and hume work with the distinctions among the 
implied reader (the authorial audience in rhetorical theory), the nar-
ratee, and the empirical reader (the flesh-and-blood reader in rhetorical 
theory). Baetens and hume note that the first two audiences are encoded 
in the text while the third operates independently of textual encoding. 
They also make the astute observation that encoded speed is “never just 
determined by what is being read here and now, but also by what has 
just been read and by what one has been expecting to read immediately 
afterwards” (2006, 352). In this sense, as Baetens and hume point out, 
speed is connected to the larger concept of textual rhythm.
 My version of rhetorical theory is primarily interested in encoded 
speed, and I endorse Baetens and hume’s point about the relation 
between speed and rhythm (2006). But as my analysis of “Das Urteil” sug-
gests, rhetorical theory can offer greater precision about the interaction 
between textual and readerly components of speed through its attention 
to the dynamics of progression and especially through its attention to the 
role of interpretive and ethical judgments—and to the strategic place-
ment of an interpretive gap. In other words, what Kafka’s story teaches 
us is that a narrative can accelerate its pace, not simply by increasing the 
pace of the complication of instabilities but also by accompanying that 
acceleration with an increasing number of interpretive and ethical judg-
ments—and by requiring that the audience jump over a space in which 
one would normally expect to make such judgments. Indeed, as I have 
indicated above, this combination of accelerated judgments with the stra-
tegic gap seems central to both the story’s power and its strangeness.
 Station three. In my discussion of edith Wharton’s “Roman Fever” 
(1934/1997) in chapter four of Experiencing Fiction, I have made what 
I regarded as an appropriate generalization by proposing that effective 
surprise endings meet three conditions. The surprise must (1) lead to a 
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plausible reconfiguration of the narrative, (2) be prepared for (that is, in 
retrospect, it must be part of a recognizable pattern), and (3) enhance in 
some way the overall effect of the narrative. Narratives in which the sur-
prise depends on characters acting in accord with traits that they have not 
previously exhibited, narratives that include absolutely no clues to the 
surprise (for example, many versions of the “it was only a dream” end-
ing), and narratives in which the surprise, though congruent and prepared 
for, is an elaborate contrivance rather than a necessary part of a larger 
purpose—all either fall flat or come across as ethical or aesthetic cheats.
 With consummate skill, Wharton constructs “Roman Fever” so that 
it meets all of the conditions for a successful surprise ending. The story 
ends with grace Ansley’s surprising revelation to her rival Alida Slade 
that the father of grace’s admirable daughter Barbara is not grace’s hus-
band, but Alida’s. grace’s revelation causes both Alida and the authorial 
audience to reconfigure their understanding of what happened in Rome 
twenty-five years previously, when Alida developed a scheme to have 
grace contract tuberculosis and so be unavailable as a possible love inter-
est for her future husband, Delphin. Alida’s scheme was to forge Delphin’s 
signature to a note asking grace to meet him after dark in the Colos-
seum. Thus, it is only with this final revelation that Alida realizes how her 
scheme brought about the tryst that led to grace’s conception of Bar-
bara. The surprise fits with the previous progression because it does not 
contradict but rather rounds out our understanding of grace’s character, 
and it effectively concludes the women’s conversation that has in some 
way been a re-enactment of the rivalry that they engaged in twenty-five 
years previously. The surprise has been prepared for in numerous ways, 
including the narrator’s disclosure of seemingly incidental information 
about Barbara and the narrator’s calling attention to odd emphases or 
silences in grace’s half of the conversation. And the surprise enhances the 
story by showing how its present-tense conversation not only re-enacts 
the rivalry but also concludes it in a similar way: Alida has been trying 
to establish her superiority over grace only to discover once again that 
grace has gotten the better of her.
 Kafka’s “Das Urteil” teaches rhetorical theory something new because 
its surprise ending works in a remarkably different way, but no less 
effectively. The stubbornness associated with the moment of judgment 
means both that the surprise is not fully congruent with the rest of the 
progression and that it is not prepared for in the way that the surprise 
of “Roman Fever” is. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the surprise signifi-
cantly enhances the story’s strange power and appeal. What “Das Urteil” 
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teaches, then, is that the neat reversals and coherent reconfigurations that 
characterize “Roman Fever,” Ambrose Bierce’s “An Occurrence at Owl 
Creek Bridge” (1890), Ian Mcewan’s Atonement (2001), and other effec-
tive stories with surprising endings are not an absolute necessity for all 
narratives built on the principle of surprise. To put the lesson in more 
positive terms, “Das Urteil” shows that a limited stubbornness—even, 
or especially, when associated with a climactic moment in the progres-
sion—can significantly enhance the power of the story, even as it points 
to a purpose different from the kind we find in the stories that meet my 
three conditions. Rather than getting its power from a tighter and deeper 
understanding of the characters’ actions, Kafka’s story gets its power by 
keeping things open and broadening our explorations into the ethical 
and psychological dynamics—and thematic meanings—of the events we 
have just read about. In other words, the value added by the surprise is not 
that it takes us deeper into the mimetic situation but rather that it invites 
us to relate the story to an ever-widening range of issues and contexts.
 Station four. The lesson here is about stubbornness itself. In my previ-
ous explorations of this phenomenon, I have focused on the recalcitrance 
we encounter in our efforts to interpret adequately characters such as 
Toni Morrison’s Beloved in Beloved (1987), John Fowles’s Sarah Woodruff 
in The French Lieutenant’s Woman (1969), and Jim in Conrad’s Lord Jim 
(1900). In an analysis of Robert Frost’s “home Burial” (1916) in Experi-
encing Fiction (2007), I have also considered the textual stubbornness that 
results when an author does not take sides in an argument between two 
sympathetic characters who embrace opposed ethical principles. The case 
of Kafka’s practice in “Das Urteil” encourages me to propose the broad 
generalization that any element of a narrative is potentially available for 
the productive functions of the stubborn.6
aesthetics and ethics
As I turn toward my conclusion, the traffic of my discussion is ready to 
move back in the other direction and consider what the consequences of 
these conclusions are for our aesthetic judgments of “Das Urteil.” given 
what I’ve said so far, I realize that I have spoiled any possible surprise. 
The story is a remarkable aesthetic achievement, one whose speed, lim-
ited stubbornness, and consequent openness offer a strange and unset-
tling experience whose value is indisputable, even if—or because—it is 
not easy to pin down. To put this point another way, “Das Urteil” is a 
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formally innovative story that suggests new possibilities for storytelling 
itself. It is no wonder that Kafka regarded his composition of the story as 
marking a significant phase in his development as a writer. In addition, the 
story’s formal innovation is productive precisely because it brings us face-
to-face with, among other things, the uncanny elements of father-son 
relationships and the unsettling nature of guilt, love, and individual agency.
 Finally, I turn to consider the ethics of Kafka’s telling as revealed in 
the trajectory of the implied author-authorial relationship across the pro-
gression. The implied Kafka is at once a subtle guide and a formidable 
figure who keeps his distance. Furthermore, at a key point in the trajec-
tory, he leaves a major gap. Consequently, he is as interested in unsettling 
us as in guiding us—indeed, perhaps he guides us to the point at which 
he can unsettle us most profoundly. But it is also clear that he wants to 
unsettle us because he believes it will be for our own good. I, for one, am 
willing to conclude that he’s right.
notes
 1. See Experiencing Fiction (Phelan 2007, 15–22, 151–54). For additional back-
ground, see Reading People (Phelan 1989), especially the introduction and chapter 4.
 2. For a fuller discussion and demonstration of these points, see Experiencing Fic-
tion (Phelan 2007).
 3. For a fuller discussion of the rhetorical approach, see Reading People (Phelan 
1989), Narrative as Rhetoric (Phelan 1996), Living to Tell about It (Phelan 2005), and 
Experiencing Fiction (Phelan 2007).
 4. For additional—and very insightful—commentary on ellis’s reading, see Pas-
cal (1982, 27–31). More generally, Pascal is a very fine reader of Kafka, and his larger 
conclusion about “Das Urteil,” though arrived at via a different route, is similar to 
mine: the story leaves us with “a baffling and painful puzzle” (Pascal 1982, 30).
 5. Baetens and hume (2006) actually locate pauses for description at the story 
level, but that seems counterintuitive to me. 
 6. As these examples indicate, textual stubbornness is a feature available across 
genres and across works of different lengths. Although I believe, as my attention to 
narrative speed indicates, that the brevity of the short story form aids and abets the 
effectiveness of the stubbornness of “Das Urteil,” I do not see any necessary general 
connection between brevity and stubbornness. Indeed, since stubbornness is textual 
recalcitrance that will not yield to our interpretive efforts and since reading always 
involves interpretation, stubbornness is potentially a feature of any text. But from 
an authorial perspective, the difference between constructing a textual recalcitrance 
that won’t yield to interpretation and having that recalcitrance function to contrib-
ute to the power of one’s design is huge. 
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iOne of the great challenges when interpreting Kafka’s texts is to describe 
correctly the difficulties they pose for their reader. Another is to respond 
to these difficulties in a way that allows them to play a role in the texts’ 
rhetorical design and communicative effect. having discussed the prob-
lems arising from relying on “allegorical equations of Kafka’s figures with 
abstractions drawn from other systems, be they theology, philosophy, 
psychoanalysis or ‘textual self-reflexivity,’” Ronald Speirs and Beatrice 
Sandberg settle for a way of reading Kafka’s three novels that takes them 
“as far as possible, at face value” (1997, 28). Taking this approach—with 
its important qualification “as far as possible”—as a guide to the reading 
of “Die Verwandlung” (“The Metamorphosis”) (Kafka 1994) one may 
ask: Just how far does this face-value approach take us? how is the reader 
supposed to respond to the features of the text that show resistance to such 
a reading? Is there a way of responding to such features of the text as a 
part of its rhetorical design without resorting to an allegorical reading?
 Let me start by outlining a reading that follows Speirs and Sandberg’s 
example and progresses through the text intent on seeing it as “a descrip-
tion of the experience of one individual in his dealings with others” 
(1997, 28). The opening paragraph of the story is designed to involve the 
reader immediately, and with no preparation, in a huge crisis in gregor 
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Samsa’s life: he wakes up in his bed and finds himself transformed into 
some form of insect. The event destabilizes the entire life of the Samsa 
family, and the dramatic action revolves around the various ways in which 
gregor and his family respond to and try to deal with this crisis. All the 
members of the family—gregor’s father, mother, and his sister, grete, in 
addition to gregor himself—seem to share one overall project: to re-
establish normality by healing the rupture that the metamorphosis has 
caused. however, if the project is essentially shared, gregor’s and the 
family’s strategies are markedly different and in conflict with each other. 
gregor aspires from the first minute to heal the rupture by seeking to 
communicate his humanity to his family despite his new non-human 
bodily form so as to secure his place in the family as son and brother, 
while the other members of the family seek to re-establish normality by 
protecting themselves and their ordinary life from the social and emo-
tional consequences of the outbreak of abnormality at the heart of family 
life by locking gregor in his room.1 The conflict between divergent strat-
egies in dealing with the rupture of normality develops into a “territo-
rial” struggle within the flat, a struggle that structures the dramatic action 
of the story. each of the first three parts sees a build-up of dramatic ten-
sion that reaches its climax when gregor tries to break out of his room, 
only to be driven back into this confined space. After his third attempt, he 
gives up, returns to his room, and lies down to die, finally to be swept up 
and disposed of as litter by the cleaning lady.
 This reading of the story as a family drama is supported by the flash-
backs in the opening sections of the story, through which we get a sense 
of gregor’s resentment prior to the metamorphosis—his resentment, 
more specifically, at the restrictions imposed on his social life and his 
love life by his role as the breadwinner of the family after his father’s 
bankruptcy. The metamorphosis certainly offers no improvement of his 
situation; on the contrary, it ruins any hope of a wider and more satisfy-
ing engagement with other people. The metamorphosis also reinforces 
the pattern of power struggle and oppression that seems well established 
among the male members of the family. It is hardly a coincidence that 
the authoritarian father is the only one who never enters into the trans-
formed gregor’s room, that he plays the most violent role in preventing 
gregor from breaking out into the rest of the flat, and that he delivers 
the final blow to gregor’s deteriorating health. The suppressed sexual 
longings that fuel gregor’s general dissatisfaction with life before the 
transformation are brought out in a cruder form after his transformation, 
in his clinging to the picture of the woman with the fur boa, while the 
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connection between the father’s oppression of gregor and gregor’s sex-
ual needs is suggested by the apple the father throws at him and which 
slowly decays in the wound on his back.
 The transformation also throws an unbearably ironic light on gregor’s 
willingness to make such sacrifices in his life prior to this catastrophic 
event. Now that he is unable to provide for the family, it appears not only 
that the economic situation was not as bad as gregor was led to believe 
but also that his sacrifices have inhibited the rest of the family and 
prevented them from flourishing. They are liberated and revitalized by 
gregor Samsa’s death; they are able to realize capacities they did not 
recognize before. If he was the victim of their needs, they seem to have 
been the victims of his support. They all seem to have been locked in 
the destructive workings of family life, with its characteristic patterns 
of dependence and power, guilt and suppressed longings, sacrifices and 
mutual victimization.
 According to such a reading, the narrative invites a readerly response 
that is based on the mimetic aspect of the characters,2 gregor included: 
We relate to them as people. Their conflicts and the story’s inherent iro-
nies make sense of and cast light on life as we know it. however, there 
is one serious snag to this way of responding to the story. It seems to 
depend on our forgetting or ignoring just how unheard of, how unac-
ceptable and in effect unthinkable the metamorphosis is, how deeply and 
fundamentally it constitutes a breach with the world as we know it and 
with the logic of life. Being struck and puzzled by the metamorphosis 
as a rupture of the logic of life, the reader should ask: What claims to 
understanding gregor’s fate are we entitled to? Are we actually making 
sense of his situation, or are we just under the illusion that we are doing 
so? In order to normalize his situation, gregor struggles to remain a 
member of the family inside the human circle. But is it not the case that 
he has also fallen outside human society as far as the reader is concerned?
ii
At second thought, the face-value approach seems to run into trouble at 
the very beginning of the narrative. We are clearly invited to engage the 
story as a family drama, but this engagement leads to a frustration of the 
sense-making effort of the reader. The event of the metamorphosis con-
stitutes an instance of ontological fuzziness that requires an effort of natu-
ralization on the part of the reader, an effort of “bring[ing] it into relation 
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with a type of discourse or model which is already, in some sense, natu-
ral and legible” (Culler 1980, 138). So what routes to naturalization are 
available to the reader of “Die Verwandlung”? Rimmon-Kenan distin-
guishes between two kinds of models of coherence available to the reader 
of narratives: the reality models, which “help naturalize elements by ref-
erence to some concept (or structure) which governs our perception of 
the world,” and the literary models, which “make elements intelligible by 
reference to specifically literary exigencies or institutions” (2002, 125). 
Neither of these, however, is of much help in attempts at giving coher-
ence to this particular story. First, the metamorphosis appears as the result 
of unknown forces or an agency that has no place in any model of real-
ity as we perceive it. Second, even though the event of the metamor-
phosis has a rich array of literary forebears in fairy tales, folklore, and 
pre-realistic texts such as Apuleius’s The Golden Ass, it is a salient feature 
of the metamorphosis as it is presented in Kafka’s story that it is located 
in a world that otherwise operates according to the laws of the world as 
we know it. We are not in the world of fairy tales; nevertheless, fairy-tale 
events seem to happen here.
 In its discursive treatment of the event, the text clearly and self-
consciously acknowledges this. If we look at how the metamorphosis is 
described, we find that it is not in fact described. We are not told what 
happened; only the situation consequent to the event is presented to 
the reader. This indeterminacy is a logical necessity, given the nature of 
the event. It cannot be made determinate within the human universe on 
which it is projected. To regard it as a dream would be a way of bringing 
it within the logic of life as we know it, but that possibility is rejected 
immediately by the protagonist himself: “es war kein Traum” (KAF, 
1:93) (“It was no dream” [Kafka 1996, 3]). This instance of free indi-
rect thought, reflecting and participating in gregor’s struggle to come 
to terms with his situation, has a function also on the axis of commu-
nication between implied author and reader. Marking the authorial rec-
ognition of the attentive reader’s attempts to naturalize the event, the 
authorial message seems clear: the central event in “Die Verwandlung” 
defies explanation and refuses naturalization, at least along such tracks.
 This message runs counter, however, to the spirit in which the story 
is told by the narrator, who is loyal to gregor’s attempt to play down the 
consequences of the transformation and relates the story in a fashion that 
assumes that there is no problem whatsoever connected with the logic of 
the event. This attitude is clearly fundamental to our initial engagement 
in the drama. We are invited to forget the shock of the metamorphosis as 
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soon as it occurs and to give ourselves over to the narrative flow, which 
allows us to participate in gregor’s brave but eventually failed attempt 
to reintegrate himself in the normal life of the family despite his new 
conditions. however, the attitude of the narrator, his covering up the 
ontological fuzziness of the metamorphosis, is also fundamental to our 
growing sense of distrust in the sense we are invited to make. In his 
reporting function the narrator relates in an untroubled fashion some-
thing we simply cannot accept. even if we follow the action primarily 
through gregor’s perspective, and even if his thoughts and aspirations are 
those of a human being, the reader is constantly reminded through the 
detailed description of his movements as an insect of gregor’s separation 
from human life as we know it, and thus his separation from us.
iii
Seen thus, “Die Verwandlung” appears as a narrative with a rhetorical 
design that is rich in inherent contradictions. On the one hand, we are 
invited to forget the ontological fuzziness of the metamorphosis in our 
attempts at making sense of the story. On the other hand, our sense of 
puzzlement at this very event is stimulated by the text itself. how do we 
resolve these inherent contradictions in the response the story invites? 
Perhaps the best way to bring the story within the reader’s comprehen-
sion is the most confrontational: to take what seems to be destructive of 
sense to be a potential source of its construction. Rather than ignoring 
the transformed gregor’s ontological fuzziness, we should take the devia-
tion from mimetic demands to be central to the story’s thematic concern 
and rhetorical effect; we should see the metamorphosis itself, the trans-
formation of gregor, as that which allows his fate to speak to us, albeit in 
terms that go beyond the mimetic aspect of his character.
 To see this possibility more clearly, we have to return once more to 
the opening of the story, in which the nature and the immediate conse-
quences of the metamorphosis are exposed. Perhaps the most shocking 
aspect of it is not the metamorphosis itself but rather the fact that the 
narrator’s account assumes gregor’s inner human life to be unaffected by 
the transformation of his human body into some verminous creature. he 
wakes up thinking, believing, fearing, wishing, resenting, remembering, 
pondering, and planning in the manner of a human being, but he has a 
non-human body.
 Looked at from the point of view of the history of philosophy, how-
ever, this thought does not seem shocking at all. Philosophical dualism 
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sees the human being as divided between an outer and an inner being, a 
bodily being on the one hand and a mental or spiritual being—a soul—
on the other. Whatever terms we prefer to use to denote the difference 
between the human body and the inner human life, dualism seems to 
assume that the inner human life constitutes the real human being, and 
that there is in fact no necessary relationship between the (outer) human 
body and the inner life. One’s body is incidental to one’s humanity. This 
idea may be theorized in various ways, the most famous and influential, 
perhaps, being that of René Descartes, whose distinction between the 
two substances—the immaterial res cogitans and the material res extensa—
may be easily dismissed by most modern thinkers, but whose conception 
of the human being nevertheless continues to haunt us and to shape our 
coming to terms with what it is to be human.3
 Taking the dualistic assumptions underlying the event of the meta-
morphosis as the starting point for another readerly progression through 
the text, it seems that the story invites the reader to engage in the nar-
rative’s exploration of the ontological repercussions of the metamorpho-
sis. A major compositional feature of “Die Verwandlung” is the pattern 
of alternation between gregor Samsa’s being alone in his room and his 
facing the other family members. This allows for a dual perspective on 
the ontological repercussions of the metamorphosis: it creates a rhyth-
mic shift between the first-person perspective and the third-person per-
spective through which the implications of gregor’s bodily change are 
explored.
 how does the assumption of an external relationship between the 
inner and the outer human being hold up when it is explored through 
the first-person perspective in the narrative? In one sense it is confirmed, 
for gregor does experience his body as external to his humanity. From 
the second he wakes up in his bed transformed into a new shape, his 
bodily being emerges as something out there, as something he first famil-
iarizes himself with by looking at:
er lag auf seinem panzerartig harten Rücken und sah, wenn er den Kopf 
ein wenig hob, seinen gewölbten, braunen, von bogenförmigen Verstei-
fungen geteilten Bauch, auf dessen höhe sich die Bettdecke, zum gänz-
lichen Niedergleiten bereit, kaum noch erhalten konnte. Seine vielen, 
im Vergleich zu seinem sonstigen Umfang kläglich dünnen Beine flim-
merten ihm hilflos vor den Augen. (KAF, 1:93)
he was lying on his back as hard as armor plate, and when he lifted his 
head a little, he saw his vaulted brown belly, sectioned by arch-shaped 
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ribs, to whose dome the cover, about to slide off completely, could barely 
cling. his many legs, pitifully thin compared with the size of the rest of 
him, were waving helplessly before his eyes.) (Kafka 1996, 3)
The distance between gregor and the body he surveys is expressed in his 
tendency to view his body as having a life of its own. he watches it with 
concern: the legs are pitifully thin and are waving helplessly. That is, his 
body has become an object that he reaches out to through his thoughts; 
he has to learn to use his body in the way that one has to learn to handle 
a tool. This is made all the more difficult by the fact that the things 
around him—the tools (“die Zeuge,” to use heidegger’s term from Sein 
und Zeit) that suit the human body perfectly—are sheer obstacles to him 
in his new bodily shape. he experiments with ways of moving his body 
out of bed and with ways of using his new mouth to turn the key: “es 
schien leider, daß er keine eigentlichen Zähne hatte,—womit sollte er 
gleich den Schlüssel fassen?”) (KAF, 1:106) (“Unfortunately it seemed 
that he had no real teeth—what was he supposed to grip the key with?” 
[Kafka 1996, 11]). Only with the greatest effort and concentration does 
he manage to maneuver his body out of the room and make himself vis-
ible to the others.
 gregor’s object-relation to his new body, however, is clearly a con-
sequence of the metamorphosis, and as such the transformation cannot 
confirm the assumption that there is no logical connection between the 
inner human life and the human body. Rather, the transformation seems 
to have severed the logical connection between gregor’s inner life and 
his body. even if his inner life has survived his metamorphosis, the char-
acteristic way in which the inner human life is related to the human body 
has not. The spontaneous flow of movement, the flow of intentional 
action and bodily movement that characterizes the human way of being 
in the world, has stopped. In gregor’s first attempt to withdraw to his 
room in response to his father’s despair and fury, “und so begann er . . . 
sich nach Möglichkeit rasch, in Wirklichkeit aber doch nur sehr langsam 
umzudrehen” (KAF, 1:112) (“he began to turn around as quickly as pos-
sible, in reality turning only very slowly” [Kafka 1996, 15]. In this clause 
we see the working of the mind that is in effect detached from the work-
ing of the body.
 In other words, gregor’s difficulties in making his body move in 
accordance with his will and intentions, the way in which his body has 
become objectified, sheds light on the way our body under normal cir-
cumstances evades objective thought. Being confronted with gregor’s 
greve, “the humAn body And the humAn being”  47
thought-dependent movements, we are shocked into seeing what we 
normally take for granted. We see that we are not the decision-makers 
for our own bodies, manipulating it with our intellect into the right 
position in relation to things in the world. It is not because we have an 
intellectual grasp of the dimensions of the space and our body’s size and 
position that we know how to move in inhabited space; our wanting 
something, intending something, thinking something—this is a bodily 
stance toward the world. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a philosopher who has 
explored this problem in great detail, uses the term subject-body to indi-
cate the way in which the inner human being is logically connected with 
the human body: “Consciousness is being-towards-the-thing through 
the intermediary of the body” (1989, 138–39). The ability to act in and 
on the world is grounded in our being a subject-body. As such we proj-
ect ourselves toward the things in the world in a way that does not leave 
room for a purely instrumental relation to one’s own body: “In the action 
of the hand which is raised towards an object is contained a reference to 
the object, not as an object represented, but as that highly specific thing 
towards which we project ourselves, near which we are, in anticipation, 
and which we haunt” (Merleau-Ponty 1989, 138). gregor is no longer a 
body-subject in Merleau-Ponty’s sense, and this very concept holds up 
a mirror in which we can see the distortions of gregor’s relation to his 
body. We see more clearly that the metamorphosis constitutes a depar-
ture from the characteristic human way of relating to one’s own body, a 
fall from being a subject-body.
 By positing the human being as a subject-body, Merleau-Ponty also 
criticizes the intellectualism inherent in Cartesian dualism: “Conscious-
ness is in the first place not a matter of ‘I think that’ but of ‘I can’” (1989, 
137). The whole process of accessing the world is connected with this “I 
can”:
Our bodily experience of movement . . . provides us with a way of access 
to the world and the object, with a “praktognosia” [practical knowledge], 
which has to be recognized as original and perhaps as primary. My body 
has its world, or understands its world, without having to make use of 
my “symbolic” or “objectifying function.” (Merleau-Ponty 1989, 140–41)
Far from having a body that “has its world,” gregor has a body that has 
lost its world, that no longer “understands” it. his inner life has become 
a matter of “I cannot”; the severing of the logical relation between 
consciousness and body is matched by a severing of the logical relation 
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between body and world, and a loss of the bodily at-home-ness in the 
world that goes with the “I can.”
 We see this all the more clearly in gregor’s relation to his room as 
the story progresses. To some extent he manages to establish a relation 
to his new body that in turn makes him more at home in the world: he 
learns to crawl on the walls and enjoys hanging from the ceiling: “es war 
ganz anders, als das Liegen auf dem Fußboden; man atmete freier; ein 
leichtes Schwingen ging durch den Körper” (KAF, 1:126–27) (“it was 
completely different from lying on the floor; one could breathe more 
freely; a faint swinging sensation went through the body” [Kafka 1996, 
23]). And even when he loses control of his upside-down body in the 
state of “fast glücklichen Zerstreutheit” (KAF, 1:127) (“the almost happy 
absent-mindedness” [Kafka 1996, 23]), his acquired at-home-ness in his 
new body is such that he is not hurt by the fall.
 however, as gregor gradually becomes more united with his new 
non-human body, he simultaneously becomes more detached from his 
humanity, and this affects his relation to his room. An important stage 
in his deterioration takes place when the furniture is removed from his 
room so as to simplify his moving about. Initially, he foresees this change 
as a change for the better, but he realizes soon that it is catastrophic to 
his sense of being human. It not only means that he becomes even more 
isolated in his room: “Denn in einem Raum, in dem gregor ganz allein 
die leeren Wände beherrschte, würde wohl kein Mensch außer grete 
jemals einzutreten sich getrauen” (KAF, 1:130) (“Into a room in which 
gregor ruled the bare walls alone, no human being beside grete was ever 
likely to set foot” [Kafka 1996, 25]). he also realizes that without the 
human room with its furniture he will no longer be able to remember 
his human past, and it seems absolutely clear to him that retaining the 
room in its former state is crucial to his survival:
Nichts sollte entfernt werden; alles mußte bleiben; die guten einwirkun-
gen der Möbel auf seinen Zustand konnte er nicht entbehren; und wenn 
die Möbel ihn hinderten, das sinnlose herumkriechen zu betreiben, so 
war es kein Schaden, sondern ein großer Vorteil. (KAF, 1:129)
(Nothing should be removed; everything had to stay; he could not do 
without the beneficial influence of the furniture on his state of mind; 
and if the furniture prevented him from carrying on this senseless crawl-
ing around, then that was no loss but rather a great advantage.) (Kafka 
1996, 25)
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In other words, this characteristic feature of inner human life—that one 
relates to past events, that one’s human past lives on in one’s conception 
of oneself as a person and as a human being—is dependent on gregor’s 
relation to the human body he no longer has. The logical connection 
between being human and having a human body is confirmed, now 
mediated through the significance of “ein richtiges, nur etwas zu kleines 
Menschenzimmer” (KAF, 1:93) (“a regular human room, only a little on 
the small side” [Kafka 1996, 3]) that he looked at with appreciation the 
first morning he woke up as an insect.
 Thus, rather than having survived the transformation, gregor’s inner 
life is transfigured into a consciousness in deterioration. Instead of con-
firming dualistic assumptions about the human being, the progression of 
the story is geared toward revealing dualism’s philosophical distortion of 
it. In so far as we think it has survived, it may be because our own think-
ing suffers from the same distortion.
iv
If the scenes in which gregor battles with his new bodily form bring out 
the logical relation between the human body and the inner human life, 
the scenes of confrontation between gregor and his family explore the 
ontological repercussions of his metamorphosis by highlighting the con-
nection between ontology and ethics in our dealings with one another. 
The story seems to reveal the potential conflict between psychological 
reactions and ethical demands: The members of the family know the ver-
minous creature is gregor; indeed, the fact that they know this is part of 
the horror of seeing him in this bodily form.
 grete’s response to gregor carries a huge moral weight. She contin-
ues to treat the creature as a human being and as her brother, as someone 
to whom she owes care and love. Is her response grounded in dualistic 
assumptions? Does she continue to treat him as a human being because 
she thinks his inner self is unscathed by the metamorphosis? Not neces-
sarily. We may take her to accept that the vermin is gregor, her brother, 
in virtue of his history; that is, she responds to the vermin as her brother 
not because she can recognize her brother in the creature, nor because 
she is able to give a plausible explanation for what has happened to him, 
but simply because she acknowledges that this transformation is some-
thing that has happened to him, her brother gregor. This non-dualistic 
and non-reductive conception of the identity of the human being4 brings 
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out the continuity in the demands other people make on us quite inde-
pendently of what changes they undergo, in ways we are familiar with in 
connection with people who undergo severe physical or psychic damage, 
for instance. In grete’s initial response, then, there seems to be no room 
for the thought that he is outside the human circle of care and concern. 
In his new bodily form, gregor may not meet the ontological standards 
of human beings, but that is morally irrelevant because he did not qualify 
for her moral concern in the first place.
 Viewed in this light, grete’s final denunciation of the vermin as 
gregor, the son and the brother—“Ich will vor diesem Untier nicht den 
Namen meines Bruders aussprechen [ . . . ]. Du musst bloss den gedanken 
loszuwerden suchen, dass es gregor ist” (KAF, 1:149, 150) (“I won’t pro-
nounce the name of my brother in front of this monster. . . . you just have 
to try to get rid of the idea that it’s gregor” [Kafka 1996, 37, 38])—is to 
be regarded as a moral failure. But can the question be so easily settled? 
First, this view seems hardly to recognize the deep connection between 
the ethical and the psychological strands of our response: we develop our 
ethical responses to other people who have a recognizable human form, 
and although it is clearly a mistake to turn this recognizable human form 
into a criterion for moral concern, it is difficult to imagine a moral con-
cern of the kind we owe human beings that is completely divorced from 
the habitual response toward beings with a recognizable human body. 
Second, there are important differences between the severely deformed 
person and gregor Samsa. In the first case, there is a story of deformation 
that can be told. The story of gregor’s metamorphosis, however, cannot 
be told. The ontological fuzziness that is an obstacle to sense in the story 
pops up again, but now as an obstacle to holding on to the thought that 
the vermin is gregor.
 Trying to counter the deep-seated dualistic tendency in our thought 
about human beings, Wittgenstein says, “The human body is the best 
picture of the human soul” (2001, 152). how are we to understand “the 
best picture of ”? Stanley Cavell offers us help in this gloss on the remark: 
“The human body is the best picture of the human soul—not, I feel like 
adding, primarily because it represents the soul but because it expresses it. 
The body is the field of expression of the soul, the body is of the soul; it 
is the soul’s; a human soul has a human body” (1982, 356).
 Without a human body that is the field of expression of his soul, 
gregor fails to communicate with his family. Thus, contrary to the 
assumptions behind the dualistic conception, human understanding seems 
to depend on the live expressive human body. The meeting of minds is 
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not so much hindered by the body as the dualist induces us to believe, 
but rather is made possible by or conditioned by the human body. The 
meeting of minds depends on the human being’s natural expressiveness. 
To say that it is natural is not, however, to deny that it is conventional in 
some sense. The point is rather that we tend to work with a misleading 
conception of the relation between the natural and the conventional. In 
Cavell’s words, “very little of what goes on among human beings . . . is 
merely conventional” (1982, 119).
v
If this progression through the text captures something important in the 
story, it still seems unclear how these philosophical concerns relate to 
the story as a family drama. Is it an allegorical reading of the text I have 
offered, the actual dramatic action being merely a vehicle for the discus-
sion of philosophical problems? Such a conclusion seems to miss the 
communicative point of the interdependence and interaction of the two 
readerly progressions, the one engaging in the story as a family drama 
and the other exploring our ontological assumptions about the event that 
sets the drama in motion.
 To see how deeply the ontological “drama” is embedded in the fam-
ily drama, we need to return once again to the beginning of the story. 
As already mentioned, there is no description of how the metamorphosis 
took place, and this indeterminacy follows from the nature of the event: 
it simply cannot be made determinate within the world as we know it. 
however, the opening clause of the story is marked by another indeter-
minacy that at least allows the possibility of a causal connection between 
the metamorphosis and gregor’s life prior to it. The sequence of events 
referred to in the opening paragraph—his unsettling dreams and his 
waking up to find himself transformed into an insect—is in fact inde-
terminate between a consecutive and a consequential reading. his trans-
formation may simply come after his unsettling dreams (x happened, then 
y happened) or there may be a causal connection between his unsettling 
dreams and the state in which he wakes up. even if the first is the only 
reading with an indisputable basis in the text, the second is not ruled 
out.5
 But how are we supposed to make sense of a causal connection 
between the unsettling dream and the metamorphosis? What kind of 
causal connection could there possibly be? One possibility is to see the 
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metamorphosis itself as the result of an escape fantasy on the part of 
gregor. There are several textual indications of a tie between the meta-
morphosis and gregor’s desire to escape. his deep dissatisfaction with 
his professional life, family life, social life, and love life lends credibility 
to the idea that he has entertained the thought of escaping it all. The 
image of a verminous creature is well suited to capture the combina-
tion of aggression toward a dominating father, suppressed sexual desire, 
and self-contempt that seems to make up his frame of mind prior to the 
metamorphosis. Fantasizing and escapism both belong to the world of 
dreams, but in this case the dreamer finds on waking up that the escap-
ist dream has taken on the form of a nightmarish reality. This is perhaps 
the ultimate nightmare, or nightmare turned daymare: to wake up from 
acting out suppressed wishes in one’s dreams and find oneself changed in 
accordance with those dreams.
 The temptation to escape by means of bodily withdrawal also appears 
in the other piece of writing in which Kafka experiments with the motif 
of a man transformed into a vermin, the fragment “Wedding Prepara-
tions in the Country.” The protagonist Raban imagines that he can send 
his human body into a situation that he is dreading. he remains in his 
bed and becomes a giant beetle. “Die Verwandlung” may be seen as the 
fantasy in which this fantasy takes on the form of reality.
 Taking the metamorphosis to be the fatal outcome of an escape fan-
tasy has the effect of embedding the ontologically fuzzy metamorphosis 
in the dramatic action, but it also requires a reconfiguration or recon-
struction of the plot structure in “Die Verwandlung.” One of the assump-
tions that governed the first progression through the text was that the 
opening of dramatic action coincides with the beginning of the discourse 
(i.e., that the first destabilizing event is the event of the metamorpho-
sis). This assumption does not hold if we accept a consequential rather 
than a consecutive reading of the opening connective clause: it implies 
that we are faced with an in medias res opening in “Die Verwandlung,” 
leaving the reader with the task of reconstructing the part of the plot 
that reaches back into the past. What is presented as background to the 
unfolding drama (gregor’s discontent and frame of mind) is in fact part 
of the causal chain of events. Again the reader is misguided by the narra-
tor: while we are given the impression that we are entering the dramatic 
action exactly when it gets going, it turns out that we enter the dramatic 
action at a point when it is in fact far into the process of complication. 
The real start of the dramatic action, in this case, is gregor’s response of 
entertaining the escape fantasy.
greve, “the humAn body And the humAn being”  53
 It follows from this reconfiguration of the plot that gregor has a 
considerable part in, and therefore responsibility for, his own misery. It is 
not the result of a hidden external agency but rather internally related to 
his handling of his life. The reconfiguration also sheds light on his curi-
ous and seemingly inappropriate response to his transformation. he is 
certainly distressed by his new bodily form, and he reflects on how he 
will be responded to, but quite absurdly he seems even more concerned 
with being too late for work. his refusal to recognize the seriousness 
of his situation makes sense if we see it in light of his unwillingness to 
acknowledge his responsibility: escapist, wishful thinking that prompted 
the metamorphosis carries over into the way his mind works after his 
temptation to depart from his human body has taken on the form of a 
nightmarish reality.
vi
Does my interpretation, with its postulation of a causal connection 
between gregor’s previous life and the metamorphosis, restore the face-
value approach to the text? It clearly does not solve the problem of natu-
ralization. According to our understanding of how the world normally 
works, we simply do not wake up from a dream and find ourselves trans-
formed in accordance with those dreams. The crucial event in the story 
remains unacceptable and unheard of, and no psychological explanation 
of the escape wish (the wish to escape from obligations, an outbreak of 
suppressed sexual desire, a wish for revenge on his father, etc.) is able to 
do away with the ontological fuzziness of the metamorphosis.
 however, perhaps naturalization is not the route to follow when try-
ing to make sense of this story; seeing the significance of the story’s 
resistance to sense is a better alternative. We seem to gain sense by allow-
ing the story to revolve around the ontological problematic it contains. 
We should not take the story to be a vehicle for reflection on issues in 
philosophical anthropology, but rather see the unfolding of the dramatic 
action as an enactment of or fleshing out of the temptation of dualism. 
The temptation of dualism resides not only in the history of philosophy 
but also in us. I guess most of us have sometimes woken up hoping that 
Descartes was right—that the bodily creature we are, uneasy as any one 
of us may feel about it, is external to the human being that we are; that 
there are no essential connections. This may be due either to self-con-
tempt or to an unwillingness to stand by human life as essentially shared 
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with other bodily human beings. exactly because dualism is conceived of 
in this story not primarily as a philosophical idea, but rather as a human 
temptation, or as an idea that is existentially grounded, we are able to 
find our feet with the transformed gregor.
 By acknowledging that dualism is an idea that resonates deeply with 
any human being who is alert to life’s complexities and anxieties, we can 
see that gregor’s extraordinary ontological situation, his being human 
and yet not a human being, emerges as a fictional dramatization of the 
rather more ordinary and familiar struggle of coming to terms with the 
human condition and a reflection of our often half-hearted commitment 
to it. The image of gregor transformed into something verminous is 
particularly suited to capturing the aspects of the temptation of dualism 
noted above: the aggression toward other people, the resentment of their 
demands on us, and the self-contempt that is likely to result.
 In the fictional dramatization of this wish in “Die Verwandlung,” the 
denial of the human condition turns out to be fatal, not least because 
gregor is deprived of a comprehensible human language. Initially, he 
is unaware of his exclusion from linguistic communication. he thinks 
he speaks to his family in words, he hears his own sounds as words, but 
they can’t hear words in the sounds he utters. he clearly recognizes the 
importance of conversation in order to stay human: his attempt at com-
municating is essentially an attempt at communicating his humanity to 
them, assuming that the inclusion in the human conversation sustains his 
inclusion “in den menschlichen Kreis” (KAF, 1:106) (“into human soci-
ety” [Kafka 1996, 11]), and he regards his progressively lowered awareness 
of what is important to him as a human being to be a consequence of 
his being excluded from the human conversation. But contrary to the 
assumption on which the fantasy of dualism rests, this conversation—
“Seit ein gespräch wir sind,” to use a phrase from hölderlin—is a con-
versation the whole human being participates in. If we take conversation 
and communication as crucial to our being human, there is in no logical 
room for divorcing the human being that we are from our human body.
 This focus on the importance of the human conversation also carries 
over to the text itself, as an act of communication. By taking such pains 
to frustrate the reader’s attempts at making sense of the story, Kafka runs 
the risk of failing to communicate with his reader at all. even so, the chief 
difficulty of “Die Verwandlung” is the nature of the story’s concern—
its probing into the role of the human body in our being human and 
our unwillingness to confront this issue, to participate in these probings. 
hence the elusiveness of the communicative content of the story: the 
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anguish connected with the temptation of dualism, with its reference to 
our wavering between acknowledging the human condition and our all 
too human wish to escape it, indicates the sense of anguish that the story 
gives voice to and the kind of truth it expresses. Speirs and Sandberg say 
of Kafka’s fiction in general, “Such elusive, only intuitively graspable and 
yet indubitable ‘truth,’ rather than some rationally demonstrable ‘sense,’ is 
what Kafka hoped his fiction, at its best, could achieve” (1997, 18). For 
the reader of “Die Verwandlung,” this communicative effect is captured 
not by abandoning the face-value approach but by following it to its limit 
and by seeking to recognize and optimize the significance of this limit. 
however, if the particular kind of anguish given expression in “Die Ver-
wandlung” does not resonate with us, it is unlikely that we can see our-
selves as spoken to by the story in this way. No matter how important the 
textual design is in shaping the reader’s relation to the text, the readerly 
interaction with that design is still dependent on who the reader is and 
the sense of existence that is within the reader’s reach. In that respect 
“Die Verwandlung” is a highly risky act of communication.
 Its riskiness, however, does not detract from its importance as a con-
tribution to a philosophical discussion. Participating in the fictional drama-
tization of the temptation of dualism, the reader is invited to experience 
the connection between the thesis of dualism and the ontological-exis-
tential anguish of the Samsa family: that of gregor in particular, but also 
of the father, mother and sister. Such connections between ontological 
and existential issues are seldom vibrant in philosophical discussions, even 
if they are crucial to understanding what is at stake; why the discussion 
matters. Thus, experiencing the thesis fleshed out in the form of a nar-
rative is also philosophically important in that it helps us reconnect the 
thesis with the anguish. To acknowledge this is to acknowledge that the 
narrative form of “Die Verwandlung” is crucial to the reader’s engage-
ment with and grasp of its philosophical concerns.
notes
 1. Note the nuances within the family’s response: grete accommodates for the 
fact that gregor is still gregor longer than do the mother and the father.
 2. I employ the term “mimetic” here in accordance with James Phelan’s use of 
the term. he distinguishes between three aspects of the literary character—the mi-
metic, the thematic, and the synthetic—and defines the mimetic aspect of the char-
acter as “that component of character directed to its imitation of a possible person” 
(2005, 216). generally, the reading strategy adopted in my interpretation of “Die 
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Verwandlung” is indebted to Phelan’s rhetorical approach to narrativity, especially 
the significance attributed to the progression of the story and to the readerly sense-
making engagement in this progression.
 3. The idea that there is only an external relation between the inner human 
being and the outer human body may be imagined in at least two ways. We may 
envisage the possibility that the human body is merely an automaton. What looks 
like a human being is in fact not that at all: despite the smile, the devious glance, the 
seemingly wholehearted dedication to other human beings, and other human char-
acteristics, there may be in fact no inner life there to support the bodily and verbal 
expressions. Conversely, we may be asked to imagine that inside the body that does 
not look like a human being at all there is a rich inner human life unfolding—
complete with intentions, hopes, and the capacity for planning, calculation, and 
dismay in the face of severe trouble—with no way of expressing this inner life in 
the concentration of a face, the hopeful glance, the beaten looks or, for that matter, 
in the posture of the human body, in dragging one’s feet in despair. All these human 
feelings and cognitions are there, inside the non-human body, and the absence of a 
human body for them to be expressed in seems not to be detrimental to their real-
ity. The way gregor’s transformation is described is premised on the second version 
of this dualistic picture of the human being.
 4. For an extensive discussion of this conception of the identity of human be-
ings, see David Cockburn, Other Human Beings (1990). My discussion of dualism 
owes a lot to Cockburn’s work.
 5. Our attitude to this indeterminacy may depend on our view of the reading 
process. Is it a matter of choice on the part of the reader whether we see a causal 
connection between the two events? Rimmon-Kenan seems to think so. In her 
comment on Forster’s famous distinction between plot and story and his example 
of the latter (“‘The king died and then the queen died’”), she holds that “there is 
nothing to prevent a causally-minded reader from supplementing Forster’s . . . ex-
ample with the causal link that would make it into an implicit plot” (Rimmon-
Kenan 2002, 17). A more rhetorically oriented reader, however, will assume the 
possibility that this indeterminacy may be part of the rhetorical design of the text, 
assuming that our response to it should be constrained by considerations of the 
potential connections between this aspect of the text and others that together may 
contribute to the text’s overall communicative effect. 
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Relations between the neighboring domains of literary scholarship and 
cultural studies have sometimes been less than cordial. In his speech of 
thanks for the Bavarian grand Prize for Literature, for example, the emi-
nent german literary critic Karl heinz Bohrer (2005) fought to defend 
his “fatherland” (literary scholarship) against the barbaric nomads of 
today (cultural studies). I would like to take three of his statements as a 
point of departure for the following reflections. First, culture is always 
the outward form an age gives to its shared thought, action, and arts; it is 
a form of knowledge corresponding to a social norm. Literature, on the 
other hand, like painting and music, always refers to some incommensu-
rable event, an anti-normative phenomenon. If I want to understand the 
art of a piece of art, Bohrer contends, I may not make use of the histori-
cal category of culture. Second, the reality displayed in the language of 
literature is ominous, and its referentiality needs to be questioned. Third, 
from these considerations results the a priori assumption of any literary 
scholarship worth its name—that is to say, the absolute and fundamental 
difference between history and reality on the one hand, and literature on 
the other (Bohrer 2005, 20).
 In what follows I would like to question the severe alternative Bohrer 
offers literary scholarship: either the variety stage of cultural forms devoid 
of any true artistic value or the position adopted by the true aesthete, sit-
ting in a rocking chair and gazing out of the window, hands in trouser 
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pockets, a bottle of wine on the table. I shall look at the cultural form of 
modern propaganda, the historical event of World War I, and the narrative 
strategy in Kafka’s Chinese stories of spring 1917, in order to demonstrate 
the intricate nexus between the “reality displayed,” or rather hidden, in 
these stories, and the ominous referentiality of Kafka’s poetic language. I 
shall argue, in other words, that the origin and the law of the “anti-nor-
mative” quality of Kafka’s narratives are only conceivable through close 
analysis of precisely those cultural forms and historical events that sur-
round them.1
 Admittedly, mentioning the war seems to be the weakest possible 
foundation for any such claim. If we consult the currently available hand-
books in german on the literature of war, we do not find a single refer-
ence to Kafka. This scholarly finding is of course immediately confirmed 
by one of the main sources for Kafka scholarship, namely Kafka’s own 
diary. On July 31, 1914, the first day of the global catastrophe, we read 
(over and over again): “Ich habe keine Zeit. es ist allgemeine Mobilisier-
ung. K. und P. sind einberufen. . . .  Nachmittag werde ich in der Fabrik 
sein müssen. . . . Aber schreiben werde ich trotz alledem, unbedingt, es 
ist mein Kampf um die Selbsterhaltung“ (KKAT, 543) (“I have no time. 
general mobilization. K. and P. have been called up. . . .  [So] I shall 
have to spend my afternoons in the factory. . . . But I will write in spite 
of everything, absolutely; it is my struggle for self-preservation” [Kafka 
1964, 300]). And again, six days later: “Der Sinn für die Darstellung 
meines traumhaften inneren Lebens hat alles andere ins Nebensächliche 
gerückt und es ist in einer schrecklichen Weise verkümmert und hört 
nicht auf zu verkümmern“ (KKAT, 546) (“My talent for portraying my 
dreamlike inner life has thrust all other matters into the background; they 
have dwindled dreadfully, nor will they cease to dwindle” [Kafka 1964, 
302]). Could there be a clearer assertion of Bohrer’s scholarly a priori, 
the irredeemable disjunction of history and literature? Could Kafka have 
expressed his indifference toward all things military more obviously than 
in his entry of August 2: “Deutschland hat Russland den Krieg erk lärt.—
Nachmittag Schwimmschule” (KKAT, 543) (“germany has declared war 
on Russia.—Swimming in the afternoon” [Kafka 1964, 301])? But wait: 
here, in fact, we may just have found a nice example of that “ominous 
referentiality” about which Bohrer warns us. A sufficient quantity and 
quality of wine provided, it will occur to us that in Kafka’s notebooks 
“swimming” is a prominent cipher for the condition of the writer, a 
model image connecting an existential situation (swimming as opposed 
to drowning)2 to a publicly acclaimed skill or ability (competitive swim-
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ming for a world record).3 So let us see if we can find out more about 
this ominous referentiality that links the war to the swimming school.
i
The beginning of the First World War, that “seminal catastrophe” (Ken-
nan 1979, 3) of the twentieth century, also marks a turning point in the 
history of language and narrative. In the german-Austrian Augusterlebnis 
(“August experience”) of 1914, the poets’ yearning for a reunion of lan-
guage and life—as expressed so beautifully in hugo von hofmannsthal’s 
A Letter (a fictional letter, purportedly addressed to Philip Lord Chan-
dos)—had been fulfilled, albeit in a doubly paradoxical way. First, the sup-
posedly unreflecting, immediate experience of collective enthusiasm was in 
fact generated by an unparalleled, concerted effort of mass organization 
and the mass media. Referring to a public proclamation of war that he 
observed from his window, Kafka notes in his diary on August 6, “Organ-
isiert war es gut. es soll sich jeden Abend wiederholen, morgen Sonntag 
zweimal” (KKAT, 546) (“It was well organized. It is to be repeated every 
evening, twice tomorrow and on Sunday” [Kafka 1964, 302]). Second, 
the enhanced life described in the general narrative of the Augusterlebnis 
is always sacrificed life, the poetic cipher for the beginning of industri-
alized mass killing. This was the hour for the poets and intellectuals to 
proclaim what gustav Roethe, a professor of german literature in Ber-
lin, called “the immense experience [das ungeheure Erlebnis] that binds us 
together, purifies and elevates us” (1914, 18). Thus, Erlebnis, that child 
of fin-de-siècle german philosophy, with its triple narrative potential—
embracing the biography of the individual, the collective social experi-
ence, and the higher plane of world history (see horn 2000, 131)—had 
been summoned to report for active duty. In that summer of 1914, no 
one seemed to mind the gap between culture and artistic expression, 
Bohrer’s a priori of literary scholarship. Of course, considered as a turn-
ing point in the history of public speech, the Augusterlebnis had not come 
out of the blue. As Friedrich Kittler has pointed out, the three german 
“wars of unification” between 1863 and 1870 had already posed a seri-
ous problem for the iconography of war: “Telegraph networks, military 
build-up plans, recruitment statistics, and ballistic tables—none of these 
would yield pictures any more. Their only reality is numbers. yet mass 
armies could not be recruited with naked numbers alone. hence a new 
politics of images was part of the new strategy of national wars” (2000, i).
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 Two further points need to be added. First, the challenge (the lack 
of immediate, manifest significance in technology and positive knowl-
edge) was not restricted to the military field; second, the response (the 
production of new levels or layers of evidence) was not restricted to the 
visual media but applied to verbal imagery as well. In his anti-capitalist 
and anti-Semitic pamphlet, Das Gesetz des Nomadentums und die heutige 
Judenherrschaft (“The law of the nomad and today’s reign of the Jews”),4 
for example, the Viennese Orientalist Adolf Wahrmund offered a reading 
of history as an eternal conflict between two human types: the sedentary, 
culturally productive Aryan, and the nomadic, destructive Semite, who 
made a living out of raiding Aryan culture (1919).5 In order to justify his 
reductionist model, Wahrmund called for the creation of a visual form 
of historiography to counteract “meaningless” positivism and statistics. 
What was needed in order to understand history was not theory and the 
systematic organization of evidence; rather, only “real, which is to say 
natural powers of life should be looked at” (“ins Auge gefaßt werden”), 
the “eternal key figures of historical events” who could resist the techno-
logical-Semitic “collapse of culture” (“Kultursturz”) (Wahrmund 1919, 4).
 Clearly, Western society’s current habit of invoking a “clash of cul-
tures” as a remedy for the imminent “collapse of culture” (i.e., the prac-
tice of externalizing an immanent threat to one’s way of life) is deeply 
rooted in modern metahistory. As hegelian philosophy began to disinte-
grate, cultural types, freed from the treadmill of the dialectic, spread out 
across a variety of discourses, including those of scholarship, journalism, 
and propaganda. The application of typology could be located anywhere 
on a scale between two epistemic poles, an essentialist one, allegedly con-
nected to depth and transcendental truth, and a cognitive one, connected 
to surface and positive knowledge. Wahrmund’s Aryan-Semitic dichot-
omy obviously represents an extreme version of the essentialist option, 
with its discursive claim to penetrate the appearance of historical phe-
nomena and grasp their essence. In the aftermath of the two world wars, 
conservative german historians argued that types of the second (cogni-
tive) kind had to be distinguished clearly from such essentialist terminol-
ogy. Types were to be considered as “approximative or accidental terms, 
approaching the essence of their historical object asymptotically . . . and 
naturally open to changes, additions, and amendments, not as to their 
form, but as to their content, creating space for a conflict of opinions 
from which the truly typical traits would then emerge” (Zittel 1967, 128; 
my translation). Seen thus, types functioned as cultural protocols for his-
torical processes and events. While the recording or filing function of the 
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accidental type was opposed to the expressive function of the essentialist 
type, it is precisely the paradoxical interplay of these two functions that 
created the remarkable discursive appeal of typology and brought about 
the typically german fascination with types.
 In the summer of 1914, in a series of state-sponsored talks given in 
Berlin and distributed widely in cheap pamphlets (Wilamowitz-Moellen-
dorf 1914), german professors contributed to the new politics of imag-
ery by providing it with a set of pseudo-scholarly narratives that served as 
an enhancing cultural frame. For example, the political economist Werner 
Sombart (Max Weber’s most notable scholarly opponent in the pre-war 
period) updated essentialist typology for military deployment. In Som-
bart’s narrative, presented in a pamphlet published in 1915 and entitled 
Händler und Helden (“Traders and heroes”), world history is dominated 
by the conflict between traders (typically British) and heroes (typically 
germans). Whereas the trader strives for a secure and comfortable life, a 
life they control by calculation, Sombart’s hero “wants to give, he wants 
to waste himself, to sacrifice himself ” (1915, 64) to call attention to the 
state at war and its life-devouring military machine. “Do people have a 
clue,” exclaimed Karl Kraus, the foremost critic of this murderous typol-
ogy, “about the kind of life to which the press gives expression? A life 
that has long since been the imprint [Ausdruck] of this very press” (1988, 
16). In the face of an all-embracing war journalism that was capable of 
“transforming printer’s ink into blood” (1988, 18), Kraus chose to turn 
to silence—albeit in his own paradoxical way, by proclaiming his famous 
anti-war tirade to be an inevitable commentary that distinguished his 
silence from tacit agreement.6
 Kafka’s famous remark of 1922—“mauscheln wie Kraus kann nie-
mand” (Kafka 1975, 336) (“No one can ‘mauscheln’ like Kraus” [Kafka 
1978, 288])—represents a case of extreme modesty. In response to the chal-
lenge of war propaganda, Kafka too, just like Kraus, falls back on maus-
cheln, an untranslatable term for the anti-Semitic notion that there exists 
a typically Jewish, or rather yiddish, modus loquendi, allegedly a fraudulent 
language that combined vivid gesticulation with hidden meaning. Unlike 
Kraus, however, Kafka creates a narrative voice that conceals even the traces 
of its own mauscheln, thereby combining silence with utmost eloquence.
ii
In the spring of 1917, when the multi-ethnic hapsburg empire believed 
itself to be surrounded by an alliance of foreign and barbaric enemies 
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while facing, on the domestic front, the choice between returning to 
authoritarian centralism or being swept away by the strong and multiple 
movements toward national independence in its constituent territories, 
Kafka was invited to join an artists’ association for “greater Austria.” he 
declined the invitation on the grounds that he was “nicht imstande, mir 
ein im geiste irgendwie einheitliches groß-Österreich klarzumachen 
und noch weniger allerdings, mich diesem geistigen ganz eingefügt zu 
denken, vor einer solchen entscheidung schrecke ich zurück” (KKANI, 
336) (“incapable of envisaging a homogeneous greater Austria and even 
less capable of imagining myself completely integrated into that spiritual 
whole; from such a decision I shrink back”) (my translation). This rejec-
tion implies the initiating factor in all of Kafka’s writings: an assignment.
 On the very next page of his notebook Kafka sets out to write 
down two stories about the Chinese empire. The first and longer frag-
ment, “Building the great Wall of China,” reflects the interplay between 
national defense against barbarous nomads on the one hand and the 
domestic issue of the administrative and imaginary organization of 
political leadership and unity on the other. While the story’s first sen-
tence—“Die chinesische Mauer ist an ihrer nördlichsten Stelle beendet 
worden” (KKANI, 337) (“The great Wall of China was finished at its 
most northerly point” [KSS, 113; translation modified])—seems to pro-
claim the completion of the defensive wall, it soon becomes clear that, as 
the Chinese master of torture in Octave Mirbeau’s novel Torture Garden 
had whispered in Kafka’s ear, “Something is rotten in the state of China” 
(1997, 152).7 The flaw lies in the system of partial construction that leaves 
wide gaps in the wall and creates doubts about the accountability of the 
Chinese high Command. By the end of the account, however, these very 
doubts, together with the manifold representations of the emperor him-
self in the various provinces and villages, are acknowledged precisely to 
be the foundation of the empire’s political constitution. The second frag-
ment, “A Page from an Old Document,” proves this conclusion wrong, 
however, as it describes the situation after the failure of national defense, 
when the capital has been invaded by the nomads while the emperor 
looks on helplessly. The diegetic frame (the document is alleged to be a 
fragment of an old manuscript damaged by fire) seems to place it in the 
historical past of the first account.
 At first glance, we are dealing here with a neat historical analogy 
linking China with Austria, wrapped up in a literary image. On the one 
hand, Kafka’s Chinese account corresponds with the facts of Chinese 
history in its key elements and even in many striking details. The first 
long narrative could be located around 1435 when, at the cultural peak 
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of the Ming Dynasty, the great Wall was completed. The second account 
could be connected to the nomad invasion in the thirteenth century 
when the Chinese capital of Nanking, unlike Beijing in later centuries, 
was still located far from the border, as an important detail of the shoe-
maker’s account has it. On the other hand, Austria enters the picture 
via a letter in which Talleyrand, after the battle of Austerlitz, reminded 
Napoleon that “the hapsburg monarchy is an accumulation of states fit-
ting together badly, completely different in language, customs, creed, and 
constitution, which only have in common the person of their emperor. 
Such a power cannot but be weak; but it is a suitable bulwark against 
the barbarians—and a necessary one” (Cooper, 186). This image of the 
“necessary bulwark” against the barbaric Slavs was of course revitalized 
in german-Austrian war propaganda time and time again.
 yet the correlation between Kafka’s China and the Austria of 1917 
cannot simply be reduced to the semiotic scale, to the mere analogy 
between two empires on the verge of being invaded. Rather, it needs to 
be located and analyzed on a pragmatic level, namely as Kafka’s reaction 
to and intervention in political discourse by the aesthetic means of nar-
ration. Allow me to unfold this hypothesis in three steps.
 If we look at the diegetic frame of Kafka’s narrative, we note that 
his narrated world stands in close proximity to the typological thinking 
of his day. In nineteenth-century typology, “China” was used as short-
hand for the cultural condition that the german conservative sociolo-
gist Arnold gehlen was later to term “crystallized” in his critique of the 
administrative social state on both sides of the iron curtain (1962, 311–
28). In hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History, the crystallized culture 
of the Chinese—a system of strictly top-down administrative and intra-
family hierarchies and the complete absence of subjective inwardness and 
responsibility—represented the cultural other of a dynamic and progres-
sive Western culture based on individual responsibility and reason. It was 
only later in the nineteenth century, in Nietzsche’s criticism of Western 
culture and the Bismarckian welfare state, that the possibility of filing 
the case of europe itself under the rubric of “Chinese affairs” was first 
discussed at some length. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche wrote, “Social-
ists and the state idolaters of europe, with their measures for making life 
better and safer, could easily establish Chinese conditions and Chinese 
‘happiness’ in europe too, if only they could first extirpate the sicklier, 
more tender, more feminine dissatisfaction and romanticism that are still 
superabundant here at present” (2001, sec. 1, 25). In the first version of 
his Protestant Ethic (1904), even Max Weber spoke of the “‘Chinese’ pet-
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rifaction” of modern culture ; in the revised edition, published after the 
end of World War I, this regressive use of typology was wisely changed 
to “mechanical petrifaction” (1996, 154, 202; my translation). In Wahr-
mund’s anti-Semitic pamphlet, it is the “petrified” Semitic culture that 
threatens to undo europe’s efforts to tear itself away from the influence 
of Asia during the classical age. Conversely, Martin Buber, one of the 
founding fathers of “cultural Zionism,” with its center in Prague, con-
tends that only Oriental culture is capable of granting unity and unques-
tionable meaning, of creating those “metaphors of the nameless” (1963b, 
56; my translation) that would be able to reconcile what Buber called the 
“Asian crisis” (1963b, 64) of the age, its lack of a unifying myth, as craved 
by the artists’ association of “greater Austria” that Kafka declined to 
join. In Buber’s Zionist cultural script, it is precisely and exclusively “the 
Jew” to whom this mission must be assigned, since he alone had always 
“remained an oriental” (1963b, 62).
 Kafka certainly knew the cultural “China” file to the extent that it is 
displayed here, and far beyond. When he started writing about China at 
the turning point of the First World War, however, he not only imitated 
a complex semiotic structure but also inscribed his writing into a series 
of pragmatic speech acts. In the years following the constitutional crisis 
of 1848, when the unity of the hapsburg empire was threatened by 
the desire of its various peoples for self-determination, Karel havlícˇek 
Borovský, a founding father of the Czech political press, was exiled to 
Tyrol. From there he wrote, in the guise of a foreign correspondent, criti-
cal reports about the domestic affairs of Ireland and China, reports that 
could be related approximately or accidentally to the hapsburg empire.8 
Withdrawing to a setting in order to reflect critically on the present need 
not, however, simply be a reaction to repression and censorship. It can 
also be an active move to create space for contemplation in the face of 
overwhelming events. Kafka’s Chinese reflections also participate in the 
tradition of this other gesture, as instanced most notably by Nietzsche’s 
retrospective foreword to The Birth of Tragedy: “As the thunder of the 
Battle of Wörth rolled across europe, the brooder and lover of riddles 
who fathered the book was sitting in some corner of the Alps . . . writ-
ing down his thoughts about the Greeks . . . ” (1999, 3). Kafka, in turn, 
as the first and foremost among those readers Nietzsche had been crav-
ing all his life,9 found the precise formula for his sidestep to Asia in the 
opening section of the fourth Unfashionable Observation, where Niet zsche 
invokes the example of Alexander the great to characterize the Wagne-
rian perspective on contemporary culture: “We know that in moments 
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of extraordinary danger or when making important decisions about their 
lives, people compress all their experiences in an infinitely accelerated 
process of introspection and are able to perceive once again with uncom-
mon sharpness the nearest and the most distant things. What might 
Alexander the great have seen in that moment in which he had europe 
and Asia drink from one and the same cup?” (1995, 262).
 Shifting focus from the diegetic frame to the narrative instance, we 
can now establish that the latter, in terms of contemporary cultural typol-
ogy, truly is Chinese. “The Chinese,” hegel writes in his Lectures on the 
Philosophy of History, “have as a general characteristic a remarkable skill 
in imitation, which is exercised not merely in daily life, but also in art” 
(1900, 144). Right from its first breath, in other words, Kafka’s Chinese 
voice is infected with literacy. Not only does it produce nothing but imi-
tations but it emerges from an act of imitation itself, appearing simply to 
echo hegel’s Chinese typology, including its subsequent changes, addi-
tions, and emendations. This narrative voice keeps oscillating between 
the nearest and the most distant things, as Nietzsche put it, tensed as it is 
between inwardness and identity on the one hand, and exteriority and 
multiplicity on the other. Accordingly, the narrator of the “great Wall” 
fragment is at once in the position of a detached observer of the defense 
venture and involved in it (as a subordinate leader). he thus operates on 
both sides of the distinction between a heterodiegetic and a homodi-
egetic narrator, while the diegetic world is at once a “narrated world” and 
a “discussed world.”10 As we are discussing a story by Franz Kafka, this 
narratological distinction, or rather indecision, between detachment and 
involvement already occurs on the level of the narrative itself. Thus, the 
Chinese narrator repeats the movement of his Bohemian author when 
he stresses that “Meine Untersuchung ist doch nur eine historische, aus 
den längst verflogenen gewitterwolken zuckt kein Blitz mehr” (KKANI, 
346) (“my investigation is purely historical; lightning no longer flashes 
from the long since vanished thunderclouds” [KSS, 117; translation modi-
fied]). At the same time, the narrative structure that creates this pecu-
liar indecision, which is to say a rudimentary matrix narrative bringing 
forth an extended and complex, multi-level hyponarrative, is a defining 
feature of the multifarious reports on safety measures Kafka, the insur-
ance clerk, had to write for the Austrian authorities. here, too, the genre 
requires the reporter’s detachment from the content of the report, while 
official responsibility grants continuous involvement. The specific differ-
ence between those Bohemian reports and the Chinese report lies in 
the fact that in the latter case the matrix narrative does not precede the 
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report, but is embedded in it, thus confronting the reader with an unini-
tialized hyponarrative. At both levels of writing, the detached style of 
the report may be interrupted by quoted statements of actors involved 
in the field. Within Kafka’s office writings, his long report on “Umfang 
der Versicherungspflicht der Baugewerbe und baulichen Nebengewerbe” 
(Kafka 2004, 54–69, 70–73) (“the Scope of Compulsory Insurance for 
the Building Trades” [Kafka 2009, 54–73]) represents a vivid example of 
just such an orchestration of voices by the insertion of third-degree nar-
ratives.11 In the same vein, his Chinese narrator eschews the perspective 
of Erlebnis (“experience”) in favor of the perspective of historical events 
but easily shifts to the opposite mode of expression when he quotes the 
rhetoric and spirit of the Augusterlebnis in the following description of 
the building operations: “jeder Landsmann war ein Bruder, für den man 
eine Schutzmauer baute. . . . einheit! einheit! Brust an Brust, ein Reigen 
des Volkes, Blut, nicht mehr eingesperrt im kärglichen Kreislauf des Kör-
pers, sondern süß rollend und doch wiederkehrend durch das unendli-
che China” (KKANI, 342) (“every fellow countryman was a brother for 
whom one was building a wall of protection. . . . Unity! unity! breast on 
breast, a round dance of the people, blood, no longer locked up in the 
cramped circulation of the body but rolling sweetly and yet returning 
through the infinity of China” [KSS, 115; translation modified]).
 This oscillation between involvement and detachment, this amalga-
mation of the nearest and the most distant things, becomes even more 
crucial when we try to get to know the narrator. his peculiar double 
qualification as an expert on nomad prevention and “vergleichende 
Völkergeschichte” (KKANI, 48) (“comparative ethnography” [KSS, 118]) 
betrays a certain kinship with Kafka, the Bohemian expert on accident 
prevention and writer of stories about China whose confessed desire 
was to “die ganze Menschen- und Tiergemeinschaft zu überblicken, ihre 
grundlegenden Vorlieben, Wünsche, sittlichen Ideale zu erkennen, sie 
auf einfache Vorschriften zurückzuführen” (Br, 755) (“know the entire 
human and animal community, to recognize their fundamental prefer-
ences, desires, and moral ideas, to reduce them to simple rules” [Kafka 
1974, 545]). It is a kinship, though, that is less a case of personal simi-
larities than of common skills, despite a number of correspondences in 
educational and career matters. Any Kafka scholar interested in narratol-
ogy would do well to listen closely the Chinese narrator’s clue that “es 
gibt bestimmte Fragen denen man nur mit diesem Mittel gewissermaßen 
an den Nerv herankommt” (KKANI, 348) (“there are certain questions 
whose nub, so to speak, one can get to only by this method” [KSS, 118]), 
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namely by linking comparative ethnography (Kafka’s definition of his 
writing project) to issues of public safety.
 The interplay between literature (on one side of Bohrer’s gap) and 
the great War and industrial accident insurance (on the other) goes 
far beyond a number of random allusive references. In the wake of the 
excitement triggered by the Chernobyl disaster, it has been suggested 
that historians should adopt some of the methods of accident research 
in order to understand better the emergence and course of major armed 
conflicts.12 Kafka’s response, as it were, has been waiting patiently for this 
challenge to be made. A glance across to the “cultural” side of Bohrer’s 
gap to the desert of Kafka’s office writings, reveals that the narrative 
arrangement of his Chinese-nomadic typology owes a considerable debt 
to the discourse of accident prevention and accident insurance. In fact, 
we find the key problems of Kafka’s Chinese narrative prefigured in two 
speeches Kafka composed in 1913 as a ghostwriter for his Institute’s pre-
sentation at the Second International Congress for Rescue Service and 
Accident Prevention in Vienna (see Kafka 2004, 860.). To begin with, the 
difference between a complete defense wall and the inexpedient system 
of piecemeal construction points to the distinction between accident pre-
vention in the german Reich and in Austria, whereas in germany the 
organization of accident insurance by trade associations (specific branches 
of production) permitted a systematic method of accident prevention: 
“[war] die territoriale Organisation [in Österreich] . . . viel zu umfas-
send . . . um mit der Unfallverhütung zweckmäßig verbunden zu werden” 
(Kafka 2004, 278) (“the territorial organization [in Austria] was much 
too broad . . . to be coupled with accident prevention in a purposeful 
way” [Kafka 2009, 269]). This led to the very system of piecemeal con-
struction on which the narrator comments: “Aber der Teilbau war nur 
ein Notbehelf und unzweckmäßig. Bleibt also nur die Folgerung, dass 
die Führerschaft etwas Unzweckmäßiges wollte. Sonderbare Folgerung, 
gewiß” (KKANI, 345) (“But partial construction was only a makeshift and 
unsuited to its purpose. The conclusion that remains is that the leaders 
wanted something unsuited to its purpose. An odd conclusion, certainly” 
[KSS, 117]). The first Vienna speech on Bohemian accident prevention 
also anticipates the strategic crux of the Chinese construction proj-
ect—adapting the construction of the wall not only to the continuous 
development of building technology but also to the nomads’ permanent 
shifting from place to place: “die Unfallverhütung [ist] in fortwährender 
Umbildung begriffen . . . da sie einerseits der entwicklung der Industrie 
und Maschinentechnik, andererseits jener der Unfallverhütungstechnik 
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folgen soll” (Kafka 2004, 277) (“accident prevention is in the process of 
continuous reformulation, since it must follow both the development of 
industry and machine technology as well as the developments of acci-
dent prevention technology” [Kafka 2009, 251]).13 Like the Chinese in 
Kafka’s story, his expert colleagues on accident insurance in Prague were 
well aware of the fact that they could learn from the accidents/nomad 
movements how best to organize their defense against them. In 1916 Alois 
güt ling, the head statistician of the Prague institute, with whom Kafka 
shared an office, suggested applying Charles Frederick Taylor’s Principles 
of Scientific Management to accident prevention. By breaking down the 
process of production into its most basic steps, it would soon be possible 
to establish statistically the precise accident risk of every single movement 
made by an individual worker (gütling 1916, 189).14 As contemporary 
war reporting on the strategy of battlefront development was organized 
according to the same basic conflict—between a defense effort that fol-
lowed a spatial logic and an enemy whose movements in space seemed to 
be incalculable—Kafka’s Chinese-nomad scenario offers its readers a space 
for an interdisciplinary dialogue on accidents in industry and history.
 The presence of extra-literary forms and procedures at the very cen-
ter of the aesthetic becomes even more undeniable when we look at the 
overall arrangement of narrative voices. Like his office writings, Kafka’s 
“Chinese protocols” depend on a narrative source that brings forth a 
variety of voices, among which the voice of the expert does not claim 
privileged credibility or authority, thereby exposing the void space of 
a metanarrative instance, or rather, the metanarrative instance as a void 
space.15 Thus, the Chinese architect cites a number of legends from Chi-
nese folk wisdom, thereby insisting on the superiority of public opinion 
over the scholarly knowledge of historians and finally underlining the 
fact that it is precisely the polyphonic constitution of imaginary unity 
that is the foundation of the Chinese empire. yet there is a most signifi-
cant multi-vocality at work here that transgresses even the diegetic frame 
of the architect’s report. When Kafka abandoned his first Chinese frag-
ment, the next thing he wrote was the first few lines of the story about 
a trader who prematurely shuts down his shop in the afternoon out of 
disgust at his business (KKANI, 357). On the very next page of Kafka’s 
notebook we witness the opening of another story and another shop: 
“Ich habe eine Schusterwerkstatt auf dem Platz vor dem kaiserlichen 
Palast. Kaum öffne ich in der Morgendämmerung meinen Laden, sehe 
ich schon die eingänge aller hier einlaufenden gassen von Bewaffneten 
besetzt. es sind . . . offenbar Nomaden aus dem Norden” (KKANI, 358) 
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(“I have a shoemaker’s shop on the square in front of the Imperial Palace. 
No sooner do I open my shop at dawn than I see armed men occupy-
ing the openings to all the streets that run into the square. . . . they are 
evidently nomads from the North” [KSS, 66]).
 The connection between the architect’s report on nomad prevention 
and the shoemaker’s report on nomad invasion is much stronger than 
this. It goes far beyond the opposition between two strategic scenarios—
a shop closed in the afternoon and a shop opened in the morning, “the 
most risky time of the day” (cf Vogl 1994, 745)—and far beyond the 
order of pages in Kafka’s notebook. In fact, Kafka has taken the inter-
play between the two irreconcilable narratives and voices (those of the 
architect and the shoemaker) straight from his downtown office at the 
Accident Insurance Institute up to his “shoemaker’s shop”16 to the Alchi-
mistengasse (right in front of the Prague Royal Palace), where he wrote 
his after-hours protocols at that time. The two narrative perspectives on 
the nomad issue reflect precisely the two discourses on industrial acci-
dents that collided almost day by day, week by week, on Kafka’s office 
desk. On the one hand, there is the discourse of the expert on acci-
dent prevention, speaking in the name of an institution, arguing from 
a wide angle and multiple perspectives with knowledge of technology 
and manpower management, conceiving the accident as an eventuality, 
a mere probability—a risk related to the life of a population. On the 
other hand, there is the discourse of the accident victim, with all the 
features of a typical incident report (Hergangsbericht) as prescribed by the 
official form for a compensation claim.17 In the latter case, an individual 
faces the post-accident situation with an unequipped mind, incapable 
of remembering the actual event—“Auf eine mir unbegreifliche Weise 
sind sie bis in die hauptstadt gedrungen, die doch sehr weit von der 
grenze enfernt ist” (KKANI, 358) (“In a manner incomprehensible to 
me, they have penetrated to the capital, although it lies a long way from 
the border” [KSS, 66])—and describes a fate as it relates to the life of an 
individual. Moreover, in the shoemaker’s account the Chinese architect’s 
Erlebnis scenario, the supposedly immense and elevating experience of 
a collective communio sanguinis, is inverted, for the imagined liberation 
of the blood actually comes about quite literally as a live ox is torn to 
pieces by the bloodthirsty nomads who congregate in the name of cru-
elty and havoc. What is more, the witness/victim not only finds himself 
abandoned by those responsible for nomad prevention but also finds that 
the third narrative dimension of the Erlebnis, the plane of world history, 
has been cancelled. As the emperor watches the scene from his Palace 
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with his head bowed, unable to take action, all are abandoned, even by 
nomad insurance. The traders and craftsmen, following Sombart’s typo-
script, establish an elementary mutual insurance scheme as a substitute 
for heroic state action by pooling their money to support the butcher 
whose free home delivery of raw meat to the nomads is intended to still 
their thirst for blood. Alas, this procedure has as much influence on the 
nomads as accident insurance has on the occurrence of accidents: “Bekä-
men die Nomaden kein Fleisch, wer weiß was ihnen zu tun einfiele, wer 
weiß allerdings, was ihnen einfallen wird, selbst wenn sie täglich Fleisch 
bekommen” (KKANI, 360) (“If the nomads were not to get meat, who 
knows what would occur to them to do; who knows, for that matter, 
what will occur to them even if they do get their daily meat” [KSS, 67]). 
There is neither an “event” nor decisive action in the endless leagues of 
China; it is a traders’ world devoid of those heroes who could turn this 
whole affair into what First World War propaganda would consider a 
proper narrative: “Uns handwerkern und geschäftsleuten ist die Ret-
tung des Vaterlandes anvertraut; wir sind aber einer solchen Aufgabe nicht 
gewachsen; haben uns doch auch nie gerühmt, dessen fähig zu sein. ein 
Mißverständnis ist es und wir gehn daran zugrunde” (KKANI, 361) (“To 
us craftsmen and businessmen the salvation of the fatherland is entrusted; 
but we are not up to such a task; certainly we have never boasted of 
being capable of it. It is a misunderstanding, and it is driving us to our 
ruin” [KSS, 67]). This is how Kafka responds post festum, in the spring of 
1917, to Sombart’s invocation of heroism at the outset of the war.
 In his analysis of Kafka’s narrative voice, Joseph Vogl argues that the 
eventum tantum, the purely virtual event beyond empirical time with its 
linear flux, the event that has always happened already or has not hap-
pened yet, organizes the unique narrative space of Kafka’s stories (see Vogl 
1994, 754). As I have just shown, the status of the accident in insurance 
discourse is marked precisely by this oscillation between prematurity and 
belatedness, between the “not yet” of accident prevention and the “no 
more” of the accident report.18 Thus, Kafka the poet and Kafka the clerk 
are obviously guilty of smuggling on a grand scale across Bohrer’s for-
bidden border. yet this matter is even more scandalous, and even more 
complicated. The gap between Kafka’s narrators and the event they elab-
orate on, Vogl continues, opens up the impersonal space of a form of 
indirect speech, a discours indirect libre that sets the scene for an assem-
blage of voices, voices not emerging from subjects but in turn creating 
a fluid matrix for multiple subjectivities (1994, 755). In contrast to the 
intra-diegetic multi-vocality discussed so far—the voices reported by the 
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architect, his insistence on the emperor’s manifold imaginary existence, 
the différend between the architect and the shoemaker—this other, glosso-
lalic multi-vocality is radically transdiegetic, transtextual, or, rather, trans-
medial.
iii
I believe that it is precisely at this apparently abstract point of my analysis 
that an assignment for philology comes into play. Kafka, as Vogl argues 
convincingly, developed his “fourth person” (1994, 747) narrative voice 
right from the start in his Beschreibung eines Kampfes (Description of a Strug-
gle) and “hochzeitsvorbereitungen auf dem Lande” (“Wedding Prepara-
tions in the Country”). But it is only after the summer of 1914, when 
the Erlebnis of the first-person plural, the nationalist “We feeling” (Wir-
Gefühl), makes its murderous presence felt, that Kafka begins to think 
about occupying strategically the unmarked space of the “fourth person.” 
In his stories from the First World War, Kafka deploys his “urge to imi-
tate” (Kafka 1964, 157)—to build a literary machine that simultaneously 
copies and destroys the machinery of war propaganda. Thereafter, his 
narratives, word by word and scene by scene, down to their most incom-
mensurable and incomprehensible passages, seem to consist of the rich 
prey of Kafka’s truly nomadic raids in writing.
 To begin with a random example, the treacherous first sentence of 
this pseudo-foundational narrative (“The great Wall of China was fin-
ished at its most northerly point” [KSS, 113; translation modified]) could 
well be seen as “inspired by” or “copied from” the first sentence of the 
preface to the proceedings of the Second International Congress for 
Rescue Service and Accident Prevention, which, in its Bohemian section, 
was so closely connected to the fragmentary organization of the Chinese 
security effort. The volume that made Kafka an international, if anony-
mous, author on insurance begins, “With the Second International Con-
ference which took place between 9 and 13 September 1913 within the 
walls of the friendly Imperial Capital of Vienna, a great and significant 
work has been completed” (Charas 1914, iii). If we shift our focus onto 
the rhetoric of the fatherland and philosophical subtleties, such as the 
difference between mythological time and historical time, as in a speech 
titled “Social Welfare and the german Will to Victory” delivered by the 
president of the german Imperial Insurance Bureau, Paul Kaufmann, to 
the attentive staff of Kafka’s Prague agency, we find the following: “A 
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century ago patriotic men had confidently drawn attention to germany’s 
eternal calling (Ewigkeitsberuf ), which is to set the final stone on the obe-
lisk of history” (Kaufmann 1915, 23). In the same fall, Kafka might have 
stumbled across the proclamation in Rudolf Kjellén’s geopolitical writ-
ings that the “final stone” was about to be added to another “building,” 
namely the german bridge between Berlin and the Orient, which was 
the providential project of the Baghdad Railway that germans had been 
looking forward to so enthusiastically since the summer of 1914 (Kjel-
lén 1916, 39; my translation). If you have a sensitive ear for the newsflash 
quality of Kafka’s famous opening sentence, you might hear yet another 
voice omnipresent in Kafka’s writings, the voice of Theodor herzl, who 
advertised his project of a Jewish state to his sponsors as a “defense wall 
of europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barba-
rism.” Later in his fantasy, herzl went on: “Once the Jewish Company 
has been constituted the news will be carried in a single day to the 
remotest ends of the earth by the lightning speed of our telegraph wires. 
And immediate relief will ensue” (1943, 110). At this point, Kafka’s seem-
ingly displaced Chinese fragment, “In diese Welt drang nun die Nach-
richt vom Mauerbau. Auch sie verspätet etwa dreißig Jahre nach ihrer 
Verkündigung” (KKANI, 356) (“News of the building of the Wall now 
penetrated into this world. It, too, was delayed by some thirty years after 
its proclamation” [KSS, 123]), an announcement made by a boatman to 
the narrator’s incredulous father, seems to move more to the center of the 
narrative. But even if you are more interested in the contradictory poten-
tial of that opening sentence, you do not necessarily need to read on 
in Kafka’s story to uncover it. For its contradictions are already virulent 
in what seems to be its “source material.” In 1910, when he was getting 
more involved in Zionist issues, Kafka (and other readers of herzl’s The 
Jewish State) were informed, as members of the audience allegedly listen-
ing enthralled to Martin Buber’s Prague speeches on Jewry, that “the Jews 
have not even begun their work” (Buber 1963a, 17), since this work was 
not plain and simple nation-building but a brotherhood based on a com-
munity of blood. If we remember that Kafka is a writer by assignment, 
we only need to turn a few pages in Paul de Lagarde’s Deutsche Schriften 
(“german writings”) to find the gist of his response to the Writers’ Asso-
ciation for greater Austria. “The church,” so de Lagarde asserts in his 
essay titled “The Religion of the Future,” “satisfied men’s minds for as 
long as it was under construction. Once it was completed, people left it. 
Should we not, then, find our satisfaction in building, since the centuries 
have shown us that the only thing humans can ever achieve is to begin 
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and to continue; when it comes to finishing things, they tire of the com-
pleted work and start all over again” (1891, 232; my translation).
iv
how are we to make use of this mess for narrative theory? Obviously, 
a “materialist” approach to text—as a montage of elements or a web of 
motives—would inevitably bring to light the business of a most bizarre 
“patch-up job,” a literature very much resembling the man inhabiting the 
present-day “Land of Culture” of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra:
Written all over with the signs of the past that are daubed over in turn 
with new signs: thus you have hidden yourselves well from all interpret-
ers of signs!
  . . . you seem to be baked from colours and out of scraps of paper 
glued together.
 All ages and peoples gaze motley out of your veils; all customs and all 
beliefs speak motley out of your gestures.
 he who tore away from you your veils and wraps and paint and ges-
tures would have just enough left to frighten the birds. (Nietzsche 2003, 
142)
This is precisely the “culturalist” scenario Bohrer warns against—and it 
would be hard to deny a certain similarity between Nietzsche’s Alex-
andrine “present day man” and the object of half a century of Kafka 
scholarship. Meanwhile, to be sure, post-structuralism has warned against 
assuming that there is a difficult recalcitrance in first-rate works of art, a 
resistance to understanding that calls for masterful interpretive recon-
struction. But does that condemn us to leave the rich life of Kafka’s multi-
vocality behind, to abandon it for the sake of the inexorably recurring 
insight into the impossibility of perfection, unity, and truth? Or could we 
hope to assume a case of “textual stubbornness” here,19 after all, a narra-
tion resisting our efforts to interpret the text and yet having a production 
within a larger purpose?
 Shifting focus from “meaning” to “production,” we then would no 
longer reduce Kafka’s text to an organized set of signs representing this 
or that meaning or transcribing this or that source material. Beyond the 
stubborn imperfection of those signs, we would trace a set of signals evok-
ing multitudes of voices,20 producing an indeterminacy that would aim 
to counteract the murderous determination implied in the propaganda-
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based national identities of Kafka’s time. What creates the movement of 
this kind of literature is not the simple difference between a hypotext 
and a hypertext that “transforms” the hypotext (as suggested by genette 
[1992, 15]) but rather the complex difference between the series of echo 
texts triggered by a matrix text—very much in the way that the manifold 
imaginings of the emperor define the life of the Chinese people, while 
the emperor himself, like the scripture, remains unalterable. While at any 
point the unalterable text of Kafka’s protocol may be used to introduce a 
temporary order into the chaos of echoes, the echoes will keep coming 
back and intensifying with each new reading of the protocol.
 In the conceptual frame developed so far, we can describe this phe-
nomenon as being yet another instance of Kafka the writer borrowing 
skills from Kafka the clerk, of a cultural skill becoming effective in the 
very heart of the aesthetic. At any given point in the syntagma of Kafka’s 
poetic protocols, his unique terminological shorthand, by its mere power 
of allusion (or “approximation”),“records” and “files” a paradigm of (often 
conflicting) expressive voices. By short-circuiting the essentialist and the 
approximative poles of german typological thinking, Kafka transforms 
propagandistic types from images of dissociation (designed to create a 
“them against us” plot) into images of association, thereby undermining 
their polemic potential. hence the next step of my analysis—reaching 
far beyond the scope of this article—would require me to show in detail 
how, in the course of his Chinese reports, the Chinese-nomad constel-
lation would simultaneously or intermittently “approximate” the threat 
that the Czechs represented to the germans, the germans to the Czechs, 
the Jews to the anti-Semites, the anti-Semites to the Jews, the so-called 
Ost juden to the Westjuden, and, at the end of the day, the threat presented 
by any of the warring parties in the eyes of the other.21 If we conceive of 
reading as a matter of multiple acts performed by multitudes (as sug-
gested by Roland Barthes) rather than as the unique act of an individual, 
then Kafka, the eternal shipwreck and great swimmer, provides his con-
temporaries with a semiotic Noah’s Ark, offering, as the “larger purpose” 
postulated above, a common ground for any individual and any people 
precisely on the basis of their common habit of using polemics to distin-
guish themselves from one another. 
v
Such “Kafkaian negotiations,” as we may summarize in the specific con-
text of this volume, are by no means restricted to the level of “competing 
76  ChAPter 3
representations” (greenblatt 1990, 7) to the topical or figurative level of 
speech. As we have seen, they also comprise the level of narrative form 
and strategy. even these apparently purely poetic features are informed 
(or, as Karl heinz Bohrer or Jochen Vogt22 might prefer to say, infected) 
by non-literary discourses, such as administrative reports on legal and 
technological aspects of public insurance; and in turn, ever since the 
discursive event called “Kafka,” bureaucratic formats have been infected 
with the virus of multi-vocality. If literature, to conclude with another 
of the provocations Bohrer hurled into the face of his audience, is “too 
tall an order” (2005, 20) for today’s students, this is not because of its 
remoteness from the cultural context but because of literature’s rootedness 
in and its indebtedness to just such a context. This is the tall order I have 
in store for all readers of Kafka: instead of coming to know themselves by 
ceaselessly going over, word for word, the decrees of the highest Leaders, 
or musing endlessly over the intentions and plans of the emperor, I invite 
them to take the trajectory of the Chinese architect—that is, to explore 
the soul of all the provinces, to listen to the stories and legends of all 
the village-dwellers of all ages. For it is between these narratives that the 
immeasurable wealth and wisdom of Kafka’s leaderless empire of letters 
can be found. 
notes
 1. In other words, and on a larger scale, I am aiming to revise a new histori-
cist approach to literary texts and cultural context by reconstructing such misty 
metaphors as the “circulation of social energy” and “negotiations” between text and 
context (greenblatt 1990, 67), the specific writing strategies, techniques, and proce-
dures a given author employs, and the specific set of documents processed by them.
 2. See the “bachelor” fragment, posthumously “restored” by Max Brod (Kafka 
1964, 25).
 3. See the “great swimmer” fragment in KKANII (254–56). For an english trans-
lation of this fragment, see http://www.grandstreet.com/gsissues/gs56/gs56e.html 
(accessed March 29, 2009).
 4. First published in 1887, Wahrmund’s book became an anti-Semitic “bestseller” 
when it was re-published after World War I.
 5. “Der Jude als Razziant an arischem geistesgut” (“The Jew as a raider of Aryan 
intellectual property”) (Wahrmund 1919, 112–13). 
 6. “At this great time you may expect to hear from me no words of my own. 
None apart from these, which are still just about able to prevent silence from being 
misinterpreted” (Kraus 1988, 9; my translation).
 7. This novel (Le Jardin des Supplices), first published in german in 1901 and im-
mediately confiscated by the censor, challenges european civilization by comparing 
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it to excessive “Asian” cruelty. While it has been identified as a major source for 
Kafka’s 1914 story “In the Penal Colony” (see Zilcosky 2003, 110), its far-reaching 
echoes in his “Chinese voice” remain to be discovered.
 8. After the war, Kafka made private use of the fade-over between havlícˇek’s 
biography and his own. Long-exiled in a Tyrolean village in the spring of 1920, 
ink-wooing his Vienna based translator Milena Jesenská, and constantly suppressing 
the desire to board the next train to the capital, he instead book-travels to a Tibetan 
village, only to ink-sigh over its distance from Vienna, adding: “What I call foolish 
is the idea that Tibet is far away from Vienna. Would it really be far?” (Kafka 1953, 
45).
 9. On Kafka as Nietzsche’s first reader, see Wagner (2006a). 
 10. For this distinction see Weinrich (2001).
 11. For my terminology of narrative levels and a useful conversion of concepts 
developed by gérard genette, Mieke Bal, and others, see Jahn (2005).
 12. See, for example, Jäckel’s reading of World War I as an “accident at the maxi-
mum limit of credibility” and his remark “it is astonishing that historians have never 
learned from accident experts. For both face the task, again and again, of clearing up 
catastrophes” (1996, 154; my translation).
 13. “Those sections of the wall left abandoned in barren regions can easily be 
destroyed, over and over, by the nomads, especially since at that time these people, 
made anxious by the construction of the Wall, changed their dwelling places with 
incomprehensible rapidity, like locusts, and so perhaps had a better overview of 
the progress of the Wall than even we ourselves, its builders” (KSS, 113; translation 
modified).
 14. For details, see Wagner (2009, 40–41).
 15. gerhard Neumann’s chapter in this volume focuses on this procedure. For its 
role in Kafka’s office writings, see Wagner (2003).
 16. For the association of writing with the craft of a shoemaker, see Kafka’s diary 
entry of June 5, 1922, where he notes his “Talent für ‘Flickarbeit’” (KKAT, 922) 
(“talent for ‘botch work’” [Kafka 1964, 421]).
 17. On the impact of accident forms on the narrative structure of Kafka’s stories, 
see Wagner (2006/2008).
 18. For a sophisticated analysis of the status of the event in accident insurance, see 
Schäffner (2000).
 19. See James Phelan’s chapter in this volume, esp. pp. 32–34.
 20. For a similar use of the concept of “signal” in Joyce studies, see Topia (1984, 
109).
 21. For a detailed reconstruction, see Wagner (2006b).
 22. In his epilogue to the (belated) german translation of genette’s Discours du 
récit, Vogt argues that in the structuralist and poststructuralist decades (i.e., 1960–
1990, roughly speaking) it was more difficult for a theory of literature based on 
the idea of aesthetic autonomy to cross the Rhine than to make the passage across 
the Atlantic. however, as we have seen, even at the level of form the aesthetic text 
is deeply indebted to its cultural context. Therefore, poetological analysis may very 
well (and actually needs to) make use of discourse analysis without falling guilty of 
downgrading literature to the level of mere “ideology or ersatz philosophy” (Vogt 
1998, 299).
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Ich will nicht daß er es allen erzählt. (“I do not want him to tell everyone”.)
—Kafka, Der Verschollene (KKAV, 39)1
Aber auch abgesehen davon sind in Deiner Rede einige Fehler enthalten 
gewesen, d.h. ich meine, es hat sich in Wirklichkeit nicht alles so zugetragen. 
(“But apart from that there were some errors in your account; that is, I think 
that not all of it really occurred in that way”.)
—Kafka, Der Verschollene (KKAV, 43)
Du mußt Dich aber zur Wehr setzen, ja und nein sagen, sonst haben ja die 
Leute keine Ahnung von der Wahrheit. (“But you must defend yourself, say 
yes or no—otherwise people have no inkling of the truth”.)
—Kafka, Der Verschollene (KKAV, 49)
i
Kafka’s writings focus particularly on something that he once called 
“den riskantesten Augenblick im Tag” (“the most risky moment of the 
day”).2 It is the focus of attention on the transition from sleep to wak-
ing, on the act of birth from the mother’s womb into the bosom of the 
family, and finally on the exit from the family and the entry into soci-
ety. It is this last transition to which Karl Roßmann’s American uncle 
refers when he explains that “die ersten Tage eines europäers in Amerika 
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[seien] einer geburt vergleichbar” (KKAV, 56) (“the first days of a euro-
pean in America are comparable to a birth”). Kafka’s story “The Stoker” 
likewise revolves around this act of birth into a strange society, around 
this most hazardous moment of the transition from the familiar to the 
alien. Adhering to the conventional structure of the novel of individual 
development, Kafka gives his story the traditional focus on the incep-
tion of a twofold career, stemming from a scenario of origins: there is, 
on the one hand, a beginning in sexual experience, and, on the other, in 
vocational life.3 But for such a career to get under way successfully, there 
needs to be—as I mentioned—an opening scene, a story that may be 
narrated as an origin and that generates from out of itself a continuing 
life-narrative.4 In the case of the protagonist of “The Stoker,” Karl Roß-
mann, it is an erotic episode that serves as a narrative of origin—no rarity 
in stories of individual development. It is the episode of Karl Roßmann’s 
being seduced by the cook, Johanna Brummer, a servant in his parents’ 
apartment.5 This scene of seduction is modeled on the mythical template 
of the Fall from grace. yet in stark contrast to the myth, it reveals itself 
to be the embarrassing failure of a scene of recognition between the 
sexes: a scene Karl is incapable of putting into narrative, since it involves 
too much shame and helpless incomprehension. After his metamorphosis, 
gregor Samsa asks in comparable terms, “Was ist mit mir geschehen?” 
(KKAD, 115) (“What has happened to me?”); and it is said of Josef K. at 
the end of The Trial: “es war, als sollte die Scham ihn überleben” (KKAP, 
312) (“it was as if his shame were destined to survive him”).
 In no sense can Karl draw on support for his future career from the 
narration of this “primal scene.” Thus his situation is the opposite of that 
which occurs in many nineteenth-century novels, where a sexual initia-
tion opens the portal to a process of maturity. Kafka’s story “The Stoker” 
tells of the crisis of the individual’s “second birth” into the world and 
then relates the problems that result from the fact that the scene of origin 
simply cannot be narrated.6 In this sense, Kafka conducts an experiment 
with the possibility or impossibility of beginnings that provide or do not 
provide the foundation for a life-narrative.
 And yet if we cast only a cursory glance at Kafka’s story, we do get the 
impression that a life-narrative of this kind could readily be told in two 
short sentences. The novella begins as follows:
Als der siebzehnjährige Karl Roßmann, der von seinen armen eltern nach 
Amerika geschickt worden war, weil ihn ein Dienstmädchen verführt 
neumAnn, “the AbAndoned Writing desK”  83
und ein Kind von ihm bekommen hatte, in dem schon langsam gewor-
denen Schiff in den hafen von Newyork einfuhr, erblickte er die schon  
längst beobachtete Statue der Freiheitsgöttin wie in einem plötz lich 
stär ker gewordenen Sonnenlicht. Ihr Arm mit dem Schwert ragte wie 
neuerdings empor und um ihre gestalt wehten die freien Lüfte. (KKAV, 7)
(When, at the age of seventeen, Karl Roßman, who had been sent to 
America by his poor parents because a servant-girl had seduced him and 
borne a child as a result, sailed into New york harbour on board a ship 
that was gradually losing way, he suddenly saw the statue of the goddess 
of Liberty, on which he had had his eyes for some time, as if in a flash of 
brighter sunlight. her arm with the sword was raised aloft as before and 
the free breezes played about her figure.)
here we find the blueprint for a whole life and the template for a career, 
such as one might find in any book. From this point the narrative could 
flow with perfect freedom, telling of the primal scene of the Fall from 
grace, of the story of his sexual initiation (a story that he has brought 
with him to the New World of the virtual allegorizing of the scene from 
the perspective of guilt and punishment, discipline and justice—all in the 
radiance of an aura of destiny. But an interpretation of the text in this 
sense as the nucleus of a story with a quite predictable future develop-
ment would be entirely misguided. As Karl is about to leave the ship, 
it turns out he has made two mistakes. he has forgotten his umbrella 
and he has also left behind the suitcase entrusted to him by his father.7 
These two errors will deflect Karl from the straight and narrow path 
and lead him back into the labyrinthine belly of the ship. he wanders 
along corridors, hurries through an empty room “mit einem verlassenen 
Schreibtisch”(KKAV, 8) (“with an abandoned writing desk”)—a detail 
whose importance will become clear later—and ends up knocking on 
“eine beliebige kleine Türe” (KKAV, 8) (“a random little door”) behind 
which he meets the stoker, who—of course—gives the story its title. The 
adolescent boy and the man of mature years try to get to know each 
other and to communicate about their respective situations.
 The stoker says he has just been dismissed from his job on account of 
some misdemeanors he is supposed to have committed, and he intends to 
complain about this to the captain. Karl has been compelled to emigrate 
to America, so they have both, in a sense, been sent into exile. But when 
the stoker inquires: “Warum haben Sie denn [nach Amerika] fahren müs-
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sen?” (“Why did you have to travel to America?”) Karl refuses to tell 
his story. Rather, the text tells us: “‘Ach was!’ sagte Karl und warf die 
ganze geschichte mit der hand weg” (KKAV, 12) (“‘Not worth men-
tioning!’ said Karl, and dismissed the whole story with a gesture”). To 
this the stoker replies, “es wird schon einen grund gehabt haben” (“Oh 
yes! There’ll have been a reason, all right”), and the narrator observes, 
“[daß man nicht recht wußte] ob [der heizer] damit die erzählung die-
ses grundes fordern oder abwehren wolle” (KKAV, 12) (“that it was not 
clear whether the stoker wanted to demand this reason be revealed or 
prevent any disclosure of it”). By means of this ambiguity, the stoker (and 
through him the narrator) gives us a clue as to how the rest of the story 
might best be read. Our attention is meant to focus on the constant 
alternation of demands that, on the one hand, stories be told, and on the 
other hand, the rejection or refusal of narrative.
 When Karl and the stoker finally end up in the Captain’s cabin, Karl 
tries in two ways to block the narration of his own story—for naturally 
he believes he has “thrown it away.” his first attempt is to present his 
passport to confirm his identity, but the purser reacts—as the text says—
by flicking it away with two fingers, precisely as Karl had previously 
“flicked aside” his own life-story. Karl’s second strategy to avoid telling 
how he had been seduced consists in taking sides with the stoker, then 
usurping the other’s life-story and reciting it to the impatient gentlemen 
in the cabin. In order to achieve what we might term an indirect narra-
tion of himself, he vicariously tells the stoker’s story—with the secret 
desire of casting the tale of his own Fall from grace into oblivion: “Wenn 
ihn doch seine eltern sehen könnten,” (“If only his parents could see 
him now”) the text runs “wie er im fremden Land vor angesehenen Per-
sönlichkeiten das gute verfocht” (KKAV, 33) (“fighting for the good in a 
foreign land before persons of repute”).
 At this point the reader’s attention is drawn to the man with the 
bamboo cane, who has, up till now, been present in the cabin merely 
as an observer. he approaches Karl and asks—not once but twice—the 
ques tion that implicitly demands the narration of his true life-story: 
“Wie heißen Sie denn eigentlich?” (KKAV, 31, 35) (“What is your real 
name?”) Through this exchange it slowly comes to light that the stranger 
is Karl’s rich American uncle. The cook, Johanna Brummer, who had 
seduced Karl, has written him a letter that arrived faster than the ship 
and informed him of Karl’s “love story.” The uncle has copied a sum-
mary description of Karl from the letter into his notebook and has now 
recognized Karl by comparing his appearance with the notes.
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 During this recognition scene8—virtually an anagnorisis in the drama 
of Karl’s quest for an identity—Karl for a second time resists narrating 
his story. For when, according to the account in the cook’s letter, the 
uncle sets about retelling the story of Karl’s seduction, Karl says quietly 
to himself “ich will nicht daß er es allen erzählt” (KKAV, 39) (“I do not 
want him to tell everyone”). This does not in the least prevent the uncle 
from doing precisely that, namely reciting the history of Karl’s seduc-
tion, announcing as he does so that he will later give his nephew the 
letter his seductress has written, so that he “den Brief, wenn er mag, in 
der Stille seines ihn schon erwartenden Zimmers zur Belehrung lesen 
kann” (KKAV, 41) (“can read it for his edification in the quiet of the bed-
room that has already been prepared for him”). Thus, Karl would be not 
once but twice the recipient of the story he himself refuses to tell at any 
price: in the version contained in the cook’s letter and also in his uncle’s 
recounting of that text “for his edification.”
 At this moment during the “narrative” of the cook’s “narration” of 
his story, the dialogue-scene in the Captain’s cabin suddenly jumps—in 
the novella— into a kind of indirect speech that reflects Karl’s stream of 
consciousness:
Karl hatte aber keine gefühle für jenes Mädchen. Im gedränge einer 
immer mehr zurückgestoßenen Vergangenheit saß sie in ihrer Küche 
neben dem Küchenschrank, auf dessen Platte sie ihren elbogen stützte. 
(KKAV, 41)
(But Karl felt nothing for that girl. In the crowded scenes of his past, that 
were being pushed ever further back, he saw her in her kitchen next to 
the kitchen-cupboard, with her elbows propped up on its marble top.)
It was this sequence and its indirect speech that, as early as 1914, delighted 
Robert Musil in his review of the story; Musil considered it a mode that 
one could scarcely designate as “narrative,” yet one that nonetheless gives 
voice to the dull murmur of experience.9 Karl’s indirect speech ends 
with the following words:
Weinend kam er endlich nach vielen Wiedersehenswünschen ihrerseits in 
sein Bett. Das war alles gewesen und doch verstand es der Onkel, daraus 
eine große geschichte zu machen. (KKAV, 43)
(Weeping, Karl reached his own bed after receiving many assurances from 
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her that she wanted to see him again. That was all it had been, and yet the 
uncle was managing to make some great story out of it.)
here the problem of the metanarrative that is Kafka’s central concern in 
“The Stoker” appears with the greatest clarity. The “big story” told by 
the uncle is superimposed on the petit récit that unfolds—without Karl’s 
grasping its significance—in the sequence of indirect speech. To borrow 
a term from giorgio Agamben (2002), the “grandiose program” of liter-
ary narrative is played off against the dull, half-conscious murmuring of 
“naked life.”
 When the audience fails to laugh at his uncle’s “big story” as Karl 
had feared—probably out of respect for the uncle’s dignified presence—
Karl turns once again to the story of the stoker, which he had taken 
over once before at the beginning of the novella. he now tries to give 
the stoker a lesson—in, of all things, the correct and true way to recount 
life-stories. For in the meantime, the stoker—trying to tell his own 
sob-story to the Captain—has literally talked himself out of his job, by 
making what the text describes as a “trauriges Durcheinanderstrudeln” 
(KKAV, 27) (“pitiful mishmash”) of his own arguments. “Sie müssen das 
einfacher erzählen, klarer, der herr Kapitän kann das nicht würdigen 
so wie Sie es ihm erzählen” (KKAV, 28) (“you must tell everything 
more simply, more clearly—the way you are telling it, the Captain can-
not appreciate the facts”)—thus Karl’s admonition to the stoker at the 
beginning of the scene in the cabin. To this he adds, “Ordnen Sie doch 
Ihre Beschwerden, sagen Sie die Wichtigste zuerst und absteigend die 
andern. . . . Mir haben Sie es doch immer so klar dargestellt” (KKAV, 
28) (“Put your complaints in an orderly manner, state what is most 
important first and then the rest in descending order. . . . you always 
put it so clearly to me”). Then, right at the end, when he takes leave 
of the stoker, Karl warns him again: “Du mußt Dich aber zur Wehr 
setzen, ja und nein sagen, sonst haben ja die Leute keine Ahnung von 
der Wahrheit” (KKAV, 49) (“But you must defend yourself, say yes or 
no—otherwise people will have no inkling of the truth”). even when 
confronting his uncle, Karl assumes the manner of a teacher of rhetoric: 
“[abgesehen davon] sind in Deiner Rede einige Fehler enthalten gew-
esen, d.h. ich meine, es hat sich in Wirklichkeit nicht so zugetragen” 
(KKAV, 43) (“there were some errors in your account; that is, I am of 
the view that in reality not all of it occurred in that way”). Karl, who 
is incapable of narrating the originary scene of his own life-history 
and who—perhaps because of this—tries to suppress it, paradoxically 
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assumes the posture of instructor to his fellow narrators so as to conceal 
his inability to tell his own story.
ii
Keeping in mind that this novella is at the same time the opening chap-
ter of a novel, it seems to be Kafka’s intent to demonstrate the impos-
sibility of narrating the one scene that is the inception of a developing 
life-story. The method he chooses is to intertwine narratives of narra-
tives and observe their continual failures. Karl suppresses the story that 
marks the commencement of his exile and “throws it away.” But this sup-
pressed story overtakes him on his voyage to America in the form of a 
letter written by his seductress, the cook, and is transformed by his uncle 
through the process of narration into a kind of text of recognition and 
test of identity—and thus turned into a “big story” (as Karl describes it) 
or “grand narrative” (as it might be described in literary theory). Karl’s 
muted consciousness then narrates the whole again to himself as a petit 
récit, as the murmuring of an almost inarticulate experience. Finally, 
Karl adopts a kind of alibi-narrative, namely the stoker’s story. Instead of 
attempting to make his own story credible according to the rules of “rea-
sonable” narratives, he tries to infuse this alibi-narrative with credibility 
and to rehearse it as a cover-narrative of his own story, which cannot be 
told; we might say that the cover-narrative is the true narrative’s double. 
In this way Karl’s own erotic story is overlaid by that of the stoker’s 
career—painted over, as it were.
 here we confront Kafka’s unique narrative construct that has the fol-
lowing implications: the story of one and the same “experience” is con-
veyed from one narrative voice to another, and assumes in the process 
the qualities of a “suppressed,” “written,” “retold,” “withheld,” and “trans-
lated” narration. What remains a mystery is the vantage point from which 
this play of narrative and metanarrative, of telling and of telling-upon-
telling is actually directed. For the “authorial” narrator, who occasionally 
flits through the text, remains a very weak presence. he has surrendered 
virtually all his authority to the characters who tell and retell the story. 
One indication of this specifically Kafkaesque metanarrative construct—
that is, the absence of a dominant narrator—seems to me to be given 
by the detail I emphasized previously. When Karl, lost and disoriented, 
traverses the labyrinth of the empty ship looking for his umbrella, he 
passes a “verlassenen Schreibtisch” (KKAV, 8) (“abandoned writing desk”) 
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in an empty room. This clue points to the authorial narrator who has 
abandoned his place at the writing desk and thereby abandoned the indi-
vidual characters to their own narrative fates—namely to those modes of 
telling that are transformed in their passage from one narrative voice to 
another— transmitted, translated, transnarrated—through the medium of 
the letter and the notes.
 One is tempted to call this an extremely daring game with vicarious 
narration. It takes the form of the unstoppable telling of the stories of 
others. The cook vicariously narrates Karl’s story. Karl vicariously narrates 
the stoker’s story. The uncle, in turn, vicariously retells Karl’s story. These 
narratives are “recapitulations” and “overlays” that translate, correct, falsify, 
displace, magnify and reduce, but they do not reveal the nucleus that is 
the primal scene from which everything else proceeds. This must be left 
a mystery.
 These narrative constructs, with whose conditions and possibilities 
the story experiments, seem to crystallize out of three distinct fields 
of discourse and their respective codes. First, there is the field of the 
authorial narrator—weakly contoured as he may be—who at no point 
engages in metafictional reflections about his own narrative. Second, 
there is the level of utterance by the characters who carry the story and 
who frequently indulge in vicarious narration. The text itself betrays an 
awareness of this. When Karl begins narrating the miserable tale of the 
stoker, taking it over from its “owner,” the reproach is made that the 
stoker has brought with him an “eingelernten Stimmführer” (KKAV, 24) 
(“pre-rehearsed mouthpiece”). But the characters in the text are not just 
vicarious narrators—they also assume the posture of critics and rectifiers, 
indeed almost of instructors, with regard to the narratives of other fig-
ures. Third, there is the mode of “indirect speech” as a narrative strategy, 
reflecting not only Karl’s half-awareness but also, at one point, that of the 
stoker. This strategy may be read as a move on the part of that authorial 
narrator who has cleared his desk, who has abandoned the responsibility 
for narrating the story and left it to the half-awareness of his characters—
characters who can do no more than entrust themselves to what cannot 
be told, what is experienced dimly and with no transparency, whether 
this be the enigmatic seduction to which Karl falls victim—or else the 
wrong that the stoker has to suffer uncomprehendingly.
 Kafka thus interweaves the narrative fields of the authorial narrator, 
of what the characters tell one another, and of indirect speech. I pro-
pose that we consider the complex intertwining of these three realms of 
narrative authority as a game with metanarrative strategies. If metalan-
neumAnn, “the AbAndoned Writing desK”  89
guage is that second language which speaks about a first,10 then we could 
say metanarrative is that second narrative which overlays a prior one. In 
doing so it demonstrates the conditions that govern the possibility that 
“the telling of life-stories”—within a given historical and cultural situa-
tion—can be rendered intercommunicative (that is, achieved by mutual 
understanding). What makes Kafka’s text unique, I imagine, is that the 
game with different narratives is no longer played by the authorial nar-
rator but that the latter smuggles interference into the narrative voice of 
the text—hence a game of retellings, of a narrative that doubles itself and 
allows what is told to be subverted by the very act of telling. So it is that 
we are no longer dealing with the self-reflection of an authorial narrator 
who thinks aloud about how and in precisely what narrative guise he is 
to present the story he has in mind—something Thomas Mann is fond 
of to the point of embarrassment. Rather, we must here be receptive 
to a voice that cuts across the process of narrative, harmonizing—as it 
were—with the utterances of one narrator after another but directed by 
no discernible, dominant narrative authority.
 In this sense it is, perhaps, more accurate not to describe what is 
effected in Kafka’s prose as an overlaying of narrative processes but to 
see it rather as an oscillation and alternation within the narrative process 
itself. We might call it a vibration of the narrative thread, which—released 
from the control of the authorial narrator—has different narrative voices 
within the text align their frequencies with itself, or, better still, assigns 
to them in turn its own resonance. Kafka’s narrative strategy thus creates 
something like a free-floating tissue of narration, for which no one voice 
accepts lasting responsibility and which ultimately splits into several sepa-
rate strands. It is almost as if Kafka intended to allow a freedom of space 
in which a story could narrate itself in several voices—a story that can 
by no means leap over the abyss between inarticulate life and the norms 
of discourse, between “naked life” and “sovereign law,” but still it “shows” 
that the gap is there. “The Stoker” is a novella which tells of what deter-
mines the possibility that, in a world of ironclad norms of discourse, it 
might once more be possible to establish narratives as a way of telling 
about lives.
iii
Now, in these terms we should of course ask ourselves why Kafka, at first 
sight, seems to use such simple patterns of narration. There has long been 
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talk of Kafka’s “obstinate” manner of story-telling. And yet he develops 
such complicated patterns of narratives and of the doubling of narratives. 
Clearly, this complexity of narrative structures is related to the question 
of whether it is possible at all to relate the history of the “modern” sub-
jectivity, which developed around 1900. If it is possible, how it might be 
done? For this unfortunate entity strives to find its proper place among 
three different codes that are mutually incompatible. First, there is the 
code of public existence, which is determined by politics and institu-
tions (habermas 1962); second, there is the code of private or familial 
existence, which is dictated by paternal authority; third, there is the code 
of intimacy (Luhmann 1982), which involves the basic improbability that 
emotions may be communicated between individuals and presupposes 
that the uniqueness of each individual is an inalienable quality.11 What 
faintest possibility might there be that any authorial agency should suc-
ceed in creating a unified narrative within the field of interplay between 
these three discrepant codes? how could the kernel of intimacy in any 
human life ever be articulated and transmitted in acts of narrative under 
such circumstances?
 Storytelling, as Kafka sets out to illustrate in “The Stoker,” demon-
strates that the task of narrating the event within the field of tension that 
exists between the withholding and forcing-out of the same story can 
simply not be performed. No code exists in which its “as suchness” can 
be expressed. There remains only the resort to interrogations and confes-
sions. If the event of intimacy can be glimpsed at all, then it can be only 
in the gap that yawns between the law and “naked life.” The catch-22 
situation in which narrative here has to try to sustain itself is the irre-
solvable, compulsive alternation between being interrogated—thus the 
uncle’s question, “Wie heißen Sie denn eigentlich” (KKAV, 31) (“What is 
your real name?”)—and being forced to an admission—thus Karl’s “ich 
will nicht daß er es allen erzählt” (KKAV, 39) (“I do not want him to tell 
it to everyone”). Lastly, there is the lapse into inarticulacy, which some-
how finds its place in the gap between the other two. For Kafka there is 
no other mode of telling than a “narrative under condemnation.” Jacques 
Derrida’s formulation of this is memorable: the law with all its strategies 
of oppression invariably pre-exists narrative; but, contrariwise, the telling 
of a life in total exposure invariably precedes the law and can find no way 
of entering into it.12 Only in this gap between the two extremes can the 
trace of the narrative voice, passing from mouth to mouth, inscribe itself: 
sometimes as a corrective, sometimes as a retelling, sometimes vicariously.
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 On the basis of this insight, we might now make the attempt to show 
the literary status of the text “The Stoker” among varieties of narrative 
in a more precise manner. Is it a novella in its own right, or should we 
rather see it as the opening chapter of a novel? To all appearances Kafka 
has, in the opening scenes of this novel, put the problematic variations of 
literary narration to the test—and taken them to absurd lengths. Just as 
Karl’s route should lead straight from the ship into America’s open spaces 
but gets tangled right at the start and takes him back into the labyrinth 
of the ship’s belly, so the narrative traces, which should make tangible 
Karl’s originary narrative, as the seed from which his future will sprout, 
become knotted and confused. Just as the direct route takes him farther 
and farther into the labyrinth; just as the main portal becomes some ran-
dom little door on which he chances to knock;13 just as—to draw a final 
analogy—the diretissima bifurcates into a rhizome, in all these ways syn-
tagmatic narrative—at the very beginning of a novel, of all places!—sud-
denly flips into a kind of paradigmatic narration, into a perpetuum mobile 
of stories that bifurcate and overlay one another.14 One might venture to 
call such storytelling “stereometric.” In any event, it is overgrown with 
metanarratives. Storytelling that is vicarious and that constantly corrects 
itself becomes increasingly an interweaving of narrative acts, narrative 
repetitions, and their mutually critical interactions. But all this occurs 
without the intervention of an omniscient narrator or even the establish-
ment of a hierarchy of narrative levels. Such an absence of a conventional 
hierarchy may help explain the apparent contradictions in Kafka’s nar-
rative manner and the mutability of his narrative modes. Viewed from 
one perspective, “The Stoker” is a novella; viewed from another, it is the 
beginning of a novel that could have no proper end. The ordering power 
of the omniscient narrator is conspicuous by its absence, and this absence 
manifests itself in the intricate layering of ambivalences behind façades of 
narrative simplicity.
 Kafka has used his novella “The Stoker” as a means of setting out 
the question that is characteristic of all his work—or, rather, he has set 
it before our very eyes in narrative form. This question is, of course, 
whether there are still any narratives available for the telling of individual 
uniqueness, for the recounting of that inalienable “naked life.” Thus, I 
conclude that he has given us, with this novella, his version of that poeto-
logical primal scene which prefigures his art as a novelist, together with 
all the irresolvable contradictions active within it.
(Translated by Anthony Stephens)
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notes
 1. All translations by Anthony Stephens.
 2. A textual variant in The Trial: “Darum sei auch der Augenblick des erwachens 
der riskanteste Augenblick im Tag, sei er einmal überstanden, ohne dass man irgend-
wohin von seinem Platze fortgezogen wurde, so könne man den ganzen Tag über 
getrost sein” (KKAP, 169) (“Therefore the moment of waking is the most perilous 
moment of the day—once you have survived it without being forcibly dislocated 
from your proper place, you can face all the rest of the day with confidence”).
 3. In Wilhelm Meister this scenario is presented as a paradigm; on the reading of 
love relationships as patterns of identity, see Luhmann (1982). On the construction 
of individuality, see Luhmann (1994, 191–202).
 4. In Wilhelm Meister this function is fulfilled by the marionette theatre, Tankred 
and Chlorinde, Mariane, and the fisher-boy.
 5. This was a cliché in literature around the turn of the century, for example in 
Schnitzler’s “Der Reigen.”
 6. Something similar is attempted by Rotpeter, the ape turned human, in Kafka’s 
“ein Bericht für eine Akademie.”
 7. “Als ihm der Vater den Koffer für immer übergeben hatte, hatte er im Scherz 
gefragt: Wie lange wirst du ihn haben?” (KKAV, 14) (“When his father had entrust-
ed him with the suitcase for ever, he had asked jokingly, how long will you manage 
to keep it?”).
 8. The stoker explicitly refers to it as “Wiedererkennung” (KKAV, 47) (“recog-
nition”).
 9. According to Musil (1914), Kafka showed himself as “a very conscious artist” 
(1170) whose narrative style is characterized by “total dissolution and total control” 
(1169). The protagonist’s actions are “entirely matters that can never be brought to 
an end that, from the perspective of the external world, dangle into it like broken 
off wires, and his thoughts are such as he can never think through to a conclusion” 
(Musil 1914, 1170). “It is deliberate naivety . . . something indirect, complicated, ac-
complished . . . a moral sensibility . . . of a refined and penetrating irritability” that 
“makes visible peculiar overlaps” (Musil 1914, 1170).
 10. Roland Barthes terms this strategy “metanarrative, because it is a second lan-
guage in which one speaks about the first” (1978, 115). Above all, I refer to genette 
(1969, 1982, 1994).
 11. Kafka’s short autobiographical text “Jeder Mensch ist eigentümlich . . . ” 
(KKANII, 7) (“each person is unique . . . ”) is of great significance in this context. 
See also the chapter by hillis Miller in this volume.
 12. It is rewarding to consider slightly different expressions of this insight. See 
Derrida (1983; 1984, 88; 1992a; 1992b).
 13. There are three doors in the narrative, the “kleine Tür” (KKAV, 8) (“little 
door”) before the stoker’s berth, the “heillos unvorbereitet (KKAV, 33) (“fatally un-
expectedly”) opened door to the Captain’s cabin, and the “Türchen” (KKAV, 52) 
(“little door”) through which Karl and his uncle leave the ship by way of a set of 
stairs, possibly a gangway.
 14. The twin concepts of syntagm and paradigm have been extensively used by 
Rainer Warning in his studies of Proust, following on from the narrative theory of 
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A. J. greimas. For a discussion of the metaphor of the rhizome as a structural char-
acteristic of Kafka’s narratives, see Deleuze and guattari (1997).
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iThis discussion of Der Verschollene (The Man Who Disappeared) begins by 
making some introductory observations on the narrative structure of 
Kafka’s uncompleted novel. I then proceed to analyze a particularly inter-
esting example of embedded narrative, namely Therese’s story in chapter 
five, entitled “Im hotel Occidental.”1
 The central plot of the novel concerns the story of Karl Roßmann. 
having been seduced by a maidservant and given her a child, Karl 
has been cast out of his family’s home in Prague and sent to America. 
According to his uncle, Karl has been “einfach beiseite geschafft . . . wie 
man eine Katze vor die Tür wirft, wenn sie ärgert” (38) (“simply got rid 
of, the way you put the cat out if it’s making a nuisance of itself ”). This 
expulsion is only the first in a catechism of repudiations that serve to 
establish the novel’s narrative pattern. This pattern is embedded in the 
overarching narrative scheme of a journey: literally, the crossing from 
europe to America, the arrival in New york, the trip to a country house 
on the outskirts of the city, the “march” to the city of Ramses, the period 
spent in the hotel Occidental, and then the ride to Clayton, where Karl 
is admitted to the “Nature Theatre of Oklahama” under the name of 
“Negro.” As in other narratives by Kafka, however, the literal journey 
is given overtones of another, larger and spiritual journey, of which the 
movements of the figures are examples.
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 The narrative pattern of journeying bears a wide range of associations 
in Kafka’s oeuvre. K.’s arrival, after a long walk, at the bridge leading to 
the village constitutes the beginning of the novel Das Schloß (The Cas-
tle), in which the protagonist will undertake numerous, fruitless attempts 
to communicate with the authorities who are assumed to occupy the 
castle overlooking the village. By the end of Der Proceß (The Trial ), it 
emerges that another kind of journey (one that leads to death) started 
with the arrest of Josef K. at the beginning of the novel. The waiting of 
the man from the country in the story “Vor dem gesetz” (“Before the 
Law”), which Kafka incorporated in The Trial, is presented as a stage in 
a journey toward The Law. In The Man Who Disappeared, the pattern of 
journeying includes passages describing communication through various 
media, technical devices, writing situations, work sequences and, above 
all, traffic. America is perceived and described as a domain in which 
humans, means of transportation, and information are incessantly chasing 
one another.
 In this novel, journeying can be described more accurately as a pat-
tern of temporary or illusory inclusion alternating with expulsion, via 
the (repeated) cycle of seduction, lapse, condemnation, and banishment. 
This pattern emerges mainly from the interactions of the protagonist 
Karl with seductive females on the one hand and authoritative figures 
on the other, such as his parents and uncle, the head Waiter, the head 
Porter, and the female head Cook who all pull and push him in various 
directions. As we shall see, Therese’s story is integrated into the overall 
composition by the way it represents a revealing variation of this pattern 
of inclusion and exclusion, as a sub-plot in which someone is brought 
to the reader’s attention as an expellee in need of help from others—
including Karl himself. If the novel shows Karl being expelled and oth-
ers failing to help him, Therese’s story shows Karl in turn failing to help 
another person, who is just as much in need of help as he is. Karl was 
expelled by his parents, Therese was abandoned by her father and then 
by her mother. Karl’s self-image as an excluded victim of circumstance is 
thereby contrasted with an image of him as one of the excluders.
 The first seduction of Karl Roßmann in the family home by the 
maidservant or “Köchin” Johanna Brummer results in his condemnation 
and subsequent expulsion by his parents. Karl’s second seductress is Klara, 
daughter of Pollunder. Acting against his uncle’s wishes, Karl has let him-
self be coaxed by Mr. green into visiting a country house near New 
york. Karl experiences the meeting with Klara as a seduction; he resists it 
and calls Klara “eine tolle Katze” (91) (“wildcat”); in his view, her room 
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bears the traits of a “recht gefährlichen höhle” (90) (“rather danger-
ous lair”). As his uncle had earlier compared Karl to a cat being turned 
out of the house (38), the encounter underscores the ferocity of rela-
tions in a world of hunters and prey. After midnight on the day of Karl’s 
visit to Pollunder’s country house, the uncle (repeating the pattern that 
began in the parental home) communicates his own condemnation and 
expulsion of Karl by letter, according to which his nephew’s lapse stems 
from his decision “vom Onkel fortzugehen” (123) (“to leave his uncle”). 
The third seduction of Karl, ostensibly into the role of adopted child, is 
undertaken by the maternal and obese head Cook at the hotel Occi-
dental, grete Mitzelbach, who hails from Vienna. here again Karl’s lapse 
is marginal and apparently involuntary. he leaves his workplace at the 
elevator for a brief moment in order to help a comrade. Nevertheless, the 
condemnation by the head Waiter and the subsequent “execution” by 
the head Porter are effected. Karl is accused of having left his “Posten” 
without permission (225) and of having “gelogen, gelumpt, gesoffen und 
gestohlen” (259) (“lied, debauched, drunk and stolen”). With the intro-
duction of the fourth woman encountered by Karl it becomes evident 
that most of the female characters have been designed as a serial type. 
her name, Brunelda, faintly echoes that of “Brummer,” the name of the 
family maidservant, and may allude ironically to Brunhilde, the mythical 
figure of germanic saga and of Wagner’s opera.
 The fifth and last “Verlockung” (388) (“lure”) is effected by a poster 
offering admittance to the “große Theater von Oklahama.” “‘Jeder war 
willkommen,’ hieß es” (388) (“‘everybody was welcome,’ it said”). hun-
dreds of seemingly gigantic women are standing at the entrance to the 
grounds of the racecourse where recruiting to the theater takes place. 
Alternating with male devils, the women figure as a line of angels. Karl 
recognizes one of these women as Fanny, an “alte Freundin” (393). To 
him she appears as “fast die höchste” (“almost the tallest”) of women. It is 
Fanny who enables him to make his way to the place of admission. her 
name may allude to Cleland’s pornographic novel Fanny Hill, but the 
link is not elaborated.
 In this pattern of seduction and expulsion, the experience of sexu-
ality opens repeatedly onto encounters with death. During his sexual 
intercourse with Johanna Brummer, Karl, suffocating, shakes: “Kopf und 
hals aus dem Kissen heraus” (43) (“Karl’s head and neck leapt out of 
the pillows”). The next dominatrix, Klara, threatens to slap Karl in the 
face and says “Und vielleicht bist du ein ehrenmann—ich möchte es 
fast glauben—und wirst mit den Ohrfeigen nicht weiterleben wollen 
und dich aus der Welt schaffen” (92) (“Maybe you’re a man of honor—I 
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almost think you are—and you won’t be able to go on living after you’ve 
been slapped and you’ll have to do away with yourself ”).
 The series of female characters opens with the maidservant, intro-
duced in the very first sentence of the novel. Immediately thereafter we 
are told how Karl sees the Statue of Liberty in New york harbor. As she 
is furnished not with a torch but with sword, this “goddess of freedom” 
appears to have been transformed into a figure alluding both to the god-
dess of justice and to the cherub with the flaming sword who guards 
the gate of Paradise (gen. 3:24). As the semantic switch from “die schon 
längst beobachtete Statue” (“the statue which had already been in view 
for some time”) to “erblickte” (“suddenly saw”) and “wie neuerdings” 
(“only just”) indicates, this description is not made by an objective nar-
rator. Rather, it is a focalization of Karl’s perception. he perceives, or 
imagines, the statue as a figure whose arm with the sword rises up while 
the “freien Lüfte” (7) (“unchained winds,” verbatim: “free winds”) are 
blowing around it.2
 This entangling of a realistic and an imaginary perception establishes 
from the outset a realistic and at the same time an allegorical dimension 
of meaning for the entire novel. In the narrative process, the elements 
of the opening sequence—seduction, expulsion, journey—are picked up 
again, elaborated, and integrated into a spiralling network of motives. 
This is quite characteristic of any traditional novel. The statue’s sword, for 
example, recurs as the uncle’s stick and several subsequent hints and allu-
sions to the military (“comrade,” “post,” and “execution,” for example). 
The direction of the sword-arm, “empor” (“aloft”), commented on by 
Karl—“So hoch” (7) (“So high”)—is mirrored in Karl’s path, which on 
the one hand leads spatially upward from station to station, always a little 
farther up: from the uncle’s house to the house in the country, to the 
hotel, to “solche höhe” (“such heights”) in the theater of Oklahama, 
while at the same time leading downward socially.
 In an attempt to brush aside his uncle’s account of his seduction and 
expulsion, Karl uses the words “große geschichte” (43), translatable ver-
batim as a “big story” or “a great story.” yet within the novel’s allegori-
cal dimension (introduced by the sword of the goddess), this “big story,” 
which Karl wishes to reject, evokes the seduction of Adam by eve and 
the expulsion from paradise. given that their expulsion entails the change 
from immortal to mortal existence, in which the continuity of life is 
only assured by procreation (the consequence of the “original sin”), this 
expulsion has the character of a birth or re-birth. When Karl’s uncle 
compares the crossing from europe to America with a “geburt” (56) 
(“birth”), involving the passage “vom Jenseits in die menschliche Welt” 
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(“entering the human world from the beyond”), he is invoking precisely 
this “große geschichte” to impose a particular, culturally familiar meaning 
on Karl’s arrival in the New World. At the same time, this journey into 
the human world is fraught with allusions to death: The pattern of the 
passage to America itself alludes to the mythical Acheron: the passage to 
death. The officials at New york harbor wear black uniforms, Karl applies 
at the Theatre of Oklahoma under the name of “Negro.” The cold and 
loneliness of the abandoned Therese and her mother in New york and the 
deliberate death of Therese’s mother will take up the same motif again.
ii
On his way to Ramses with two mysterious characters, the tramps Rob-
inson and Delamarche, Karl arrives at the hotel Occidental. The head 
Cook takes to him and employs him as a lift-boy. Therese, typist and 
secretary to the head Cook, befriends Karl. however, one cannot say 
that Karl befriends her in equal measure. “Sie hatte keine geheimnisse 
vor ihm” (195) (“she had no secrets from him”), we are told, but nothing 
is said about Karl revealing his secrets to her. On the contrary, she has to 
submit to Karl. From Karl’s perspective the following arrogant statement 
is added: “es wäre auch nicht gut möglich gewesen, nach ihrem Besuch 
damals am ersten Abend noch geheimnisse vor ihm zu haben” (195–96) 
(“and indeed it would have been difficult for her to have any secrets after 
her first visit to him that first evening”).
 Therese is an illegitimate child; the father, a builders’ foreman, had 
emigrated to New york, leaving Therese’s exhausted mother to follow 
him with her daughter. yet he deserted them shortly after their arrival 
without much explanation, moving on to Canada. The “Zurückge-
bliebenen” heard no more of him—“zum Teil auch nicht zu verwun-
dern . . . denn sie waren in den Massenquartieren des New yorker Ostens 
unauffindbar verschwunden” (196) (“which wasn’t all that surprising as 
they were hopelessly lost in the cramped ghetto in the eastern part of 
New york”; “unauffindbar”: verbatim: “not to be found”). This father is 
“verschollen,” they are “verschollen.” The term “verschollen” is applied 
to people whose whereabouts are known to no one, of whom there are 
no tidings, of whom no one knows whether they are still alive. This story 
contains a twofold reflection of Karl’s story. Like Karl, bereft of his fam-
ily, the mother has lost her husband and the child has lost her father and 
her mother while they themselves are lost in New york. Conversely, the 
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father has left his only child behind, voluntarily, just as Karl seems to have 
forgotten about his own child. At any rate, his consciousness betrays no 
trace of it.
 Therese’s story begins thus: “einmal erzählte Therese—Karl stand 
neben ihr am Fenster und sah auf die Straße—vom Tod ihrer Mutter” 
(196) (“Once—Karl was standing next to her at the window, gazing 
down on the street—Therese had talked about the death of her mother”). 
Obviously she relates this event in considerable detail because it is “spät” 
(202) (“late”) when she finishes. The reference to looking out of the 
window down at the street is of some importance. Previously, the uncle 
had warned Karl not to look down at the street from the balcony, since 
this action would give rise to confusion and would lead anyone “der 
hier bleiben will” (“who wants to stay here”) to his “Verderben” (56) 
(“doom”). The situation at the window is a situation occurring, omi-
nously, at a threshold.
 Therese’s story is not the first embedded narrative or narrated narra-
tive in the novel. In the first chapter, the uncle, while being entertained 
in the captain’s cabin, relates the story of Karl’s seduction and expul-
sion, mentioning the maidservant’s letter that announces Karl’s arrival 
in New york. The uncle tells this story to explain a “kleine Familien-
szene” (37) (“little family scene”), since Karl has questioned their rela-
tion. In this account, more of the events predating Karl’s arrival in New 
york are revealed. Furthermore, the uncle’s narrative has such a profound 
effect on Karl that the episode of his seduction returns to the forefront 
of his consciousness “Aus dem gedränge einer immer mehr zurückges-
toßenen Vergangenheit” (41) (“in the crush of an ever-receding [verba-
tim: ‘repelled’] past”).
 Besides the acts of saying, talking, asking, answering, inquiring, inter-
rogating, and admitting, the act of narrating is of importance. Through-
out the novel, narrations are demanded or warded off.3 Karl asks the 
stoker to narrate “einfacher . . . klarer” (28) (“more clearly and simply”); 
he tells the uncle about life at home; he has to tell the head Cook 
about europe; the head Waiter tells about Karl’s misdeeds (240). In her 
narration, Therese tells of the death of her mother ten years ago, when 
she was about five years old. Together with Therese, the mother is in 
desperate search of accommodation in wintry New york. The mother 
has no employment, no money, nothing left to eat, no “Plätzchen,” (198) 
(“place”) only the prospect of work on a construction site, starting the 
next morning. As she feels dead tired and has already coughed up blood, 
she tries to “irgendwo in die Wärme zu kommen und sich auszuruhen” 
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(197) (“get in the warm somewhere and rest”). As if “in einem Wahn” 
(196) (“possessed”) she rushes through the streets during a snowstorm, 
a situation her child is not wholly able to understand: “das ganze schien 
damals für seinen Unverstand nur die erklärung zu haben, daß die Mut-
ter von ihm weglaufen wolle” (199) (“in her incomprehension the only 
explanation she could find for the whole thing was that her mother was 
trying to run away from her”).
 They seem to be refused admittance everywhere, but they do not 
step inside any building even though the gates and doors are not locked. 
After midnight, the mother stops addressing anyone and does not want 
rest anymore. In the morning, they reach the construction site where the 
mother is supposed to start working. Like a Native American prepar-
ing for fighting, she ties a colored rag around her head, then she climbs 
the scaffolding and plunges herself over the edge. Seen from Therese’s 
viewpoint, the mother has escaped into death. “Die letzte erinnerung 
Thereses an ihre Mutter war, wie sie mit auseinandergestreckten Beinen 
dalag in dem karierten Rock, der noch aus Pommern stammte, wie jenes 
auf ihr liegende rohe Brett sie fast bedeckte, wie nun die Leute von allen 
Seiten zusammenliefen und wie oben vom Bau irgendein Mann zornig 
etwas hinunterrief ” (202) (“Therese’s last memory of her mother was of 
her lying there with legs apart in the checkered skirt she had brought 
with her from Pomerania, the rough plank on top of her, almost covering 
her, people running together from all directions, and from up on the site 
some man angrily shouted something”).
 embedding narrations is a familiar enough technique of novel writ-
ing. embedded narrations can mirror and condense fundamental aspects 
of the novel as a whole. Kafka already employs this technique in Be schrei-
bung eines Kampfes (Description of a Struggle) and also in his two other 
novels: “Before the Law,” which is the “legend” in The Trial, and Olga’s 
story about Amalia’s secret in The Castle. Both have similar mirroring 
functions. Therese’s story reflects Karl’s story, while the mother’s restless 
hunt through the streets exemplifies the pace of the American world of 
industry and labor he encounters elsewhere. The head Cook only sleeps 
for a few hours each night; the student Joseph Mendel does not sleep 
at all; the elevator-boys sleep standing on their feet in order to manage 
their twelve-hour-shifts; Karl and Therese carry out their errands in a 
great hurry. however, in Therese’s memory this great hurry might well 
have been “in Wirklichkeit ganz gut auch bloß ein Schleichen” (“and 
perhaps in reality it was no more than a mere crawl”). “Therese wußte 
auch nicht, ob sie von Mitternacht bis fünf Uhr früh in zwanzig häusern 
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oder in zwei oder gar nur in einem haus gewesen waren” (199) (“Nor 
could Therese be sure whether they had tried their luck in twenty houses 
between midnight and five o’clock, or two or even just one”). The fruit-
less search appears to go on for an eternity; it seems that mother and 
child are refused entry everywhere—and for all time.
 The mother’s climb up the scaffolding, whose vertical bars soared 
into the blue sky, takes the same direction as the sword raised aloft by the 
Statue of Liberty; it also mirrors Karl’s progress through a series of ever-
higher destinations. This detail is particularly important to Therese: “Sie 
hatte ausführlich erzählt, wie es sonst nicht ihre gewohnheit war, und 
gerade bei gleichgültigen Stellen, wie bei der Beschreibung der gerüst-
stangen, die jede für sich allein in den himmel ragten, hatte sie mit 
Tränen in den Augen innehalten müssen” (202) (“It had been unusually 
detailed for her, and, especially in unimportant places, for instance the 
description of the scaffolding poles each soaring into the sky, she had to 
stop with tears in her eyes”). The expression “gleichgültige Stellen” (202) 
(“unimportant places”) is semantically ambiguous, since it can also mean 
“gleich gültige Stellen” of the story, i.e. passages of equal importance.
 At first glance, the story told by Therese about her mother is a tale of 
hunger, sickness and despair, ending in the mother’s lethal fall from the 
scaffolding. It seems to be a tale of the deadly coldness and indifference 
of a capitalist society in the tradition of the social novel à la Dickens or 
hugo. however, the situation also bears apocalyptic traits transcending 
the social dimension. The passage describing the “rauchigen Dunst, der 
wie durch einen Brand verursacht, die Zimmer erfüllte” (198) (“the haze 
that filled the rooms like smoke from a fire”) conjures an image of the 
tenement halls as an apocalyptic world. The hotel dormitory is likewise 
filled with smoke (149) and the uncle is somber with satisfaction when 
Karl, sharing his place by the window, recites his first American poem, 
“die Darstellung einer Feuersbrunst” (62) (“the account of a conflagra-
tion”).4
 Much the same as her memory is not reliable, Therese’s narration also 
is ambiguous because it is intertwined with a conflicting voice telling a 
different story. In the narration two voices are blended. From a certain 
moment onward, the mother is no longer looking for an accommoda-
tion for herself and her child; instead, already “totmüde” (197) (“dead 
tired”), she is looking for death. With hindsight it appears to Therese 
that the mother “nur in den ersten Stunden ernstlich einen Platz suchte” 
(198) (“had only been serious in her search for the first few hours”). 
The child’s incomprehension can only give the whole thing the seeming 
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“erklärung,” (“explanation”) “dass die Mutter von ihm weglaufen wollte” 
(199) (“that her mother was trying to run away from her”). In this con-
text the expression means more than merely running away. They do not 
join any of the groups of people they encounter but count themselves 
“glücklich” (200) to escape them. They are no longer looking for accom-
modation.
 The mother’s fall seems at first glance to be an accident. But it is no 
accident. There are indications that she resolutely plunges herself into 
death: for her climb, she has decorated herself with the aforementioned 
“colored rag” like an Indian.5 She moves purposefully, with a sureness and 
authority she did not have before. “Nun kam aber die Mutter auf ihrem 
gang zu einem kleinen Ziegelhaufen, vor dem das geländer und wahrs-
cheinlich auch der Weg aufhörten, aber sie hielt sich nicht daran, ging 
auf den Ziegelhaufen los, ihre geschicklichkeit schien sie verlassen zu 
haben, sie stieß den Ziegelhaufen um und fiel über ihn hinweg in die 
Tiefe” (157) (“Then her mother came to a little pile of bricks marking 
the end of the railing and probably the path as well, but she didn’t stop, 
she walked up to the bricks, her sure-footedness seemed to have deserted 
her, she kicked over the bricks and fell with them over the edge”). In this 
sentence, one voice recounts the mother’s death as a deliberate act, while 
another voice presents the death as an accident caused by clumsiness. 
The expression “ging auf den Ziegelhaufen los” also means a determined 
attack by the mother against the obstacles in her path. In her narration, 
Therese both understands and misunderstands “the whole thing,” mar-
veling at her mother’s “sure-footedness” in “ihrem Dusel” (201); “Dusel” 
means drowsiness or daze as well as stupendous, unexpected good fortune. 
The ambiguity plays both on the mother’s numbed subjection to circum-
stance and on her determined pursuit of release from her situation.
 enhanced by semantic allusions and ambiguities, the intensity of 
Therese’s narration establishes a parabolic meaning. It can be understood 
as “proof ” of the impossibility of finding “Unterkommen”—accommo-
dation as well as a sustaining position—in life. The men in the doorways 
of the houses not only deny entry to Therese and her mother by their 
mute presence or a curt word. They prove, as it is said, the “Unmöglich-
keit des Unterkommens”—the impossibility of finding shelter, or, indeed, 
a place in life: “trat nur die gestalt irgend jemandes hervor, der im Tür-
rahmen stand und entweder durch seine stumme gegenwart oder durch 
ein kurzes Wort die Unmöglichkeit eines Unterkommens in dem betre-
ffenden Zimmer bewies” (198) (“a human figure would loom in the 
doorway, and either with a curt word or by its mute presence prove 
the impossibility of finding shelter in that particular room”). Strikingly, 
Kurz, “therese’s story in Der Verschollene”  103
the phrase mentions the fact that there is “immerfort Leben” (199) 
(“always life”), thus life per se. The houses where people meet at every 
turn can stand for life in general. Thus, one possible meaning of “immer-
fort Leben” is that there is always life, evermore, continuous. Another 
meaning of the phrase is “life that always is already gone, permanently 
lost”: immer fort.
 A proof to whom? To Therese? She is shown in the narrative as a 
character who does not understand and yet at the same time understands 
“the whole thing.” To Karl? Should he, or can he understand the story 
as proof of a previous statement or experience? Does he already under-
stand the story as such a proof? Or should we say that the employment 
of “proved” betrays a subconscious understanding? In any case, the word 
indicates a proof to the addressee of the narration: Karl on one level, the 
reader on another.
iii
how is Therese’s story presented? It is the classic storytelling situation. 
Somebody, Therese, in her room one evening, is telling somebody else, 
Karl, on some occasion and for some purpose, that something happened: 
the death of her mother. The story is framed by indicating an act of nar-
ration: “Once . . . Therese had talked about . . . ” and by a concluding 
narrative comment on the narration (202). Retrospectively, Therese tells 
of an incident that occurred “damals”(197) (“then”), ten years earlier; 
she must have been five years old, as she says. her narrative commentary 
asserts that she can recollect everything—“ganz genau” (202) (“every 
detail”). And yet the use of the modal particles “wohl” (“arguably”) or 
“vielleicht” (“perhaps”) and the phrase “schien es jetzt im Rückblick” 
(198) (“had a dim memory, verbatim: “seemed in retrospect”) indicates 
the uncertainty of her recollection. Thus, Therese’s story is a subtle exam-
ple of Kafka’s technique of producing narrative uncertainty and of blend-
ing different narrative voices, different perspectives.
 Originally, Kafka had written Therese’s narration as a passage related 
by a first-person narrator (KKAVA, 195). he then changed it into a third-
person narrative, thus making it congruent with the narrative discourse 
of the whole novel. he proceeded similarly with the beginning of The 
Castle. The adoption of a third-person narrative allows for interferences 
and the shifting of voices and perspectives. As is well known, the narra-
tive perspective in Kafka’s novels and stories is closely related to the main 
character’s perspective. Moreover, adapting Therese’s story to the novel’s 
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overall narrative discourse creates an intriguing bond between Karl’s 
perspective and the perspectives adopted by the narrator. The following 
sentence is an illustrative example of these shifts and interferences: “Karl 
hatte noch keinen Winter in New york mitgemacht” (196) (“Karl hadn’t 
yet experienced a winter in New york”). The narrative voice could be 
Therese addressing Karl, presented or transposed as third-person narra-
tion. Or the voice could be that of a heterodiegetic narrator. Or, if we 
link the sentence to Karl’s perspective, the narrative voice can merge 
with Karl’s voice, thus constituting a variant of free indirect speech influ-
enced by Therese’s description.
 Thus two—or, given the possibility of Karl’s voice being heard, 
three—narrative instances are blended together: Therese’s—narrating, as 
we have seen, with two voices—Karl’s, and the one reporting, transpos-
ing, and narrating Therese’s speech. As readers who are considering the 
narrative situation—Therese as narrator, Karl as her audience standing 
close to her—we get the impression that this narrator’s voice is blending 
into the filter of Karl’s awareness or consciousness. hence we also get the 
impression that Karl is deeply affected by Therese’s story.
 In the narrative discourse, four levels of speech are integrated: 
reported direct speech, free indirect speech, transposed speech, and nar-
rated speech. The discourse alternates between scenic immediacy and 
narrative mediation, between past and present tense. Consider the first 
sentence: “Wie die Mutter und sie an einem Winterabend—sie konnte 
damals etwa fünf Jahre alt gewesen sein—jede mit ihrem Bündel durch 
die Straßen eilten, um Schlafstellen zu suchen” (196) (“The way that one 
winter evening her mother and herself—she must have been five at the 
time—each carrying a bundle, chased down the stree, looking for a place 
to sleep”). This is a beginning in medias res. The transposed speech indi-
cated by the third-person narration and the past tense switches to free 
indirect speech due to the absence, the deletion of a narrative act (i.e., 
“Therese erzählte.”) Narrating and experiencing, or reliving, converge. 
The inserted sentence, “sie konnte damals etwa fünf Jahre alt gewesen 
sein” (“she must have been five at the time”), is being told from the dis-
tance of an external focalization.
 Immediacy and mediation of the narrative presentation also change 
in the following three sentences: “Und diese Schneestürme in den lan-
gen geraden Newyorker Straßen!” (196) (“And the snowstorms in the 
long straight streets of New york!”): free indirect speech, reported speech. 
“Karl hatte noch keinen Winter in New york mitgemacht.” (196–97) 
(“Karl hadn’t experienced a winter in New york”): reported speech, 
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reported thoughts of Karl or utterance of an external narrator. “geht 
man gegen den Wind, und der dreht sich im Kreise, kann man keinen 
Augenblick die Augen öffnen, immerfort zerreibt einem der Wind den 
Schnee auf dem gesicht, es ist etwas Verzweifeltes.” (197) (“If you walk 
into a swirling headwind, you can’t open your eyes even for a second, the 
wind is incessantly rubbing snow in your face, you walk and walk and get 
nowhere, it’s quite desperate”): reported direct speech.
 With what intention does Therese tell Karl the story about her moth-
er’s death? Therese’s narration has a mirroring, parabolic-reflexive, “prov-
ing” function in the novel’s discourse. In the narrated world of the novel, 
the narration has diverse functions as well: Therese tells of her mother’s 
death since she does not want to keep any secrets from Karl. With this 
narration, she confides in Karl and thereby asks for his reliance, friend-
ship, and affection. She also explains her personal situation, particularly 
her relationship with the head Cook who takes on the role of a substi-
tute mother.
 Another important purpose is specified directly. This purpose is what 
Therese is interested in at the end of her story: “weil der Anblick ihrer 
Mutter oben im halbfertigen erdgeschoß das letzte Andenken an das 
Leben der Mutter war und sie es ihrem Freunde gar nicht genug deutlich 
überantworten konnte, wollte sie nach dem Schluße ihrer erzählung 
noch einmal darauf zurückkommen, stockte aber, legte das gesicht in 
die hände und sagte kein Wort mehr.” (202–3) (“because the sight of her 
mother up on the partly finished ground floor was her last memory of 
her mother’s life, and she couldn’t relate it clearly enough to her friend, 
she wanted to go back to it again after the end of her story, but she fal-
tered, buried her face in her hands and didn’t say another word”). This 
is odd phrasing: “das letzte Andenken an das Leben der Mutter . . . über-
antworten”—that is, to commit or hand over the last memory, the last 
mental souvenir to Karl. The last sight does not really refer to the actual 
last sight, the dead mother on the ground, but to the mother’s behavior 
on the scaffolding, to the mother’s life. “Überantworten” can mean to 
bequeath, to entrust, to deliver; it connotes giving ownership, responsibil-
ity, and consequences. Something of importance is judiciously entrusted 
to the care and responsibility of another.
 Which message does Therese want Karl to understand by telling 
her story? What consequence is the bequest of the “last memory” of 
the mother’s life supposed to have for Karl? Which kind of Antwort 
(“answer”) is he supposed to give? Is it supposed to be a recognition of 
death, of one’s own mortality, of the responsibility for one’s own death?
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The sentence “Sie hatte ausführlich erzählt, wie es sonst nicht ihre 
gewohnheit war und gerade bei gleichgültigen Stellen, wie bei der 
Be schrei bung der gerüststangen, die jede allein für sich in den him-
mel ragten, hatte sie mit Tränen in den Augen innehalten müssen” (202) 
(“The story had been unusually detailed for her, and, especially in unim-
portant places, for instance the description of the scaffolding poles each 
soaring into the sky, she had to stop with tears in her eyes”) symboli-
cally emphasizes that the human being is alone in this situation. The 
poles rise up to the sky “jede allein für sich” (“each on its own”), con-
veying the sense that one must take responsibility for living and dying. 
Therese narrates this while crying. For her, this part of the story is any-
thing but unimportant. The phrasing “gleichgültige Stellen” (“unimport-
ant places”), in contrast, focalizes Karl’s perception of what she describes 
so vividly, or rather, his incomprehension. yet why does Karl so emphati-
cally perceive these passages to be unimportant? The end is ambiguous: 
Therese falters and rests her face in her hands. This could convey that she 
is overwhelmed by her own feelings, or it could be an expression of her 
desperation, since she cannot reach Karl; this communicative journey too 
has led into emptiness. The chapter ends without Karl giving an answer.
notes
 1. My work on this essay has been aided by studies by Kurz (1980, 152–58), 
Nicolai (1981), Neumann (1985, 43–65), Kremer (1994, 238–53), Plachta (1994, 
75–97), Speirs and Sandberg (1997, 29–62), godé and Vanoosthyse (1997), Scheffel 
(1999/2000, 279–95), greiner (2003, 637–58), Metz (2004, 646–71), and Schille-
meit (2004, 211–24). Textual references are to the critical edition of Der Verschollene 
(KKAV). Quotations in english from this edition refer to the translation by Michael 
hoffman: Franz Kafka. The Man Who Disappeared (Amerika). London: Penguin Books 
1996. I thank Daniel Randau for help with the translation of this essay.
 2. At this point in the manuscript, Kafka deleted the following sentence: “er sah 
zu ihr auf und verwarf das über sie gelernte” (KKAVA, 123) (“he looked up at her 
and discarded all that he had learned about her”).
 3. See gerhard Neumann’s discussion in chapter 4.
 4. Cf. the apocalyptic image of New york: “Und morgen wie abend und in 
den Träumen der Nacht vollzog sich auf dieser Straße ein immer drängender Ver- 
kehr . . . und alles dieses würde erfaßt und durchdrungen von einem mächtigen Li-
cht, das immer wieder von der Menge der gegenstände zerstreut, fortgetragen und 
wieder eifrig herbeigebracht wurde und das dem betörten Auge so körperlich er-
schien, als werde über dieser Straße eine alles bedeckende glasscheibe jeden Augen-
blick immer wieder mit aller Kraft zerschlagen” (55) (“In the morning and evening, 
and in his dreams at night, that street was always full of swarming traffic . . . and all 
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this was held and penetrated by a mighty light, that was forever being scattered, car-
ried off and eagerly returned by the multitudes of objects, and that seemed so pal-
pable to the confused eye that it was like a sheet of glass spread out over the street 
that was being continually and violently smashed”).
 5. The motif of the Native American Indian as a figure of liberty recurs through-
out Kafka’s work. Illustrative examples include “Die Abweisung” and “Wunsch, In-
dianer zu werden.”
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The castle’s Challenges to narratology
The narratological presuppositions of The Castle are (1) that none of the 
characters have direct or verifiable access to the minds of other characters 
and (2) that the narrative voice is limited to partial access to the protago-
nist’s mind, without any direct access to the minds of other characters. 
The Castle’s narrative is governed by these presuppositions; they hold true 
in all of the segments and fragments we have of this incomplete novel. 
This essay explores the novel from the perspective of these controlling 
assumptions.
 This essay has as its guiding path a question: how useful are narrato-
logical modes of analysis in reading and understanding Kafka’s Das Schloß? 
An impressive body of theoretical and practical work exists in the dis-
cipline that calls itself “narratology.” Though narratologists differ among 
themselves, their general goal is to establish an agreed-upon set of terms 
and distinctions that will allow an objective and verifiable analysis of nar-
rative technique in a given work. Their correct assumption is that tech- 
nique participates in the production of meaning. Some narratologists, 
skittish about the word “meaning,” would prefer to say “production of 
effect.”
 The narrative techniques Kafka employed have inspired the more or 
less unpredictable and variable performative effects of reading his work. 
By “performative effect,” I mean a decision, brought about by the read-
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ing, to do something; for example, to teach the novel or to write about it, 
but also perhaps to change one’s behavior in everyday life. evidence of 
the variability of these effects is the distressingly contradictory ways of 
reading Kafka that have developed over the years. Readings of many dif-
ferent kinds—religious readings, autobiographical readings, psychoana-
lytical readings, political readings, sociological readings, intrinsic readings, 
and allegorical readings—have proliferated, each claiming to “have Kafka 
right.”
 Two conspicuous features of Das Schloß are prima facie challenges to 
a narratological reading, though they do not forbid such a reading: (1) 
The novel is unfinished and (2) it is discontinuous, not a straight narrative 
line going from beginning to middle to end. Das Schloß is made up of a 
sequence of more or less detached segments or fragments that do not fol-
low from one to the other in a linear narrative leading toward some ending 
that ties all the threads together. Kafka apparently improvised the various 
sections of the novel as he went along and as episodes for it occurred to 
him. Only in retrospect did he assign chapter numbers and establish a 
definite narrative sequence. That was never done for the later segments, so 
we do not know just what order they would have had, nor do we know 
what never-written sections might have intervened. In spite of hints that 
Kafka made to his friend Max Brod we do not really know how the novel 
would have ended. Brod said that Kafka told him, “The ostensible Land 
Surveyor was to find partial satisfaction at least. he was not to relax in his 
struggle, but was to die worn out by it. Round his death-bed the villagers 
were to assemble, and from the Castle itself word was to come that though 
K.’s legal claim to live in the village was not valid, yet taking certain auxil-
iary circumstances into account, he was to be permitted to live and work 
there” (Kafka 1951, 329–30). This ending would have been ambiguous 
enough. K. was to die at the moment he was given permission, so to speak, 
to live. Kafka did not live to write this or any other ending. Moreover, he 
may have been sugarcoating the story for his good friend Brod who had 
trouble accepting the ironically comic bleakness of Kafka’s work.
The castle’s narrator
The donnée, as henry James would have called it, of Das Schloß is simple 
enough. A young man, who is called “K.” by the narrator, arrives on a 
snowy night in a village at the foot of a Castle hill. he claims that he 
has an official appointment from Count Westwest, the Castle’s sovereign, 
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as Land Surveyor for the village. The novel’s segments recount various 
attempts by K. to get accepted by the Castle and by the village. Ini-
tial telephone calls to the Castle yield ambiguous information. First the 
Castle authorities say no, and then they say yes.
 I turn now to my first narratological question: what presumptions are 
made in The Castle about the way the protagonist, K., is related to other 
people in the village and to those he encounters who purport to be from 
the Castle? The early chapters of The Castle were initially written in the 
first person. Kafka then decided to write the novel in the third person. 
he went back through the manuscript to change “Ich” to “K.” Maurice 
Blanchot, perhaps Kafka’s best reader, has noted, in “Kafka et la littéra-
ture,” that Kafka says he became a writer when he changed “Ich” to “Er,” 
“I” to “he” (Blanchot 1981, 86). The effect of this change is to double the 
narrative line and to make that double line vibrate with uncertainty. The 
doubling into free indirect discourse from first-person discourse, in the 
case of Das Schloß, gives the reader not only the way things seem to K. 
but also, at the same time, the effaced narrator’s dry, objective report. That 
report enigmatically ironizes what K. says, thinks, and feels. I call the 
ironizing “enigmatic” because the narrator never explicitly passes judg-
ment on K.’s judgments. K. may be right or he may be wrong. The nar-
rative voice never says anything about that. Indeed, it never says anything 
at all on its own hook. The narrative voice just transposes first-person 
present-tense narration into third-person past-tense narration, Ich bin 
into Er war.
 That narrator, moreover, does not fit very well into any of the usual 
narratological pigeon-holes. Far from being imaginable as any kind of 
person with one or another focalization, and identifiable as reliable or 
unreliable, the “narrator” of Das Schloß is almost completely impersonal. 
The narrative voice has somewhat restricted access to K.’s thoughts, per-
ceptions, and feelings. This narrative voice is hardly amenable to eval-
uation as remaining the same from one time of narration to another, 
so dependent is it on K. Moreover, K. does not remain the same from 
one narrative segment to another. Nor do the characters. A spectacular 
example of this variability is what Olga tells K. about Klamm, K.’s chief 
intermediary for access to the Castle: “They say he looks completely 
different [anders] when he comes into the village and different when he 
leaves it, different before he has had a beer, different afterwards, differ-
ent awake, different asleep, different alone, different in conversation, and, 
quite understandably after all this, almost utterly different [fast grundver-
schieden] up there at the Castle” (Kafka 1997, 216; Kafka 1998, 176. I 
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have interpolated in the english translations here and throughout some 
words and phrases from the german original, when they help indicate 
the nuances of what Kafka wrote). 
 Ironic discourse is, notoriously, pace Wayne Booth, undecidable in its 
meaning (Booth 1974; de Man 1996; Miller 2001). The doubling of the 
protagonist by the narrative voice, as it functions in this particular case, 
makes Das Schloß ironic through and through. The narrator in Das Schloß 
is no more than a strange, disembodied power of narration, a linguistic 
energy of articulating (or disarticulating) K.’s experiences, thoughts, and 
feelings. This linguistic energy modulates from episode to episode. The 
narrative is hardly an “organic unity,” such as some narratologists expect 
from a good literary work. Of course, someone might object that my claim 
that no globally unified reading is possible is a globally unified reading. I 
agree, but I would answer that this is a conspicuously Kafkaesque aporetic 
formulation. It is like, for example, what Kafka says about despair: “Don’t 
despair, not even over the fact that you don’t despair” (Kafka 1976, 224).
Forms of narration in The castle
Second narratological question: what mixture of ways of narration char-
acterizes the words on the pages? The narrative texture of Das Schloß 
is made up, for the most part, of three linguistic registers: (1) dialogue 
between K. and the characters, reported with minimal objective or descrip-
tive commentary (as opposed to interpretation) by the anonymous narra-
tor, (2) interpretative speeches to K. by one of the characters, sometimes 
going on for many pages, to which K. responds, almost always in dis-
agreement, with interpretative comments of his own (examples are the 
long speeches to K. by the landlady, by Frieda, by Olga, by Bürgel, and 
by Pepi), and (3) the report in free indirect discourse by an unnamed, 
impersonal narrator of things that go on inside K. (thoughts, feelings, 
interpretations, and sensations). This narrator’s access is limited. The nar-
rator often seems not to know things about K. that the reader would like 
to know—for example, whether or not K. is lying when he says he has 
an appointment as Land Surveyor.
 The strict rule of the narration, as I have said, is that neither K. nor 
the narrator ever has direct access to the minds, feelings, or bodily sensa-
tions of the other characters. The landlady boastfully, and I believe fal-
laciously, asserts at one point that she can read K.’s thoughts. (“Wenn ich 
mir viel Mühe gebe,” she says,” kann ich mich ja hineindenken in Ihre 
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gedanken” [Kafka 1997, 104]). (“If I make an effort, I can even think my 
way into your thoughts, which make no sense here but are perhaps valid 
in the foreign lands you come from”) (Kafka 1998, 83). even if she were 
able to think her way into K.’s thoughts, they would not make sense. 
They would seem like the babble of a foreigner speaking in a foreign 
tongue about strange customs and assumptions. More in correspondence 
with the evidence is the possibility of generalizing K.’s assertion that “ihre 
Beweggründe hält Amalia in ihrer Brust verschlossen, niemand wird 
sie ihr entreißen” (Kafka 1997, 242) (“Amalia keeps her motives sealed 
within her breast, and nobody can drag them from her” [Kafka 1998, 
198]). 
 An immense part of the dense local texture of narration in The Castle 
is made up of dialogue between K. and one or another of the characters, 
sometimes punctuated by long stretches of free indirect discourse record-
ing K.’s thoughts and feelings as he confronts that other person, looks 
him or her in the face, and listens to what that other person says. The 
law of these encounters is that K. cannot understand the other, nor can 
the other person understand him. good examples of the registration in 
free indirect discourse of K.’s weird thoughts, as well as good examples 
of the way K. changes from scene to scene, are the long conversation in 
contretemps with Frieda in chapter 14, titled “Frieda’s Reproach” (Kafka 
1998, 151–61), and K.’s fantasy in the next chapter of what might have 
happened if he had not encountered Schwarzer at the inn on the night 
of his arrival. What he is reported to think to himself in his imaginings, 
however commonsensical those imaginings are, completely contradicts 
his claim in the opening pages that he has an appointment from Count 
Westwest. he thinks of “K. himself knocking on the door at the council 
chairman’s during office hours the following day and registering as a for-
eign journeyman [fremder Wanderbursch] who had already found a place to 
sleep at a local citizen’s [bestimmten Gemeindemitglied] and would probably 
continue his journey the next day, unless, and this was most unlikely, he 
found work here, but then only for a few days, since he hadn’t the slight-
est intention of staying longer. This is what would have happened, or 
something of that sort, had it not been for Schwarzer” (Kafka 1997, 203; 
Kafka 1998, 165).
 The word “verschlossen” (“sealed”) in the passage about Amalia’s 
secrecy reminds the reader of what is implied by the german word for 
Castle, “Schloß” (“a sealed enclosure”). The characters of Das Schloß are 
sealed off from one another. each dwells in a private castle. Other peo-
ple’s thoughts and feelings must be inferred, always doubtfully and uncer-
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tainly, from what they say and from how they look. The result is that no 
verification of K.’s assumptions about what the other person is thinking 
or feeling is possible. This law of unverifiable “analogical apperception,” 
as husserl called it (1960), and the consequent uncertainty of interpreta-
tion, apply just as much to K.’s reading of the people in the village as to 
his (mis)understanding of people hypothetically connected to the Castle 
or representing it. What K. sees or hears or reads may mean this or it may 
mean that. No possible way exists to tell for sure. Nevertheless, an urgent 
need to make correct interpretations defines K.’s situation throughout. 
his life depends on it.
interpreting others and digressive narration 
The result of the difficulty or perhaps even impossibility of understand-
ing others is that The Castle is made up to a considerable degree of acts 
of interpretation (by K. or by others) that often contradict one another 
in the midst of a sentence. If what K. sees, hears, and reads were easy 
to understand, no lengthy work of interpretation would be necessary. 
The novel has scores of examples of the law of contradiction that gov-
erns interpretation in Das Schloß. Unverifiable and inconsistent “exegesis” 
forms the basic stylistic fabric of the novel. The narrative is not so much 
the straightforward telling of a story that might be interpreted narra-
tologically as it is the staging of situations that are permanently incon-
clusive acts of reading, always in excess of the data they attempt to read. 
These readings are, perhaps, allegorical representations of the readers’ 
own acts of interpretation.
 The acts of interpretation within the novel exist on many different 
levels. They may take the form of a contradictory interpretation by K. or 
by another character based on some apparently trivial detail in another 
person’s appearance, behavior, or speech, such as Frieda’s hands, an exam-
ple discussed below. The contradictions may take the form of extended 
dialogues in which K. and some other character—Frieda, the village 
chairman, the landlady, hans Brunswick, Momus, Barnabas, Olga, Pepi, 
or others—argue at length and inconclusively about some aspect of K.’s 
situation or about someone else’s “connection” to the Castle. These con-
tradictory acts of exegesis may take the form of inconsistencies between 
the chapters. K. does not seem to be able to stick to any promise or com-
mitment, as he tries, always unsuccessfully, way after way to reach Klamm, 
and to go beyond Klamm to the Castle itself. “Weg,” german for “path,” 
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“road,” or “way,” is a key word in the novel. “Weg” might be taken as 
an ironically inappropriate name for the novel’s narrative sequence, as it 
wanders this way and that, always starting over again from the beginning 
and never getting any closer to the Castle.
 K.’s actions are perversely contradictory and self-destructive. he 
promises fidelity to Frieda but then betrays her by turning to Olga, 
Barnabas, and Amalia. he says at one point that he has left a wife and 
a child at home, but that does not keep him from promising to marry 
Frieda after he has slept with her. he repudiates the landlady’s advice but 
later depends on her for information. Instead of getting him closer to 
the Castle, his dilatory wavering gets him farther and farther off course, 
or away from his “Weg,” as the novel works its way toward stopping in 
the middle of a sentence. This sentence was about to report the speech 
of an apparently peripheral and inconsequential character, gerstäcker’s 
mother, after previous digressions to Pepi and then to gerstäcker. It 
is even doubtful if the word “digression” may legitimately be used to 
describe The Castle’s narrative structure, since no identifiable straight or 
crooked path to the goal exists, and since we have no certainty even about 
the nature and location of the goal. A given “digression” might suddenly 
reach the goal, as exemplified by the proverbial law that “the longest way 
round is the shortest way home.” As a narrative sequence open to clear 
and unambiguous interpretation, The Castle is most unsatisfactory.
 The most extensive connected sequence (several chapters long) is 
made up by the “digression” of a story within a story. This is the narrative 
of the ostracism, by what Olga explicitly calls “die gemeinde” (Kafka 
1997, 254) (“the community” [Kafka 1998, 208]) of Barnabas’s family 
after Amalia’s refusal of a sexual advance from Sortini, an official from 
the castle. The novel, in specific scenes and as a whole, has the narrative 
rhythm of one of those dreams characterized by endless delay and a slow-
ing down of time, as though one were trying to make one’s way through 
deep snow, as K. indeed does early in the novel. Readers feel, to boot, 
as if they are getting farther and farther away from a constantly receding 
destination. When K. does finally get an interview with someone from 
the Castle—Bürgel, who says that he would be irresistibly tempted to 
help K., and who explains to K. just what he should do to get to the 
Castle—K. falls asleep at the crucial moment, so long-winded has Bür-
gel’s discourse been. This may be an oblique warning to the reader to 
keep wakeful, even though the novel does not seem to be getting any-
where. One remembers the notorious occasion when Christ’s disciples 
went to sleep: “What, could ye not watch with me one hour?” (Matt. 
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26:40, King James version). Reading Das Schloß is a most exasperating, 
perhaps even sleep-inducing, experience.
the impossibility of verifiable interpretation  
as a Consequence of others’ opacity
Many locutions that take the form “x and not x,” or “x and at the same 
time y,” or “perhaps this but also perhaps that” occur throughout Das 
Schloß, in many different ways and at many different scales. These expres-
sions of unresolved contradictions, of negations without dialectical nega-
tivity or possible sublation, are either within speeches by one or another 
of the characters or within reports in free indirect discourse of some-
thing K. thinks to himself. The people who dwell in the village beneath 
the Castle are caught in the double bind of a permanently unverifiable 
either/or—or maybe this/perhaps that, or both this and that—though 
matters of the utmost importance, to the characters at least, are at stake in 
these undecidable oscillations between contradictory interpretations. The 
characters in Das Schloß all waver this way and that, often in a single sen-
tence, because they can find no solid external ground for deciding one 
way or the other. The notorious run-on sentences that make up much 
of Das Schloß, long sequences of phrases or complete sentences bound 
together by commas or perhaps by semicolons, a stylistic feature that Max 
Brod “corrected” in the first edition and that was also suppressed in the 
Muir translation, mimics this side-by-sideness in non-hierarchical and 
non-dialectical dispersal of contradictory judgments or interpretations, 
just as I have mimicked this dispersal in this sentence.
 This limitation in human possibilities of knowledge can be defined 
as the impossibility of verifiable interpretation. This impossibility, para-
doxically, is what generates the narrative. Strangely enough, interpretative 
uncertainty, for Kafka, makes the world go around and keep its balance, 
as one passage asserts in a characteristically ironic and contradictory way, 
“So korrigiert sich selbst die Welt in ihrem Lauf und behält das gleich-
gewicht. Das ist ja eine vorzügliche, immer wieder unvorstellbar vorzüg-
liche einrichtung, wenn auch in anderer hinsicht trostlos” (Kafka 1997, 
326) (“That is how the world corrects its course and keeps its equilib-
rium. It’s certainly an excellent arrangement, always unimaginably excel-
lent, even if in certain other respects hopeless” [Kafka 1998, 271]). Well, 
which is it, unimaginably excellent or hopeless (“trostlos”)? One would 
like to know.
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 In an important entry in the Diaries, a characteristically strange and 
hyperbolic notation made on November 20, 1911, Kafka reflected on his 
fateful penchant for “antitheses,” as well on as his distaste for them. “My 
repugnance for antitheses is certain,” he says. he then goes on, predict-
ably, to express this antipathy in a spectacular example of the way his 
thinking proceeds by way of (or rather, gets hung up on) antitheses that 
turn around and around. Though this circling seems to lead to endless 
vistas, Kafka’s antitheses always conclude by turning back on themselves 
in a self-enclosure that offers no leads for going farther in any direc-
tion. No dialectical synthesis is possible for Kafka’s antitheses. They just 
proliferate in a cascade of antitheses. The “wheel of life,” a note in the 
Diaries explains, is “a toy through the aperture of which one perceived 
the successive positions of a figure affixed to a revolving wheel. It thus 
created the illusion of motion” (Kafka 1976, 495). The wheel of life was 
a primitive motion picture machine. It went round and round, repeating 
the same illusory motion:
My repugnance (“Widerwillen”) for antitheses is certain. They are unex-
pected, but do not surprise (“überraschen nicht”), for they have always 
been there; if they were unconscious, it was at the very edge of con-
sciousness. They make for thoroughness (“gründlichkeit”), fullness, com-
pleteness, but only like a figure on the “wheel of life” (“Lebensrad”), we 
have chased our little idea around the circle. They are as undifferentiated 
as they are different, they grow under one’s hand as though bloated by 
water, beginning with the prospect of infinity (“Aussicht ins grenzen-
lose”), they always end up in the same medium size. They curl up (“rol-
len sich ein”), cannot be straightened out, are mere clues (“geben keinen 
Anhaltspunkt”), are holes in wood, are immobile assaults, draw antitheses 
to themselves, as I have shown. If they would only draw all of them, and 
forever. (Kafka 2004b, not paginated; Kafka 1976, 122)
Performative naming of Frieda’s Hands
yes, if we could just gather all antitheses in one sequestered bundle and 
let them keep quietly circulating there forever. Unfortunately, in Kafka’s 
writing new antitheses are constantly appearing, outside the circle. Read-
ing Das Schloß is certainly exasperating! It is exasperating because it skips 
from one antithesis to another, while remaining still stuck in the same 
place the narrative begins—in the village, at the foot of the Castle’s hill. 
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Why so much equivocation? Why so little narrative progress? Let me 
look into a little detail at one apparently trivial such passage. K. reflects, 
when he first meets Frieda, that “Ihre hände allerdings waren klein und 
zart, aber man hätte sie auch schwach und nichtssagend nennen kön-
nen” (Kafka 1997, 50) (“her hands were indeed small and delicate, but 
they could also be called weak and expressionless” [Kafka 1998, 37]). The 
effect of such sentences on the reader is extremely odd. Well, which is 
it, small and delicate, or weak and expressionless? Why cannot K., or the 
narrative voice, which here speaks for K. in free indirect discourse, make 
up their minds? It seems important to know, since K. is about to enter into 
a long-term liaison with Frieda. The odd effect is generated to a consid-
erable degree by that phrase “man hätte sie . . . nennen können,” “one 
could have called, or named, them. . . . ” Called by whom? Named by 
whom? K.? The narrator? Kafka? Anyone under the sun (“one”; “man”)?
 Kafka himself, the reader may suddenly reflect, is ultimately respon-
sible. he is making the whole thing up. he could call Frieda’s hands 
whatever he likes, small and delicate, weak and expressionless, or any-
thing else he chooses. The language of Das Schloß is not constative or 
referential, since no extra-linguistic referent exists against which it can 
be measured, but performative or constitutive. The word “nennen” calls 
attention to the constructive power of performative language in a literary 
fiction. It calls attention indirectly to the way the whole novel represents 
examples of the perpetual either/or or both/and of performative inter-
pretation. Since no possible access to any external referent exists, you, K., 
the narrator, “man” in general, can call those imaginary hands anything 
you or they like. The situation of the characters, K. especially, doomed 
as they are to perpetual undecidable acts of interpretation, mimics the 
reader’s own situation. The reader too is engaged in a difficult, or perhaps 
impossible, act of exegesis. The storyline generates the reader’s attempt to 
understand as it pursues its wandering and discontinuous way through 
the novel.
secular imitation of talmud and midrash
It is as if, in Das Schloß, the famous nitpicking rabbinic interchanges of 
Talmudic or Midrashic readings had been applied to the give-and-take 
of ordinary human intercourse (Blanchot 1981, 192–95). The difference 
is that Talmudic or Midrashic interpretations are even more extravagant. 
Their exegesis, moreover, is often applied to passages from Jewish sacred 
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scripture, not to specific secular details, so the assumption is that Jehovah 
must have meant something definite, even though that something may 
be hard to interpret. In addition, the goal of Talmud and Midrash, often 
at least seemingly reached, is reconciliation, harmony, elucidation, resolu-
tion of apparent contradiction.
 The transfer of something like Talmudic or Midrashic procedures to 
K.’s never-successful attempt to understand the people around him, to 
find out how to get an audience with Klamm and how to get through 
Klamm to the Castle, produces something exceedingly strange and unset-
tling. An interminable interrogation of the evidence appears destined not 
to reach a verifiable conclusion, since no access is possible to solid, extra-
textual, authoritative evidence that would justify deciding one way or the 
other.
 Much attention in Das Schloß is paid to written documents and to 
the difficulty of interpreting them. In one salient example, not only K. 
but also the village chairman and his wife read Klamm’s letter to K. They 
never agree on the right way to read it. Is it an official letter or an unof-
ficial one? Which would be better for K.? Is it friendly or unfriendly? 
Does it give K. an authorized position in the village or not?
 The hardworking Castle authorities and their representatives in 
the village spend much time producing, storing, and interpreting huge 
assemblages of documents. An example is the comic description of the 
search for one document that may be lost in the closet full of documents 
in the chairman’s room. The chairman’s wife, Mizzi, and K’s two assis-
tants search there for the Castle’s original decree stating that a Land Sur-
veyor is needed (Kafka 1998, 60–62). This is followed by the seriocomic 
account of what happened to the misdirected file about the decision to 
hire or not to hire a Land Surveyor (Kafka 1998, 62–64). Another exam-
ple is the putative description by the chairman of Sordini’s office (neces-
sarily putative because no one the reader encounters from the village has 
actually been there or ever seen Sordini), with its piles of documents that 
are constantly falling down (Kafka 1998, 66).
 Sordini’s office reminds me of Borges’s story “The Library of Babel.” 
That story, in turn, reminds me of the mind-boggling proliferation of 
databases, files, e-mails, and websites on the Internet, and of the never-
wholly-successful attempts by google and yahoo! to keep them search-
able. The World Wide Web in 2005 already had more than 600 billion 
pages (Kelley 2005, 96). It must have many billions more by now. A 
similar problem exists in The Castle. The Castle officials not only fail 
to keep up with the piles of new documents but also fail on most occa-
miller, “the sense of An un-ending”  119
sions to find documents that go astray. Files sent on the World Wide Web, 
such as e-mail attachments, are broken up into relatively short “packets,” 
then routed through different trajectories and nodes to their destination, 
where they are reassembled in order. One can imagine a packet that gets 
lost and circulates endlessly in cyberspace without ever reaching its goal. 
Something like that happens to the village chairman’s response to word 
from the Castle that a Land Surveyor should be appointed. The village 
chairman consults with the village citizens and responds that the village 
has no need of a Land Surveyor. That document, however, is mistakenly 
sent to Department B rather than to Department A. Department B has 
no idea what to do with it. The folder is mysteriously empty anyway. 
years and years go by before the mix-up is sorted out. The delay is exac-
erbated because no mechanism exists in this bureaucracy, in a way similar 
to many bureaucracies, for admitting that an error has been made, even 
though a Control Department exists. This endless delay in getting docu-
ments sent to their right addressees is one example of the nightmarish 
temporality I mentioned earlier as a basic feature of narration in Das 
Schloß.
 The reader of The Castle, faced with all this treatment of documents 
and their interpretation, may suddenly at some point realize that he or 
she is at that moment engaged in an act of interpretation that is mirrored 
by those in the novel. The text of Das Schloß and its various translations 
are by no means unequivocal. Kafka died leaving the novel unfinished. 
It stops in the middle of a sentence. It is plausible to believe that it 
was in principle impossible to finish. K. makes no headway at all in get-
ting closer to the Castle. If anything, he is farther away at the end than 
he was at the beginning. The chapters do not progress chronologically 
toward a pre-determined or pre-existing goal. They move laterally, as K. 
encounters one dead end after another, only to retrace his steps and start 
again. It may be that Kafka gave up writing the novel because he was 
committed to writing as a way to make headway toward the goal of his 
own salvation and discovered to his dismay that writing cannot be used 
in this way. Literature, he may have come to believe, only leads to endless 
wandering.
rejection of mediation and Failed attempts at Passage
For Kafka, as for Derrida, “Between my world, the ‘my world’; what I call 
‘my world,’ and there is no other for me, every other world making up 
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part of it, between my world and every other world, there is initially the 
space and the time of an infinite difference, of an interruption incom-
mensurable with all the attempts at passage, of bridge, of isthmus, of com-
munication, of translation, of trope, and of transfer” (Derrida 2002/2003; 
my translation). The Castle, no reader can doubt, is a potentially endless 
variation on the theme of failed “attempts at passage.” K. wants, or says 
he wants, to come face-to-face with the highest Castle authorities, with 
Count Westwest himself, in order to demand and get official authority 
to practice in the village his “calling” of Land Surveyor. he repudiates 
every mediation in the name of unmediated direct encounter. his sin is 
impatience. he wants to find a pathway to the interior of the Castle. he 
finds over and over again that he can attain only mediated access by way 
of people who have some sort of equivocal distant “Verbindung” (“con-
nection”) to the Castle, or perhaps only appear to do so.
 “Verbindung” is a key word in the novel. It occurs again and again in 
different contexts; for example, strikingly, in Bürgel’s description of him-
self as “Verbindungssekretär” (Kafka 1997, 313) (“a connecting secretary” 
[Kafka 1998, 259]). Bürgel is a self-proclaimed mediator, a connector. K., 
however, refuses, over and over, to have anything to do with such inter-
mediaries. he recognizes, correctly, that all such intermediaries are also 
“blocking agents,” obstacles in the pathway. K. discovers that, as one of 
Kafka’s crucial aphorisms puts it, “es gibt ein Ziel, aber keinen Weg; was 
wir Weg nennen, ist Zögern” (Kafka 2004a, no. 26) (“There is a goal but 
no way; what we call the way is only wavering” [Kafka 1946, 283]).
 This pattern is repeated over and over in the incomplete novel. It 
might have gone on being repeated interminably in more and more 
chapters, without ever reaching that hypothetical deathbed scene with 
which Kafka, perhaps with an intention to mislead, told Max Brod he 
intended to end the novel.
 It is not so much contrariness as an instinctive rejection of all media-
tion that leads to K.’s refusals. As the narrator says, apropos of one of 
those refusals, speaking for K. in free indirect discourse, “far be it from 
him to feel admiration or even envy [for Momus] since it was not close-
ness to Klamm in itself that was worth striving for but rather that he, 
K., and he alone, not anybody else with his wishes, or anybody else’s, 
should approach Klamm, and approach him “nicht um bei ihm zu ruhen 
sondern um an ihm vorbeizukommen, weiter, ins Schloß” (Kafka 1997, 
138) (“not so as to rest there with him but to get past him and go on 
into the Castle” [Kafka 1998, 111]).
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Conclusion
The genius of Das Schloß is to have shown that the sad situation of its 
hero is the result of not having direct access to other people’s minds and 
feelings. This means that, for Kafka, our situation vis-à-vis other people 
is the confrontation of a proliferating network of signs. The interpreta-
tion of those signs, or, more precisely, our reading and exegesis of them, 
is both urgently necessary and at the same time impossible or, even more 
precisely, always possible, but not ever possible to verify. We can read the 
signs others emit, but we can never be sure we have read them right. That 
is what Isabel Archer, by way of the narrator’s indirect discourse, says to 
herself about gilbert Osmond in henry James’s The Portrait of a Lady: 
“she had not read him right” (James 1909/1979, 192). James, however, 
reassuringly implies that Isabel has finally read Osmond “right,” whereas 
Kafka never gives the reader that kind of reassurance.
 This impossibility of verifiably correct reading is correlated with the 
special narrative devices, such as the effaced narrator, the narrative dis-
continuities, and the impossibility of finishing the story, that are distin-
guishing features of The Castle. I have focused throughout this essay on 
the relation between narrative conventions and problems of interpreta-
tion. especially important have been questions having to do with the 
narrator, with the narrator’s knowledge of the characters, and with their 
knowledge of one another. The Castle dramatizes the consequences of 
not being sure what other people are thinking and feeling, whatever they 
say and whatever their eyes, faces, and gestures seem to indicate. These 
consequences include the difficulty, perhaps the impossibility, of finishing 
any narrative, of giving a story narrative continuity and rounding it off 
with a satisfactory ending.
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Reading Kafka in the critical and the facsimile editions deepens one’s 
sense of how much he struggled to create continuity and connected-
ness (Zusammenhang) once he had started to write from a given begin-
ning or to find the right point of ingress in order to follow a thread that 
would lead him through a story he wanted to tell. Whenever he found 
such a beginning, as in “The Metamorphosis,” “The Stoker,” and espe-
cially in “The Judgment,” he felt overwhelming joy at having achieved 
coherence in a complex story. What he experienced while writing “The 
Judgment” represented his ideal: “Nur so kann geschrieben werden, in 
einem solchen Zusammenhang, mit solcher vollständigen Öffnung des 
Leibes und der Seele” (KAF, 10:101) (“This is the only possible way to 
write, in such a connected way, with such complete opening of body and 
soul”).1 This experience set a standard he strove to meet throughout his 
life but seldom attained, according to his own rigorous criteria. Usually 
the critics have agreed about the success of these narratives, but some 
have disagreed, such as hans Dieter Zimmermann, who expresses doubts 
about “The Judgment,” a novella that he believes to be overestimated 
with regard to its formal qualities and its elaboration of motifs.2
 Zimmermann is not the only critic to have pointed out various defi-
ciencies and inconsistencies, which are possibly attributable to the fact 
that the story was conceived of and executed in the course of a single 
starting in tHe middle?
ComPliCations oF 
narrative Beginnings and 
Progression in KaFKa
7
Beatrice Sandberg
123
124  ChAPter 7
hectic night.3 According to Kafka’s own testimony, however, the story had 
great importance for him because it represented the liberation of his 
ambitions as a writer. It also has a fascinating enigmatic obscurity as a story 
that welled up from a hard-pushed writer’s mind in a more or less uncon-
trolled way after many unsuccessful attempts at producing literary texts. 
yet Kafka could also be harsh about stories his readers admired when 
the stories did not meet his own standards. even if he usually argues too 
negatively because of his high ambitions and his low self-esteem, such 
criticism of weaknesses in his texts is not always unwarranted. he men-
tions his feelings of bitterness, for example, while listening to Max Brod’s 
reading aloud of his “kleine Automobilgeschichte” (KAF, 9:177) (“little 
automobile story”):
Die ungeordneten Sätze dieser geschichte mit Lücken daß man beide 
hände dazwischen stecken könnte; ein Satz klingt hoch, ein Satz klingt 
tief wie es kommt; ein Satz reibt sich am andern wie die Zunge an einem 
hohlen oder falschen Zahn; ein Satz kommt mit einem so rohen Anfang 
anmarschiert, dass die ganze geschichte in ein verdrießliches Stau nen 
geräth. . . . Ich erkläre es mir damit dass ich zu wenig Zeit und Ruhe habe 
um die Möglichkeiten meines Talentes in ihrer gänze aus mir zu heben. 
es kommen daher immer nur abreißende Anfänge zu Tage, abreißende 
Anfänge z. B. die ganze Automobilgeschichte durch. Würde ich einmal 
ein größeres ganzes schreiben können wohlgebildet vom Anfang bis 
zum ende, dann könnte sich auch die geschichte niemals end giltig von 
mir loslösen und ich dürfte ruhig und mit offenen Augen als Blutsver-
wandter einer gesunden geschichte ihrer Vorlesung zuhören, so aber 
läuft jedes Stückchen der geschichte heimatlos herum und treibt mich  
in die entgegengesetzte Richtung. (KAF, 9:177)
(The unordered sentences of this story with gaps you could put your 
hand through; one sentence sounds high, another sounds low just as it 
comes; one sentence rubs against the next, like your tongue rubbing 
against a hollow or false tooth; one sentence comes marching up with 
such a coarse beginning that the whole story is thrown into ill-tempered 
astonishment. . . . I explain this to myself as the result of having too little 
time and peace to raise the entire potential of my talent to the surface 
of my being. This is why the only things ever to emerge are broken-
off beginnings, such as the broken-off beginnings throughout the entire 
automobile story. If I were ever able to create a larger whole, well formed 
from beginning to end, I would never be able to detach the story from 
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myself completely and I could listen calmly and with open eyes to its 
recitation, as a blood relative of a healthy story; as things stand, however, 
every little piece of the story runs around without a home and drives me 
off in the opposite direction.)
When we read this story, which Kafka wrote in September 1911 (Rei-
setagebücher KAF, 12:75–78) after seeing a car accident in Paris together 
with Max Brod, we cannot wholly disagree with Kafka’s verdict. In a 
way we are reminded of a film clip by Charlie Chaplin, with people 
coming and gesticulating, vehicles moving around and filling the square, 
and finally a crowd waiting for further developments. The sentences 
comment on the situation ironically in a rather erratic sequence, fol-
lowing the confusion on the square. The laboriously detailed descrip-
tion creates a staccato effect or resembles a film going into reverse from 
time to time. This impression is intensified when a policeman enters 
the scene and starts to take down details from the witnesses. his pedan-
tic accuracy corresponds to the kind of behavior we know from silent 
movies and reaches a peak at the end, when he runs into trouble with 
his report:
er hat nämlich den Bogen an einer Stelle zu beschreiben angefangen, 
wo er aus irgend einem grunde nicht hätte anfangen dürfen. . . . er 
muß den Bogen immerfort wieder umdrehn, um den schlechten Prot.
[okoll]anfang zu glauben. Da er aber von diesem schlechten Anfang 
bald abgelassen und auch anderswo zu schreiben angefangen hat, kann 
er, wenn eine Spalte zu ende ist, ohne großes Auseinanderfalten und 
Untersuchen unmöglich wissen, wo er richtigerweise fortzusetzen hat. 
Die Ruhe die dadurch die Angel.[egenheit] gewinnt, läßt sich mit jener 
frühern durch die Bet.[eiligten] allein erreichten gar nicht vergleichen. 
(KAF, 12:78)
(you see, he had started to write on a part of the page where, for some 
reason, he ought not to have begun. . . . he has to turn the sheet of paper 
round several times in order to believe the bad beginning of the report. 
As he quickly abandons this bad start and begins writing somewhere 
else, it is impossible for him to know, without much unfolding of paper 
and searching, where the report should continue once he has reached 
the bottom of a column. The calm imparted to the incident through this 
procedure simply cannot compare with the calm previously achieved by 
the parties involved alone.)
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The narrator describes the event from the position of an observer. his 
manner of reporting recalls the role of the witness in the famous “street 
scene” Brecht used to teach his actors how to give an objective, unemo-
tional description of an accident when the narrator claims: “es handelt 
sich nun zuerst darum zu erklären, wie es zu dem Unfall gekommen” 
(KAF, 12:75) (“What matters in the first instance is to explain how the 
accident came about”). This witness misses no opportunity to describe as 
fully as possible all the movements and discussions he is able to observe. 
We are dealing here with a witness who reports extensively on an episode 
and thus becomes a real, if somewhat long-winded narrator. Not until we 
get near the end of the text does the policeman begin recording the wit-
ness statements without much investigation of his own, at which point 
the unconscious and “unverständige hoffnung aller Anwesenden auf 
eine sofortige sachliche Beendigung der ganzen Angel[egenheit] durch 
den Pol[izisten] ging in eine Freude an den einzelheiten der Prot[okoll]
aufn[ahme] über” (KAF, 12:78) (“unreasonable hope of all present that 
the whole matter would be brought to a rapid and objective conclu-
sion gave way to delight in the details recorded in the officially recorded 
statements”).
 The reader who is familiar with Kafka’s type of narrative progression 
(or lack of it) and the difficulties involved, will intuitively read this pas-
sage as an indirect self comment, exemplified in the actual presentation, 
which comes to a stop while the policeman is still struggling with his 
various beginnings in an attempt to find the right place to continue. In 
spite of the transposition of place and time and an apparently dissimilar 
situation, there can be little doubt that Kafka is using the figure of the 
policeman to satirize his own problems with this text. Intensified by its 
orchestration as a public event, the whole scene becomes very awkward 
and results in the incomparable calm of the crowd as the policeman strug-
gles with the different beginnings in an effort to arrive at the last entry. 
It seems that the feelings provoked in Kafka by Brod’s reading “meine 
kleine Automobilgeschichte” were particularly linked to his dissatisfaction 
at the “abreißenden Anfänge” (KAF, 9:177) (“broken-off beginnings”). In 
addition he criticizes a lack of fluency and the disparate directions the 
many beginnings take throughout the story. The holes in the argumenta-
tion emerge from a lack of decent workmanship, in contrast to his ideal 
of continuous narration without gaps.4 Although a writer’s criticism of 
his own work may not be reliable, what we are witnessing here is Kafka’s 
lifelong struggle for coherence, evident in the countless attempts to bring 
off the kind of narratives he had in mind. his own observation that his 
account lacked fluency convinced him that what he had written was not 
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designed for reading, as he writes to Max Brod in 1922: “Dieses heft, das 
ich Dir nach Deiner Novelle zu geben gewagt hatte, obwohl ich weiß, 
daß es doch nur da ist zum geschrieben-, nicht zum gelesenwerden” 
(MB, 389) (“This notebook that I dared to give you after your novella, 
although I know that it is only there to be written, not to be read”). 
Nevertheless, despite this deeply felt skepticism, Kafka still thought of his 
writing as being like “die Fahne des Robinson auf dem höchsten Punkt 
der Insel” (MB, 386) (“Robinson [Crusoe’s] flag on the highest point of 
the island”).
 At the end of 1909, while plagued by an inability to write, Kafka 
defined his difficulties thus:
Alle Dinge nämlich, die mir einfallen, fallen [mir] nicht von der Wur-
zel aus ein, sondern erst irgendwo gegen ihre Mitte. Versuche sie dann 
jemand zu halten, versuche jemand ein gras und sich an ihm zu halten, 
das erst in der Mitte des Stengels zu wachsen anfängt. Das können wohl 
einzelne, zum Beispiel japanische gaukler, die auf einer Leiter klettern, 
die nicht auf dem Boden aufliegt, sondern auf den emporgehaltenen 
Sohlen eines halb Liegenden, und die nicht an der Wand lehnt, sondern 
nur in die Luft hinaufgeht. Ich kann es nicht, abgesehen davon, dass 
meiner Leiter nicht einmal jene Sohlen zur Verfügung stehen. (KAF, 
9:15)5
(you see, all the things that occur to me do so not from the root up but 
rather from somewhere about their middle. Let someone then attempt 
to hold them, let someone attempt to hold a blade of grass and support 
himself by holding on to it as it begins to grow, starting in the middle 
of its stalk. Some individuals can probably do this, like those Japanese 
acrobats for example who climb up a ladder that is standing not on the 
ground but on the raised soles of another acrobat who is lying half pros-
trate, and which is not leaning against a wall but simply goes up in the air. 
I can’t do it, quite apart from the fact that my ladder doesn’t even have 
such a pair of soles to stand on.)
A year later Kafka wrote: “Kein Wort, das ich schreibe, paßt zum 
andern. . . . Meine Zweifel stehn um jedes Wort im Kreis herum. . . . 
Wenn ich mich zum Schreibtisch setze, ist mir nicht wohler als einem, 
der mitten im Verkehr der Place de l’Opéra fällt und beide Beine bricht” 
(KAF, 9:103) (“Not one word I write matches the next. . . .  My doubts 
stand in a circle around every word. . . . When I sit down at my desk I 
feel no better than someone who falls and breaks both legs in the middle 
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of traffic on the Place de l’Opéra”). Kafka’s comparisons are virtually 
unique in their vividness and degree of self-exposure. In the first exam-
ple, he fears he lacks the artistic ability to meet the challenges presented 
by his calling as a writer. The second example expresses a crisis so intense 
that even his writing desk, that most precious object to which he often 
clung for dear life, makes him feel utterly exposed and vulnerable (see 
chapter 4 for gerhard Neumann’s discussion of the abandoned writing 
desk in “The Stoker”). he tries to explain why he is incapable of putting 
on paper things he had imagined before sitting down to write:
es liegt natürlich zum großen Teil daran, daß ich frei von Papier nur in 
der Zeit der erhebung, die ich mehr fürchte als ersehne, wie sehr ich 
sie auch ersehne, gutes erfinde, dass dann aber die Fülle so groß ist, dass  
ich verzichten muß, blindlings also nehme nur dem Zufall nach, aus der 
Strömung heraus, griffweise, so dass die erwerbung beim überlegten 
Niederschreiben nichts ist im Vergleich zur Fülle, in der sie lebte, unfähig 
ist, diese Fülle herbeizubringen und daher schlecht und störend ist, weil 
sie nutzlos lockt. (KAF, 9:195)
(Of course this mainly stems from the fact that away from paper I only 
invent good things during a time of exaltation [“erhebung”], something 
I fear more than I long for, however much I may long for it, but then the 
abundance is so great that I have to become selective and let some things 
pass, snatching things blindly, as chance dictates, out of the current, in 
handfuls, so that when it comes to writing down in a moment of reflec-
tion what I have managed to capture in this way, it is nothing compared 
with the abundance in which it lived, the writing process is incapable of 
conjuring up that abundance and is therefore bad and disturbing, because 
it entices to no avail.)
The passage illustrates vividly why Kafka was unable to capture in writ-
ing the richness of things he had imagined before beginning to write. It 
can be contrasted with other, successful moments when the imaginative 
conception of an Einfall (“inspiration,” literally the “falling in” of a cre-
ative idea) and its material transformation into ink on the page coincided 
completely.
 given the difficulties Kafka had in finding the right beginning from 
which to unroll a whole story, we may ask quite properly whether Kafka 
can be called an Erzähler (“story-teller”) in the ordinary german sense of 
the word. The incoherent argumentation and the lack of logic, which we 
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also find in “The Judgment,” resist straightforward, sequential represen-
tation. At the beginning of The Trial too we observe a protagonist who 
stumbles over his arguments, muddles them in his own mind, turns them 
around, and puts them in doubt. In many sketches, Kafka begins a nar-
rative sequence, but then the flow of narration becomes hesitant or gets 
blocked entirely. he complains about the difficulties of finding the right 
starting point that will offer him a guarantee of getting into the story:
Anfang jeder Novelle zunächst lächerlich. es scheint hoffnungslos, daß 
dieser neue noch unfertige überall empfindliche Organismus in der ferti-
gen Organisation der Welt sich wird erhalten können, die wie jede fertige 
Organisation danach strebt sich abzuschließen. Allerdings vergisst man 
hierbei, dass die Novelle, falls sie berechtigt ist, ihre fertige Organisation 
in sich trägt, auch wenn sie sich noch nicht ganz entfaltet hat; darum 
ist die Verzweiflung in dieser hinsicht vor dem Anfang einer Novelle 
unberechtigt . . . (KAF, 11:65)
(The beginning of every novella is laughable in the first instance. There 
seems to be no hope that this new, unfinished organism, vulnerable at 
every point, will be able to survive in the already finished organisation 
of the world which, like every complete organization, strives to become 
self-enclosed and to exclude other things. Admittedly one forgets, as 
one thinks along these lines, that the novella, if it is justified, carries its 
own already finished organization within itself, even if this has not yet 
unfolded completely; thus this kind of despair before the beginning of a 
novella is unjustified.)
When Kafka really did find a beginning, he could become dominated 
by the unhappy sense of a “fortwährenden Anfangs, das Fehlen der Täu-
schung darüber, dass alles nur ein Anfang und nicht einmal ein Anfang 
ist” (KAF, 11:187) (“permanent, continuous beginning, the absence of 
the illusion that everything is just a beginning and not even that”), so 
that he was able neither to progress any further nor to find a way of end-
ing the story.6
 Kafka regarded Dickens with envy as a writer who seemingly “eine 
geschichte von ihrem Anfang an in sich erlebt vom fernen Punkt bis 
zu der heranfahrenden Lokomotive aus Stahl, Kohle und Dampf . . . von 
ihr gejagt wird und aus eigenem Schwung vor ihr läuft wohin sie nur 
stößt und wohin man sie lockt” (KAF, 9:33) (“experiences a story within 
himself from its very beginning, from that point in the distance up to 
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the approaching train made of steel, coal and steam . . . is pursued by the 
story and runs ahead of it under his own impetus in whichever direction 
it pushes him and wherever he entices it to follow him”)—whereas he 
himself experienced all the troubles described above when trying to find 
a thread that would at least help him to get a story moving.
 If we look at two of Kafka’s earliest texts, the first from 1906, the draft 
of a response to Max Brod’s article on aesthetics “Man darf nicht sagen” 
(One may not say) and the other the beginning of a planned novel, the 
so-called Raban story, which in some respects is a predecessor of the 
“Metamorphosis,” we can see some characteristic features of his writ-
ing that are connected to the problem of “vorwärts zu kommen” (KAF, 
11:187) (“moving ahead”).7 The first of these texts is just three pages 
long and deals with the term “ästhetische Apperception” (“aesthetic 
apperception”). In it Kafka offers a kind of philosophical reflection, but 
the discussion of the term is challenging and inconsistent. There is some-
thing of a lawyer’s and a philosopher’s discursive practices in play here. 
The author of the text promises a rational procedure but never arrives at 
a clarifying solution; rather, he persuades the reader that it is not possible 
to arrive at such a solution. here we can readily recognize many of the 
elements found in such short narratives as “gib’s auf!” (“give Up!”) and 
other writings: tiredness, loss of orientation, and an unsuccessful struggle, 
while logical reasoning becomes more and more difficult and contradic-
tory and ends in unresolved conflict. The reader, who has followed the 
argumentation eagerly in the hope of learning more about this important 
concept, is left at the end facing both its “uncertainty” and the impres-
sion of its lack of fit with practical life. As so often is the case in Kafka’s 
stories, the line of argument is inverted and the conclusion is missing.
 The next text Kafka wrote in the same year is familiar to many read-
ers, namely the opening sequence of “hochzeitsvorbereitungen auf dem 
Lande” (“Wedding Preparations in the Country”), of which various drafts 
exist.8 There are differences in the descriptions, some simplifications, and 
some enhancements between version one and two. Both start in an easy 
manner with an everyday situation, as a man steps out of his door into 
the street:
Als eduard Raban, durch den Flurgang kommend, in die Öffnung des 
Tores trat, sah er, daß es regnete. es regnete wenig.
 Auf dem Trottoir gleich vor ihm gab es viele Menschen in ver-
schiedenartigem Schritt. Manchmal trat einer vor und durchquerte die 
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Fahrbahn. ein kleines Mädchen hielt in den vorgestreckten händen ein 
müdes hündchen. Zwei herren machten einander Mitteilungen. Der 
eine hielt die hände mit der innern Fläche nach oben und bewegte sie 
gleichmäßig, als halte er eine Last in Schwebe. Da erblickte man eine 
Dame, deren hut viel beladen war mit Bändern, Spangen und Blumen. 
Und es eilte ein junger Mensch mit dünnem Stock vorüber, die linke 
hand, als wäre sie gelähmt, platt auf der Brust. Ab und zu kamen Männer, 
welche rauchten und kleine aufrechte längliche Wolken vor sich her tru-
gen. Drei herren—zwei hielten leichte Überröcke auf dem geknickten 
Unterarm—giengen oft von der häusermauer zum Rande des Trottoirs 
vor, betrachteten das, was sich dort ereignete und zogen dann sprechend 
sich wieder zurück. . . . 
 Raban fühlte sich müde. . . . Man arbeitet so übertrieben im Amt, 
dass man dann sogar zu müde ist, um seine Ferien zu genießen. . . . Und 
solange Du “man” sagst an Stelle von “ich”, ist es nichts und man kann 
diese geschichte aufsagen, sobald Du aber Dir eingestehst daß Du selbst 
es bist, dann wirst Du förmlich durchbohrt und bist entsetzt. (KAF, 5:15)9
(When eduard Raban, after coming through the hall, stepped into the 
opening of the entrance onto the street he saw that it was raining. It was 
raining lightly.
 On the pavement directly in front of him he saw people walking 
in a variety of ways. Sometimes someone would step forward and cross 
the street. A little girl held a tired little dog out in front of her on out-
stretched arms. Two gentlemen were giving information to each other. 
One of them held out his hands with the palms upwards, moving them 
evenly, as if he were balancing a load. Then one saw a lady whose hat 
was heavily laden with ribbons, brooches and flowers. And a young man 
with a thin stick hurried past, holding his hand flat against his chest, as 
if it were lamed. Now and again men would come who were smoking 
and carried small, thinnish, vertical clouds of smoke before them. Three 
gentlemen, two of them carrying light coats over bent arms, would fre-
quently go from the wall across to the edge of the pavement, look at what 
was going on there, and then step back to the wall again, still talking. . . . 
 Raban felt tired. One works so excessively at the office that one is 
too tired even to enjoy one’s holidays. . . . And as long as you say “one” 
rather than “I,” it’s nothing and one can tell this story, but as soon as you 
admit that this is about you, then it cuts you to the very quick and you 
are horrified.)
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It is a typical Kafka scene—like something taken from a painting by 
georges Seurat. The first part of the fragment is written in the third-
person perspective, with events being observed by an omniscient narra-
tor who reports in the past tense. Then the point of view changes, and 
in certain passages we hear Raban arguing with himself in the present 
tense about his undertakings. Later the author changes the perspective 
yet again and reverts to the authorial point of view. however hilarious 
many of the scenes may look, we are soon confronted with the protago-
nist’s problems, difficulties we are also familiar with from the author’s life. 
The switch to the first-person perspective thus is not merely a technical 
choice but indicates that the protagonist is the author’s alter ego, express-
ing moods and analyzing situations and decisions that Kafka himself was 
struggling with. The crucial moment lies in the switch from the imper-
sonal pronoun “one” to the personal pronoun “I,” a change which opens 
up a gulf between the detached recital of a story and the experience of 
being cut to the quick by its significance. James Rolleston (1979, 404) 
has called Raban a “transparent substitute” for the author (a connection 
confirmed by Kafka’s free play with the letters of his own name). There 
is certainly much autobiographical material in these drafts, expressed in 
a rather direct and subjective form, whereas Kafka later tried to find less 
immediate ways of expressing his inner concerns. Thus, Raban conjures 
up in his mind a picture of himself lying securely in bed in the shape of 
a huge stag beetle while the empty shell of his bourgeois persona is to 
be sent out into the world on unsteady legs. The image will return in 
the figure of the transformed gregor in the “Metamorphosis” but with 
the fundamental difference that in the later story the dream is no longer 
a dream and the reader is confronted with an unacceptable premise he 
is nevertheless forced to accept, not least because the point of view is 
shifted into the protagonist gregor, a narrative move that brings the fig-
ure close to the reader while at the same time alienating the reader from 
empirical reality.
 We find specific elements of Kafka’s art in this fragmentary novel 
about Raban. Kafka’s language is plain and unpretentious, and the nar-
rator presents figures and settings visually and theatrically. Raban has to 
cope with so many movements, so many sharply observed people cross-
ing his path, and so many visual curiosities that he soon gets tired. There 
is also Kafka’s characteristic way of opening the narrative—inviting the 
reader to follow the narrator into a seemingly harmless, innocent look-
ing world, which soon turns out to be confusing and difficult to deal 
with despite the simple language and all the seemingly humorous devia-
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tions that prolong the protagonist’s promenade almost ad infinitum.10 If 
readers simply follow the narrator’s authorial perspective, they might be 
misled by the colorful street scene and only discover the first suggestion 
of a disconnection between form and content when Raban reveals what 
he is thinking. A crucial point here is Kafka’s combination of the pro-
nouns “man” (one), “du” (you), and “ich” (I) in the reflection at the end 
of the paragraph that turns the passage into a metatext that conveys the 
narrator’s own options regarding the choice between different ways of 
describing things via the protagonist’s revelations about his state of mind.
 Another typical element, the “impossibility of narration,” seems to 
be implicit in Kafka’s texts from early on, both in the struggle for expla-
nations and sometimes in the fragmentary character of the texts. The 
attentive reader will be brought to reconsider his or her reading strat-
egy and ask whether Kafka’s texts offer more resistance than other texts 
and therefore whether they demand to be read in different ways. Is it 
enough to describe Kafka’s narrators as unreliable narrators, or is the 
problem located in the approach to subject matter? Does it originate, for 
example, in the typical “Schaukel-Diskurse als sprunghafte Widerspruch-
sentwicklung” (“see-sawing discourses as a way of developing contradic-
tions by discontinuous progression”) with which Kafka was familiar from 
the Jewish narrative tradition (BrM, 154), whereby the meaning changes 
according to shifts of perspective, as in the famous discussion between 
Josef K. and the prison chaplain in The Trial?11 The “Negierung der 
erzählbarkeit” (“negation of narratability”) in Kafka’s work is the start-
ing point of Peter höfle’s argument. he characterizes the specific form 
of Kafka’s narratives as “aufbauende Zerstörung” (“constructive destruc-
tion”), an expression taken from Kafka’s notebooks in spring 1918 (KAF, 
6:222). In höfle’s view (1998, 159), Kafka’s entire oeuvre embodies a 
“Poetik des Mangels” (“poetics of deficiency”).
 In the two texts from 1906, we find two important indications for 
both the deviant discursive progression highlighted by höfle and the 
relation between the narrator’s perspective and the exposure of the nar-
rative as such or, to put it another way, between the shifting loyalties of 
the narrator and the communicative effect of the text. When reading The 
Trial and other narratives by Kafka, early readers experienced difficulty 
in getting hold of the content and the argument because the narration 
appeared to lack consistency and logical stringency. The peculiarities of 
Kafka’s narration are largely responsible for the ways his works have been 
read—or misread—over the years because his strange stories and uncom-
mon motifs made the strongest impression on his early readers, prompt-
134  ChAPter 7
ing them to compare his stories to others they were already familiar with, 
such as the fantastical tales of e. T. A. hoffmann. After all, what do we do 
when we have difficulties with understanding a text? We often refer to 
something similar in order to get some help for the interpretation. This 
kind of normalization can be carried out on different levels.
 If we look at the beginning of some of the published texts, a novel 
and some stories, we can take the first chapter of Der Verschollene (The 
Man who Disappeared) as an invitation from Kafka to read the novel in the 
tradition of the great novels of self-formation from the classical and real-
istic periods in europe. A suitable model for Karl’s story might also be 
sought in the novel of travel (see gerhard Neumann’s discussion in chap-
ter 4). In both types of novel a young person is sent out into the world to 
gain experience, but with the aim of bringing him home again, matured 
by the challenges and adventures he had to deal with, and ready to settle 
down to an ordinary life as a useful member of society. Kafka seems at 
first to open his novel with the same procedure, but the reader soon dis-
covers complications that neither the young protagonist nor the reader 
knows how to tackle or to integrate in their fields of experience. even if 
Karl Roßmann seems initially to be guided by a benevolent Providence 
when he gains admission to the fine house of his rich uncle, where he is 
provided with riding and piano lessons and an english teacher so that he 
can have as “brilliant” a career as his uncle, the reader senses from early 
on the dangers in the situation Karl is sliding into.
 In this way Kafka designs a pattern and invites the reader to follow it, 
while at the same time building in warning signals that an experienced 
reader will spot immediately. Through these expressions, signs, and words, 
the narrator establishes an unobtrusive but important degree of distance 
between the narrator and the protagonist. Thus, the narrator may either 
lead the naive reader to see the fictional world through the eyes of the 
protagonist and feel alienated along with him, or he may make the more 
experienced reader suspicious and wary of looking at the world in this 
way.
 Beside this network of motifs and patterns that help the reader to 
navigate through the texts, Kafka uses other means, which have a con-
trary effect. he organizes a game of ambiguities, contradictions and traps 
that force the reader into strenuous mental gymnastics in an effort to 
establish some logical order.12 The reader follows the narrator and his 
syntactic model: conjunctions like “if,” “though,” “but,” and “however” 
invite him to make rational pirouettes, while causal and consecutive 
clauses give the impression of logical argumentation, although such an 
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argument is not actually present. Other expressions like “perhaps,” “in a 
way,” “rather,” “in a sense,” “seemingly,” “nearly,” “at first glance,” and “in 
reality” relativize the logic of progression, as in the opening lines of a key 
narrative from his last period of writing, “Der Bau” (“The Burrow”):
Ich habe den Bau eingerichtet und er scheint wohlgelungen. Von außen 
ist eigentlich nur ein großes Loch sichtbar, dieses führt aber in Wirklich-
keit nirgends hin, schon nach ein paar Schritten stößt man auf natürliches 
festes gestein. (KAF, 8: 165)
(I have established my burrow, and it seems to be a success. From the 
outside all that is visible is a large hole, but in fact it leads nowhere; after 
just a few steps you hit hard, natural rock.) (KSS, 162)
In the first half of the opening sentence, the first-person narrator, a 
mole-like creature, talks about the result of his labors, but the second 
half concludes only that the burrow seems to be well made. At first the 
hole mentioned in the second sentence is taken by the reader to be the 
entrance, but it turns out to be merely a mock opening leading straight 
into a wall of rock. That the narrator’s logic does not match the reader’s 
expectations is made clear when the narrator applies the adjective “natu-
ral” to a system that does not immediately strike one as the most natural. 
But the reader is likely to stop fighting against the narrator’s strange logic 
quite quickly and to listen instead to the narrator who is the architect 
of this building/burrow as he explains the distinctiveness of his burrow/
construction (detecting perhaps in the ambiguity of the term “Bau”—
meaning both burrow and construction—that this strange enterprise may 
allude to the narrative itself).13
 A contrasting example is the opening of “ein Landarzt” (“A Coun-
try Doctor”), which begins with an admission: “Ich war in großer Ver-
legenheit” (KAF, 1:200) (“I was in great difficulty”). From this not very 
promising start, which goes on to enumerate all manner of hindrances 
preventing the doctor from responding to a call to visit a patient, the 
story suddenly starts to accelerate, trapping the doctor on his carriage 
and whisking him away “wie holz in die Strömung” (KAF, 1:201–2) 
(“like wood in a current”), finally leaving the reader in great difficulties 
as he too struggles to understand the nightmarish story.
 We surely can agree with Beicken when he says that Kafka “takes 
over the gesture of traditional narration without fulfilling the promise 
of familiar contents. What he narrates is always alien in character” (1979, 
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37). The difference between the traditional form of narration and Kaf-
ka’s can be ascribed to certain factors on different levels. he certainly 
did not write in accordance with the ruling literary conventions of his 
time, neither stylistically nor with regard to expectations of meaning-
fulness or logical progression. As many critics have demonstrated, this 
had an impact both on his narrative technique and on the reception 
of his works. Beda Allemann found that Kafka’s works do not have a 
conventional narrative structure—typically, an opening situation, compli-
cation, development and resolution, all arranged in chronological order 
(see Introduction, note 1). Not only does the action usually stagnate in 
Kafka’s stories almost immediately but the narrated world is not situated 
in the empirical world and seems to be detached from time as we know 
it. This is what Kafka might have meant when he spoke of “Stillstand im 
Fortschritt” (“stasis in progress”) or “stehender Sturmlauf ” (“charging on 
the spot”) (see Andringa 2008, 331).
 Klaus Ramm (1971, 1979), on the basis of earlier investigations by 
Beißner, Walser, Allemann, and others, has made important observations 
that may help us to understand why Kafka often did not succeed in his 
efforts to carry a narrative through from beginning to end. Kafka himself 
may have been aware of more hidden obstructions than those he men-
tions. Ramm was interested in the problem of narrative organization in 
Kafka’s narratives. he saw the main difficulty in the non-congruence of 
traditional narrative terminology with Kafka’s mode of narrative pro-
gression. Instead of following a particular path, Kafka’s protagonists are 
ceaselessly thinking of alternatives, which are incorporated in the action 
in hypothetical or subjunctive form (cf. Kremer 2008, 344). “On the gal-
lery” and “Before the Law” are two striking examples of a form of nar-
ration that takes the form of a reflection that is progressively deepened 
and yet arrives at no goal, a pattern of thinking that we have met as a 
central characteristic of Kafka’s writing from the very beginning.14 No 
wonder it was extraordinarily difficult to guide a protagonist through all 
these hypothetical alternatives, relativizations, and constrictions toward 
a solution. When an experiment of this kind failed because “the pleni-
tude of what was imagined” could not be got down on paper, Kafka had 
simply to dismiss his figures. Such a complicated method does not aim 
at a synthesis or conclusion but rather produces a sequence or series of 
sequences in which construction is followed by deconstruction.
 In his study on the art of portraiture, Peter von Matt tries to cap-
ture this phenomenon of Kafka’s very special kind of writing. he argues 
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that the fury of the writing spirit transforms Kafka into “ein Textwe-
sen” (“a textual entity”) who ignores all kinds of obligations and laws: 
“even within an evolving text a preceding sentence has no power over 
its successor, the event currently being described is not determined by 
the event that has just been described; saying A does not involve the obli-
gation to say B, and saying B does not involve the obligation to have said 
A first. References to a reality or an idea are only necessary in as much 
as they facilitate the gesture of emancipation from any such obligation 
on the part of the writer to refer to things outside the text” (1983, 16). 
Other critics have been struck by the same peculiarity. Umberto eco, for 
example, describes the phenomenon as “the autonomous movement of 
a text” (1984, 13), while Neumann outlines the movements of “reversal 
and deviation” in Kafka’s “slipping paradoxes.”15
 Perhaps one of the most outstanding examples of this kind of proce-
dure is to be found in “The Judgment,” where almost every statement is 
inverted in the course of the action. In spite of this lack of narrative con-
sequence (seen from a traditional point of view), Kafka is filled with an 
exuberant feeling of happiness or even ecstasy, which he usually expresses 
through his feelings of exaltation, euphoria, sovereignty, and domination. 
These feelings find its equivalents on the level of narrated events through 
the suspension of gravity (as in “The Bucket Rider,” “A hunger Artist,” 
“Investigations of a Dog”). In “The Metamorphosis” and in “The Burrow” 
we find examples of a similar kind of happiness, such as the “Schwingen” 
(“swinging/vibration”) experienced by gregor as he hangs from the ceil-
ing. At such moments he feels free and no longer bound by the laws of 
gravity, even if he has lost the outer attributes of a human being:
Besonders oben auf der Decke hing er gern; es war ganz anders, als das 
Liegen auf dem Fußboden; man atmete freier; ein leichtes Schwingen 
ging durch den Körper; und in der fast glücklichen Zerstreutheit, in der 
sich gregor dort oben befand, konnte es geschehen, dass er zu seiner 
eigenen Überraschung sich losließ und auf den Boden klatschte. (KAF, 
1:126–27)
(he especially liked hanging from the ceiling; it was completely different 
from lying on the floor; one could breathe more freely; a faint swinging 
sensation went through the body; and in the almost happy absent-mind-
edness which gregor felt up there, it could happen to his own surprise 
that he let go and plopped onto the floor). (KSS, 23)
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In “The Burrow” too we find a description that recalls Kafka’s images of 
happiness on those few occasions when all the obstacles to writing were 
eliminated. The first-person narrator expects to find the greatest possible 
happiness in a specially constructed room in his burrow once the whole 
work is finished (something that is never in fact realized and indeed may 
not ultimately be achievable):
In diesem hohlraum hatte ich mir immer, und wohl kaum mit Unrecht, 
den schönsten Aufenthaltsort vorgestellt, den es für mich geben konnte. 
Auf dieser Rundung hängen, hinauf sich ziehen, hinabzugleiten, sich 
überschlagen und wieder Boden unter den Füßen haben. (KAF, 8:192)
(I had always imagined this hollow space, probably not without some 
justice, as the most wonderful abode I could ever have. To hang from this 
dome, to pull yourself up, to slide down, to turn a somersault, and once 
again to feel the ground under your feet.) (KSS, 179–80)
In all these examples we find the above-mentioned overlap between the 
narrator’s and the protagonist’s feelings that the editor of the critical edi-
tion, Malcolm Pasley, noticed when working with Kafka’s manuscripts. 
The close link between the author and the writing process, the inter-
penetration of the writing situation and the situations being narrated, 
results in the recording of processes in which the movement of writing 
(literally the movement of the pen across the page), narrative progression, 
and the unfolding of events correspond to one another so that the text 
as a whole absorbs the flow of narration with all its obstacles and recal-
citrant reflections. This illustrates what Kafka meant when he said, in 
numerous variations, that his entire life was dictated by his relation to lit-
erature and the writing of literature. It is the process of writing that matters 
more to him than the final outcome—although of course he was always 
disappointed if that process could not be unfolded and pursued to a fit-
ting conclusion. In this writing process lay for Kafka the most intimate 
connection between living and writing. As he writes, life is transformed 
into literature and literature into life.16 Only as a writer did he feel fully 
alive, albeit at the cost of radical separation from what the majority of 
non-writers would recognize as life truly lived.
 In his letters and diaries, Kafka almost invariably uses the term writ-
ing (“mein Schreiben”) for the activity on which his life depended. he 
does not distinguish between his fictional and non-fictional writing in 
this respect (he turned back to his diary, for example, when the fictional 
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vein dried up), and the reason seems to be that all forms of writing had 
the virtue of keeping the activity of putting words on paper going in the 
hope of not missing that crucial moment when the flow of a story might 
emerge, involuntarily, from the movement of his pen.17
 It is important to remember that not all of Kafka’s literary works fall 
under the category of “narratives.” his longer works are definitely narra-
tives, and so are many of his novellas or longer short stories. But it seems 
important to draw a categorical line between these texts and some of the 
shorter pieces of prose, “die kleinen Winkelzüge” (“minor maneuvers”) 
as Kafka called them (see Kurz 1995, 345), which are not really narratives 
but rather short descriptions or reflections. These are often strikingly 
visual and can have a strong element of tentative, sometimes unsuccessful 
or inconclusive reasoning, as in “Die Bäume” (“The Trees”) from Betrach-
tung (Contemplation), Kafka’s first published book of prose. As Neumann 
has argued convincingly (1968, 728), this whole text is concentrated on 
and built around deviation—no action takes place other than in the mind 
contemplating some tree trunks in the snow, no conflict, no resolution. 
There is instability, but the instability is concentrated in the movement 
of thought and perception. each mental movement undoes the previous 
perception so that by the end we are left totally unsettled. If we think of 
the first text mentioned above on apperception, “Man darf nicht sagen,” 
it seems that these two texts permit an interesting comparison. The text 
about apperception started in logical reasoning but moved toward narra-
tive as the reasoning faltered, whereas “Die Bäume” starts with percep-
tion and moves toward an increasingly reflective mode of discourse as it 
becomes unclear what is actually seen—or not seen.
 Such deviations, which are not narratives per se, are sometimes inte-
grated in the narrative flow of the longer texts. More often than not, they 
seem to hinder the flow, at least temporarily. Although part of the narra-
tive progression, they seem to turn and redirect it, moving it toward some 
kind of paradox. In this way the deviant movements on the micro-level 
seem vital for the structure on the macro-level, alienating the text from 
normal narrative progression and perhaps even from the concept of nar-
rative itself.
 As we have seen, Kafka tried repeatedly to describe the difficulties he 
felt when struggling to grasp a topic and find an adequate form for it. At 
the end of January 1921, while staying at a sanatorium in Matliary, vainly 
trying to build up some strength after the debilitating onset of tubercu-
losis, he tried to write to Max Brod to explain some of the difficulties he 
had with his conception of life, but the letter swelled up both in volume 
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and in complexity. Finally he tried to explain his difficulties figuratively 
to his friend in the following passage:
es ist aber eben das Musterbild eines schlechten Schriftstellers, dem das 
Mitzuteilende wie eine schwere Seeschlange in den Armen liegt, wohin 
er tastet, nach rechts, nach links immer nimmt es kein ende, und selbst 
was er umfasst, kann er nicht ertragen. (MB, 313).18
(It is the paradigm of a bad writer, who carries what he has to convey in 
his arms like a heavy sea-snake; in whichever direction he reaches out, 
whether to the right or the left, it never comes to an end, and he cannot 
even support the part he is holding in his arms.)
 There are many drafts by Kafka that start like this at some point in 
the middle of a story rather than at the beginning. As James Rolleston 
has noted, “Kafka’s stories begin in the middle; or rather, near the end, as 
the very specific situational details seize hold of the hero’s mind (some-
times his body too) and propel him forward” (1979, 3). As Anniken greve 
points out in her analysis of the “Metamorphosis” in chapter 2 of this 
volume, even this story that otherwise satisfies the definitions of a narra-
tive, does not start at the very beginning. The reader gets no indication 
of how the metamorphosis came about, how the changes started, and 
what exactly happened to gregor as he was assuming his new, verminous 
shape. Of course, here we can point to the convention that the narrator 
may start at any point he wants to and thus throw the reader in medias 
res, but that is not the kind of problem we are discussing at this point.
 All of Kafka’s protagonists have a history behind them when they 
appear on the scene, whether one looks at Karl Roßmann, whose embar-
rassing past is pulled apart by his uncle in front of the authorities in New 
york, or K. in The Castle who (like Josef K. in this respect) is not regarded 
as trustworthy by the reader because his past is unknown and unverifi-
able. But we are familiar with this technique from analytical drama and 
from many other texts as well, especially from all kinds of detective sto-
ries where the past has to be unfolded once the action has begun and 
as things happen in the present time. As readers we are willing to read 
on and find out, as we do at the beginning of The Trial, only to discover 
after some time that this text, in spite of many similarities, does not fulfill 
the norms of the genre it initially seemed to belong to. Thus, pretending 
to follow a specific pattern seems to facilitate the beginning of a new 
text for Kafka even when he does not actually intend to continue along 
the same lines.
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 The last two examples I wish to consider are taken from Kafka’s last 
years of writing. After the onset of his tuberculosis in 1917, a series of 
narratives mark the beginning of a new period of creativity for Kafka. 
From 1918 onward, he wrote, for example, a number of very short stories 
or sketches based on greek myths, such as “Prometheus,” “Poseidon,” 
and “Das Schweigen der Sirenen” (“The Silence of the Sirens”).19 By 
taking these pre-existing stories as his point of departure, Kafka seems to 
have avoided the frustrations of beginning and not finding an end. he 
can simply leap into the middle of the story, twist it in another direc-
tion, and mystify the reader by estranging its content. Another such case 
is a little story about the Tower of Babel, written in September 1920 and 
published by Brod in 1931 under the title “Das Stadtwappen” (“The City 
Coat of Arms”).20
 The motif of the Tower of Babel accompanied Kafka throughout 
his life (see Binder 1975, 241). Kafka’s well-known comment “Wir gra-
ben den Schacht von Babel” (KAF, 8:95) (“We are digging the Shaft of 
Babel”) dates from the same time as the story, and here again we can see 
him using the image in a quite unfamiliar way, for instead of referring to 
the new structure as a kind of skyscraper, he inverts the dimension of the 
tower, sending it beneath the surface of the earth.
 If we compare Kafka’s story with the original myth in the Book of 
genesis, we can see the difference between the two narratives immedi-
ately. The people of Babylon decided their city should have a tower so 
immense that it would reach into the heavens. The tower was built not 
for the worship and praise of god but for the glory of man: “And they 
said, go to, let us build us a city and a tower, whose top may reach unto 
heaven; and let us make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad upon the 
face of the whole earth” (gen. 11:4, King James Version). god, seeing 
what the people were doing, confounded their languages and scattered 
the people across the earth.
 Kafka starts the narrative “somewhere in the middle,” pointing out 
that all is well when the construction of the tower begins, at which time 
interpreters and workers are already at work. Thus, the building activity 
starts after the confusion of language, reversing the biblical order of cause 
and effect. What matters is only to construct a tower that reaches into 
heaven, and to achieve this goal it is considered wise to build as slowly 
as possible because technical progress that they hoped to achieve within 
one hundred years would make it easier to accomplish the building. On 
the other hand, it is unclear to the builders whether the next generation 
would like the building or would prefer to destroy it and start again. 
These doubts undermined the project and the morale of the building 
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workers who neglected the tower and concentrated instead on building 
a nice town to live in. This in turn gives rise to jealousy and quarrels 
among the workers, which further hinders work on the tower. While the 
second and third generations continue the work with even greater skill, 
the senselessness of the undertaking becomes obvious. But it is too late 
to give up because people in the city are now too involved with one 
another. From this point onward, the city is filled with longing for the 
prophesied day when a “Riesenfaust” (giant fist) will smash the whole 
city. Which is why, according to the conclusion of Kafka’s story, the city 
has a hammer in its coat of arms.
 If one compares Kafka’s version to the original myth, the most obvi-
ous change is the lack of a larger, framing narrative, since the pact between 
god and mankind has been omitted. god is never mentioned by Kafka, 
the building of the tower has nothing to do with disobedience or hubris, 
and no reason is given for the confusion of tongues. The focus is not on 
the accomplishment of the tower, but on changes from an early stage that 
obstruct progress. Ultimately, the only apparent purpose of the story is 
to “explain” Prague’s coat of arms, albeit with one crucial difference. Just 
as Kafka exchanged the torch in the hand of the Statue of Liberty for a 
sword in The Man Who Disappeared, Kafka changed the meaning of the 
fist with the sword in the Prague coat of arms, turning it into an image 
of the desire for destruction rather than for protection. Thus the original 
story loses its meaning entirely in the new version, while the new story 
changes the meaning on every level to produce an antithesis. Although 
the narrator constructs a new pseudo-logic, he deconstructs it at the 
same time: the senselessness of the project is acknowledged by all, but the 
work goes on while everybody waits for its destruction. Instead of god’s 
punishment, the people damn themselves to a Sisyphean prolongation of 
their undertaking. The story seems to illustrate Kafka’s aphorism that in 
life generally there is a goal, but no way (KAF, 7:146). It may also (and 
consistently) express Kafka’s view of his own creative work.
 The manuscripts written after 1920 consist of numerous recordings 
of small events, impressions, or thoughts, but they also contain a good 
number of promising stories in which we as readers are left regretting 
the fact that we seem to be deprived of the solution, which sometimes 
appears to lie just round the corner. The evidence of the manuscripts 
shows that Kafka was still struggling “in immer neuen Ansätzen den ein-
stieg in das erzählen zu finden” (KAF, 8:251) (“to find a way into narra-
tion by attempting one new approach after another”). In 1921 he states 
that he wants to use small components from his “autobiographical inves-
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tigations” (KAF, 8:10) to build a “house,” but he still fears that he lacks 
the strength to complete the construction.21
 The last story I wish to discuss was not, as Binder assumed (1975, 
239–41), written at the same time as the other stories, which were based 
on pre-existing narratives, but was actually composed in the autumn of 
1923 when Kafka was living in Berlin, away from Prague and his family 
for the first time in his life.22 This finding, one of the results of the criti-
cal edition of Kafka’s works, puts the text, entitled “heimkehr” (“home-
coming”) by Brod, into a new context. his difficult economic situation 
and the spread of his tuberculosis made Kafka think more and more of 
the necessity of returning to Prague. The little story alludes almost cer-
tainly to the parable of the prodigal son from the gospel of St. Luke, but 
it differs significantly from its predecessor, possibly because of the ambiv-
alent feelings Kafka had with regard to his return to his hometown.23
 In the biblical parable we hear of a man who has two sons. The younger 
demands his share of the inheritance and goes off to a distant country, 
where he wastes everything and finally has to take work as a swineherd. 
There he comes to his senses and decides to return home and throw him 
self on his father’s mercy, thinking that even if his father does disown 
him, being one of his servants would be better than feeding pigs. But 
when he returns home, his father greets him with open arms and cel-
ebrates his return. The older brother resents his father’s favored treatment 
of the younger brother, but the father responds that he must be glad, 
for his brother who once was dead is alive again, was lost and now is 
found. In the original story we can recognize the narrative schema of 
“someone telling somebody on some occasion that something happened.” 
Kafka, however, makes some surprising and radical changes that throw this 
scheme into disorder:
Ich bin zurückgekehrt, ich habe den Flur durchschritten und blicke 
mich um. es ist meines Vaters alter hof. Die Pfütze in der Mitte. Altes 
unbrauchbares gerät in einander verfahren verstellt den Weg zur Boden-
treppe. Die Katze lauert auf dem geländer. . . . Ich bin angekommen. 
Wer wird mich empfangen? Wer wartet hinter der Tür der Küche? . . . Ist 
Dir heimlich? Fühlst Du Dich zuhause? Ich weiß es nicht, ich bin sehr 
unsicher. (KAF, 8:162)
(I have returned. I have crossed the entrance and look around me. It is 
my father’s old farmyard. The puddle in the middle. A tangled jumble of 
useless equipment blocks the way to the stairs leading up to the loft. The 
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cat lies in wait on the balustrade. . . . I have arrived. Who will receive me? 
Who is waiting behind the kitchen door? . . . Do you feel safe and secure? 
Do you feel at home? I don’t know, I’m very unsure.)
The crucial change lies in the shift from an authorial third-person story 
to a first-person narrative told in the present tense and in direct speech. 
All the preceding events of the biblical story are absent, and if we do not 
assume that the story of the prodigal son is the underlying model for this 
one, we have to admit that we are confronted with a person we know 
nothing about. We see the lurking cat and the disorder of the neglected 
farm through his eyes, and it is not long before the narrator addresses 
me, the reader, asking if I feel at home. Who answers? I (the reader) or 
the man who has just arrived? We deduce that the latter does, for he 
explains that it is his father’s house, although he does not feel connected 
to anything. he does not dare to knock on the door. he tries to listen 
from a distance to what is going on in the kitchen but can hear noth-
ing and carries on waiting so as to respect the secret of those sitting in 
the kitchen. “Je länger man vor der Tür zögert, desto fremder wird man. 
Wie wäre es wenn jetzt jemand die Tür öffnete und mich etwas fragte. 
Wäre ich dann nicht selbst wie einer der das geheimnis wahren will” 
(KAF, 8:163) (“The longer one hesitates outside the door, the more of a 
stranger one becomes. how would it be if someone were now to open 
the door and ask me something? Wouldn’t I then be like someone who 
wants to keep a secret?”).
 The story ends with an unbridgeable distance between the return-
ing man and his family, who may be sitting in the kitchen. They do not 
know about his arrival, while he adopts the posture of someone who is 
hesitating, someone who is just as reluctant as they are to reveal his secret. 
No reunion with his father takes place; indeed, who knows if the father 
is even alive? There is no joy at seeing one another again, no reconcili-
ation, not even an effort on the part of the returning man to overcome 
his timidity to knock at the door and reveal his presence. If the opening 
sentences look like the preparation for the last steps to complete the 
return, the closing sentences show that the reunion does not take place. 
Uncertainty and ambivalence take over: every observation is relativized, 
what seemed to be secure becomes uncertain, home becomes an alien 
place. We as readers enter the story via a typically Kafkaesque route, by 
following the protagonist and arriving at the same state of mind as he is 
in when it is over. We feel as uncertain as he does, we do not know if we 
have reached the end or if some act of courage might change the situa-
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tion or the door might open—or whether everything might end in great 
disappointment.
 Similarly, between the beginning and the end of the story about the 
tower or shaft of Babel, we find Kafka’s well-known words: “es gibt nur 
ein Ziel, keinen Weg. Was wir Weg nennen, ist Zögern” (KAF, 7:146) 
(“There is only a goal, but no path. What we call a path is hesitation”). 
Again, the story shows exactly this pattern of movement, taking one step 
forward and two steps back, before it finally stagnates at some point, 
unsure if it is at the end.
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a main character or focalizer through the dialectical interplay of contradictions be-
tween the protagonist’s and the narrator’s perspectives (“the perspective of experi-
ence” and the “perspective of observation”).
 12. The assumption that the reader is often led along a course parallel to that of 
the protagonist and his attempts to orient himself is still made by critics today; see, 
for example, Schmidt (2007, 228).
 13. In her excellent study on Kafka’s textgenesis, Annette Schütterle analyzes 
Kafka’s Oktavhefte (Journals) from the period 1916–1917 and beyond as “a process 
of writing that takes the form of a system of partial construction” (2002, 140) as 
described in Kafka’s story “Building the great Wall of China.”
 14. Cf. Friedrich Schmidt’s profound analysis of the legend of the doorkeeper for 
a thorough critical presentation of the history of research (2007). Cf. also chapter 8 
for Jakob Lothe’s analysis of the narrative beginning of “In der Strafkolonie.”
 15. Scheffel’s narrative analysis (1999/2000) is based on gerhard Neumann’s basic 
finding (1968).
 16. A few quotations indicate this important topic: “nur der Wellengang des 
Schrei bens bestimmt mich. . . . Meine Lebensweise ist nur auf das Schreiben hin ein-
gerichtet” (F, 66) (“Only the wave-like movement of writing determines my life. . . . 
My way of life is entirely organized for the purpose of writing”); “dass Schreiben 
meine einzige innere Daseinsmöglichkeit ist” (F, 367) (“That writing is the only 
inner possibility of existence for me” ); “Alles, was sich nicht auf Literatur bezieht, 
hasse ich” (DW, 140) (“I hate everything that is not related to literature”); “Ich habe 
kein literarisches Interesse, sondern bestehe aus Literatur” (F, 444) (“I don’t have lit-
erary interests, I consist entirely of literature”); “Mein ganzes Wesen ist auf Literatur 
gerichtet” (F, 456) (“My entire being is directed towards literature”).
 17. Kafka was certainly not alone in having this problem. Many great novelists ex-
perienced difficulties in writing, and at the beginning of the twentieth century we 
find a great number of writers suffering not just from writer’s block but also from 
the crisis of language—the disjunction of signifier and signified—that became acute 
around that time.
 18. In his next letter from the beginning of February, Kafka apologizes that his 
long letter might not have arrived, but if so, this would not matter, since nothing 
was lost because “so wie er kein ende hatte, hatte er auch keine Mitte, nur Anfang, 
nur Anfang. Ich könnte gleich wieder von neuem anfangen” (MB, 314) (“Just as it 
had no ending, it had no middle, only a beginning, only a beginning. I could start 
from the beginning again immediately”).
 19. In a study from 1985, hans Dieter Zimmermann analyzed these and other 
short narratives by Kafka on a modified structural basis and in comparison with 
Robert Walser’s prose. he showed the specific way in which the two authors con-
struct a narrative, paying particular attention to Kafka’s use of a pre-existing pattern 
as a starting point and his deviation from it, as in the examples mentioned ear-
lier. Also many other critics have pointed out this specific procedure (cf. Neumann 
1968, 702–44).
 20. Like most of the stories in Kafka’s manuscripts, this story was given no title by 
Kafka.
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 21. here we are reminded of the Babel metaphor as an impossible undertaking. 
 22. For the evidence of the manuscripts, see KKANIIA, 134–42).
 23. There are several fragmentary texts from this period dealing with the theme 
of return: “es ist meine alte heimatstadt und ich bin wieder in sie zurückgekehrt” 
(KKANII, 562) (“It is my old home town and I have returned to it”) and “es ist 
meine alte heimatstadt und ich irre langsam, stockend durch ihre gassen” (KAF, 
8:154) (“It is my old home town and I stray slowly, hesitantly, through its streets”).
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The beginning of a narrative is closely related to its title, which in one 
sense is both its beginning and its ending. Since a narrative’s title is what 
we read first, it shapes our reading of the narrative beginning—and of 
the whole text. Moreover, once we have read the narrative and asked 
what it means, what its thematic significance is, we may discover that a 
good title—and Kafka’s titles are often good—approximates a radically 
condensed version not only of the narrative text but also of a possible 
interpretation of that text.1
 yet although the title of a fictional text is closely linked to its narrative 
beginning, a title’s narrative dimension can be more or less clear, and also 
more or less significant. here too it makes a difference whether we have 
read the text or not: if we know the story, the title’s narrative potential is 
activated in ways we cannot possibly appreciate on our first reading. An 
illustrative example is the first sentence of Kafka’s Der Proceß (The Trial): 
“Jemand musste Josef K. verleumdet haben, denn ohne dass er etwas 
Böses getan hätte, wurde er eines Morgens verhaftet” (KKAP, 7) (“Some-
one must have been telling lies about Josef K. for without having done 
anything wrong he was arrested one morning” [Kafka 1988, 17]). Repeat-
ing and thus stressing the title of chapter 1, “Verhaftung” (“Arrest”), the 
verb form “verhaftet” (“arrested”) indicates that the process against Josef 
K. has already started. Positioned just before the last comma, “hätte” is 
a key word in this sentence. The subjunctive form of the verb signals 
tHe narrative Beginning oF KaFKa’s 
“in der straFKolonie”
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that although K. was not aware of having done anything wrong, perhaps 
he still might have done something precipitating his arrest. Thus “hätte” 
makes the literary text ambiguous in a way that creates suspense.2 This 
kind of ambiguity, in evidence later in the text too, is not only linked 
to Josef K. as a main character but also associated with the third-person 
narrator and with the implied author.3 Although the narrator informs us 
that Josef K. was arrested, his use of the subjunctive form “hätte” suggests 
that it remains open whether this was with good reason or on thin evi-
dence. Perhaps the narrator does not know the reason for his arrest; 
perhaps nobody does; perhaps there is no simple reason. Moreover, as 
Ronald Speirs and Beatrice Sandberg have noted, the subjunctive form 
makes the narrative perspective approach Josef K.’s experiential perspec-
tive: “We are not reading the story of a man who is arrested despite the 
fact that he is innocent, but rather the story of a man who maintains that 
he has been wrongfully arrested” (1997, 68; original emphases). With a 
view to the novel’s title, the essential point to make here is that already in 
the opening sentence Josef K. is implicated in a process whose starting-
point and cause are apparently unknown to him, and from which, as we 
may suspect on a first reading and as we know on a second, he will never 
escape. The title represents, in condensed form, the frustratingly circular 
plot and thwarted plot progression in which Josef K. is not only engaged 
but also trapped.
 There is a striking similarity between the beginning of Der Proceß and 
that of “In der Strafkolonie” (“In the Penal Colony”). Kafka wrote this 
long short story in the autumn of 1914, just after the outbreak of the 
First World War. On August 13, he had started Der Proceß, but because of 
the problems of beginning and developing this text, he took a two-week 
holiday “um den Roman vorwärtszutreiben” (“in order to press on with 
the novel”).4 This writing strategy failed (as did that of first writing the 
novel’s first and last chapters), and in fact Der Proceß was never finished. 
however, during the holiday Kafka managed to write “In der Strafkol-
onie.” In order to indicate the affinity of the beginnings of these two 
texts, I briefly note how the passive construction “wurde . . . verhaftet”—
the words at the end of the first sentence of Der Proceß—further increases 
the uncertainty associated with “hätte.” Since in a presumably civilized 
society (the word “Rechtsstaat” is used on page 11 of Der Proceß) one is 
not arrested unless one has done or is suspected of having done some-
thing wrong, and since any arrest prompts the question of who ordered 
it, our attention as readers is drawn to the issue of power and to the 
agent representing that power. This agent, a kind of court, remains enig-
matic throughout. In “In der Strafkolonie” too there is a similar agent, or 
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rather there are two, represented by the conflicting values and legal sys-
tems of “der alte Kommandant” (“the old commander”) and “der neue 
Kommandant” (“the new commander”). If the court’s distance from the 
accused in Der Proceß is counteracted by its all-pervasive presence in the 
narrative discourse, the officer in the short story repeatedly refers to the 
absent old and new commanders in the penal colony—and thus implic-
itly to the systems of power and law enforcement associated with them.5 
In “In der Strafkolonie” too, the main characters are already engaged in 
an ongoing legal process when the narrative discourse begins.
 In his seminal study of beginnings, edward W. Said finds that although 
beginnings appear to mark a distinct break with that which precedes 
them (e.g., a story’s title), they may seem curiously predetermined:
Where, or when, or what is a beginning? If I have begun to write, for 
example, and a line has started its way across the page, is that all that 
has taken place? Clearly not. For in the act of asking a question about 
the meaning of a beginning, I seem to have discerned vague outlines of 
significance where very little had been suspected. Claude Lévi-Strauss 
suggests that the mind’s logic is such that “the principle underlying a 
classification can never be postulated in advance. It can only be discov-
ered a posteriori.” Moreover, language, which seems to be man’s most 
influential instrument of classification, is, according to Lévi-Strauss, “an 
unreflecting totalization [of] . . . human reason which has its reason and 
of which man knows nothing.” (Said 1975, 29; Lévi-Strauss 1966, 58, 
252)
even though Said agrees that to identify a point as a starting-point is to 
classify it after the fact, he certainly does not find the study of beginnings 
a critically useless exercise. That a beginning is hard to pinpoint, that we 
can hardly intellectually conceive of such an idea, does not in itself make 
the questions prompted by the problem of beginnings uninteresting or 
irrelevant to literary studies. On the contrary, a number of issues actual-
ized by the problem of narrative beginnings are, as Kafka’s fictional texts 
demonstrate, not just important in themselves but also closely associated 
with other constituent elements of the complex mechanics of narrative.
 One essential reason why beginnings appear arbitrary and peculiarly 
ungraspable is suggested by the way in which language operates. The 
beginning of a text is there, observable on the page, and yet it is not 
there since the first linguistic sign or the first linguistic utterance is pre-
ceded by something about which we are ignorant, something located 
before or beyond the text. Although there is a sense in which all narra-
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tives start in medias res, Brian Richardson is right to note that “modern-
ist texts . . . typically begin with a plunge into the middle of an action 
of deceptive casualness” (2008, 4). This is an important point, as is the 
accompanying observation that in modernist fiction “the artifice of the 
textual beginning is . . . contrasted to the unbounded plenum of events it 
partially circumscribes” (Richardson 2008, 5).
 By linking narrative and event Richardson implicitly highlights what 
I consider as an original and extreme variant of narrative beginnings, 
“Kafka’s technique of absolute beginnings” (Ramm 1979, 95; my transla-
tion). In a thoughtful essay on processes of action and thought in Kafka’s 
fiction, Klaus Ramm finds that, for Kafka, the challenge of beginning 
to narrate is imbued with an existential dimension in that it reveals the 
author’s doubt about new beginnings in his own life—ultimately even 
his “Zögern vor der geburt” (KKAT, 888) (“hesitation before birth”) 
evoked in his diary entry for January 24, 1922. Ramm elaborates, “With 
the first words the characters emerge, wake up, are ready to travel . . . the 
beginning of the narrative corresponds to its thematic movement [and] 
the characters are without any precondition pushed into the narrative” 
(1979, 95; my translation). One could counter that such an observation 
applies to many narratives, not least modernist ones; and one could also 
contend, as did Maurice Blanchot—one of the finest of Kafka’s early 
critics—that the protagonists of his stories have in a way already died.6 
Still, Ramm’s description of Kafka’s beginnings has much to recommend 
it, since the narrative into which the characters are thrown may seem to 
begin near the end. Moreover, as Ramm implies, the complexity of Kaf-
ka’s narrative beginnings is further enhanced once we attempt to relate 
the question of the beginning of the literary text to the beginning of the 
action and to the first event within this text. Writing of a “contamination 
of text and action” (1979, 95), Ramm argues that the “iterative qual-
ity” of beginnings in Kafka’s fiction expresses his “peculiar conception of 
time, of history generally” (97; my translation).
 Ramm’s perceptive observation is linked to several points of the fol-
lowing discussion. Succinctly put, my argument is that the first paragraph 
of “In der Strafkolonie” is possessed of a combination of narrative features 
that, almost immediately assuming the form of what James Phelan (2005, 
19–20) calls tensions (unsettled relationships among author, narrator, and 
audience based on disparities of knowledge, understanding, or values) 
and/or instabilities (unstable relationships among the characters), further 
the text’s movement in one direction rather than another. As should be 
clear already, my focus will be on issues of narrative, and one premise 
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for my discussion is that the narrative features of a fictional text’s begin-
ning are highly significant structurally, thematically, and ideologically. In 
mentioning this premise I draw attention to the problem of reading and 
rereading a narrative beginning. Two dissimilar critical dispositions are 
at work here. On the one hand, we may want to study a beginning as a 
“pure” beginning, thus attempting to read and interpret it without pay-
ing attention to the text’s middle and end. On the other hand, as my use 
of the verb “attempt” reveals, in practical criticism this turns out to be 
impossible. Nor is it desirable: there is actually very little to say about a 
beginning if we do not relate it to the following parts of the narrative, 
and of course the significance of a beginning is in large part determined 
by the narrative’s middle and by its ending.7
 “In der Strafkolonie” begins thus:
“es ist ein eigentümlicher Apparat,” sagte der Offizier zu dem Forschungs-
reisenden und überblickte mit einem gewissermassen bewundernden 
Blick den ihm doch wohlbekannten Apparat. Der Reisende schien nur 
aus höflichkeit der einladung des Kommandanten gefolgt zu sein, der 
ihn aufgefordert hatte, der exekution eines Soldaten beizuwohnen, der 
wegen Ungehorsam und Beleidigung des Vorgesetzten verurteilt worden 
war. Das Interesse für diese exekution war wohl auch in der Strafkol-
onie nicht sehr gross. Wenigstens war hier in dem tiefen, sandigen, von 
kahl en Abhängen ringsum abgeschlossenen kleinen Tal ausser dem Offi-
zier und dem Reisenden nur der Verurteilte, ein stumpfsinniger, breit-
mäuliger Mensch mit verwahrlostem haar und gesicht und ein Soldat 
zugegen, der die schwere Kette hielt, in welche die kleinen Ketten aus-
liefen, mit denen der Verurteilte an den Fuss- und handknöcheln sowie 
am hals gefesselt war und die auch untereinander durch Verbindungs-
ketten zusammenhingen. Übrigens sah der Verurteilte so hündisch erge-
ben aus, dass es den Anschein hatte, als könnte man ihn frei auf den 
Abhängen herumlaufen lassen und müsse bei Beginn der exekution nur 
pfeifen, damit er käme. (KKAD, 203–4)
(“It is a peculiar piece of machinery,” said the officer to the traveler and 
with a look that contained some admiration surveyed the machine that 
was after all so familiar to him. It was apparently only from politeness 
that the traveler had accepted the invitation of the commandant, who 
had requested his presence at the execution of a soldier condemned to 
death for disobeying and insulting his superior officer. The interest in 
this execution, even in the penal colony, did not seem to be very great. 
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At any rate, apart from the officer and the traveler, here in the deep, 
sandy little valley enclosed on all sides by bare slopes there were only the 
condemned man—a stupid fellow with a big mouth and unkempt hair 
and face—and a soldier who held the heavy chain into which the small 
chains ran with which the condemned man was bound at the wrists, 
ankles, and throat and which were further linked together by connecting 
chains. In fact, the condemned man looked so doggishly submissive that 
it seemed you could let him run around freely on the slopes and would 
only have to whistle at the start of the execution for him to come.) (KSS, 
35–36)
This is a strange first paragraph, engrossing and yet difficult to under-
stand. even though it is not the whole beginning, it is surely an impor-
tant part of it, and it will be the focus of my critical attention here. We 
first note an interesting detail: the word “Beginn” which in german is 
used synonymously with “Anfang” in a manner broadly corresponding to 
“beginning” and “opening” in english, is actually mentioned at the end 
of the paragraph. The use of “Beginn” here is symptomatic of the way in 
which the beginning is simultaneously accentuated and problematized. 
One function of the word is to confirm what we have been told already, 
thus suggesting that we (the characters as well as the reader) are at the 
beginning of a course of action presumably revolving around the execu-
tion itself. At the same time, however, the phrase “Beginn der exeku-
tion” indicates that what begins here is neither the narrative account of 
the crime nor, as in Der Proceß, of the arrest. Rather, “Beginn” is closely 
linked to the last stage of a trial—the implementation of what is presum-
ably the death sentence.
 In order to structure the following discussion, I use James Phelan’s 
account of four different aspects of a narrative beginning: exposition, 
launch, initiation, and entrance. Although Phelan’s understanding of nar-
rative is more explicitly rhetorical than my formal-historical approach, I 
find his concepts and the way he uses them helpful and critically produc-
tive (see James Phelan’s discussion in the introduction and in chapter 1).
 By exposition Phelan means “everything, including the front matter, 
that provides information about the narrative, the characters (listings of 
traits, past history, and so on), the setting (time and place), and events of 
the narrative” (2007, 17). In this particular text, the most important ele-
ment of the front matter is clearly the title. Relating the title of “In der 
Strafkolonie” to the short story’s first paragraph, we first note the corre-
spondence between the preposition “in” and the location of the narrative. 
By using “in” rather than, for instance, “nach” (“to”), Kafka signals that 
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the story’s focus is on what happens here, in this particular place. There is 
a close link between the “in” of the title and the in medias res beginning 
that follows. When we start reading, we are already on location in two 
senses. By force of homology, we are both present as imaginary observers 
at a distant location and present as readers, at this very moment and place, 
within the “penal colony” that the author’s narration, with our collabora-
tion, is building out of words. Moreover, we are in a place it is difficult 
to escape from, both for the characters in the story and for the readers 
who are its imaginary co-creators, and where, as we have noted already, 
the first paragraph seems to mark the ending of a course of action rather 
than its beginning.8
 The key word of the title in german is a composite noun, made from 
combining the two nouns “Strafe” (“penalty or punishment”) and “Kolo-
nie” (“colony”). Both of these nouns are semantically loaded and have 
numerous connotations associated with them. The number, range, and 
interpretive immediacy of these will of course vary from reader to reader. 
My point here is that our response to the words “Strafe” and “Kolonie” 
contributes to our attempt, even as we start reading, to understand the 
formation of a new noun consisting of these two. Reading the first para-
graph, our knowledge of the title helps us to rapidly understand that the 
events recounted in the narrative take place in a colony in which an act 
of punishment is to be carried out and that the two elements are closely 
related. And yet there is something strange about the relationship between 
the word “Strafkolonie” and the following sentences. The associations we 
get when reading the title do not seem wholly reconcilable with the 
information provided in the short story’s opening: “Strafkolonie” makes 
us think of the historical practice of deportation, but nowhere in Kaf-
ka’s story is the word “deportation” mentioned. This does not mean that 
the word is unimportant, however. Rather, due to the strong associative 
field of “Strafkolonie” and “deportation” in many readers’ minds, a more 
dynamic element—the act or practice of being deported—is added to, or 
superimposed on, the stasis of being “in der Strafkolonie.” The interpre-
tive relevance of this association is qualified, though not canceled, in the 
following narrative.
 In a detailed study entitled Die Deportation des Menschen (“The depor-
tation of man”), Walter Müller-Seidel situates Kafka’s story in its historical 
and cultural european context. Although, as he reminds us, punishment 
by deportation was an invention of Roman law, the practice of deporta-
tion became more widespread once european powers started to establish 
colonies in the wake of the discoveries of the Americas and other (from 
a european perspective) remote regions. A supplement to or variation 
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of banishment, deportation was often considered as a substitute for the 
death penalty; thus there is a sense in which, for the reader possessed of 
this knowledge, the condemned man (who may or may not have been 
deported to the penal colony) will be punished twice. On a second read-
ing of the beginning, we know that the language spoken in the penal 
colony is French. France did not abolish deportation as an element of 
the nation’s criminal law until 1945. Linked to this colonial power’s use 
of deportation, moreover, is the famous Dreyfus affair—a historical event 
likely to be known by many readers of Kafka’s story.
 even though the importance of the Dreyfus affair may be exagger-
ated in a discussion of the narrative beginning of “In der Strafkolonie,” 
it provides an interesting example of a strong intertextual echo already 
in the story’s title.9 Two aspects are particularly striking. First, there is the 
blend of issues—historical, political, religious—associated with the affair 
itself.10 Centered on the relationship between crime and punishment, the 
Dreyfus affair revolved, as does Kafka’s story, around the use and possible 
abuse of power. Second, there is the significance of location. Dreyfus was 
deported to Devil’s Island, off the coast of French guiana. One of the 
best known and most infamous of all penal colonies, the French colony 
in Devil’s Island was in use from 1852 to 1946. The point I want to 
make here is not that Kafka wants the reader to think of Devil’s Island 
as he or she starts reading “In der Strafkolonie.” In common with many 
other authors, including Joseph Conrad, Kafka tended to shy away from 
linking his fictional locations to places in the real world. The only one 
mentioned in the story is europe, since we are told that the traveler is a 
european. What is important about the penal colony is, first, that it is not 
limited to one place only and, second, that it is far removed from europe. 
If the former element enables Kafka to cast his narrative in more general 
terms, thus furthering its suggestiveness and continuing resonance in the 
world today, the latter serves to establish a link among various activities 
involving spatial distance—punishment, colonization, and, in the case of 
the traveler (der Forschungsreisende), research. By associating the traveler’s 
mission with the first two activities, Kafka uses the title to suggest the 
dubious nature of that mission. To draw attention to the story’s sugges-
tiveness and lack of geographical specificity, however, is not to argue that, 
seen from the perspective of readerly dynamics, the association of the 
Dreyfus affair and Devil’s Island is unimportant. Rather, reminding us of 
the subtle ways in which Kafka’s fiction is both related to and inspired 
by historical events, the intertextual echo of the Dreyfus affair serves to 
extend the thematic range of the story’s beginning.11
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 While it is significant that the word “Beginn” is mentioned toward 
the end of the paragraph, it is also important that the key word of the 
title is repeated in the text’s third sentence. The word “Strafkolonie” is 
thematically productive here: repeating and thus calling renewed atten-
tion to the title, it colors the information provided about the event, the 
characters, and the narrative’s time and place. The specification of “Strafe” 
as execution—the short story’s main event—is part of the exposition, 
but the element of tension suggested by the combination of “Strafe” and 
“Kolonie” blends into the narrative’s launch which I will discuss shortly. 
By “launch,” Phelan means “the revelation of the first set of global insta-
bilities or tensions in the narrative” (2007, 18). 
 The short story’s four characters are all introduced in the first para-
graph: “der Offizier,” “der Forschungsreisende,” “der Verurteilte,” and “der 
Soldat.” What brings them together is the implementation of the punish-
ment. Thus “Strafe” is actualized once again. Moreover, as in the case of 
the interlinking of “Strafe” and “Kolonie,” exposition of the characters 
almost immediately blends into launch.
 When it comes to the exposition of time and place, we note that 
the time seems to be unspecified yet modern, and as indicated already, 
the place is somewhere far from europe. The beginning is possessed of 
a relatively imprecise temporal marker associated with the officer and 
particularly his relationship with the machine. Already at this early stage, 
before the officer explains the details of the apparatus to the traveler, we 
sense that this “Apparat” is a product of modernity, of european industri-
alization. As hans Dieter Zimmermann has noted, the officer is a euro-
pean “above all in his admiration for technique, this european invention, 
which in the apparatus has reached a degree of perfection: in the appara-
tus which has no purpose but to torture the condemned man for twelve 
hours and then to kill him” (Zimmermann 1994, 159; my translation). That 
our attempt to specify the time of the story involves the adjective “euro-
pean” illustrates the narrative’s interplay of temporal and spatial elements: 
it proves difficult to delineate one element without referring to or at 
least implying the other. The historical process of european modernity 
is linked to european imperialism and european colonization of other 
continents.12 The officer’s identity as a european whose uncomfortable 
uniform is at least a reminder of his distant Heimat (“homeland”) estab-
lishes a link to der Forschungsreisende from europe. The nationalities of the 
condemned man and the soldier, however, are not specified. The traveler 
seems troubled by being in an intermediate position between these parties, 
and his sense of inescapable entrapment is suggested right from the start.
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 For Phelan, the launch “marks the boundary between the beginning 
and the middle” (2007, 18). Broadly agreeing with Phelan’s identifica-
tion of this significant aspect of a narrative beginning, I argue that ele-
ments pointing in the direction of such a launch are observable in the 
first paragraph of Kafka’s story. One possible location of the launch is the 
moment when the officer announces the sentence: “Unser Urteil klingt 
nicht streng. Dem Verurteilten wird das gebot, das er übertreten hat, 
mit der egge auf den Leib geschrieben” (KKAD, 210) (“Our judgment 
does not sound severe. The harrow will write the commandment he has 
violated on the condemned man’s body” [KSS, 39]). At this moment the 
revelation of the global instability is complete and the reader is likely to 
ask, will this sentence be carried out and how will the traveler respond to 
the implementation of the sentence? It could be countered that the para-
graph under consideration is too short to allow for the narrative direc-
tion and subsequent progression associated with the launch. however, in 
this short story narrative movement and progression remain curiously 
illogical, unpredictable and suspended, and the tensions I identify seem 
to me global in the sense of informing not only the narrative beginning 
but also the textual movement from beginning through middle to end-
ing. The first paragraph lays important groundwork for the launch by 
emphasizing that each of the four characters has a different relation to 
the “Apparat,” a difference that also influences their attitude and relation 
to one another.
 By identifying and discussing the tensions pointing toward the nar-
rative launch, I want to comment on the narrator, and his role in what 
Phelan calls the “initiation”—“the initial rhetorical transactions among 
implied author and narrator, on the one hand, and flesh-and-blood and 
authorial audience on the other” (2007, 18). As in Der Proceß and Das 
Schloß (The Castle), Kafka uses a third-person narrator. This narrator 
describes the setting, introduces the characters, and reports the action 
(and, significantly, the lack of action). Moreover, the narrator repeatedly, 
though not wholly consistently, links his perspective to that of the trav-
eler, telling us about the latter’s thoughts, doubts, and impressions of the 
three other characters. Just as important, however, is what Kafka does not 
make his narrator do. As we note right from the beginning, the narrator 
does not provide much background information. More importantly, we 
cannot help noticing how reluctant the narrator is to position himself 
in relation to, and to distance himself from, the event he reports. The 
two key factors here are, first, the narrator’s limited knowledge and, sec-
ond, his inability—or unwillingness—to respond morally to the event 
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of the execution. Revealing the narrator’s human qualities, these factors 
are constituent aspects of Kafka’s original variant on third-person nar-
ration. Interestingly, what may be a personal weakness of the narrator 
is also the narrator’s strength. As Zimmermann rightly points out, the 
narrator juxtaposes two perspectives: the officer’s and the traveler’s. And 
yet the narrator’s attitudinal perspective approximates that of the traveler. 
An early indication of this attitudinal affinity comes toward the end of 
the paragraph, when the narrator describes the condemned man in a 
manner that is not only biased but condescending. That the traveler is a 
Forschungsreisende evidently does not exempt him from racial and cultural 
prejudice; nor is the narrator free of such prejudice.
 If the story’s narration is rhetorically effective and thematically pro-
ductive, it also signals that the implied author views the narrator’s and the 
traveler’s positions as ethically dubious. It is the interaction of these posi-
tions (implied author’s, narrator’s, traveler’s, and authorial audience’s) that 
constitutes the initiation. I am not claiming that as authorial audience we 
are in a position to ascertain the implied author’s value system at the end 
of the story’s first paragraph. But it does signal that the implied author’s 
ethical stance is at odds with that of the officer, and that it is not unprob-
lematically identifiable with that of the traveler or the narrator, either.
 Phelan relates one more aspect of the narrative beginning to our 
activity as authorial audience. This fourth facet is “entrance”: “the flesh-
and-blood reader’s multileveled . . . movement from outside the text to 
a specific location in the authorial audience at the end of the launch. 
When the entrance is complete, the authorial audience has typically made 
numerous significant interpretive, ethical, and even aesthetic judgments, 
and these judgments influence what is arguably the most important ele-
ment of the entrance: the authorial audience’s hypothesis . . . about the 
direction and purpose of the whole narrative, what I will call its con-
figuration” (Phelan 2007, 19). The narrative beginning of “In der Straf-
kolonie” is hardly an entrance as Phelan understands it; it is too short, 
and comes too early, to enable the authorial audience to form a coherent 
hypothesis about the short story’s configuration. While the instabilities 
and tensions we have noted simultaneously point toward and complicate 
the launch, however, these tensions also further a provisional hypothesis 
about configuration. One such hypothesis could be that this narrative 
will dramatize the execution of the condemned man. yet although tenta-
tive ideas of configuration are being formed, or starting to be formed, 
Kafka appears to halt narrative progression almost as soon as he has made 
his narrator initiate it. There is a sense of Windstille (“wind calm”) in this 
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narrative beginning—an impression of stasis and deadlock, and equally, a 
sense of complication and deferment of narrative progression.13 There is 
a hesitation, Zögern, in the narrator’s (and behind him, Kafka’s) attitude 
to the story he is starting to tell.
 One consequence of this narrative feature is that the transition from 
the text’s narrative beginning to its turning point—the traveler’s refusal 
to grant the officer’s request and the latter’s decision to put himself in 
the other party’s shoes—is unusually abrupt. Again, I am not arguing that 
this peripety, rhetorically effective in forcing us to revise our hypoth-
esis about the narrative’s configuration, is prefigured in the opening 
paragraph. Still, already in the first sentence the officer’s attitude to the 
machine is presented as very peculiar: “‘es ist ein eigentümlicher Appa-
rat,’ sagte der Offizier zu dem Forschungsreisenden und überblickte mit 
einem gewis ser massen bewundernden Blick den ihm doch wohlbekann-
ten Apparat.” The adjective “eigentümlich,” not easily translated into 
english, accurately describes the sentence. The word suggests that the 
machine is not just “peculiar” (probably the best english word if we must 
choose just one) but also “original” and “curiously fascinating.” This first 
sentence seems to make a simple statement, and yet this statement is dou-
bly qualified—first by the officer’s use of an unexpected adjective before 
“Apparat” and then by his “bewundernden Blick.” It is remarkable how 
accurately the officer’s negotiations, which approximate to a redefinition 
of progression as bifurcation and eventually result in a senseless mutila-
tion of himself, are presented in embryo in the story’s first paragraph. The 
statement is also qualified by a narrator who not only reports the officer’s 
strange observation on the apparatus but also comments on his strange, 
and partly unresolved, attitude to it. The oddity of the officer’s observa-
tion is reinforced in a narrative comment that not only confirms but ten-
tatively questions the text’s first sentence. As the qualification embedded 
in the narrator’s remark reveals a limitation of narrative knowledge, the 
ending of the first sentence prepares the reader for the use of “schien” 
(“seemed”) at the beginning of the following one; thus, a pattern of nar-
rative uncertainty, though not necessarily unreliability, is ingrained in the 
formation of that very narrative.14
 One important function of the tensions is to create suspense—a suspi-
cion on the first reading, blending into expectation on the second—that 
the constellation of these four different characters may provoke a conflict, 
probably violent, whose outcome is uncertain. Lurking underneath the 
narrative discourse of this opening paragraph are issues of power, author-
ity, and dominance. As we have seen, some of these issues are suggested 
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by, and activated through, the intertextual field of the story’s title. They 
are also prompted by the ways in which the first paragraph’s tensions 
are negotiated later in the narrative. Contributing significantly to the 
story’s curiously hesitant yet dramatic plot progression, these narrative 
negotiations are linked to the characters’ actions, involvement, and devel-
opment. As regards the condemned man and the soldier guarding him, 
we are more forcibly struck by the affinity of their positions than by 
the opposition between them. This kind of resemblance (which becomes 
particularly striking at the very end of the story when the condemned 
man and the soldier unsuccessfully try to enter the traveler’s boat) is 
signaled by the reference to both of them as soldiers in the first para-
graph. One thematic effect is to illustrate the contingency of the system 
and the use of the machine. It seems a matter of chance which of the 
two is condemned to death; the other one might also easily have done 
something that, given the penal colony’s strange and unpredictable legal 
system, could have resulted in the death sentence. The arbitrariness of 
crime, arrest, and punishment calls the beginning of Der Proceß strikingly 
to mind. As readers we wonder to what kind of “Rechtsstaat” the penal 
colony could possibly belong.
 The peculiar affinity of the soldier and the condemned man is 
strengthened by the traveler’s stance: his attitude toward them is virtu-
ally as hostile as that of the officer. Kafka’s narrative presentation of these 
two main characters, including the ways in which they differ from each 
other and resemble each other, is a significant aspect of the story’s the-
matic import and interpretive suggestiveness. If the soldier and the con-
demned man strangely resemble each other, so do the officer and the 
traveler. Constituent elements of their peculiar relationship are hinted at 
already in the first paragraph, both in the paragraph as a whole (including 
the title) and in key words such as “bewundernden” (“admiring”) and 
“schien” (“seemed”). Inspired by these two words’ thematic significance, 
I relate the introductory presentation of the officer and the traveler to the 
following action in which they are engaged.
 The officer looks at the machine “mit einem gewissermassen bewun-
dernden Blick” (“with a look that, to a certain extent, expressed admira-
tion”). By telling us not only that the officer admires the machine but 
also that his admiration is somehow qualified, the third-person narrator 
suggests, right at the beginning of the narrative, that the officer’s atti-
tude to the machine—and thus to his own activity as an officer in the 
penal colony—is problematically ambiguous. Referring reverently to the 
old commander who constructed the machine, he presents himself as 
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an ardent supporter of the machine, the penal system, and the practice 
of torturing victims for twelve hours before they are eventually killed. 
At the beginning of the story, the officer seems as eager to defend the 
continued use of this practice as he is keen that this particular execution 
succeeds. yet he is also keen to give his account of the machine and its 
operations to the traveler; it is almost as though he needs to persuade his 
visitor that the method of punishment is justifiable in order to convince 
himself that it is. There is an important connection between the doubt 
suggested by “gewissermassen” (“to a certain extent”) in the first para-
graph and the officer’s observation some pages later that “Der grundsatz, 
nach dem ich entscheide, ist: Die Schuld ist immer zweifellos”) (KKAD, 
212) (“The principle according to which I decide is: ‘guilt is always 
beyond all doubt’” [KSS, 40]). Insisting that guilt is always “zweifellos,” 
the officer may secretly doubt that it is. he calls it a “principle,” but actu-
ally it is more like a working assumption or legal fiction. Reminding us 
that a large portion of the text is made up of the officer’s act of narra-
tion, Richard T. gray observes that “when we as readers exit the fictional 
world of the past invoked by the Officer . . . and enter the real time of 
the explorer’s experiences in the penal colony, the events that transpire, 
in particular the operation of the penal machine, run absolutely counter 
to the fictions invoked in the Officer’s narrative” (2006, 217). Perhaps, 
in spite of his claims to the contrary, he needs to support the old com-
mander and his views in order to counter the influence exerted on him 
by the new commander and the ladies associated with him. These ladies, 
the officer tells the traveler, are opposed to the death penalty; yet when 
he later unbuttons his uniform before putting himself under the harrow 
of the machine, “fielen ihm zunächst die zwei Damentaschentücher, die 
er hinter den Kragen gezwängt hatte, in die hände” (KKAD, 240) (“the 
two lady’s handkerchiefs that he had squeezed under the back of his col-
lar immediately fell into his hands” [KSS, 55]). John Zilcosky finds that 
the officer “longs masochistically to become like his victim” (2003, 118). 
yet as Zilcosky also notes, masochism is not the only issue here; it is 
blended with elements of sadism and other aspects of the officer’s psyche 
related to, and shaped by, the complex historical developments of punish-
ment, deportation, and colonialism.
 If the officer asserts that guilt is “zweifellos,” and if his unresolved 
understanding of guilt and punishment is signaled by his ambivalent atti-
tude to the machine he admires, the traveler is also fascinated by the 
apparatus of torture from which he claims to distance himself. In one 
sense his interest in the machine is as ethically dubious as the officer’s 
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defense of its continued use: even though he expresses his doubts about 
the proceedings, he does not interfere to stop or change them. In fact he 
is, in Alexander honold’s apposite phrase, a “teilnehmender Beobach-
ter” (2008, 491) (“participating observer”). The sudden appearance of 
the traveler in the penal colony contributes essentially to the story’s in 
medias res beginning. On a second reading, we understand better why the 
officer wants the traveler to attend the execution, and then we can also 
appreciate the dramatic irony resulting from our knowledge that the vic-
tim, contrary to the officer’s intention at the outset of the story, will be 
himself. Concomitantly, once the execution has occurred and the traveler 
abruptly leaves the colony, the story ends.
 On arrival the traveler is immediately plunged into a murderous situ-
ation from which it is impossible to emerge ethically unscathed. This 
impossibility establishes an important link between the traveler and the 
reader, who also pays a visit to the colony during the act of reading the 
story and who may also be simultaneously fascinated and repulsed by the 
machine. To make this point is not to argue that we are asked to identify 
with the traveler. But it is to suggest that since our attitudinal distance 
from the traveler is less marked than that from the officer, we are forced 
to reconsider our attitudinal affiliation with him as the narrative pro-
gresses. The word “schien” suggests, as does the sentence of which it is 
a part, the curious ambiguity of the traveler’s position. The third-person 
narrator does not seem to know why the traveler accepts the officer’s 
invitation, yet this kind of narrative uncertainty proves thematically pro-
ductive and remarkably accurate.
 With the important exception of his violent act of repelling the sol-
dier and the condemned man when they try to enter his boat as he is 
leaving the colony, the traveler’s behavior is characteristically reluctant: 
“Der Reisende überlegte: es ist immer bedenklich, in fremde Verhältnisse 
entscheidend einzugreifen. . . . er reise nur mit der Absicht zu sehen und 
keineswegs etwa, um fremde gerichtsverfassungen zu ändern” (KKAD, 
222) (“The traveler reflected: It is always a sensitive matter to interfere 
decisively in other people’s affairs . . . he was traveling with the sole pur-
pose of observing and by no means altering other people’s legal institu-
tions” [KSS, 46]). If, as the traveler asserts, he has come to the colony 
just to observe, then in one sense the narrative progresses to its ending 
because that is exactly what he does. And yet, as “schien” may also sug-
gest, he is actually more interested, and more deeply involved, than his 
insistence on “sehen” leads the reader to expect. The paradoxical cul-
pability of his position becomes conspicuous two sentences later in the 
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narrative: “Die Ungerechtigkeit des Verfahrens und die Unmenschlich-
keit der exekution war zweifellos” (KKAD, 222) (“The injustice of the 
procedure and the inhumanity of the execution were beyond all doubt” 
[KSS, 46]). If the officer’s emphatic employment of the word “zweifellos” 
signals his lurking doubt about the procedure he defends, the traveler’s 
use of the same word similarly suggests a growing doubt about the appli-
cability of european law in the penal colony. Revealing his european 
prejudice and sense of superiority, even and not least as a researcher,15 it 
aligns his position with that of colonialism and its systematic use of vio-
lence against the natives of the conquered territories around the world.
 In Imperial Eyes, Mary Louise Pratt coins the concept of the “con-
tact zone,” “the space of colonial encounters, the space in which peoples 
geographically and historically separated come into contact with each 
other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of 
coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict” (1992, 6). During 
his brief stay in the penal colony, the traveler is situated in one such 
contact zone, and once in it his attitude and behavior are colored by its 
conditions. his characteristic reluctance as a “seeing-man” (Pratt 1992, 
7) is related to another of Pratt’s key terms, “anti-conquest”: “strategies 
of representation whereby european bourgeois subjects seek to secure 
their innocence in the same moment as they assert european hegemony” 
(7). even though this kind of resemblance does not necessarily make the 
traveler a typical representative of european colonialism, it strengthens 
the colonial aspect apparent in the story’s title. It also strengthens the link 
between the traveler and the european (or Western) reader: with a view 
to the processes of european colonialism and imperialism (including its 
use of penal colonies), there is a disconcerting sense in which the reader 
is also a bystander. In his Evil and Human Agency (2006), Arne Johan Vet-
lesen discusses the distinction that Raul hilberg (1992) makes between 
perpetrator, victim, and bystander. We must of course be wary of linking 
such character designations—which hilberg and Vetlesen construct from 
thorough discussions of acts that historical people performed, or failed 
to perform, during the holocaust and other instances of genocide—to 
fictional characters in a short story. Still, I conclude by suggesting that 
in Kafka’s story both the narrators and the main characters are complex 
fictional representations of all three categories, and all of them are intro-
duced, and even to some extent developed and refined, in the narrative 
beginning. engaged in systematic and repeated acts of torture and mur-
der, the officer is a perpetrator; since the punishment of the condemned 
man is absurdly disproportionate to the offense he has committed, he is 
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presented as a victim. even though both of these categories are desta-
bilized, however, it is the role of the bystander that is most insistently 
explored by Kafka. Starting in the first paragraph, the narrative discourse 
of “In der Strafkolonie” demonstrates that this category is less neutral, 
and ethically more dubious, than the bystander himself tends to think. 
“Der Forschungsreisende” regards himself as a bystander, yet his passivity 
is a form of participation that makes him complicit in the action; more-
over, at the end of the narrative he acts violently in his own self-interest.
 Concluding, I return to the third-person narrator, whose function is 
crucially important yet difficult to accurately describe. Not just reporting 
the story, the narrator includes—and is thus capable of including—refer-
ences to the characters’ thoughts and reflections, for instance those of 
the traveler discussed above. yet there is also, as his use of “schien” in the 
first paragraph indicates, a lot that the narrator does not know. As we 
have seen, though, this kind of narrative uncertainty proves thematically 
productive and remarkably accurate. In an essay on Kafka’s story “Der 
Bau” (“The Burrow”), J. M. Coetzee writes of the “complex and indeed 
baffling . . . relations between the time of narration (the moving now of the 
narrator’s utterance) and the time of the narrative (referential time)” (1981, 
557; emphasis in the original).16 A similar point can be made about “In 
der Strafkolonie”: as the qualifications and elements of doubt observable 
already in the first paragraph suggest, the narrator is removed from, yet 
also dangerously close to, the events he reports and the characters he 
describes. This relation is temporal, yet it is also spatial. It is “dangerous” 
because there is a sense in which the narrator, though he takes care to 
distance himself from the traveler, also becomes a kind of bystander (and 
one who draws the reader into like complicity) whose ethical position is 
perhaps also dubious. Indeed, one significant achievement of this story is 
to suggest that, confronted with and reporting the story’s events and the 
historical processes which, as fiction, they represent, no available perspec-
tive is ethically unproblematic. This concluding point, too, applies to the 
reader, who, after having read the short story, is prompted to reread and 
reflect on its title and narrative beginning—and on his or her prepared-
ness to read on.
notes
 1. For further discussion see Rabinowitz (1987, esp. 58–65). 
 2. As we can see, this aspect of the sentence’s meaning is lost in the english 
166  ChAPter 8
translation. For a comparison of the beginning of Der Proceß and that of Orson 
Welles’s The Trial, see Lothe (2002). A detailed study of Kafka’s language is Kobs 
(1970).
 3. even though, in contrast to a first-person narrator, a third-person narrator 
is not active as an identifiable character in the plot, he or she (or it) is an integral 
part of the fiction, serving as the author’s narrative instrument and yet sometimes 
revealing limited knowledge and expressing views distinct from those of the implied 
author. For further discussion see Lothe (2000, 20–25). James Phelan defines the 
implied author as “the streamlined version of the real author responsible for the 
construction of the text” (2005, 5), and I would add that in constructing the text the 
implied author creates an image of himself that readers are able to discern. A helpful 
discussion of the concept is Shen (forthcoming). 
 4. Kafka (1995, 28); cf. Kurz (1995, 348). If no references are given, translations 
from the german are my own. 
 5. An excellent study of repetition in narrative fiction is Miller (1982); see also 
Miller (1998, esp. 57–60). 
 6. Quoted by James Rolleston (2006, 3); cf. Blanchot’s essay “Kafka et la lit-
térature” (1949). In the introduction to his Companion to the Works of Franz Kafka, 
Rolleston comments perceptively on the issue of beginnings in Kafka. For short 
discussions of the beginnings of Kafka’s “Die Verwandlung” (“The Metamorphosis”) 
and Das Schloß (The Castle), see Lothe (2004, 2008). See also the chapters by An-
niken greve and Beatrice Sandberg in this volume. 
 7. Since the following discussion presupposes the reader’s knowledge of the basic 
events and characters of the short story, I provide the following summary or “story” 
(i.e., “the content plane of narrative as opposed to its expression plane or discourse,” 
[Prince 1991, 91]): Visiting an unnamed penal colony, a european traveler is invited 
by an officer to attend the execution of a condemned man who is guarded by a sol-
dier. Designed by the earlier commandant of the colony, the execution device is an 
elaborate torture machine that carves the sentence the man has violated on his skin 
before letting him die after twelve hours. Praising the machine, the officer asks the 
traveler to speak to the current commandant on behalf of the machine’s continued 
use. As he refuses to do so, the officer puts himself under the harrow of the machine. 
however, its needles malfunction and quickly stab him to death. The traveler then 
leaves the colony, repelling the soldier and the condemned man as they try to board 
his boat.
 8. Alexander honold finds that the colonial situation of violence and punish-
ment “has always begun before it can be exposed as narrative at all” (2008, 484). 
 9. On this point I register a minor dissent from Richard T. gray, who in a 
thoughtful interpretation of the short story argues that Müller-Seidel, as a leading 
representative of “the faction of literalist interpreters . . . insists that Kafka’s text is 
grounded primarily in ‘contemporary history,’ not in ‘metaphysics, a theology of re-
demption, or other such themes’” (2006, 215). For me, the distinction between liter-
alist and figurative interpreters—represented by, for instance, Müller-Seidel’s (1986) 
historical and contextual approach on the one hand and Wilhelm emrich’s (1965) 
and Ingeborg henel’s (1973) allegorical approaches on the other—is less clear-cut 
than it appears to be for gray. “In der Strafkolonie” provides the textual basis for 
widely divergent interpretations, and one main reason why is that, as gray observes, 
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“of all the texts published by Kafka during his lifetime, it is perhaps the most frac-
tured, disjunctive, and inconclusive” (2006, 216). 
 10. A great political scandal that divided France at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury and that was widely discussed across europe, the Dreyfus affair concerned the 
conviction for treason in 1894 of Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a young French artillery 
officer of Jewish descent. Sentenced to life imprisonment for allegedly having passed 
on French military secrets to the german embassy in Paris, Dreyfus was deported 
to the penal colony in Île du Diable (Devil’s Island) in French guiana; several years 
later, due to vehement protests by Émile Zola and others, he was exonerated and 
reinstated as an officer. At the time when Kafka wrote his story in 1914, Dreyfus was 
serving as a major in the French army.
 11. The rich and varied intertextual field in which the story is situated, and to 
which it is related, is mapped by Müller-Seidel (1986) and Klaus Wagenbach (Kafka 
1995). Seen from a literary perspective, one intertext interestingly related to and in 
some ways extending that of the Dreyfus affair is Dostoevsky’s Notes from the Under-
ground (1864).
 12. It is also linked to the outbreak of the First World War. As Zimmermann notes 
(2004, 87), there is little reason to doubt that Kafka’s experience of the beginning of 
the war played a part in his writing of “In der Strafkolonie.” A thoughtful discussion 
of the beginning of the Second World War is Philippe Carrard’s “September 1939” 
(2008).
 13. This point was made by Stanley Corngold in conversation (see chapter 9 of 
this volume). For helpful suggestions and comments on earlier drafts of this chapter, 
I also thank Jeremy hawthorn, James Phelan, and Beatrice Sandberg. I am par-
ticularly grateful to Ronald Speirs, whose constructive criticisms and wise advice 
enabled me to recast and extend an earlier version of the essay. 
 14. honold also finds the first sentence of the short story unusually suggestive 
(2008, 477). Curiously encapsulating the story’s thematics and evoking its threaten-
ing atmosphere, the first sentence is, I suggest, an extension of the title as much as 
the first sentence of the narrative discourse.
 15. Müller-Seidel thinks that Kafka’s fictional traveler is modeled after Robert 
heindl. A german jurist, heindl was commissioned by the german Colonial Min-
istry to investigate deportation practices in New Caledonia and other european 
penal colonies. See Müller-Seidel (1986, 80–87, 108–10) and Zilcosky (2003, 230). 
See also Mladek (1994).
 16. There are notable similarities between the beginning of “In der Strafkolonie” 
and that of Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians (1980). For a brief discussion of the 
beginning of Coetzee’s novel, see Lothe (2008).
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Constrained—and fascinated—by the narrative of Kafka’s “Forschungen 
eines hundes” (“Researches of a Dog”), I will proceed by indirections, 
in the hope “by indirections [to] find directions out.” And so readers may 
be glad to see a précis of the argument in advance.1
 As a young dog, the narrator is overwhelmed by the music accom-
panying the sudden appearance of a group of dancing dogs. This shock 
brings about a great change in his life, forcing him—for a time—to focus 
all his attention on these dogs and their music. Instead of consistently 
pursuing this reflection, however, he suddenly turns in another direc-
tion: he begins to investigate the source of “nourishment” for dogs, now 
claiming that this is the more fundamental question. his change of direc-
tion appears to be driven by an impulse of self-protection, a need to flee 
the thoughts thrown up by music’s power to dissolve the boundaries of 
the ego and, indeed, the self at whatever depth.
 There is a homology between the dog’s intellectual life and Kafka’s: 
just as the dog deviates from his concern with music toward his concern 
with nourishment, so Kafka’s organism represses his reflective response 
to music in order to concentrate on writing—a repression that prompts 
Kafka to refer afterwards to his absolute unmusicality. Only late in life, 
with the story “Josefine, die Sängerin oder das Volk der Mäuse” (“Jose-
fine, the Singer or the Mouse People”) does Kafka attempt to bring his 
repressed reflection into the half-light of literature.
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 The dog’s original deviation is central to the story, corresponding 
to Kafka’s own great thesis on his writing life as a deviation, a falling 
off, from an authentic origin. The story takes its shape, rhythm, or flow 
from tensions both proleptic and analeptic, carrying the reader along on a 
forward loop of thought, then backward, then forward again. The reader 
is impelled toward the end in the hope, shared with the narrator, of dis-
covering something crucial about a lost or never-understood origin that 
might be called “traumatic knowledge.”2
i
“Wie sich mein Leben verändert hat und wie es sich doch nicht verändert 
hat im grunde!” (KKANII, 485) (“how my life has changed, and how, 
at heart, it has not!” [KSS, 132]). The opening sentence of “Researches 
of a Dog” contains rich but contrary narrative signals, which at once 
retard and advance the narrative, yet the final effect is to advance it in 
an interesting way. The opening thesis produces interest through its sense 
and thrust: the reader is eager to know in what way the narrator’s life has 
changed, especially as the claim is asserted with such gusto, promising a 
vigorous and engaging story. But Kafka’s signature tendency toward “ste-
hender Sturmlauf ” (KSS, 259–60), toward marking double time in place 
(“immobile assault” [D1, 157]), quickly produces a skeptic arrest through 
antithesis: My life has changed, and my life has not changed. The skepti-
cism of this arrest is of the ancient kind, as in Sextus empiricus’s cel-
ebrated citation of Pyrrhonism, that is, “the ability that sets up antitheses 
among appearances and judgments. . . . By such skepticism, on account of 
the ‘equal weight’ which characterizes opposing states of affairs and argu-
ments, we arrive first at ‘suspension of judgment’ and second at ‘freedom 
from disturbance’” (Long, 75). 
 This “suspension” would bring the narrative to an end, in what 
Kafka calls a “Windstille” (KKANII, 72), a wind calm. But this story must 
advance, and it does so, propelled forward by the end signal “im grunde” 
(“at heart,” “basically”), which in wonderfully concise form announces 
the voice of a philosopher. The phrase “im grunde,” spoken by a mind 
questioning its first vigorous affirmation, breaks up this standstill by going 
further. It is a mind that cannot rest. The story advances on the wings of 
a flight from antithesis. By Kafka’s own account, from his diary entry of 
November 20, 1911,
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Sicher ist mein Widerwillen gegen Antithesen. . . . Sie erzeugen zwar 
gründlichkeit, Fülle, Lückenlosigkeit aber nur so wie eine Figur im 
Lebensrad; unsern kleinen einfall haben wir im Kreis herumgejagt. So 
verschieden sie sein können, so nuancenlos sind sie, wie von Wasser auf-
geschwemmt wachsen sie einem unter der hand, mit der anfänglichen 
Aussicht ins grenzenlose und mit einer endlichen mittlern immer glei-
chen größe. Sie rollen sich ein,sind nicht auszudehnen, geben keinen 
Anhaltspunkt. (KSS, 259)
(My antipathy to antitheses is certain. . . . Admittedly, they generate thor-
oughness, fullness, completeness, but only like a figure on the “wheel of 
life” [a toy with a revolving wheel]; we have chased our little idea around 
the circle. As different as they can be, they also lack nuance; they grow 
under one’s hand as if bloated by water, beginning with a prospect onto 
boundlessness and always ending up the same medium size. They curl up, 
they cannot be straightened, they offer no leads.) (KSS, 196)
 There is more than one kinetic aspect to the opening sentence of 
“Researches of a Dog”: there are also the expectations aroused by (1) the 
imperial first-person, (2) the double focus on the imputed past event of 
“Veränderungen” (“Wie sich mein Leben verändert hat”) and the present 
of reflective consideration (“und sich doch nicht verändert hat”), and 
(3) the tone of exclamation. These signals define the unfolding text as 
at once objective report and intimate memoir. It unfolds as an account 
of the chief episodes of the narrator’s past life as a cynic philosopher—
presented, however, in a charged, subjective focus—a form not rare in 
Kafka’s work, as in “ein Bericht für eine Akademie” (“A Report to an 
Academy”). The time conjured by the first person in the first sentence 
is the present of the consciousness that remembers, thinks, feels, as quite 
explicitly in the following sentence, “Wenn ich jetzt zurückdenke . . . ” 
(“If I now think back . . . ”). As the thinking subject begins to construct 
its opening narrative, it conjures the past time of remembered events, 
“die Zeiten mir zurückrufe, da ich noch inmitten der hundeschaft lebte” 
(“the times [of which I ‘summon up remembrance’] when I was still liv-
ing in the midst of dogdom”). But, as the sentence advances, we watch 
it perform a loop forward, from the past of remembered events to the 
present of active remembering, thinking, and feeling:
finde ich . . . leicht, daß hier seit jeher etwas nicht stimmte, . . . eine kleine 
Bruchstelle vorhanden war, der bloße Anblick eines mir lieben Mithun-
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des . . . mich verlegen, erschrocken, hilflos, ja mich verzweifelt machte. 
(KKANII, 485; emphasis added)
(I soon find that something was not quite right from the very begin-
ning . . . , that a little fracture was in place, [ . . . that] the mere sight of 
another dog, someone dear to me . . . filled me with embarrassment, 
fright, helplessness, even despair). (KSS, 132; emphasis added)
With the words “seit jeher” (“from the very beginning”), the loop defines 
the temporal continuum of the narrative. And so this report, which we 
have also called a memoir, continually associates the times of the present 
of a narrating consciousness with the past of remembered events in ways 
that shape the narrative’s temporal rhythm.
 We have called the text a memoir because it conveys the felt pres-
ence of a personal voice, tone, or mood telling the tale, and we have 
called it a report because, as the title indicates, it amounts to a summary 
of research accomplished, the kind of text that one might submit to a 
committee to justify a research grant. And indeed this objective, repor-
torial dimension is strengthened by the objectivity of the title’s diction. 
“Forschungen eines hundes” is a title less likely to be given to his text 
by the reporter or memoirist than by an administrator to which it had 
been submitted.3 And so we have from the start the trace of an over-
arching consciousness reading or registering this memoir. For, just as the 
narrator throughout the tale will reveal almost no trace whatsoever of 
the existence of a consciousness higher than that of the dog—in a word, 
no trace of a human consciousness—we cannot imagine the dog narra-
tor himself, or then again, a dog administrator, or even a dog readership 
to whom this report was to be submitted, titling it the researches of “a 
dog”—of whom else would the product be?4 Rousseau did not title his 
confessions Confessions d’un homme. goethe did not title his autobiogra-
phy Dichtung und Wahrheit im Dasein eines Menschen. This trace-presence 
in the title of “Forschungen eines hundes”—the tailings of a higher, a 
human consciousness—alert us to the narrative duplicity that informs 
the entire memoir-report, an ontological duplicity mirroring the duplic-
ity of genres. It is the omnipresence of the unremarked, invisible human 
order.5 The narrative, as readers of the story know, portrays a pursuit of 
the edible in the face of the unutterable.
 A brief return to Rousseau’s Confessions will illustrate a basic feature 
of this narrative situation: this is the famous distinction between (1) the 
location and the tone of voice of the narrator remembering and com-
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menting and (2) the location and the tone of voice, so to speak, of the 
stages of past research he reports. This often remarked upon doubleness 
of narrative, which sometimes leaps out and is sometimes kept hidden 
in Kafka’s story, is analyzed by Rousseau in his letters to M. Malesherbes 
apropos of his writing his Confessions.
 Rousseau explains that his story will portray not a history of events 
(it is not a report) but a history of the états d’âme that he felt along 
the way: this dimension we have called the memoir-element. Thereaf-
ter—and this is very interesting—according to Rousseau’s account of 
these moods, these états d’âme will be “doubled” (dédoublé) by the mood 
of Rousseau’s interpretation of them. If genuine autobiographical lan-
guage begins, for Rousseau, with an act of recollection of the self as a 
past affective state, this recollection must then abandon itself to what he 
calls its “description” and above all to the mood that accompanies this 
description. Rousseau writes, “In delivering myself over at once to the 
memory of a past impression (de l’impression receue [sic]) and to the feel-
ing of the moment, I would doubly paint my state of mind, namely, at 
the moment in which the event occurred and the moment in which I 
described it” (1959, 1:1154).
 Consider this interlacement of affects at the beginning of “For-
schungen.” The narrator writes, after reporting his malaise in the com-
pany of dogs, about the return of more serene and settled moments: “Wie 
hätte ich auch ohne diese erholungspausen das Alter erreichen können, 
dessen ich mich jetzt erfreue” (KKANII, 485) (“Without these periods of 
rest and recovery, how could I ever have reached the age I now enjoy” 
[KSS, 132])—an example of the loop of affects modulating one another. 
Rousseau teaches us to regard this latter moment of pleasure as involved 
in the pleasure of the peace he knew in the past. Present pleasure adjusts 
the tone of the narrative of the past, the narrative of the formation of 
“einen kalten, zurückhaltenden, ängstlichen, rechnerischen, aber alles 
in allem genommen doch regelrechten hund” (KKANII, 485) (“a cold, 
reserved, timid, calculating dog, but, all in all, a regular one” [KSS, 132]). 
The factor of such attunement, let it be noted, appears in Nietzsche’s 
writings on Wagner as the tempo of affect.6 And thinking now of Walter 
Benjamin’s reflections on history, we discover here, in a phrase, the phe-
nomenon of dialectical affect.7
 The narrative is charged from the start with the passion for origins 
of a libido sciendi. I earlier cited the sentence “finde ich . . . leicht, daß 
hier seit jeher etwas nicht stimmte” (KKANII, 485) (“I soon find that 
something was not quite right from the very beginning” [KSS, 132]). 
This activity of remembering, thinking, feeling plunges us back again to 
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“the very beginning” and as such is the signature of a narrative haunted 
by origins. The “grund” (“heart,” “basis”) sought by the narrative is 
the absolute origin of the drive toward “research,” of which this narra-
tive itself is the crown. Threading through the succession of empirical 
moments in the protagonist’s life of research is an insistently regressive 
pursuit of clues as to the origin of this very narrative. The story is not an 
end product but is itself an expression of a drive toward beginnings. And 
this—the dog’s drive to understand—must be attributed to Kafka’s drive 
to understand something of the greatest importance for him: the place of 
music, and, indeed, the place of his resistance to music at the origin of his 
own writing.
ii
The narrator’s crucial formative experience is his encounter with the 
“musical dogs.” Something of the importance of this moment is con-
veyed by the higher mimicry of subject matter and narrative ductus that 
informs the telling. And now, this narrative—the one you are reading—
will resort to a higher mimicry of its own in assuming the voice of Pro-
fessor Michael Levine, who has written about this passage with such an 
uncanny appositeness to the present argument that you, reader, cannot 
be better served than to have his words (with small interpolations of my 
own). The following brief discussion has four authors: Kafka, the narrator, 
Michael Levine, and (in a chiefly secretarial fashion) Stanley Corngold—
a rare instance of cooperation in this dog-eat-dog world.8
 The dog finds himself in “dem leeren Raum” (KKANII, 490) (“that 
empty space” [KSS, 134]) from which seven strange dogs conjure music. 
Coming from nowhere, this music is suddenly everywhere, for “alles war 
Musik” (KKANII, 490) (“everything was music” [KSS, 134]). Indeed, the 
brevity of the three-word sentence “everything was music” seems to 
register not only the abruptness of the change but the narrator’s own 
startled sense of transport, the sense of being somewhere utterly remote 
from the place he now occupies. Like the hallowed atmosphere in which 
the dog suddenly finds himself—both as past agent and present narra-
tor—the music that fills this place is indescribable. It is music that pours 
into the ears and floods the body, moving it to dance. And dance indeed 
is just what is performed by the seven dogs that the narrator goes on to 
describe—the cadences and intricate turns of his own description seem-
ingly patterned on the reciprocal “Wendungen” (“attitudes”), “Verbind-
ungen” (“combinations”), and “verschlungene Figuren” (“intertwined 
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figures”) of the dance, only to find footing, at the close, in the beat that 
the “others, great masters,” so steadily maintained:
Das heben und Niedersetzen ihrer Füße, bestimmte Wendungen des 
Kopfes, ihr Laufen und ihr Ruhen, die Stellungen die sie zueinander 
einnahmen, die reigenmäßigen Verbindungen, die sie mit einander ein-
gin gen, indem etwa einer die Vorderpfoten auf des andern Rücken 
stütz te und sie sich dann so ordneten, daß der erste aufrecht die Last aller 
andern trug oder indem sie mit ihren nah am Boden hinschleichenden 
Körpern verschlungene Figuren bildeten und niemals sich irrten; nicht 
einmal der letzte, der noch ein wenig unsicher war, nicht immer gleich 
den Anschluß an die andern fand, gewissermaßen im Anschlagen der 
Melodie manchmal schwankte, aber doch unsicher war nur im Vergleich 
mit der großartigen Sicherheit der andern und selbst bei viel größerer, 
ja bei vollkommener Unsicherheit nichts hätte verderben können, wo 
die andern, große Meister, den Takt unerschütterlich hielten. (KKANII, 
490–91)
(The way they raised and set down their feet, certain turns of the heads, 
their running and their resting, the attitudes they assumed toward one 
another, the combinations they formed with one another like a round 
dance, as when, for example, one braced his front paws on the other’s 
back and then they all positioned themselves so that the first dog, erect, 
bore the weight of all the others, or as when, their bodies slinking close 
to the ground, they formed intertwined figures and never made a mis-
take—not even the last one, who was a little unsure of himself, did not 
always immediately hook up with the others, staggered a little, as it were, 
when the melody struck up, but was unsure only by comparison with the 
magnificent certainty of the others, and even had he been much more 
unsure, indeed utterly unsure, he would have ruined nothing, since the 
others, great masters, were keeping time so steadily.) (KSS, 134–35)
And, as though the scene were too much for the little dog to take in—
and even after all this passage of time, too much for the mature narrator 
to remember—the description abruptly breaks off at this point. Object-
ing to his own account, the narrator promptly adds:
Aber man sah sie ja kaum, man sah sie ja alle kaum. Sie waren hervor-
getreten, man hatte sie innerlich begrüßt als hunde, sehr beirrt war man 
zwar von dem Lärm, der sie begleitete, aber es waren doch hunde, hunde 
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wie ich und Du, man beobachtete sie gewohnheitsmäßig, wie hunde, 
denen man auf dem Weg begegnet, man wollte sich ihnen nähern, grüße 
tauschen, sie waren auch ganz nah, hunde, zwar viel älter als ich . . . aber 
doch auch . . . recht vertraut vielmehr, viele von solcher oder ähnlicher 
Art kannte ich . . . (KKANII, 428–29)
(But it is too much to say that you actually saw them, you hardly saw any 
of them. They had appeared, you welcomed them silently as dogs; true, 
the clamor that accompanied them was very confusing, but in the end 
they were dogs, dogs like you and me; you observed them in the usual 
way, like dogs that you meet on the street; you wanted to go up to them, 
exchange greetings, for they were also very close—dogs, certainly much 
older than me . . . but . . . really rather familiar; I knew many of such a 
breed. . . . ) (KSS, 135)
This sobering series of reflections, which are here cited only in part, 
moves gradually from the impersonal pronoun “man” [translated above 
as “you,” SC] to the first person “I.” The function of these reflections 
is to distance the narrator from his initial report, to detach the dazzled 
spectator he once was from the spectacle whirling before his eyes, and to 
affirm the separate identity of protagonist and narrator. Such separations, 
however, cannot be maintained as soon as the irrepressible music wells up 
again. As it does so, the narrative “I” disappears and is replaced once again 
by a series of impersonal pronouns:
während man noch in solchen Überlegungen befangen war, nahm 
allmählich die Musik überhand, faßte einen förmlich, zog einen hin-
weg von diesen wirklichen kleinen hunden und ganz wider Willen, sich 
sträubend mit allen Kräften, heulend als würde einem Schmerz bereitet, 
durfte man sich mit nichts anderem beschäftigen, als mit der von allen 
Seiten, von der höhe, von der Tiefe, von überall her kommenden, den 
Zuhörer in die Mitte nehmenden, überschüttenden, erdrückenden, über 
seiner Vernichtung noch, in solcher Nähe, daß es schon Ferne war, kaum 
hörbar noch Fanfaren blasenden Musik. (KKANII, 429)
(But while you were still caught up in such reflections, the music gradu-
ally took over, practically seized hold of you, swept you away from these 
real little dogs, and quite against your will, resisting with all your might, 
howling as if pain were being inflicted, you could attend to nothing but 
this music that came from all sides, from the heights, from the depths, 
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from everywhere, pulling the listener into its midst, pouring over him, 
crushing him, and even after annihilating him, still blaring its fanfares at 
such close range that they turned remote and barely audible.) (KSS, 135)
As this and other passages make clear, everything in the text is a question 
of rhythm, of tempo—not only that of the dance and the music to which 
it is set but that of the narration itself.9 Just as the telling seems at times 
to become immersed in (and engulfed by) the story told, so too does the 
narrative “Ich” have a tendency to dissolve into an impersonal “man,” 
only to resurface and reconsolidate itself time and again. Such moments 
of dissolution are often associated with a loss of conscious control, with a 
sometimes anxious, sometimes ecstatic feeling of being swept away. [here 
we might recall Kafka’s aperçu of the man with his arms raised: “Der Ver-
zückte und der ertrinkende—beide heben die Arme. Der erste bezeugt 
eintracht, der zweite Widerstreit mit den elementen” (KKANII, 53) 
(“The man in ecstasy, and the man drowning: both throw up their arms. 
The first does it to signify harmony; the second to signify strife with the 
elements”) (DF, 77), SC]. This loss of control is seemingly the case in the 
passage cited above—“seemingly” because what is so remarkable about 
it is the contrast between its descriptive precision and the overwhelming 
nature of the experience described. The narrative precision suggests not 
only the sharpness of the narrator’s memory as he tells the story many 
years after the fact but his surprising presence of mind at the time of 
the actual occurrence—at a time, that is, when he is said to have been 
crushed, overwhelmed, and nearly annihilated. It appears then that even 
in the midst of extreme dissolution, something of the “I” remains. [We 
again recall Kafka’s distinction between two kinds of self-loss—one nega-
tive, one positive: “Nicht Selbstabschüttelung sondern Selbstaufzehrung” 
(KKANII, 77) (“Not shaking off the self but consuming the self ”) (DF, 
87), the latter evidently suggesting its survival as a shadow of itself, SC]. 
The “I” endures but only as an infinitely small point . . .  (Levine 2005, 
1–4).
 Exeat, with my gratitude, Michael Levine. I now resume in my own 
voice, turning, first, to Kafka’s own memorial account of his early rela-
tion to music.
iii10
On January 3, 1912, Kafka noted in his Diaries:
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In mir kann ganz gut eine Koncentration auf das Schreiben hin erkannt 
werden. Als es in meinem Organismus klar geworden war, daß das Sch-
reiben die ergiebigste Richtung meines Wesens sei, drängte sich alles 
hin und ließ alle Fähigkeiten leer stehn, die sich auf die Freuden des 
geschlechtes, des essens, des Trinkens, des philosophischen Nachdenkens 
der Musik zu allererst richteten. Ich magerte nach allen diesen Richtun-
gen ab. (KSS, 341)
For years, readers of the standard American edition of the Diaries have 
been accustomed to seeing the key sentence translated by Joseph Kresh 
as follows:
When it became clear in my organism that writing was the most produc-
tive direction for my being to take, everything rushed in that direction 
and left empty all those abilities which were directed toward the joys of 
sex, eating, drinking, philosophical reflection and above all music. I atro-
phied in all these directions. (D1, 211)
But there is a crucial, attention-grabbing detail in the german text that 
this translation elides. The Frankfurt manuscript edition reveals above 
that there is no comma between “philosophischen Nachdenkens” and 
“der Musik.” In his polemic called “Sprachlehre” (“grammar”), Karl 
Kraus began a tirade thus: “Of course, one would be unable to get the 
esteemed author to grasp that owing to the missing comma . . . ,” a rhe-
torical and semantic disaster ensues (Kraus 2010, 154). I shall pursue the 
exact, symmetrically opposite tack in reading Kafka’s diary entry. I shall 
not suppose that an author for whom—mutatis mutandis—my esteem 
is immense, never noticed, in a diary that he scrupulously kept, that he 
had omitted the comma that would safeguard him from a rhetorical and 
semantic disaster. This is especially true when the omitted comma pro-
duces an altogether different—and an altogether compelling—meaning.
 This diary passage contrasts the implicit, unnamed, ascetic joy of 
writing—its dilettantism (about which “süßer wunderbarer Lohn” [Br, 
384] [“sweet, wonderful reward” (KSS, 211)], Kafka would have a great 
deal to say in the following decade)—with several explicitly named joys, 
of which the strangest is the philosophical reflection performed by music, 
provoked by music, or addressed to music as its object. It is this consider-
able joy of thinking in the circle of music—by and about music—that 
has to be renounced in the name of writing. Writing exists as the specific 
renunciation of the joys of having sex, eating, drinking, and thinking 
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philosophically about music or listening to the sort of reflection that 
music might be imagined to produce about itself, as is if this utterly and 
crucially unstable, unresolved character of music were a sort of siren song 
that Kafka had to resist at all costs if he were to write. The ontological 
question for Kafka would then be, not “why is there Something rather 
than Nothing?” but rather, in the words of the narrator of “Josefine, the 
Singer,” “wie es sich mit dieser Musik eigentlich verhält” (KKAD, 350) 
(“what [is] this music . . . really all about?” [KSS, 95]). Writing exists as the 
resistance to such consideration, a refusal of a philosophy of music—as if 
to give oneself over to this principal reflection would be to cut oneself 
off from writing and be lost.
 The issue, then, is not Kafka’s fascination with silence as the absence 
of music but with silence as the specific outcome of a refusal to listen to 
a meditation on the nature of music, one that might come as a develop-
ment of the peculiar fact about him: his unmusicality, his unmusicality as 
a problem—and, as a problem, something to resist or selectively not to 
resist—but in both instances harboring, in its very problematic character, 
an unwonted source of strength. Consider Kafka’s letter to Milena of July 
17, 1920: “eine gewisse Stärke habe ich, will man sie kurz und unklar 
bezeichnen, so ist es mein Unmusikalisch-Sein” (BrM, 122) (“I do pos-
sess a certain strength that might be briefly and imprecisely described 
as being unmusical” [LM, 92]). you can hear in the word “imprecisely” 
the implicit requirement that unmusicality be “nachgedacht” (“thought 
through”). This strength is a function, too, of the perfection of Kafka’s 
“being unmusical.” In an earlier letter to Milena of June 14, 1920, Kafka 
insisted that he was “vollständig . . . unmusikalisch, in einer meiner erfah-
rung nach überhaupt sonst nicht vorkommenden Vollständigkeit” (BrM, 
65) (“completely unmusical, more completely than anyone I have ever 
known” [LM, 48]). This claim to a perfection of “Unmusikalisch-Sein” 
belongs in any synoptic view of Kafka together with another, earlier 
claim bearing on the perfection of his “Schriftstellersein,” his “being (as) 
a writer.” In the diary entry of February 19, 1911, he noted,
Die besondere Art meiner Inspiration in der ich glücklichster und 
Unglücklichster jetzt um 2 Uhr nachts schlafen gehe .... ist die, daß ich 
alles kann, nicht nur auf eine bestimmte Arbeit hin. Wenn ich wahllos 
einen Satz hinschreibe z.B. er schaute aus dem Fenster so ist er schon 
vollkommen. (KSS, 30)
(The special nature of my inspiration in which now, at two in the morn-
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ing) . . . is this, that I can do everything, not only with respect to a par-
ticular piece of work. If I write a sentence at random, for example, “he 
looked out of the window,” it is already perfect.) (KSS, 195)
 In his famous Plana letter to Max Brod of July 5, 1922, however, 
the same ontological question runs decisively in the negative: “Aber wie 
ist es mit dem Schriftstellersein selbst?” (Br, 384) (“But how do things 
stand with this being a writer?” [KSS, 211]). The answer is that it is a kill-
ing sweetness and the prelude to a terrible death. “Schriftstellersein” and 
“Unmusikalisch-Sein” belong in a fluctuating relation that is not merely 
antithetical. In looking for models of their relation, one might consider 
the Dionysian/Apollonian pair in Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy, where 
these energies figure as antagonists but then also as siblings (they are 
complementary and have a common root) and then also as parent and 
offspring (each strives for primacy).
 But whether we have here anything as productive as even a “hol-
zweg” will depend on the power of this errant path to draw evidence 
from the stories to itself. This is where “Forschungen eines hundes” 
comes in, with its concern for the pursuit of the origin of music as a 
topic for philosophical reflection. Referring to that initial clamor, the 
dog reflects, in a first version of this story,
hätte ich nicht deutlich gesehn daß es hunde waren und daß sie selbst 
diesen Lärm mitbrachten, trotzdem ich nicht erkennen konnte, wie sie 
ihn erzeugten—ich wäre sofort weggelaufen, so aber blieb ich. Damals 
wuß te ich noch fast nichts von der nur dem hundegeschlecht verliehenen 
schöpferischen Musikalität, sie war meiner sich erst entwickelnden Auf-
merksamkeit entgangen, nur in Andeutungen hatte man mich darauf hin-
zuweisen versucht, umso überraschender, geradezu niederwerfend waren 
jene sieben großen Musikkünstler für mich. (KKANII, 427–28)
(had I not clearly seen that they were dogs and that they themselves 
brought this clamor with them—although I could not see how they 
produced it—I would have run away this minute, but as matters stood, I 
stayed. At that time I knew almost nothing about the creative musicality 
with which only the race of dogs is endowed; it was something that until 
now had escaped my powers of observation, which were only slowly 
developing; others had attempted to call my attention to it; all the more 
surprising, then, even shocking, were those seven great musical virtuosi.) 
(KSS, 134)
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Thereafter, Kafka begins the story again at another place in his note-
books; and after the sentence that speaks of the creative musicality of 
dogs that had until then escaped the dog’s powers of observation, he adds 
these lines:
natürlicher Weise, hatte mich doch die Musik schon seit meiner Säug-
lingszeit umgeben, als ein mir selbstverständliches unentbehrliches 
Le bens element, welches von meinem sonstigen Leben zu sondern nichts 
mich zwang; nur in Andeutungen, dem kindlichen Verstand entsprech-
end, hatte man mich darauf hinzuweisen versucht. (KKANII, 490)
(naturally, ever since infancy, music had surrounded me as a self-evident, 
indispensable vital element, but nothing had compelled me to separate 
it from the rest of my life; others had attempted to call my attention to 
it.) (KSS, 134)
 With the addition of this sentence, the passage revolves entirely 
around the action of a “Sonderung,” a “separating off ” of music; this 
means making music a fit subject of philosophical reflection. The narra-
tor’s first formative experience, as he tells us, is of the separation of music 
from the naturally given life-world. And, indeed, “Mit jenem Koncert 
aber begann es. . . . Ich lief umher, erzählte und fragte, klagte an und 
forschte und wollte jeden hinziehn zu dem Ort wo alles geschehen war” 
(KKANII, 435, 434) (“It was with that concert that everything began. . . . 
I ran around telling my story and asking questions, making accusations 
and doing research; I wanted to drag everyone to the spot where it had 
all happened” [KSS, 138]).
 This drive to research is not organized, no direction is given to the 
heightened consciousness of the dog by the mere fact of this separation. 
The development of the trauma comes from his own nature, the “einge-
borenes Wesen” (“innate nature”) that continues to force the separation 
of music from the rest of life:
Ich klage nicht darüber, es ist mein eingeborenes Wesen das hier wirkt 
und das sich gewiß, wenn das Koncert nicht gewesen wäre, eine andere 
gelegenheit gefunden hätte, um durchzubrechen, nur daß es so bald 
geschah, tat mir früher manchmal leid. (KKANII, 435–36)
(I am not complaining, what is at work here is my innate nature, which 
would surely have found another opportunity to emerge even without 
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the concert, except that the fact of its happening so soon used to cause 
me a great deal of pain.) (KSS, 138)
The result of the dog’s pursuing his research is the loss of “Kindheit” 
(“childhood”) and its joys—“das glückselige Leben der jungen hunde” 
(“the blissful life of young dogs”)—though quite possibly, he thinks, it 
is a preparation for a much greater bliss when he is old: the discussion 
concerns the kinds and amounts of joy a body can bear (KKAN2, 436). 
The main thrust of this discussion, however, is not about joy. It concerns 
an epochal turning, fraught with “despair”:
Ich begann damals meine Untersuchungen mit den einfachsten Din-
gen, an Material fehlte es nicht, leider, der Überfluß ist es, der mich in 
dunklen Stunden verzweifeln läßt. Ich begann zu untersuchen wovon 
sich die hundeschaft nährte. (KKANII, 435–36)
(I began my investigations at that time with the simplest things; there was 
no lack of material, unfortunately; it is its very overabundance that, in 
the darkest hours, makes me despair. I began to investigate what dogdom 
took as nourishment.) (KSS, 138)
 These sentences are not innocent; the explicit note of despair may be 
a displacement of a primary despondency, since the choice of direction 
implies a direction not taken. The missing direction, the path not taken 
is . . . music, the question of music (read “unmusicality”). But what path 
has been taken instead? What can the sense of “nourishment” be? I shall 
claim a connection between “nourishment” and the “fullness of writing,” 
enlisting gerhard Kurz’s comment on a related moment in Kafka’s other 
great, late, long, unfinished story “The Burrow”: “Through this eucha-
ristic act of feeding and drinking, [this creature] defends itself against the 
crush of the provisions—in an allegorical sense, the crush of poetic inspi-
ration” (KSS, 342). Research flees to writing, the opposite direction from 
reflecting on music, which is to say, from practicing “Musikwissenschaft” 
(“the science of music”) (KKANII, 480).
 Well and good, but how then does the constitution of music as a 
philosophical object stand in relation to the subject of his research—
to nourishment—for which I have claimed an intuitive connection to 
writing? Music is not the object of this research; it is its provocation ex 
negativo: “It was,” after all, “with that concert that everything began.” The 
moment has the identical structure of the origin of the life of writing 
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as given in the Brief an den Vater (Letter to his Father): “Mein Schreiben 
handelte von Dir . . . er [war] zwar von Dir erzwungen, aber [verlief] in 
der von mir bestimmten Richtung” (KKANII, 192) (“although [my writ-
ing] . . . was forced by you, it took its course in the direction determined 
by me”) (KSS, 206); compare the father’s force with the traumatic shock 
of sound. In “Forschungen eines hundes,” the direction leads away from 
a meditation on “what this music is really all about” and toward nourish-
ment, bringing the concert and nourishment, music as a philosophical 
object and writing onto the same ontological plane.
 In “Forschungen,” Kafka had by no means finished posing the origin 
of music as a virtual topic for reflection. At this very point in his text we 
are discussing, he writes the following lines in the margin of his note-
book before crossing them out: “wie viel Zeit mag vergangen sein, ehe 
das hundegeschlecht erkannte, dass es inmitten einer Tonwelt lebte und 
vielleicht ist bis heute noch nicht genug Zeit vergangen, dies genau zu 
erkennen (KKANIIA, 391) (“how much time may have passed before 
dogdom recognized that it lived in the middle of a world of sound, and 
perhaps until today not enough time has passed for it to recognize this 
clearly”).
 To live in the middle of a world of sound but not to recognize it 
means never to find the Archimedean point of silence from which the 
“separation” between the apprehension of music and the failure of the 
apprehension of music (unmusicality) could be “clearly” accomplished.
 At any rate, the sentence was crossed out as . . . could we say . . . a 
dangerous piling on too soon of that philosophical reflection on music 
that is the negative counterpart of writing?
 But “Forschungen eines hundes” does not abandon the matter. Just 
as the question of the claim of music was taken up at the beginning of 
the story—and, as we have shown, repudiated—it is again taken up at 
the very close, where it then enriches before abruptly ending the story, 
although not without leaving a nimbus of radiant insight.
 The ending is immediately preceded by an extraordinary passage. At 
the conclusion of the dog-narrator’s account of the agonies of his fasting, 
he conjures another musical dog:
Ich merkte . . . daß der hund aus der Tiefe der Brust zu einem gesange 
anhob. . . . Und ich glaubte damals, etwas zu erkennen, was kein hund je 
vor mir erfahren hat, wenigstens findet sich in der Überlieferung nicht 
die leiseste Andeutung dessen, und ich versenkte eilig in unendlicher 
Angst und Scham das gesicht in der Blutlache vor mir. Ich glaubte näm-
lich zu erkennen, daß der hund schon sang ohne es noch zu wissen, ja 
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mehr noch, daß die Melodie, von ihm getrennt, nach eigenem gesetz 
durch die Lüfte schwebte und über ihn hinweg, als gehöre er nicht dazu, 
nach mir, nur nach mir hin zielte.
 heute leugne ich natürlich alle derartigen erkenntnisse und schreibe 
sie meiner damaligen Überreiztheit zu, aber wenn es auch ein Irrtum 
war, so hat er doch eine gewisse großartigkeit, ist die einzige wenn 
auch nur scheinbare Wirklichkeit, die ich aus der hungerzeit in diese 
Welt herübergerettet habe und zeigt zumindest, wie weit bei völligem 
Außer-sich-sein wir gelangen können. Und ich war wirklich völlig außer 
mir. . . . Körperlich erholte ich mich übrigens in wenigen Stunden, geis tig 
trage ich noch heute die Folgen. (KKANII, 479–80)
(I noticed that from the depths of his chest this dog was getting ready to 
sing. . . . And then I believe I perceived something that no dog had ever 
experienced before me; at any rate, cultural memory does not contain 
even the slightest hint of it; and in infinite anxiety and shame I hurriedly 
lowered my face in the puddle of blood in front of me. What I seemed to 
perceive was that the dog was already singing without his being aware of 
it—no, more than that: that the melody, detached from him, was floating 
through the air and then past him according to its own laws, as if he no 
longer had any part in it, floating at me, aimed only at me.
 Today of course, I deny any such perceptions and attribute them to 
my overstimulation at the time, but even if it was an error, it nevertheless 
had a certain grandeur and is the sole reality, even if only an apparent 
reality, that I salvaged and brought back into this world from the time of 
my fast, and shows, at least, how far we can go when we are completely 
out of our senses. And I really was completely out of my senses. . . . As 
it happened, I recovered physically in a few hours; mentally, I bear the 
consequences even today.) (KSS, 159–60)
 In this episode, ecstasy and error mingle in equal parts. (The error 
consists, very likely, of a profound misapprehension of the music pro-
duced by the hunting horns of the humans that the researcher cannot or 
will not see.) The Kafka scholar John hargraves notes that here “music 
obliterates the insight that the dogs are not alone in the world” (KSS, 
325). For us it is chiefly important that the episode prompts the narrator’s 
meditation at the close:
Meine Forschungen aber erweiterte ich auf die Musik der hunde. . . . 
Die Wissenschaft von der Musik ist . . . vielleicht noch umfangreicher als 
jene von der Nahrung, und jedenfalls fester begründet. es ist das da durch 
186  ChAPter 9
zu erklären, daß . . . es sich hier mehr um bloße Beobachtungen und 
Systematisierungen handelt, dort dagegen vor allem um praktische Fol-
gerungen. Damit hängt zusammen, daß der Respekt vor der Musikwis-
senschaft größer ist als vor der Nahrungswissenschaft, die erstere aber 
niemals so tief ins Volk eindringen konnte wie die zweite. Auch ich 
stand der Musikwissenschaft, ehe ich die Stimme im Wald gehört hatte, 
fremder gegenüber als irgendeiner anderen. Zwar hatte mich schon das 
erlebnis mit den Musikhunden auf sie hingewiesen, aber ich war damals 
noch zu jung. . . . Auch war zwar die Musik bei jenen Hunden das zunächst 
Auffallendste gewesen, aber wichtiger als die Musik schien mir ihr verschwiegenes 
Hundewesen, für ihre schreckliche Musik fand ich vielleicht überhaupt 
keine Ähnlichkeit anderswo, ich konnte sie eher vernachlässigen, aber 
ihr Wesen begegnete mir von damals an in allen hunden überall. In das 
Wesen der Hunde einzudringen, schienen mir aber Forschungen über die Nah-
rung am geeignetsten und ohne Umweg zum Ziele führend. (KKANII, 480–81; 
emphasis added)
(I widened my researches to include the music of the dogs. . . . The sci-
ence of music is . . . perhaps even wider in scope than that of food and in 
any case more firmly grounded. . . . In music, it is more a matter of pure 
observations and systematizations; there, [in the field of nutrition] . . . it 
is above all one of practical consequences. Connected to this is the fact 
that the science of music enjoys greater respect than the science of nutri-
tion, but the former could never affect the people so deeply as the latter. 
Before I had heard the voice in the woods, my relation to the science of 
music was also more remote than to any other science. It is true that my 
experience with the music dogs had already drawn my attention to it, 
but at that time I was still too young. . . . Furthermore, while in the case 
of the air dogs, music had been the first thing to strike me, their secretive 
nature seemed to me more important than the music; their terrible music was 
probably like nothing else in the world, and so I could neglect it more 
readily, but from that time on it was their nature that I encountered in 
all dogs everywhere. To penetrate into the nature of dogs, however, research into 
nutrition seemed to me most suitable and to lead unerringly to the goal.) (KSS, 
160; emphasis added)
 We have now learned something crucial. If research into nutrition 
means immersion in writing, then the project of writing, too, is in error 
from the start since this research into nutrition (read “writing”) is bent 
on nothing more nor less than “penetrating into the nature of dogs.” It 
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involves from the start, for good or for ill, something comparable to a 
cognitive program promising ethical insight, for moral, practical educa-
tion. everything goes back to the dancing dogs’ shamelessness and taci-
turnity. But how can this human, this ethical side of things be wrong, 
an error construed as an impurity? In an extraordinary letter to Felice, 
written September 30–October 1, 1917, during the very last days of 
their courtship, Kafka formulated the goal of real writing as the one 
goal that matters, the goal “einem höchsten gericht zu entsprechen” (“to 
answer to a highest Court”). yet it might also subserve a baser prac-
tice as “sehr gegensätzlich” (“quite to the contrary”), it contents itself 
with a philosophical survey of mankind, striving, as Kafka writes, “die 
ganze Menschen- und Tiergemeinschaft zu überblicken, ihre grundle-
genden Vorlieben, Wünsche, sittlichen Ideale zu erkennen, sie auf ein-
fache Vorschriften zurückzuführen” (“to know the entire human and 
animal community, to recognize their fundamental preferences, desires, 
and moral ideals, to reduce them to simple rules [or laws]”). This entire 
effort—this psychological or anthropological study—is undertaken with 
another aim in mind, which Kafka surprisingly motivates as follows:
daß ich durchaus allen wohlgefällig würde, und zwar (hier kommt der 
Sprung) so wohlgefällig, daß ich, ohne die allgemeine Liebe zu verlie-
ren, schließlich, als der einzige Sünder, der nicht gebraten wird, die mir 
innewohnenden gemeinheiten offen, vor allen Augen, ausführen dürfte. 
(KKAB2, 333)
(so that this way I should become thoroughly pleasing to all, and, to be 
sure, [here comes the jump] so pleasing, that, without sacrificing this 
general love, I might finally, as the sole sinner who will not be roasted, 
parade the meanness that dwells in me, openly, before all eyes.) (LF, 545; 
translation modified)
 We are dealing with a perversion of writing that suggests its vanity in 
the ordinary sense of the word, for this “nourishment” is not something 
that properly comes in from other people or goes out to other people. 
This text stands in a family relation with another text that highlights the 
same tension between a “pure” and an anthropological writing. This is 
the extended aperçu known as the wish on Laurentian hill. Describing 
his wish as a young man to write—let us say—“purely,” Kafka concludes,
Aber er konnte gar nicht so wünschen, denn sein Wunsch war kein 
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Wunsch, er war nur eine Verteidigung, eine Verbürgerlichung des Nichts, 
ein hauch von Munterkeit, den er dem Nichts geben wollte, in das er 
zwar damals kaum die ersten bewußten Schritte tat, das er aber schon 
als sein element fühlte. es war damals eine Art Abschied, den er von der 
Scheinwelt der Jugend nahm; sie hatte ihn übrigens niemals unmittelbar 
getäuscht, sondern nur durch die Reden aller Autoritäten ringsherum 
täuschen lassen. So hatte sich die Notwendigkeit des “Wunsches” erge-
ben. (KSS, 855)
(But he could not wish in this fashion at all; for his wish was not a wish, 
it was only a defense of nothingness, a granting of protection and civil 
rights to nothingness, a breath of cheer that he wanted to lend to noth-
ingness, into which at that time he had scarcely taken only his first few 
conscious steps but which he already felt as his element. At that time it 
[the writing destiny] was a sort of farewell that he took from the illusive 
world of youth; it had, incidentally, never directly deceived him but only 
caused him to be deceived by the utterances of all the authorities around 
him. The necessity of his “wish” had come about as a result.) (KSS, 207)
here, the enterprise of beginning to write is motivated by a compulsory 
leave-taking from a world in which, the speaker alleges, he had been 
deceived. Writing begins enmeshed in the original sin of the son’s com-
plaint that an injustice has been committed against himself.11
 In opposition to the science of music, the science of nourishment 
pursued by the dog is impure. But can we not learn what might be dif-
ferent from this enmeshment in impurity, this eternal deflection from the 
right way? We heard the dog declare that “to penetrate into the nature 
of dogs, research into nutrition seemed to me most suitable and to lead 
unerringly to the goal.” he continues and herewith concludes his report:
Vielleicht hatte ich darin Unrecht. ein grenzgebiet der beiden Wissen-
schaften lenkte allerdings schon damals meinen Verdacht auf sich. es ist 
die Lehre von dem die Nahrung herabrufenden gesang. Wieder ist es 
hier für mich sehr störend, daß ich auch in die Musikwissenschaft nie-
mals ernstlich eingedrungen bin. . . . Der tiefere Grund meiner wissenschaftli-
chen Unfähigkeit scheint mir ein Instinkt und wahrlich kein schlechter Instinkt 
zu sein. Wenn ich bramarbasieren wollte, könnte ich sagen, daß gerade dieser 
Instinkt meine wissenschaftlichen Fähigkeiten zerstört hat, denn es wäre doch eine 
zumindest sehr merkwürdige Erscheinung, daß ich, der ich in den gewöhnlichen 
täglichen Lebensdingen, die gewiß nicht die einfachsten sind, einen erträglichen 
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Verstand zeige und vor allem, wenn auch nicht die Wissenschaft, so doch die 
Gelehrten sehr gut verstehe, . . . von vornherein unfähig gewesen sein sollte, die 
Pfote auch nur zur ersten Stufe der Wissenschaft zu erheben. Es war der Instinkt, 
der mich vielleicht gerade um der Wissenschaft willen, aber einer anderen Wissen-
schaft als sie heute geübt wird, einer allerletzten Wissenschaft, die Freiheit höher 
schätzen ließ als alles andere. Die Freiheit! Freilich, die Freiheit, wie sie heute 
möglich ist, ist ein kümmerliches Gewächs. Aber immerhin Freiheit, immerhin ein 
Besitz. (KKANII, 481-82).
Perhaps I was wrong on that count. Of course, there is some overlap 
between the two sciences that even then aroused my suspicions. I mean 
the doctrine of the song that calls down food from above. here again 
I am severely handicapped by the fact that I have never seriously pen-
etrated into the science of music. . . . The deeper reason for my incapac-
ity . . . seems to me to be an instinct, and to tell the truth, it is not a bad instinct. 
If I wanted to brag, I would say that precisely this instinct has destroyed my 
scientific skill, for it would certainly be a very remarkable phenomenon, to say the 
least, if I, who display a passable intelligence in the ordinary business of daily 
life, which is certainly not so simple, and above all who, even though I do not 
understand science, nevertheless understand scientists very well . . . were from the 
very beginning unable to raise my paw even to the first rung of science. It was my 
instinct that, perhaps precisely for the sake of science but a different science than is 
practiced today, an ultimate science, led me to value freedom above everything else. 
Freedom! Of course, the freedom that is possible today —a stunted growth. But 
nevertheless freedom, nevertheless a possession.) (KSS, 160–61)
Pure writing equals a certain freedom, and also the perfect absence of 
sound: stillness.
 We alluded earlier to the question of music in Kafka’s “Josefine” of 
1924. Observe that the very “joy,” the philosophical reflection on music, 
of which Kafka was deprived in 1912 and which is named but resisted in 
1922, will make its appearance here. This topic, when it resurges in Kaf-
ka’s late work, would then have the character of a return of the repressed 
in a mode in which it could be tolerated, a fusion of the even pleasure of 
writing and the odd pleasure of a reflection on the nature of music.
 Such a return would point to the gaiety, the subtle good humor that 
glances off the pages of his late work. Think of the movement of recon-
ciliation that is especially vivid in Das Schloß (The Castle), Kafka’s bliss 
in joining two alien worlds—Schriftstellersein (“the being of the writer”) 
and Beamtenwesen (“the being of the bureaucrat”). What a happy thing to 
190  ChAPter 9
make the hell of bureaucracy redound to the benefit of his fiction. This is 
the only happiness Kafka could know: linking, fusing together in litera-
ture contesting parts of the structure of his desire—“die ungeheure Welt, 
die ich im Kopfe habe” (KSS, 562) (“the enormous world that I have in 
my head”) (D1, 288).
 Kafka’s last proposals, in the passage from “Forschungen eines hun-
des” to “Josefine,” advance toward a reconciliation of his Schriftsteller-
sein and his Unmusikalisch-Sein by a return to a meditation on music. But 
that immersion does not occur without resistance. “Forschungen eines 
hundes” raises the topic only to conclude with the narrator’s explicit 
refusal to do “the science of music,” to reflect systematically on music, 
musicality (and, in principle) unmusicality; just as in “Josefine,” we real-
ize, the philosophy of music is alienated as a topic by the narrator’s only 
questionable interest in it. In “Forschungen,” the narrator speaks not on 
behalf of a pure reflection on music but instead on behalf of a freedom 
that is nurtured by its refusal—the unheard-of freedom that he terms “an 
ultimate science.” We might call this moment the invocation of “pure 
literature,” literature degree zero, and hence something more than the 
beautiful, enigmatic, but, alas, hybrid thing that “Josefine” is—“hybrid,” 
because it is unremittingly ethical and anthropological in its bias.
iv
It might be fruitful to review our line of argument, extracted from its 
many turnings. “Forschungen eines hundes” is driven by a task, one that 
continues to maintain a hold on the narrator as he reflects: he means to 
recover the origin of his drive to do research, which principally focuses 
on “the science of nourishment.” But this focus is achieved only by dint 
of a fatal turning away from a musical concert, whose substance is his 
more authentic concern. The dog’s development is marred by his sup-
pression of a philosophical reflection on music, musicality, and unmu-
sicality. yet at the end he alleges that this movement, this very turning 
away, is an impetus toward “freedom,” the promise of freedom, which I 
connect, now in Kafka’s case, with the goal of “pure writing.”12
 The dog’s claim does not jibe with what we have been told in the 
story or in Kafka’s account of the emergence of his writing (his exer-
cises in “the science of nourishment”). Accounts in his confessional work 
cloak this emergence in bad faith—a flight from a philosophical mate-
rial that mattered; they are allegories of shock. A trace of that turning 
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presumably survives as a fault in Kafka’s writing, which can therefore 
never be pure: like the dog’s research, his writing is informed by a barely 
suppressed consciousness of indwelling errancy. In the dog’s own words, 
which are suited to his author, dogdom has deviated from “das wahre 
Wort” (KKANII, 456) (“the true word” [KSS, 148]).
 hence, something like the ethical, psychological fault at the outset of 
Kafka’s decision continues to manifest itself as a strain in his writing, a 
strain that he abjures—an ethical, psychological, “anthropological” com-
petence that is ultimately there only for show. Likewise with the dog, it 
is not music but rather the “nature of dogs” (KSS, 160) that, following his 
“innate nature” (KSS, 138), made him run from the study of an original 
traumatic event. hence, all the knowledge the dog can acquire through 
his research is not of the urgent kind, not “traumatic knowledge” but a 
dusky knowledge of the error of his flight.
 Kafka, it would appear, needed to (but did not) come to grips with 
a first cataclysmic separation; he was then captivated by a dream of pure 
writing, but, in the language of the Laurentian hill aperçu, he could 
never dream this dream properly (KSS, 207). henceforth, writing was an 
evasion of a primary task, his dream of freedom a fugitive, his “science” a 
deviation from the start.
 This fear haunted him; his only relief was the memory of what once 
seemed an exalted state. his ecstasy in writing “Das Urteil” (“The Judg-
ment”) was the great warrant for the rightness of indulging an instinct 
for this other freedom, but he lived in the shadow of its loss.
Postscript
Professor Ronald Speirs, one of the editors of this volume, who gener-
ously shaped the opening of this essay (see note 1), has again made a 
remarkable contribution. I will quote in full a letter from him, which 
I consider apposite to my argument; his remarks widen my argument’s 
frame. On January 18, 2010, Professor Speirs wrote,
I would raise a question apropos your closing remark about Das Urteil 
(“The Judgment”). The question is connected with that story or, more 
precisely, with a letter to Milena referring to it. In that letter (August 28, 
1920), Kafka wrote: “Die Übersetzung des Schlußsatzes ist sehr gut. In 
jener geschichte hängt jeder Satz, jedes Wort, jede—wenn’s erlaubt ist—
Musik mit der ‘Angst’ zusammen, damals brach die Wunde zum ersten-
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mal auf in einer langen Nacht . . . ” (BrM, 235) (“The translation of the 
concluding sentence is very good. every sentence, every word, every—if 
I may say so—music in that story is connected with the ‘fear.’ It was 
then, during one long night, that the wound broke open for the first 
time . . . ”) (LM, 173–74).
 The main point here is that Kafka connects writing not with unmu-
sicality but with music. This is at odds with other cited passages in the 
letters to Milena, where he relates writing to unmusicality. My own way 
of dealing with this apparent contradiction is to regard Das Urteil as 
representing a quite exceptional experience of writing in his oeuvre. 
All his own recollections of the process of writing that story describe 
experiences of self-opening and self-abandonment in which the narrator 
moves along “wie in einem gewässer” (KSS, 460) (“as . . . through a body 
of water” [KSS, 197]), as if he were both the fetus being delivered in the 
story and the duct through which it was delivered. This strikes me as 
rather like the dog’s initial response to the music produced by the other 
dogs, of being overwhelmed and transported, especially in the passage 
where he hears the music before it has even entered the dog-performer, 
as if it were a disembodied force finding embodiment and expression in 
this chance agent. If the link is correct, Das Urteil would represent a rare, 
possibly unique example of the kind of writing that was not blighted by 
the reflections on morality, purpose, justification, nourishment or even 
“music” itself but rather something close to the Poésie pure he dreamt 
of (“die erzählung ist mehr gedichtmässig als episch”) (Br, 149) (“the 
story is more poetic than narrative” [L, 126]), in which all parts were 
connected by necessity, nothing joined up mechanically with the aid of 
factitious arrangements [“Konstruktionen” (KSS, 597]).
 So is the dog that refuses the call of the music, closing himself off 
from its power in order to pursue other things, that part of Kafka with 
which the musician in him was in conflict, the self-aware, self-critical, 
analytic and reflective part (that eventually composes the scaffolding of 
the aphorisms to build a systematic tower out of experiences that actually 
resist such treatment and want to find a more proper outlet in the rare 
music of Das Urteil )?
 Professor Speirs’s view of the unique quality of “Das Urteil” is surely 
correct. I also argued this point in my book Lambent Traces:
On the night of September 22, 1912, Franz Kafka wrote his story “The 
Judgment,” which came out of him “wie eine regelrechte geburt” (KSS, 
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491) (“like a regular birth”) (D1, 278). This act of creation struck him as 
an unmistakable sign of his literary destiny. Thereafter, the search of many 
of his characters for the Law, for a home, for artistic fulfillment can be 
understood as a figure for Kafka’s own search to reproduce the ecstasy of 
a single night. [Corngold 2004a, 2]. 
 The originality of Professor Speirs’s comment consists in his con-
necting that ecstasy to the dog’s experience of music so that all of Kafka’s 
writing after “Das Urteil” would seem like a deflection, calling for pun-
ishment. This is an idea implied in Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie” (“In the 
Penal Colony”), when his main character asks of the culprit, “er kennt 
sein eignes Urteil nicht?” (DL, 211) (“he doesn’t know his own judg-
ment?” [KSS, 40]). Professor Speirs is incisive in linking that deflection to 
Kafka’s work on a sort of aphoristic Tower of Babel, an idea supported by 
the dog’s describing “die Musikwissenschaft” (KKANII, 480) (“the science 
of music” [KSS, 160])—and not “die Musik” itself—as a place “wo es 
sich . . . mehr um bloße [also, nicht praktische] Beobachtungen und Sys-
tematisierungen handelt” (KKANII, 480) ([where] . . . it is more a matter 
of pure observations and systematizations” [KSS, 160]). These are direc-
tions that the reader of this volume may be interested in following. 
notes
 1. A lengthy comment on this paper by Professor Ronald Speirs of Birmingham 
University was of inestimable help in formulating this précis of my argument.
 2. See geoffrey hartman’s excellent essay “On Traumatic Knowledge and Lit-
erary Studies” (1995, 537–63). See also the chapter by gerhard Neumann in this 
volume for another analysis of the effects on Kafka’s narratives of an inaccessible 
originary experience that both demands and evades narration.
 3. A title assigned by Brod, true, but a title that we will consider to be a part of 
the story that has come down to us.
 4. Note that this other order is (negatively) marked at the outset even through 
its absence: it is in the laws that dogs obey although “the rules [. . . ] are not those of 
dogdom, indeed, are more truly opposed to it” (KSS, 133). 
 5. The narrative is a sequence of propositions, accompanied by a continual verti-
cal reference, in both a concrete and a figurative sense: the dogs, the dogs’ bodies, are 
themselves often turned upward toward the virtual source of their nourishment. The 
figurative sense of this verticality—figurative, because it is invisible—is this: the en-
tire narrative is oriented toward the (unreadable) narrative of another law: the laws 
of the human world, to which this dog has no access. And so, not unlike The Trial, 
we have here a story of two worlds of law.
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 6. In notes unpublished in his lifetime, Nietzsche wrote of the decadence of 
Wagner’s music as evident in “das Tempo des Affekts.” See Nietzsche. 
 7. My phrase alludes, through modification, to the leading idea in Walter Benja-
min’s incomplete Arcades Project (1999, 462).
 8. The degree of fraternity involved here exceeds anything to be encountered 
in dogdom at the best of times; on closer scrutiny we find the following footnote 
in Professor Levine’s text: “As Corngold notes in his unpublished essay, ‘Kafka and 
the Philosophy of Music; or, Des Kommas Fehl hilft,’ again and again, in Kafka’s 
poetics, the dreamt-of poem is figured as a bodily birth.’ I am grateful to Professor 
Corngold for sharing his very rich and provocative reading of Researches with me” 
(Levine 2005, 18). So I have returned—or, in fact, snatched—this favor.
 9. For a similar account of the centrality of movement in other examples of 
Kafka’s narration, see also chapter 10 in this volume.
 10. An earlier version of part 3 of this chapter was published in Corngold (2004b, 
4–16).
 11. Kafka wrote, “Die erbsünde, das alte Unrecht, das der Mensch begangen hat, 
besteht in dem Vorwurf, den der Mensch macht . . . daß ihm ein Unrecht geschehen 
ist, daß an ihm die erbsünde begangen wurde” (KSS, 856) (“Original sin, the old 
injustice committed by man, consists in the complaint unceasingly made by man 
that he has been the victim of an injustice, the victim of original sin” [Benjamin 
1955, 114]). Benjamin ingeniously sees the complaint as also directed by the son 
against the father for the sin of having produced an heir!
 12. It was alleged by Dora Diamant that Kafka, in Berlin during the winter of 
late 1923, urged her to burn all his extant manuscripts, since they had been written 
under the spell of his Prague family, which was the very essence of unfreedom; only 
writing produced in a condition of freedom might one day be worth saving (Mur-
ray 2004, 371–72).
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Movement has always been a staple of storytelling, especially in narra-
tives involving adventures, conquests, or banishments, pursuits or escapes, 
encounters or withdrawals, ascents or descents, finding or losing the way, 
or myriad combinations of such elements. It has also been associated 
with the experience and procedures of writing, as in the figure of Pega-
sus, who flies between the Muses and the poets, or the motus animi contin-
uus that refuses to let Thomas Mann’s gustav von Aschenbach rest, or the 
scribbling pen from which emerge the journeys undertaken by Uncle 
Toby and the many other figures of wit and fancy who populate Sterne’s 
Tristram Shandy. That Kafka had his own distinctive ways of presenting 
movement in his stories, ways that seem to promise some insight into 
his perplexing imaginings, has not escaped his commentators, though 
the topic deserves to be pursued more extensively.1 This essay will con-
sider movement as a focus of narration, as a motive of narration, and as 
a mode of narration. I shall begin by examining Betrachtung, Kafka’s first 
published collection of prose, in some detail, before going on to consider 
the topic in more general terms.
 As the double meaning of the title suggests, Betrachtung (Contempla-
tion)2 is a set of very short narratives addressed both to the eye and to 
the mind, in which the reader is shown scenes from life and invited to 
reflect on them in company with the (mostly first-person) narrator. One 
has to say “scenes from life” because the descriptions seldom create the 
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illusion of solidity that is the aim of the conventional realist author. We 
are presented rather with imagery that captures a shifting kaleidoscope 
of states of mind.3 In some of them, impressions drawn from nature and 
society predominate, while in others the narrator’s imagination is clearly 
creating a quite distinct world of its own, but in every instance the border 
is permeable or fluctuating. Together they create what Kafka would later 
describe as the “monstrous” (ungeheuer, also meaning “uncanny” or “enor-
mous”) world in his head that it was the task of writing to set free.4 What 
interests me here are the contrasting patterns of movement within and 
between these different spheres of experience, those that are completed 
and those that are not, and what they might tell us about the imagination 
in which movement and stasis feature so prominently and so pervasively.
 The abruptness of the transition from one sphere to another, for 
example, is clearly conveyed in “Der plötzliche Spaziergang” (KAF, 1:19) 
(“The Sudden Walk”). here the narrator-protagonist envisages the pos-
sibility of stepping completely outside the circumscribed world of social 
conformity simply by donning his outdoor coat and announcing that he 
must go for a walk at an hour when, like the rest of the family, he would 
normally be getting ready for bed. The little story is told in a series of 
“if ” clauses (most of them belonging to a single, long, breathless sentence 
with a rising rhythm) which are hypothetical in sense but so specific and 
vivid in their details that the description reads like an account of a past 
event (or various such incidents) now being retold as if the events were 
happening in the present. The use of the indicative rather than the sub-
junctive is calculated to make it seem plausible that what is conjectured 
can indeed be realized. The narrator’s increasingly agitated suppositions, 
carried on a surge of emotion, culminate in a moment of release, indeed 
almost of apotheosis, in which the body he is speaking about is suddenly 
filled with a strange form of physical movement that matches the flow of 
his thought and feelings:
Wenn man sich auf der gasse wiederfindet, mit gliedern, die diese 
schon unerwartete Freiheit, die man ihnen verschafft hat, mit besonderer 
Beweglichkeit beantworten, wenn man durch diesen einen entschluß 
alle entschlußfähigkeit in sich gesammelt fühlt, wenn man mit größerer 
als der gewöhnlichen Bedeutung erkennt, daß man ja mehr Kraft als 
Bedürfnis hat, die schnellste Veränderung leicht zu bewirken und zu 
ertragen, und wenn man so die langen gassen hinläuft,—dann ist man 
für diesen Abend gänzlich aus seiner Familie ausgetreten, die ins Wesen-
lose abschwenkt, während man selbst, ganz fest, schwarz vor Umrissen-
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heit, hinten die Schenkel schlagend, sich zu seiner wahren gestalt erhebt. 
(KAF, 1:19–20)
(When you come to yourself again on the street, with limbs that respond 
with particular mobility to the quite unexpected freedom you have given 
them, when you feel that your whole ability to make decisions has been 
concentrated by this one decision, when you recognize with greater sig-
nificance than usual that your strength to effect and endure even the 
most rapid change with ease is greater than your need to do so, and 
when you walk in this manner down the long streets—then, for that 
evening, you have stepped out of your family entirely, which slips off into 
insubstantiality, while you, firm, silhouetted in black, slapping your flanks 
behind you, rise up to assume your true shape.)
These last few phrases suggest that the unremarkable, petty-bourgeois 
protagonist is transformed at this moment of exaltation or elevation 
(Erhebung is a key term for Kafka) into the figure of a rider on a horse, or 
even a fusion of the two. This strange notion of human-animal hybrid-
ism re-appears elsewhere in Betrachtung in the “Wish to Become a Red 
Indian,” and it was later to recur in the name of Roßmann, the protago-
nist of The Man Who Disappeared,5 and later still in the figure of the new 
lawyer, Dr. Bucephalus, formerly the warhorse of Alexander the great 
(but now a student of the law), whose equine origins are betrayed to the 
knowledgeable eye by the curious way he walks up a flight of steps.6 In 
“The Sudden Walk,” however, the suggestion is developed no further, 
as the narrator-protagonist (denoted only by the impersonal pronoun 
“man”) is imagined as using his newfound resolve merely to call on a 
friend at this late hour and to ask after his health. Taken at face value, the 
story seems to be one of the most optimistic in the collection; it implies 
that equilibrium can be achieved between the different forces pulling on 
the self so that it would be possible to remain a member of society, albeit 
an eccentric one, while “rising up” (sich erheben) in one’s hybrid “true 
shape” and drawing energy and confidence from an experience of the 
self that places it wholly outside the control of “insubstantial” (wesenlos) 
family life. On the other hand, the narrator may actually be deluding 
himself that his ability to make decisions will be strengthened and con-
firmed simply by visiting a friend, even at this late hour. For by making 
this visit he could equally well be withdrawing again into the security of 
familiar social relationships rather than facing the challenges presented by 
the new dimension of the self that has just opened up to him. Most of 
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the other stories in the collection do not support the optimistic conclu-
sion of “The Sudden Walk.”
 Indeed, the very next story, entitled “entschlüsse” (“Decisions”), 
which begins by asserting that it must be possible to “raise oneself up” 
(sich erheben) out of a state of misery (“Aus einem elenden Zustand” 
[KAF, 1:20]) through the determined use of will-power, proceeds, via an 
admission of the predictable failure of any such undertaking, to the desire 
for withdrawal into a state of complete isolation and immobility. The 
story unfolds as a series of conjectures about what would follow from a 
given starting point. In this case the narrating self appears to be alone at 
the outset (rather than in the midst of a family), and his ambition is not 
to “step outside the family completely” but rather to move, both literally 
and emotionally, into contact with others:
Ich reiße mich vom Sessel los, umlaufe den Tisch, mache Kopf und 
hals beweglich, bringe Feuer in die Augen, spanne die Muskeln um sie 
herum. Arbeite jedem gefühl entgegen, begrüße A. stürmisch, wenn er 
jetzt kommen wird, dulde B. freundlich in meinem Zimmer, ziehe bei 
C. alles, was gesagt wird, trotz Schmerz und Mühe mit langen Zügen in 
mich hinein. (KAF, 1:20)
(I tear myself out of my armchair, run around the table, make head and 
neck mobile, put fire into my eyes, tensing the muscles around them. I 
make efforts to go out to meet every feeling halfway, if A. comes I greet 
him with stormy enthusiasm, I tolerate B. amicably in my room, and, 
when C. is present, I draw everything that is said into myself in long 
draughts, despite all the pain and effort.)
The narrator-protagonist cannot imagine himself making such a move 
successfully, however, as he is convinced that he is bound to make some 
mistake, that the whole enterprise will stocken (“come to a standstill”), 
compelling him to “go back around the circle.” Faced with this dismal 
prospect, his preference is for immobility. he decides that he should “als 
schwere Masse sich verhalten” (“behave as a heavy mass”) and, even if 
he were to feel himself being fortgeblasen (“blown away”), he should not 
allow himself to be tempted into taking even “a single unnecessary step” 
or to engage in any emotional contact with others. In short, his aim is 
“was vom Leben als gespenst noch übrig ist, mit eigener hand nieder-
drücken, d.h., die letzte grabmäßige Ruhe noch vermehren und nichts 
außer ihr mehr bestehen lassen” (KAF, 1:20) (“to suppress with my own 
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hand all that remains of life as a ghost, to increase the ultimate, grave-like 
rest and permit nothing else to exist”). here the optimistic belief that an 
“elevating,” truer form of movement could be attained as an alternative 
to the static routines of social existence is challenged by the pessimistic 
view that even entry into social intercourse may not be achievable by an 
effort of the will because the self feels itself to be fundamentally inert 
and alienated from all other selves. The condition of being “miserable” 
or more precisely elend (with the etymological root sense of being “out 
of the land” or “exiled”) seems to entail inescapable stasis and loneliness 
in the midst of life. An explanation for this bleak conviction is perhaps 
to be found in the description of everyday existence as “das Leben als 
gespenst” (“life as a ghost”). Something similar was suggested in “The 
Sudden Walk” by the notion that the family would slip away “ins Wesen-
lose” (“into insubstantiality”) at the moment of the self ’s elevation to a 
truer state of being. If, at bottom, the self perceives life in society to be 
spectral, no more than a dead simulacrum of life, then it is no wonder 
that the self cannot be forced by the will to enter successfully into social 
interaction. 
 Taking these two stories together, the rational will appears to be inef-
fective and condemned to relapse into stasis, whereas the “entschlußfähig-
keit” (“capacity to make decisions”) that seems to be concentrated by a 
sudden, apparently irrational impulse can lead to the release of an unfa-
miliar kind of dynamism. It is possible, however, that the sensation of 
concentrated Entschlußfähigkeit is merely epiphenomenal, the reflection 
in consciousness of an impulse that neither originates nor operates in 
the conscious part of the self.7 Just as the rising gallop of the self ’s “true 
shape” was not allowed to have the last word in “The Sudden Walk,” so 
the resolve of the self in “Decisions” to withdraw into utter, insensate 
immobility is subject to ironic relativization by the very last sentence of 
the story: “eine charakteristische Bewegung eines solchen Zustandes ist 
das hinfahren des kleinen Fingers über die Augenbrauen” (KAF, 1:20) 
(“A characteristic movement of such a condition is the passing of the 
little finger over the eyebrows”). No matter how socially alienated and 
static the mind of the narrator may perceive the self to be, this bodily 
gesture tells a rather different story. The tiny movement of the little fin-
ger suggests both that the protagonist’s behavior is still constrained by 
social awareness, as he modestly conceals from others his intense feel-
ings of despair and anomie, and that the body is still subject to dynamic 
impulses, no matter how “ghostly” the conscious mind may declare a life 
in the company of others to be. The attempt to attain complete immo-
bility thus appears to be no more than the equally pointless obverse of 
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inauthentic social interaction, a form of sulking, to put it harshly. Rest, it 
appears, is not to be found in this life, or at least not through any refusal 
to participate in life.
 To the mind of the narrator of “Das gassenfenster” (KAF, 1:29–30) 
(“The Window onto the Street”), the complete isolation and immobility 
allegedly desired by the protagonist of “Decisions” cannot even be con-
ceived to be a sustainable mode of being. he imagines that anyone living 
alone (verlassen has the sense of “abandoned” or “desolate”) would be 
bound to feel the need for human contact occasionally and an arm—any 
arm (“einen beliebigen Arm”)—to hold on to. even the most isolated 
of individuals, he insists, could not live for long without a window onto 
the street. even if such a person is not actually seeking anything but 
simply goes to the window as a tired man whose eyes go up and down 
between the sky and the public, indeed even if he leans his head back 
a little because he simply “doesn’t want to” look down at the street he 
will nevertheless be subject to an impersonal force that does not permit 
him to remain in static isolation: “so reißen ihn doch unten die Pferde 
mit in ihr gefolge von Wagen und Lärm und damit endlich der men-
schlichen eintracht zu” (KAF, 1:30) (“then, despite all his efforts, the 
horses down below will tear him into their retinue of carriages and din, 
and thus finally pull him towards oneness with humanity”). The pro-
tagonist’s need for human support is prompted by awareness of the con-
stant changes—movements—in his environment: “die Veränderungen der 
Tages zeit, der Witterung, der Berufsverhältnisse und dergleichen” (KAF, 
1:29) (“changes in the time of day, the weather, working conditions and 
such like”). Surrounded by a restless world, his responsive gaze betrays his 
own restlessness. At the same time his tiredness suggests that it demands 
great effort to endure the conflicting pulls between a life of isolation on 
the one hand and the need for contact on the other, between the life 
of the public on the street and the view up toward the Himmel (“which 
could denote heaven or simply the sky”). The ironic twist at the end of 
this story consists in the fact that, whether because the isolated, hesitant 
individual feels the need for something to hold onto in a restless world 
or because he is simply exhausted by living with his internal tensions, 
he will ultimately be unable to resist the violent pull (“reißen”) of the 
carriage horses towards oneness or harmony (Eintracht) with humanity. 
given this individual’s lack of oneness with even his own life (a condi-
tion he shares with Kafka),8 however, it seems unlikely that the supposed 
Eintracht will prove to be anything more than a mirage.
 By contrast, far from having to be “torn” into society willy-nilly by 
the irresistible pull of imagined human Eintracht, the narrator-protagonist 
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of “entlarvung eines Bauernfängers” (KAF, 1:17–19) (“The Unmasking 
of a Confidence Trickster”) is determined to follow an invitation to join 
a social gathering (Gesellschaft)9 in a “herrschaftlichen hause” (KAF, 1:17) 
(“a well-to-do house”—the adjective herrschaftlich connotes membership 
of the ruling class). At the beginning of the story, however, it is already 
ten o’clock in the evening and he is still standing in the street outside 
the door of the house he wishes to enter. his progress into society has 
been delayed and is now blocked by a strange companion he first met 
soon after arriving in town and who, having re-appeared unexpectedly 
earlier that evening, has “dragged” the protagonist through the streets for 
the past two hours. During a long pause in which they face each other in 
silence, the narrator-protagonist of this story gradually comes to resemble 
the narrator of “The Window onto the Street” as more and more is 
revealed about his relation to the stranger/acquaintance. While insisting 
that he was invited to join the company upstairs and not to stand out-
side the door looking past the ears of his Gegenüber (“opponent/inter-
locutor”), the protagonist appears unable to move any farther—“als seien 
wir zu einem langen Aufenthalt auf diesem Fleck entschlossen” (KAF, 
1:17) (“as if we had decided to stay on this spot for a long time”). As 
they stand there, seemingly joined by mutual resolve, the protagonist and 
the stranger are shrouded in a shared silence in which everything in the 
vicinity seems to participate:
Dabei nahmen an diesem Schweigen gleich die häuser ringsherum ihren 
Anteil, und das Dunkel über ihnen bis zu den Sternen. Und die Schritte 
unsichtbarer Spaziergänger, deren Wege zu erraten man nicht Lust hatte, 
der Wind, der immer wieder an die gegenüberliegende Straßenseite sich 
drückte, ein grammophon, das gegen die geschlossenen Fenster irgend-
eines Zimmers sang,—sie ließen aus diesem Schweigen sich hören, als sei 
es ihr eigentum seit jeher und für immer. (KAF, 1:17)
(As we stood there, the houses around us and the darkness above them 
right up to the stars shared in this silence. And the steps of invisible 
pedestrians, whose ways one had no desire to guess, the wind that repeat-
edly pressed against the other side of the street, a gramophone that sang 
against the closed windows of some room or other—these things let 
themselves be heard from out of this silence, as if it always had been and 
forever would remain their property.)
As he stands facing this man, the protagonist’s experience of the world as 
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a dark place of profound silence in which every sound and sight speaks 
of the isolation of all things and all people, each in motion, resembles far 
too closely that of the man behind the “window onto the street” for us to 
accept readily his protestation that his proper place is in the company of 
those who are masters in society (an implication of the “herrschaftlichen 
hause”). When his opponent/partner finally steps aside with a smile to 
permit him to proceed, the protagonist professes shame at his failure to 
have “recognized” the man for what he allegedly is, namely a confidence 
trickster. Shame, an important emotion in Kafka’s work,10 attests both to 
the social conditioning that outlaws certain actions and to the individu-
al’s attraction to those very things that have been declared taboo. In this 
instance, the feelings connoted by the dark silence on the street are likely 
to be part of the taboo area from which the protagonist tries to distance 
himself. he does so by claiming to feel ashamed of his failure to “recog-
nize” this man as a confidence trickster rather than by admitting to the 
deeper shame of having been enveloped by an experience of alienation 
from the world so profound that it casts doubt on any notion of a har-
monious life in society (“menschliche eintracht”). even as he insists that 
the man is nothing but a trickster, the protagonist confesses to having felt 
an instinctive affinity for such figures ever since he arrived in town:
Ich verstand sie doch so gut, sie waren ja meine ersten städtischen 
Be kannten in den kleinen Wirtshäusern gewesen, und ich verdankte 
ihnen den ersten Anblick einer Unnachgiebigkeit, die ich mir jetzt so 
wenig von der erde wegdenken konnte, daß ich sie schon in mir zu 
fühlen begann. (KAF, 1:18)
(I understood them so well, they were after all my first acquaintances in 
the little pubs in the town, and I had them to thank for my first sight of 
a stubborn refusal to yield that I now felt so strongly to be part of the 
world that I was already beginning to feel it within myself.)
he confesses that the gaze of these figures is always convincing and that 
part of their technique of preventing people from reaching their goal 
is to offer instead “eine Wohnung in ihrer eigenen Brust” (a dwelling 
in their own breast). If one’s feelings rebelled against such an approach, 
the figures would treat the resistance as an “Umarmung, in die sie sich 
warfen, das gesicht voran” (KAF, 1:18) (“an embrace into which they 
would pitch themselves head first”). All of this testifies to the power of 
attraction the stranger exercises over the protagonist, illuminating both 
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the source of his shame and his need to displace the feeling. Only by 
patronizing the man, by saying “erkannt!” (“Found out!”) and patting 
him on the shoulder, can the protagonist free himself from the confron-
tation and rush up the stairs to join the party, thereby rescuing his vision 
of a life devoted to upward movement in society. But as someone who 
recognizes that the loyal expressions on the faces of the waiting servants 
are “groundless,” it is clear that he will never in fact be able to integrate 
himself securely into society. having once been brought to a standstill in 
the dark silence reaching up to the stars, he is unlikely ever to forget that 
alienating experience of universal isolation and unconnected motion in 
the world.
 That a life based on social success is not the prize envisaged by the 
protagonist in the “Unmasking of a Confidence Trickster” is confirmed 
by other stories in Betrachtung. In the reflection “Zum Nachdenken für 
herrenreiter” (KAF, 1:28–29) (“Something for Jockeys to Think About”), 
for example, coming first in a horse race simply means a brief moment 
of exultation followed by a string of negative consequences that induce 
regret: the envy of one’s opponents creates a painful contrast between the 
ride through the narrow railings to the winners’ enclosure and the open-
ness of the course glimpsed during the race; the friends who have backed 
the winner are more interested in their winnings than in him, while 
those who did not back him, for fear of losing, resent the fact that he 
won; the losers dismiss the winner’s success and look forward to the next 
race, while the ladies find the winner ridiculous because he doesn’t know 
how to handle the fuss that is made of him; to cap it all, at the end of the 
race it starts to rain. In other words, if life is regarded as a circular race 
to a finish line, the isolated individual will have progressed no further 
toward any worthwhile goal by the end of life’s journey.
 In “Der Nachhauseweg” (KAF, 1:25) (“The Journey home”), events 
take a similarly dispiriting turn as the narrator recounts his changing 
feelings while walking home after an apparently successful day at work. 
At first, filled with pride in his achievements, he “marches” in step with 
the world around him: “Mein Tempo ist das Tempo dieser gassen seite, 
dieser gasse, dieses Viertels” (“My tempo is the tempo of this side of 
the street, of this street, this quarter”). Like some embodiment of Scho-
penhauer’s universal Will, he feels responsible for all the energy being 
expended throughout the world, for every knock on a door or table, for 
all toasts, and for lovers everywhere, in beds, on scaffolding, against walls 
in dark alleys, or on the ottomans of brothels. On stepping into his pri-
vate room, however, the man becomes pensive for no identifiable reason. 
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It does not help to throw open the window and to hear music (the sym-
bol, incidentally, of the never-resting universal Will in Schopenhauer’s 
thought) still being played in a garden somewhere. A socially successful 
life, it appears, can seem satisfactory for as long as the individual keeps 
on the move, imagining himself to be in step with the world, but as 
soon as he is alone and at a standstill, the mood changes abruptly from 
enthusiasm to melancholy. The public world that “tore” the protagonist 
of “Window onto the Street” out of his isolation and toward imagined 
“human harmony” proves ultimately to disappoint even someone who 
has achieved success in social and commercial life. Neither in lonely stasis 
nor in social progress, it seems, can the characters of Betrachtung find rest. 
The final flinging-open of the window suggests an agitation of the spirit 
that can as little find an adequate outlet in the competitive business of 
normal life as it can derive consolation from music as the aesthetic apo-
theosis and overcoming of movement.11
 In another story with a similar theme, entitled “Der Kaufmann” (KAF, 
1:22–24) (“The Shopkeeper”), where the narrator-protagonist is denied 
even temporary success in the world of commerce, this kind of inner 
restlessness breaks out much more powerfully. The man’s business is small 
and brings him nothing but worry, but as he shuts up shop to go home, 
his troublesome work suddenly appears in a new light, as an activity that 
has at least kept at bay for a few hours the inner Aufregung (“agitation”) 
that had been trying to claim his attention since the morning:
Wenn nun am Abend eines Werktages das geschäft gesperrt wird und ich 
plötzlich Stunden vor mir sehe, in denen ich für die ununterbrochenen 
Bedürfnisse meines geschäftes nichts werde arbeiten können, dann wirft 
sich meine am Morgen weit vorausgeschickte Aufregung in mich, wie 
eine zurückkehrende Flut, hält es aber in mir nicht aus und ohne Ziel 
reißt sie mich mit. (KAF, 1:22)
(Now, as my business is locked up at the end of the working day and I 
suddenly see before me hours in which I shall not be able to work for 
the unceasing needs of my business, the agitation that I had sent out far 
ahead of me in the morning hurls itself back into me like a returning 
tide, but will not be contained within me and, although lacking a goal, 
tears me away with it.)
As he is unable or unwilling to make use of the impulse, the protagonist’s 
barely suppressed agitation has to express itself in other ways during his 
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return home so that he walks “wie auf Wellen” (“as if on waves”),12 his 
fingers shake, and he runs his hand over the hair of the children he meets 
coming toward him. When he is eventually alone and motionless in the 
elevator that will carry him up to his flat (or, more likely, room within 
a flat), he looks into the mirror and his agitation finds a new outlet as 
he begins to speak to some unidentified figures whom he sends out into 
the world on invisible wings, telling them at least to enjoy the constantly 
changing spectacle of movement the world provides, the feelings aroused 
by such sights, and the opportunities for adventure:
Doch genießet die Aussicht des Fensters, wenn die Prozessionen aus allen 
drei Straßen kommen, einander nicht ausweichen, durcheinandergehn 
und zwischen ihren letzten Reihen den freien Platz wieder entstehen las-
sen. Winket mit den Tüchern, seid entsetzt, seid gerührt, lobet die schöne 
Dame, die vorüberfährt. (KAF, 1:23)
(But enjoy the view from the window as all the processions coming 
out of all three streets refuse to give way to one another, weave through 
one another, and then allow the empty square to re-appear in the gaps 
between the last rows. Wave with your handkerchiefs, be horrified, be 
touched, praise the fair lady riding past.)
The pleasurable movements and actions welling up in the imagination 
of the shopkeeper as he stands alone in the elevator are as anarchic as 
the agitation that feeds them, and they contrast strongly with the desper-
ate, goal-directed haste of the man determined to escape the “confidence 
trickster” in order to join the party on the upper story of the “well-to-do 
house.” As soon as the lift stops on his floor, however, the little shop-
keeper’s excited visions give way once more to quotidian routine (and 
the stasis awaiting him at home) as he rings the door-bell and says good 
evening to the maid who opens the door for him.
 Considered in relation to other stories in Betrachtung, the impulse 
experienced as agitation or excitement by the shopkeeper appears to 
intimate his subjection to a desire for some utterly free and undirected 
form of movement that may be the source of, but could never find ade-
quate expression in, the patterns of movement that pervade everyday life, 
whether in the diurnal cycle of activity and rest, the pursuit of particular 
goals, the desire to progress up the social hierarchy, or the general con-
cept of life as a predictable journey from birth to death. Constrained 
within a rationally understood and ordered life, the desire felt—and 
sPeirs, “the dynAmiCs of nArrAtion”  207
feared—by the little shopkeeper can only be experienced as disruptive 
agitation. That impulse finds its most unconstrained expression in one of 
the shortest texts of Betrachtung, entitled “Wunsch, Indianer zu werden” 
(KAF, 1:30) (“Wish to Become a Red Indian”). It runs like this:
Wenn man doch ein Indianer wäre, gleich bereit, und auf dem rennenden 
Pferde, schief in der Luft, immer wieder kurz erzitterte über dem zittern-
den Boden, bis man die Sporen ließ, denn es gab keine Sporen, bis man 
die Zügel wegwarf, denn es gab keine Zügel, und kaum das Land vor 
sich als glattgemähte heide sah, schon ohne Pferdehals und Pferdekopf. 
(KAF, 1:30)
(If only one were a Red Indian, ready straight away, and on the galloping 
horse, leaning forward in the air, trembling briefly and repeatedly above 
the trembling ground, until one let go the spurs, for there were no spurs, 
until one threw away the reins, for there were no reins, and hardly saw 
the land ahead any more as a smooth-mown heath, already without the 
neck and head of the horse.)
As the narrator articulates this wish, he transforms himself verbally into 
something that approximates to an image of pure movement, more like 
an arrow flying through the air than like an Indian on horseback, as all 
the elements of riding disappear one after the other—spurs, reins, the 
neck and head of the horse, and even the land ahead of him. The story 
breaks off without telling us what would happen if that transformation 
were to be completed and self and movement were to become one. But 
perhaps then nothing more would happen. Perhaps being able to wish 
that wish would mean the end of all wishing to reach any goal. Perhaps, 
in other words, the rider would have achieved that paradoxical condition 
of rest in movement once identified by Zeno and jotted down by Kafka 
in one of his later notebooks: “Der fliegende Pfeil ruht” (KAF, 9:104) 
(“The flying arrow is at rest”).13 In comparison with such oneness of 
movement and rest, the alternation of agitation and stasis, or the sense of 
moving and getting nowhere that is experienced in everyday life, could 
only ever represent a poor copy of an ideal coincidentia oppositorum. But 
the story leaves us in doubt about whether the wish can even be wished. 
The notion of riding without reins or horse or the ground below negates 
everything we understand about riding. The images drawn from life and 
the use to which the narrative imagination wants to put them are funda-
mentally dissonant; the verbal vehicle cannot support the tenor. If such a 
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thing as pure movement (that is simultaneously pure rest) exists, it cannot 
be narrated, since words are saturated with the things of this world, and 
the things of this world do not behave like that. As it breaks off in mid-
sentence, the little wish-cum-story leaves the reader hovering, as it were, 
in mid-air. We cannot decide whether to see or feel in the conundrum of 
the horseless, groundless ride an intuited mode of extraordinary move-
ment that demands to be communicated via the negation of the verbal 
images that allow us to share the intuition or whether the paradoxes 
implicitly concede the absurdity and hence the failure of any wish for 
another, “higher” mode of experience. In another context, Kafka con-
cluded that a similar wish (to conceive of the world as both weighty 
and weightless at one and the same time) could not be wished, since it 
proved, on reflection, not to be a wish but rather a “Verteidigung, eine 
Verbürgerlichung des Nichts” (KAF, 11:180) (“a defense, an attempt to 
populate and domesticate nothingness”) with the help of images created 
from the words with which we attempt to master the world. The single, 
breathless, unfinished sentence of the “Wish to Become a Red Indian,” 
by contrast, at least leaves two possibilities open: either that the wish 
does indeed adumbrate the presence of some transcendent energy in the 
person making the wish, an energy that defies all attempts at verbal con-
tainment or logical comprehension, or that the story expresses a deluded 
attempt to escape the constraints on all forms of movement, physical 
or mental, imposed by life in this world and the language by which we 
organize our lives.
 One of Kafka’s chief problems as a story-teller was to devise means 
of expressing and doing justice to these contrary views or experiences 
of life, each related to a different form of movement: the familiar, earth-
bound life that is subject to social norms and the laws of nature and 
verbal order on the one hand, and, on the other, a sudden, extraordinary 
eruption of energy that is imagined to be capable of raising the self out 
of and beyond the confines of such controlled and regular patterns of 
activity and thought. Most of the stories in Betrachtung fail to achieve 
a balance between these conflicting experiences because they tend to 
reduce the sense of unconstrained movement, such as that envisaged in 
“Wish to Become a Red Indian,” to the status of a brief fantasy of escape 
from the routines of normality to which the protagonist must return 
and submit in the end. What Kafka was feeling his way toward from 
the outset was a form of narration in which the abnormal emerged as 
a form of experienced reality in its own right, a reality that asserts a 
claim to validity that contradicts but cannot simply be relativized by the 
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claims of rationality and order. A few of these early stories do point to 
Kafka’s later narrative method by asserting more boldly the extraordinary 
dimension of experience as precisely that, as something that escapes the 
control of all norms of understanding and behavior. One might say that 
in these more daring experiments Kafka allows the centrifugal force of 
an intuited, ungovernable dimension of reality to challenge successfully 
the centripetal, controlling force exerted by reason. There may therefore 
have been programmatic intent in his decision to open and close the col-
lection with two of these radical experiments.
 In “Kinder auf der Landstraße” (KAF, 1:13–16) (“Children on the 
Country Road”) with which Betrachtung opens, the narrator-protagonist, 
a child at the time of the events, is introduced seated and at rest after an 
afternoon spent playing on a swing that hangs between two trees in his 
parents’ garden. he is listening to the wagons passing along the road out-
side the garden fence and sometimes glimpsing them through gaps in the 
foliage as it is moves weakly, presumably blown by the wind. The swing 
(Schaukel) brings into focus a form of movement (hovering or oscillating) 
that will recur not just in this little story but again and again throughout 
Kafka’s oeuvre.14 The child’s experiences represent the meeting place of 
a sense of orderly routine governed by parental authority and a general-
ized, disorienting dynamism to which he succumbs by stages:
Dann flogen Vögel wie sprühend auf, ich folgte ihnen mit den Blicken, 
sah, wie sie in einem Atemzug stiegen, bis ich nicht mehr glaubte, daß 
sie stiegen, sondern, daß ich falle, und fest mich an den Seilen haltend, 
aus Schwäche ein wenig zu schaukeln anfing. Bald schaukelte ich stärker, 
als die Luft schon kühler wehte und statt der fliegenden Vögel zitternde 
Sterne erschienen. (KAF, 1:13)
(Then birds flew up as if in a spray, I followed them with my gaze, saw 
how they rose in an intake of breath until I no longer believed that they 
were climbing but rather that I was falling, and, out of weakness, hold-
ing on firmly to the ropes, I began to swing a little. Soon I was swinging 
more strongly, as the breeze turned cooler and trembling stars appeared 
in place of the flying birds.)
The precarious balance between the opposing tendencies of order and 
disruption, rest and movement, is undone progressively as the tired child 
sits over an evening meal: the curtains are swelled like sails by the warm 
wind, passers-by speak to him through the open window, and finally 
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someone jumps over the window ledge to report that “the others” are 
waiting outside, at which point the child gets up with a sigh and runs out 
of the house. Once he has joined the others, a group of children appar-
ently outside the laws not just of bed-time but of rationally graspable 
experience, he feels liberated:
Wir durchstießen den Abend mit dem Kopf. es gab keine Tages- und 
keine Nachtzeit. Bald rieben sich unsere Westenknöpfe aneinander wie 
Zähne, bald liefen wir in gleichbleibender entfernung, Feuer im Mund, 
wie Tiere in den Tropen. Wie Kürassiere in alten Kriegen, stampfend und 
hoch in der Luft, trieben wir einander die kurze gasse hinunter und mit 
diesem Anlauf in den Beinen die Landstraße weiter hinauf. . . .
 einer schrie einen indianischen Kriegsruf heraus, wir bekamen in 
die Beine einen galopp wie niemals, bei den Sprüngen hob uns in den 
hüften der Wind. Nichts hätte uns aufhalten können; wir waren so im 
Laufe, daß wir selbst beim Überholen die Arme verschränken und ruhig 
uns umsehen konnten. (KAF, 1:14)
(We broke through the evening with our heads. There was no day-time 
and night-time. Sometimes our waistcoat buttons rubbed against each 
other like teeth, at others we ran at a steady distance from one another, 
fire in our mouths, like animals in the tropics. Like cavalry in old wars, 
stamping and high in the air, we drove each other down the short lane 
and with this run-up in our legs chased each other farther up the coun-
try road. . . . 
 One of us shouted out an Indian war-cry, we felt a gallop in our legs 
like never before, as we jumped the wind lifted us by the hips. Nothing 
could have stopped us, we were so at one with our running that even 
as we overtook one another we could fold our arms and look around 
calmly.)
Such moments of elated and elevating dynamism (recalling the state of 
oneness with sheer movement imagined in “Wish to Become a Red 
Indian”) are interspersed with others where the child is so overcome with 
tiredness that he has to lie down in a ditch to sleep, a bodily reminder of 
the sphere of rational, social, and natural order from which he has not yet 
quite escaped. Indeed, toward the end of the story the child seems about 
to return home to bed, for he leaves the other children and heads back 
toward the village before suddenly striking off alone at the next cross-
roads, across the fields and into the woods, with the aim of reaching the 
town in the south where no one sleeps, as all who live there are “fools.” 
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Such a place would be one of unending movement but also one where 
movement is indistinguishable from rest, since the “fools” who live there 
never become tired.
 The closing story of the collection, entitled “Unglücklichsein” (KAF, 
1:31–36) (“Being Unhappy”) offers no such utopian prospect of per-
petual motion in perpetual rest, although it too uses the intrusion of 
an unusual form of movement to create a robust challenge to the con-
ventional order of things. here again, it is the figure of a child who, by 
trespassing across the threshold between the familiar and the abnormal, 
points to a way out of the confines of the conventional order maintained 
by rational consensus. In this case, however, the narrator-protagonist is 
not himself a child but an adult who receives an unexpected visit from 
a strange child that he immediately takes to be a ghost. At the begin-
ning of the story the protagonist is in that condition of static agitation to 
which other figures in the collection have been subject. he runs around 
his room as if on an endless race-track, repulsed as much by the world 
beyond his window as by the image of himself reflected back from a 
mirror on the opposite wall of the room. As neither the outside world 
nor the self present an acceptable goal for his restless energy, the narrator 
seeks relief from the pent-up frustration within him by at least emitting 
a scream, the acoustic equivalent of the pure movement envisaged in 
“Wish to Become a Red Indian”:
. . . und aufschrie, um nur den Schrei zu hören, dem nichts antwortet 
und dem auch nichts die Kraft des Schreiens nimmt, der also aufsteigt, 
ohne gegengewicht, und nicht aufhören kann, selbst wenn er verstummt. 
(KAF, 1:31)
( . . . and screamed, just so that I could hear the scream to which nothing 
responds and from which nothing takes away the force of the screaming, 
and so just rises, without a counterweight, and cannot stop, even when 
it falls silent.)
At that point, as if in response, an abnormal form of movement occurs 
as a door suddenly opens in the wall separating the protagonist’s private 
room from the dark communal corridor beyond:
. . . da öffnete sich aus der Wand heraus die Tür, so eilig, weil doch eile 
nötig war und selbst die Wagenpferde unten auf dem Pflaster, wie wildge-
wordene Pferde in der Schlacht, die gurgeln preisgegeben, sich erhoben. 
(KAF, 1:31)
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( . . . then the door opened out of the wall so quickly, because after 
all speed was needed and even the carriage horses down on the street 
reared up, exposing their throats, like horses that had gone wild during 
a battle.)
This portentous moment, echoing the transformation of the protagonist 
of “A Sudden Walk” as he rises (sich erheben) to assume his “true form,” 
or the rearing cavalry imitated by the children charging along the coun-
try road, heralds the appearance of the ghost-child who darts (fuhr) out 
of the dark corridor and comes to rest standing on his toes “auf einem 
unmerklich schaukelnden Fußbodenbalken” (“on a floorboard that was 
rocking almost imperceptibly”), in an echo, perhaps, of the child rock-
ing on its Schaukel in the opening story of the collection.15 As the child 
stands there, it “ließ den Luftzug von draußen um die gelenke der Füße 
streichen, auch den hals, auch die Schläfen entlang” (KAF, 1:31) (“let 
the draught from outside play around his ankles, and over his neck and 
his temples”), thereby foreshadowing a motif from a later story, namely 
the motif of the Luftzug (“draught or movement of air”) that will for-
ever cool the ankles of the tamed ape Rotpeter as it blows through the 
tiny gap in the horizon that separates his new, socialized, and self-aware 
life from the pre-conscious existence with “Freiheit nach allen Seiten” 
(“freedom on all sides”) (KSS, 79) that he had once known as a wild 
young ape. As the protagonist prepares to greet this unexpected visitor, 
he tries to expel his pent-up agitation (“my eyelashes trembled in my 
face”), but the child recognizes his lack of calm (Ruhe) unerringly. That 
no proper meeting between the host and his guest can take place (they 
address each other throughout with the formal Sie, although one of them 
is a child) is pre-determined by the man’s designation of the child from 
the outset as a ghost. On the one hand, although he claims not to believe 
in ghosts, this is the only category to which he can assign the intruding 
figure; on the other hand, he claims to have been waiting for the visit 
from the child for a long time: “Ich bin ja so froh, daß Sie endlich hier 
sind. Ich sage ‘endlich,’ weil es schon so spät ist. es ist mir unbegreiflich, 
warum Sie so spät gekommen sind” (KAF, 1:33) (“I’m glad you’re here 
at last. I say ‘at last,’ because it is already so late. It is incomprehensible 
to me that you have come so late”). he recognizes that he and the child 
share a common identity: “Ihre Natur ist meine” (“your nature is mine”), 
but it is the child who points out how limited is their ability to draw 
close to one another: “So nah, als Ihnen ein fremder Mensch entge-
genkommen kann, bin ich Ihnen schon von Natur aus” (KAF, 1:33–34) 
(“By nature I am as close to you as any stranger can get to you”). The 
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encounter of these mutually alienated beings is marked by irritation and 
ends with the protagonist’s departure from the room. When he returns 
to the empty room, however, he feels verlassen (“lonely, abandoned,” like 
the protagonist of “Window onto the Street”). Finally he seeks refuge in 
sleep, presumably because, like so many of these early protagonists, he is 
exhausted by the conflict he has just experienced between the world of 
familiar routine and the dark world beyond his room that he glimpsed 
beyond the door created by the entry of the child-ghost, a figure he both 
fears and wishes to call his own. Thus, the story that closes Betrachtung 
appears to create a pessimistic counterpoint to the optimistic story with 
which the collection opened. Whereas the first protagonist, still a child, 
leaves the highway and sets out across open country to find the city in 
the south where “fools” never sleep, the last protagonist, too little of a 
“fool” to be able to communicate with the child “ghost” who comes 
to visit him in a dark hour of agitation, is left feeling verlassen (“lonely, 
abandoned”), with only sleep to provide perhaps some respite from the 
conflict brought to a head by the visit.
 In these early stories, Kafka had already moved into what he was later 
to call a Grenzland (“borderland”) between contrasting areas or modes 
of experience, and he had begun to practice a method of narration that 
relied to an unusual degree on images of movement to characterize the 
relationship between these spheres.16 The descriptions of the process of 
writing in his diaries and letters are also pervaded by the same dynamic 
imagery, and there too its function is to capture and communicate a 
very similar structure of experience. Writing, he stated repeatedly, was the 
“direction” taken by his whole being, the only form in which he could 
feel truly alive and hence connected with the life of the world:
Mein ganzes Wesen ist auf Literatur gerichtet, die Richtung habe ich bis 
zu meinem 30(s)ten Jahr genau festgehalten; wenn ich sie einmal verlasse, 
lebe ich eben nicht mehr. Alles was ich bin und nicht bin, folgert daraus. 
(F, 456)
(My whole being is directed toward literature; I have followed this direc-
tion unswervingly until my 30th year and the moment I abandon it I 
cease to live. everything I am and am not is a result of this.) (KLF, 313)
Recognizing his essential “direction” was one thing, maintaining 
momentum proved to be quite another. Writing to Felice Bauer about 
the intermittent process of composing his first novel, for example, Kafka 
compared it to loading and driving a wagon:
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Arme, arme Liebste, möchtest Du Dich doch nie gezwungen fühlen, 
diesen elenden Roman zu lesen, den ich da stumpf zusammenschreibe. 
Schrecklich ist es, wie er sein Aussehn ändern kann; liegt die Last auf (mit 
welchem Schwung ich schreibe! Wie die Kleckse fliegen!) dem Wagen 
oben, dann ist mir wohl, ich entzücke mich am Peitschenknallen und bin 
ein großer herr; fällt sie mir aber vom Wagen herunter (und das ist nicht 
vorauszusehn, nicht zu verhindern, nicht zu verschweigen) wie gestern 
und heute, scheint sie unmäßig schwer für meine kläglichen Schultern, 
dann möchte ich am liebsten alles lassen und mir an Ort und Stelle ein 
grab graben. (F, 231)
(Poor, poor dearest, may you never feel compelled to read this miser-
able novel that I am writing away at so dismally. It is terrible how it can 
change its appearance; once the load (the ardor I write with! how the 
ink-spots fly!), is on the cart, I am all right; I delight in cracking the whip 
and am a man of importance; but once it falls off the cart (which cannot 
be foreseen, prevented, or concealed) as it did yesterday and today, then 
it feels excessively heavy for my pitiful shoulders; all I want to do then is 
abandon everything and dig my grave on the spot.) (KLF, 142)
For Kafka, the progress of narration meant following the path taken by 
his innermost being; conversely, when writing came to a stop he expe-
rienced the cessation as a form of death. As long as a story and its char-
acters, which he had to follow wherever they led, were in motion, the 
dynamism of the narrative also animated the hand of the author: “once 
the load is up on the wagon (with what verve I write! how the splashes 
of ink fly!), all is well.” To fail to tell a story to its conclusion, by contrast, 
was to leave the characters to die and to wish that he himself could fall 
into the grave, as Kafka went on to explain to Felice:
Schließlich kann es keinen schönern, der vollkommenen Verzweiflung 
würdigern Ort für das Sterben geben als einen eigenen Roman. gerade 
unterhalten sich zwei seit gestern recht matt gewordene Personen auf 
zwei benachbarten Balkonen im 8ten Stockwerk um 3 Uhr in der Nacht. 
Wie wäre es, wenn ich ihnen von der gasse aus ein “Adieu” zuriefe und 
sie gänzlich verließe. Sie würden dort auf ihren Balkonen zusammen-
sinken und mit Leichengesichtern durch die geländerstangen einander 
ansehn. (F, 231)
(After all, there can be no more beautiful spot to die in, no spot more 
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worthy of total despair, than one’s own novel. At this moment two peo-
ple—grown somewhat dim since yesterday—are talking to each other 
on two adjacent balconies on the eighth floor at 3 in the morning. how 
would it be if I called out “goodbye” to them from the street, and aban-
doned them completely? They would collapse there on their balconies 
and with corpselike expressions stare at each other through the railings.) 
(KLF, 142)
 In another passage, Kafka likened writing to traversing space by means 
of a telescope in order to bring into view the inner self that he felt to be 
separated by a great distance from the everyday, non-writing part of his 
self:
Aber jeden Tag soll zumindest eine Zeile gegen mich gerichtet werden 
wie man die Fernrohre jetzt gegen den Kometen richtet. Und wenn ich 
dann einmal vor jenem Satze erscheinen würde, hergelockt von jenem 
Satze, so wie ich z. B. letzte Weihnachten gewesen bin und wo ich so weit 
war, daß ich mich nur noch gerade fassen konnte und wo ich wirklich 
auf der letzten Stufe meiner Leiter schien, die aber ruhig auf dem Boden 
stand und an der Wand. Aber was für ein Boden! was für eine Wand! Und 
doch fiel jene Leiter nicht, so drückten sie meine Füße an den Boden, so 
hoben sie meine Füße an die Wand. (KAF, 9:15)
(But every day at least one line should be trained on me, as they now 
train telescopes on comets. And if I then should appear before that sen-
tence once, lured by that sentence, just as, for instance, I was last Christ-
mas, when I was so far gone that I was barely able to control myself and 
when I seemed really to be on the last rung of my ladder, which, how-
ever, rested quietly on the ground and against a wall. But what ground, 
what a wall! And yet that ladder did not fall, so strongly did my feet press 
it against the ground, so strongly did my feet raise it against the wall.) 
(KD, 3–14)
Alternatively, the journey to the inner self could be experienced as a 
descent into the depths or plunging down into a stream (Strom) or river 
(Fluß) of creativity: “es ist notwendig, förmlich unterzutauchen und 
schneller zu sinken als das vor einem Versinkende” (KAF, 11:76) (“you 
have to dive down, as it were, and sink more rapidly than that which 
sinks in advance of you” [KD, 330]). Although Kafka wanted to reach out 
to others once a piece of writing was complete, he was convinced that he 
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could only gain access to the depths of inspiration by separating himself 
from the “surface” or social dimension of life and by making the descent 
(or ascent) in complete isolation:
Was von dieser Oberfläche ins Schreiben hinübergenommen wird—
wenn es nicht anders geht und die tiefern Quellen schweigen—ist nichts 
und fällt in dem Augenblick zusammen, in dem ein wahreres gefühl 
diesen obern Boden zum Schwanken bringt. Deshalb kann man nicht 
genug allein sein, wenn man schreibt, deshalb kann es nicht genug still 
um einen sein, wenn man schreibt, die Nacht ist noch zu wenig Nacht. 
Deshalb kann nicht genug Zeit einem zur Verfügung stehn, denn die 
Wege sind lang, und man irrt leicht ab, man bekommt sogar manchmal 
Angst und hat schon ohne Zwang und Lockung Lust zurückzulaufen. . . . 
Oft dachte ich schon daran, dass es die beste Lebensweise für mich wäre, 
mit Schreibzeug und einer Lampe im innersten Raume eines ausge-
dehnten, abgesperrten Kellers zu sein. . . . Was ich dann schreiben würde! 
Aus welchen Tiefen ich es hervorreißen würde! (F, 250)
(Writing that springs from the surface of existence—when there is no 
other way and the deeper wells have dried up—is nothing, and collapses 
the moment a truer emotion makes that surface shake. That is why one 
can never be alone enough when one writes, why there can never be 
enough silence around one when one writes, why even night is not night 
enough. That is why there is never enough time at one’s disposal, for the 
roads are long, and it is easy to go astray, there are even times when one 
becomes afraid sometimes and has the desire—even without any con-
straint or enticement—to run back. . . . I have often thought that the best 
mode of life for me would be to sit in the innermost room of a spacious 
locked cellar with my writing things and a lamp. . . . And how I would 
write! From what depths I would drag it up!) (KLF, 156)
The self that Kafka was bent on sighting revealed itself, he believed, pre-
cisely through the imagery and dynamic patterns of the writing itself:
Wer weiß denn aus sich selbst heraus, wie es um einen steht. Dieses stür-
mische oder sich wälzende oder sumpfige Innere sind ja wir selbst, aber 
auf dem im geheimen sich vollziehenden Weg, auf dem die Worte aus uns 
hervorgetrieben werden, wird die Selbsterkenntnis an den Tag gebracht, 
und wenn sie auch noch immer verhüllt ist, so ist sie doch vor uns und 
ein herrlicher oder schrecklicher Anblick. Nimm mich also, Liebste, in 
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Schutz vor diesen widerlichen Worten, die ich da in der letzten Zeit aus 
mir herausbefördert habe. (F, 306)
(After all, who knows within himself how things really are with him? 
This tempestuous or floundering or morass-like inner self is what we 
really are, but on the secret, self-creating path along which words get 
driven out of us, self-knowledge is brought to the surface, and though 
it may still be veiled, yet it is there before us, wonderful or terrible to 
behold. So protect me, dearest, from these horrible words that I have 
mined out of myself recently.) (KLF, 198; translation modified)
The references here to the “im geheimen sich vollziehenden Weg” (the 
“secret, self-creating path,” literally, “the way which completes itself in 
secret”) and to the sense that the words “get driven” out of the writer 
express Kafka’s belief that, when writing, he was to an extent the pas-
sive instrument of a dynamic impulse that operated independently of his 
conscious will. As his ill body became ever thinner, he even joked blackly 
that his body had clearly fashioned itself into a writing implement for 
the use of whatever higher power (if such a thing existed) might wish 
to use him, via his own hand and pen, to tell its self-revealing and self-
concealing stories:
Und tatsächlich, so mager wie ich bin und ich bin der magerste Mensch, 
den ich kenne (was etwas sagen will, da ich schon viel in Sanatorien 
he rum ge kommen bin) ebenso ist auch sonst nichts an mir, was man in 
Rücksicht auf das Schreiben Überflüssiges und Überflüssiges im guten 
Sinne nennen könnte. gibt es also eine höhere Macht, die mich benützen 
will oder benützt, dann liege ich als ein zumindest deutlich ausgearbeit-
etes Instrument in ihrer hand; wenn nicht, dann bin ich gar nichts und 
werde plötzlich in einer fürchterlichen Leere übrig bleiben. (F, 65–66)
(As thin as I am, and I am the thinnest person I know (and that’s saying 
something, for I’m no stranger to sanatoria), there is nothing to me that 
one which, in relation to writing, one could call superfluous, superfluous 
in the sense of overflowing. If there is a higher power that wishes to use 
me, or does use me, I am at its mercy, if no more than as a well-prepared 
instrument; if not, I am nothing and will suddenly be abandoned in a 
dreadful void.) (KLF, 21)
Kafka’s dependence on the dynamic impulse supplied by the “higher 
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power,” or whatever it was that released the unfolding of his imaginative 
world, meant that narration was an extremely uncertain undertaking. As 
he observed in a letter to grete Bloch, “Ich habe meine Fähigkeit des 
Schreibens gar nicht in der hand. Sie kommt und geht wie ein gespenst. 
Seit einem Jahr habe ich nichts geschrieben, kann auch nichts, so viel 
ich weiß” (F, 555–56) (“I have no control over my capacity for writing. 
It comes and goes like a phantom. I haven’t written anything for a year, 
nor can I, as far as I know” [KLF, 390]). Again and again Kafka was made 
to feel that the strength needed for the “Darstellung meines traum-
haften inneren Lebens” (representation of my dream-like inner life) was 
“completely unpredictable” although he never quite gave up the hope 
that “vielleicht kommt sie doch noch einmal über mich” (KAF, 10:167) 
(“perhaps it will come upon me again” [KD, 302]). equally frustrating, 
however, were those moments when he could glimpse the jostling life in 
the depths of his imagination but could not gain access to it because of 
some inner barrier or grille: “gestern unfähig auch nur ein Wort zu sch-
reiben. heute nicht besser. Wer erlöst mich? Und in mir das gedränge, 
in der Tiefe, kaum zu sehn. Ich bin wie ein lebendiges gitterwerk, ein 
gitter, das feststeht und fallen will“ (KAF, 10:142) (“yesterday incapable 
of writing even one word. Today no better. Who will save me? And 
the turmoil in me, deep down, scarcely visible. I am like a living lattice-
work, a lattice that is solidly planted and would like to tumble down” 
[KD, 267]). At other times he would succeed in reaching down into the 
“stream” of a story, only to discover that the dynamism through which 
the sense of pulsing life in the imagined experience became manifest 
then got lost in the attempt to capture that vital energy in words:
Sicher ist, daß ich alles, was ich im voraus selbst im guten gefühl Wort für 
Wort oder sogar nur beiläufig aber in ausdrücklichen Worten erfunden 
habe, auf dem Schreibtisch beim Versuch des Niederschreibens, trocken, 
verkehrt, unbeweglich, der ganzen Umgebung hinderlich, ängstlich, vor 
allem aber lückenhaft erscheint, trotzdem von der ursprünglichen erfin-
dung nichts vergessen worden ist. es liegt natürlich zum großen Teil 
daran, daß ich frei vom Papier nur in der Zeit der erhebung, die ich 
mehr fürchte als ersehne, wie sehr ich sie auch ersehne, gutes erfinde, 
daß dann aber die Fülle so groß ist, daß ich verzichten muß, blindlings 
also nehme nur dem Zufall nach, aus der Strömung heraus, griffweise, so 
daß diese erwerbung beim überlegten Niederschreiben nichts ist im Ver-
gleich zur Fülle, in der sie lebte, unfähig ist, diese Fülle herbeizubringen 
und daher schlecht und störend ist, weil sie nutzlos lockt. (KAF, 9:195)
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(It is certain that everything I have conceived in advance, even when I 
had the good feeling of having done so word by word or even just fleet-
ingly, but in specific words, appears dry, wrong, immobile, an obstacle to 
everything and everyone around, timid, but above all full of gaps, when I 
try to write it down at my desk, although I have forgotten nothing of the 
original conception. This is naturally related in large part to the fact that 
I only conceive something good away from paper at times of exaltation, 
which I fear more than I long for, much as I do long for them, but then 
the fullness is so great that I have to let things go past untouched. Blindly 
and arbitrarily I snatch handfuls out of the stream, so that when I write it 
down consciously and deliberately, my acquisition is nothing in compari-
son with the fullness in which it lived, is incapable of summoning up that 
fullness, and thus is bad and disturbing because it tempts to no purpose.) 
(KD, 118; translation modified)
 On another occasion Kafka lamented the fact that when inspiration 
did finally come, he was still unable to write because the idea or Einfall 
(literally, “falling in”) of a story tended to occur somewhere in the mid-
dle rather than at the point where the narrative movement originated:
Alle Dinge nämlich die mir einfallen, fallen mir nicht von der Wurzel aus 
ein, sondern erst irgendwo gegen ihre Mitte. Versuche sie dann jemand 
zu halten, versuche jemand ein gras und sich an ihm zu halten das erst in 
der Mitte des Stengels zu wachsen anfängt. (KAF, 9:15)
(All those things, that is to say, those things that come into my mind don’t 
come from the root up, but rather only somewhere about their middle. 
Let someone then attempt to seize them, let someone attempt to seize a 
blade of grass and hold himself up by it when it begins to grow only from 
the middle.) (KD, 12; translation modified)
If the flow of writing was interrupted, as inevitably happened when he 
dared to attempt a longer narrative, Kafka would feel “thrown out” (ausge-
worfen) by the story or excluded (“heute verschließt sie sich völlig” [F, 204]) 
(today it is completely closed up [KLF, 121]) and tormented by the 
switch from creative dynamism to uncreative stasis: “Vollständige Stoc-
kung. endlose Quälereien” (KAF, 11:76) (Complete standstill. Unending 
torments [KD, 330]).
 Kafka’s despair at the interruptions of the writing process or at being 
subjected to the Einfälle of stories without a beginning related above all 
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to his failure to achieve the wholeness and continuity (Zusammenhang) 
that he considered to be the essential criterion of writing as he felt com-
pelled to practice it: “Das Unglück, das man ertragen muß, wenn man in 
einer Arbeit, die immer nur in ganzem Zug gelingen kann, sich unter-
bricht” (KAF, 10:51) (“The unhappiness one must suffer when one inter-
rupts oneself in a task that can only succeed if done in a single, complete 
movement” [KD, 192; translation modified]). By Zusammenhang Kafka 
understood two distinct but interrelated things. One was the internal 
connectedness of a narrative. The other was the connection between the 
writing self and what it wrote. The ideal for which Kafka strove was a 
“Darstellung, die von Wort zu Wort mit meinem Leben verbunden wäre, 
die ich an meine Brust ziehen und die mich von meinem Platz hinreißen 
sollte” (KAF, 9:115) (“description in which every word would be linked 
to my life, which I would draw to my heart and which would transport 
me out of myself ” [KD, 36]). his ideal was to “pour out” his deepest self 
into a story (“mich in sie auszugießen”), so that he could feel fortgerissen 
(“torn away”), “im Fluß der Arbeit . . . und von ihr getragen” (F, 300) (“in 
the flow of work . . . and borne along by it” [KLF, 194]). The objective of 
such writing, he realized, was existential exploration rather than artistic 
perfection:
Ich habe jetzt und hatte schon Nachmittag ein großes Verlangen, meinen 
ganzen bangen Zustand ganz aus mir herauszuschreiben und ebenso wie 
er aus der Tiefe kommt in die Tiefe des Papiers hinein oder es so nieder-
zuschreiben daß ich das geschriebene vollständig in mich einbeziehen 
könnte. Das ist kein künstlerisches Verlangen. (KAF, 9:223)
(I have now, and have had since this afternoon, a great yearning to write 
all my anxiety entirely out of me, write it into the depths of the paper 
just as it comes out of the depths of me, or write it down in such a way 
that I could draw what had been written into me completely. This is no 
artistic yearning.) (KD, 134)
The complete work, then, ought to flow directly from the self and reveal 
through its evolving, self-creating dynamic patterns the character and 
direction of the impulses it embodied. Where the desired flow could not 
be sustained, as in his first novel, Der Verschollene (The Man Who Disap-
peared), the work had to be “in kleinen Stücken mehr aneinander als 
ineinander gearbeitet” (KKAB1, 163) (“worked in small pieces, joined 
to one another rather than integrated one with the other”). As a conse-
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quence Kafka regarded the composition as a forced, artificial construc-
tion rather than as the trace of a dynamic, organic whole.
 given all these difficulties, it was extremely rare for Kafka to feel 
that he had succeeded in capturing the dynamism of his inner life and 
its moments of “erhebung” satisfactorily in his narratives. his repeated 
failures in this respect resemble the conflicts experienced by the char-
acters in Betrachtung between the empty stasis of a life spent tracing the 
routine patterns of social existence (to which Kafka too remained com-
mitted, to the detriment of his continuous concentration on his writing) 
and the pull of a quite different kind of movement that the majority of 
the figures refuse to follow. The one instance where Kafka felt certain 
that he had achieved something like complete abandonment to a unique 
kind of movement (such as he had envisaged in “Wish to Become a 
Red Indian”) was his “breakthrough” story “Das Urteil” (“The Judg-
ment”). The story, written at a single, night-long sitting in September 
1912, fulfilled the double criterion of Zusammenhang—that is, complete 
internal connectedness and immediate connection with the writer’s inner 
self (and, so he hoped, with any reader able to recognize and respond to 
such “inner truth” as it might possess). The diary entries recording this 
extraordinary creative event describe it as one in which the author expe-
rienced the flow of writing as a paradoxical combination of activity and 
passivity, as if Kafka were both a mother giving birth to a child and the 
child that was being brought into the world:
Diese geschichte “das Urteil” habe ich in der Nacht vom 22 zum 23 
von 10 Uhr abends bis 6 Uhr früh in einem Zug geschrieben. . . . Die 
fürchterliche Anstrengung und Freude, wie sich die geschichte vor mir 
entwickelte wie ich in einem gewässer vorwärtskam. Mehrmals in dieser 
Nacht trug ich mein gewicht auf dem Rücken. Wie alles gewagt werden 
kann, wie für alle, für die fremdesten einfälle ein großes Feuer bereitet 
ist, in dem sie vergehn und auferstehn. . . . Nur so kann geschrieben 
werden, nur in einem solchen Zusammenhang, mit solcher vollständigen 
Öffnung des Leibes und der Seele. (KAF, 10:101)
(This story, “The Judgment,” I wrote at one sitting during the night of 
the 22nd to the 23rd from ten o’clock at night until 6 o’clock in the 
morning. . . . The fearful strain and joy, how the story developed before 
me, as if I were advancing through water. Several times during this night 
I heaved my own weight on my back. how everything can be dared, 
how for everything that comes into one’s mind, even the strangest things, 
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there waits a great fire in which they disappear and rise up again. . . . Only 
in this way can writing be done, only with such coherence, with such a 
complete opening out of the body and the soul.) (KD, 212–13)
. . . die geschichte ist wie eine regelrechte geburt mit Schmutz und 
Schleim bedeckt aus mir herausgekommen und nur ich habe die hand, 
die bis zum Körper dringen kann und Lust dazu hat. (KAF, 10:125)
( . . . the story came out of me like a real birth, covered with filth and 
slime, and only I have the hand that can reach to the body itself and the 
strength of desire to do so.) (KD, 214)
The dynamism experienced by Kafka during the process of writing “The 
Judgment” is reflected in the story itself, imbuing it with such inner 
coherence that Kafka even dared speak of the “music” that had emerged 
along with the fear (Angst) he felt while composing it.17 This is not the 
place for an extensive analysis of the dynamics of the whole work, but 
some brief remarks about the beginning and ending may help to clarify 
how closely the unfolding of the narrative itself is related to movement 
as it affects the figures who are first summoned into being and then dis-
posed of on the “self-creating path” of narration.
 The opening paragraph of the story reads as follows:
es war an einem Sonntagvormittag im schönsten Frühjahr. georg Ben-
demann, ein junger Kaufmann, saß in seinem Privatzimmer im ersten 
Stock eines der niedrigen, leichtgebauten häuser, die entlang des Flusses 
in einer langen Reihe, fast nur in der höhe und Färbung unterschie-
den, sich hinzogen. er hatte gerade einen Brief an einen sich im Aus-
land befindenden Jugendfreund beendet, verschloß ihn in spielerischer 
Langsamkeit und sah dann, den ellbogen auf den Schreibtisch gestützt, 
aus dem Fenster auf den Fluß, die Brücke und die Anhöhen am anderen 
Ufer mit ihrem schwachen grün. (KAF, 1:39)
(It was on a Sunday morning when spring was at its most beautiful. 
george Bendemann, a young businessman, sat in his private room on the 
second floor of one of the low, lightly built houses that ran alongside the 
river, stretched out in a long row, hardly distinguishable from one another 
except in height and color. he had just finished a letter to a boyhood 
friend who was living abroad, closed it with playful slowness and then, 
with his elbow propped on the desk, looked out of the window at the 
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river, the bridge and the slopes on the opposite bank with their faint 
green.) (KSS, 3; translation modified)
The sentence with which “The Judgment” begins contains, but crucially 
is not simply a description of the day of the week and the time of year: “It 
was on a Sunday morning.” Although the verb “was” (war) would nor-
mally be classed as stative (as in: “It was Sunday morning”), its use here 
in combination with the preposition “on” (an) has a destabilizing and 
dynamic effect, making the sentence seem curiously incomplete. One 
would expect the sentence to continue with a “that” or “when” clause of 
some kind, such as “It was on a Sunday morning at the height of spring 
that georg Bendemann decided to sit down and write a letter to an 
old friend now living abroad.” The absence from the opening sentence 
of any information about what precisely “it was” that happened on that 
morning impels the reader on to the next sentence in the expectation 
of completing the sense that is implied but partly withheld. This tiny 
grammatical oddity is the first, unremarkable manifestation of a restless-
ness at work in the story that seems to want to pull the reader forward 
to its conclusion, a dynamic force that will become ever more powerful, 
unmistakable and at the same time indecipherable as it creates the path 
of its own unfolding.
 The element of instability is also at work in what the sentence 
describes and, although as yet unrecognizable to any first-time reader, 
in the ironic quality of the description. The first thing the story draws 
our attention to is time, specifically a Sunday morning at the height of 
spring. Presented like this, time seems, if anything, a beneficent force, in 
that Sunday morning connotes a period of rest and recuperation after 
the exertions of the working week, while the reference to “spring at its 
most beautiful” invites contemplation of the new life it brings. By the 
time the reader has reached the end of the story and looks back at its 
beginning (as certain analeptic elements will prompt him to do), time 
will present an utterly other, deadly, and indifferent aspect. A complicated 
narrative movement will have been generated thereby, one that is both 
circular (compelling the perplexed reader to go back to the beginning in 
the hope of grasping why the ending is as it is) and final (in the sense of 
providing a full release of the energy that has been pulsing through the 
story from the outset).
 In the remainder of the opening paragraph, the creative restlessness 
that was present but barely detectable in the first sentence gradually grows 
more apparent as it becomes embodied in a figure’s actions and thoughts. 
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On the one hand, the description of georg Bendemann as a young busi-
nessman seated in his private room develops the positive aspects of the 
first sentence, for he is a young man with the rest of his life to look 
forward to and already a man of property. On the other hand, although 
physically at rest, georg Bendemann is not entirely at ease. his gaze out 
of the window falls on the river and the line of houses that sich hinzogen 
(“ran along”) beside it. The river picks up, inconspicuously, the theme of 
transience hinted at in the mention of spring, while the fact that georg 
perceives the “lightly built” houses as if, like the river, they too were 
in motion, suggests that the narrative is creating in him a figure whose 
consciousness is filled with the same sense of instability that gave rise to 
the tensions in the story’s deceptively promising first sentence. The third, 
and last, sentence of the opening paragraph both varies these tensions 
and introduces some new elements that promise some information about 
georg Bendemann’s past life (such as his relation to the friend abroad 
and his reasons for writing the letter) while also prompting questions 
about what he will do next. The positive possibilities in the situation 
then seem to come to the fore increasingly, as georg is shown leaning on 
his desk and closing the letter to his friend with “playful slowness,” while 
his gaze travels across the river, up the slopes, and comes to rest on the 
“faint green” of the new shoots of spring. yet not one of these details is 
unambiguously positive: the gaze across the river may hint at a restless-
ness that is at odds with georg’s seemingly comfortable static situation, 
while the slowness with which he closes the letter may be a sign that he 
is hesitating, for some reason, to complete this act of communication.
 In summary, the opening paragraph of “The Judgment” is impreg-
nated with a sense of movement that issues in the unfolding of the 
sentences and prepares the reader for the leap across to the next and 
subsequent paragraphs. The instability that is most readily apparent at a 
thematic level, particularly in the mentality of the protagonist, is already 
present, as I have tried to show, before georg is called into being by a nar-
rating consciousness which is itself charged with a restlessness that seeks 
an outlet in such things as sentence structure, ambivalence and irony. 
From this beginning, the narration will unfold through a sequence of 
events that will move through conflict to resolution, or at least to an end-
ing. On its way to that ending, the story will enact a conflict between the 
forward-driving impulse that generated the instability in the very first 
sentence and the numerous forms of resistance and retardation that first 
took shape in georg Bendemann’s remaining seated at his desk long after 
he had finished the letter to his friend. It is not possible here to elaborate 
the whole, intricate interplay between the dynamics of narration itself 
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and the thematic and figural manifestations of movement throughout 
the story. Nevertheless, it is worth looking briefly at the way the story 
comes to an end, in order to make it clear just how unusual, possibly 
even unique, the part played by movement in Kafka’s mode of narration 
actually is.
 The end of the story is notoriously catastrophic. The unfolding con-
tinuum of movement in which georg Bendemann is caught up from the 
outset eventually leads him not across the river and up the slopes towards 
the first green shoots of spring he was contemplating at the beginning 
but downward to the river in which he drowns. As he drops into the 
water, the final direction of the movement that has seized hold of georg’s 
life cuts diametrically across the trajectory of an omnibus and the rest of 
the “geradezu unendlicher Verkehr” (KAF, 1:52) (“virtually endless traf-
fic”) crossing the bridge at that very moment. More radically than any-
thing attempted in Betrachtung, what “The Judgment” narrates is thus the 
imagined intersection of a strange, new, disruptive form of movement 
with the familiar movements of natural and social existence, cyclical in 
the one case and goal-directed in the other. As Jim Phelan points out 
quite correctly, however, the path from the beginning of the story to its 
end leads across an “interpretive gap,” since it is never made explicit why 
georg, initially introduced as a young man with good prospects, submits 
so rapidly to his father’s annihilating judgment.18 yet the effect of that 
“gap” is precisely to highlight the peculiar character and integrative role 
of movement in Kafka’s mode of narration.
 The moral crux and the interpretive gap arise from the fact that 
georg accepts his father’s judgment of his conduct and carries out his 
lethal verdict without there being any evident, adequate justification 
for him to do so. georg certainly has reason to feel guilty about hav-
ing neglected his old father, but the death sentence is a wholly dispro-
portionate punishment for such a failing. The father, himself a deceiver 
(Komödiant, or play-actor, as georg calls him) and someone who clearly 
relishes the recovery of his former dictatorial powers, gives no sign of 
having the moral authority to pronounce any kind of verdict, far less one 
as severe as this. Psychological explanations, although rather more per-
suasive, also lack conviction ultimately. The father assumes the appear-
ance of a giant Oedipal patriarch only intermittently, behaving at other 
times like a deranged, malicious, infantile old fool for whom georg feels 
no respect. One can suggest other reasons for georg’s submission to the 
death sentence, such as seeing in his father’s fate an image of the point-
lessness of the notions of progress on which he intended to base his own 
life, or realizing that he does not possess enough strength of feeling for 
226  ChAPter 10
his fiancée simply to sweep aside his father’s mockery of their relation-
ship. The movement out of his own room, with its window facing across 
to the greening hills of springtime, and into his father’s room, darkened 
by the wall that looms outside the window, has certainly confronted 
georg with the inescapable stasis in his life that he has been trying to 
keep hidden from himself with his plans for marriage and the expansion 
of the business. But none of this quite suffices to make georg’s self-
execution understandable within the limits of psychological plausibility. 
Faced with this problem, an early reviewer even felt compelled to argue 
that the story showed the sudden collapse of a mind into insanity, a view 
that only needs to be stated for it to become clear that the events sim-
ply cannot be contained within any psychological or even pathological 
framework.19
 By this point in the story, the narration has passed out of the realm 
of social, moral, and psychological constraints and into one where other 
forces hold sway, principally the force of narrative dynamism itself, what-
ever its obscure source may be. What has happened on the social, moral, 
and psychological levels of the narrative is the progressive destruction 
of all the flimsy defenses that the narrator, with a mixture of sympa-
thy and malice, has let georg Bendemann erect around a lonely and 
static existence that does not fundamentally believe in itself. Once that 
superstructure has been destroyed in the interaction with other charac-
ters so that georg is left with nothing to contemplate but the ruins of 
all the illusions on which he has based his bourgeois identity in recent 
years, there is nothing left to block the final unfolding of the story’s self- 
creating path. The dynamic force that was evident, from the beginning 
of the narrative, both in the world as georg perceived it and in his own 
growing unease, as he closed the letter to his friend slowly and “playfully,” 
can now be released in full. At the very moment when the father pro-
nounces his judgment, georg is seized by an impersonal force (defined 
simply as es) and is “driven” out of the house and down to his death in 
the river:
georg fühlte sich aus dem Zimmer gejagt, den Schlag, mit dem der Vater 
hinter ihm aufs Bett stürzte, trug er noch in den Ohren davon. Auf der 
Treppe, über deren Stufen er wie über eine schiefe Fläche eilte, über-
rumpelte er seine Bedienerin . . . Aus dem Tor sprang er, über die Fahr-
bahn zum Wasser trieb es ihn. Schon hielt er das geländer fest, wie ein 
hungriger die Nahrung. (KAF, 1:52)
(georg felt himself driven from the room, the crash with which his father 
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collapsed behind him on to the bed went on ringing in his ears. On the 
stairs, down whose steps he raced as if down a sloping surface, he nearly 
bowled over his cleaning woman . . . he leapt out of the house door, 
across the road it drove him. he was already clutching the railing, like a 
hungry man clutching food.) (KSS, 12; translation modified)
As he disappears in the river below, one might say that georg is being 
returned by the act of narration to the element from which the story as 
a whole emerged, the restless energy that formed the opening paragraph 
in which georg Bendemann was brought into existence and which will 
continue to flow after his death in the figurations of the river and the 
endless flow of traffic (Verkehr) on the bridge. The opening “Es war an 
einem Sonntagmorgen” is answered by the “trieb es ihn” which carries the 
action to a close, thereby confirming the dynamic nature of that decep-
tively unassuming impersonal pronoun. It may well be the same little 
pronoun (Es rather than Er), incidentally, that Kafka allowed to assume 
universal proportions in one of his best-known aphorisms: “Das Wort 
‘sein’ bedeutet im Deutschen beides: Da-sein und Ihm-gehören” (KAF, 
6:235) (“The word ‘sein’ means both things in german: to exist and to 
belong to it”).20
 Nowadays, we tend to feel uncomfortable about things that defy 
rational explanation. Kafka too was tempted to devise explanations for 
the strange inner experiences of movement to which he was subject dur-
ing those all too rare periods of Erhebung when he felt the pulse of cre-
ativity within him. In his aphorisms, for example, on which so many 
readings of his work rely, Kafka interpreted the biblical story of the Fall 
in such a way as to construct an account of all human existence as a 
state of permanent Vertreibung (i.e., a condition not simply of having been 
driven out of Paradise once and for all but of being driven out of Paradise 
unceasingly, for all time).21 his own, private experience of some extraor-
dinary form of dynamism while writing could thereby be regarded as 
a particular, perhaps privileged, symbolic concretization of the general 
human condition post lapsum, as a mode of being that is both driven in 
perpetual motion and yet static, a “stehender Sturmlauf ” or charging on 
the spot. yet so many of Kafka’s stories embody movement in such a wide 
variety of ways that it is questionable whether they can all be reduced 
to just so many illustrations of a single overarching myth of origin and 
destination (like the above) or of any other single principle that his com-
mentators might construct, such as the oft varied view that movement in 
Kafka’s writing is a self-referential allegory of writing itself. In the stories 
examined in this essay, for example, movement also serves as a vehicle to 
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achieve other ends, such as exploring the complexities of psychological 
and social existence, and it serves these purposes outstandingly well. At 
the same time, these stories repeatedly show the movements of social 
existence being intersected or interrupted by some other mode of move-
ment for which they offer no explanation. Kafka himself felt that an 
extraordinary experience of movement was somehow part and parcel of 
his writing, although he could have no certainty about its nature, origin, 
or purpose, far less any control over its appearance or disappearance. At 
times he hoped that it was a revelatory, elevating experience of general 
significance. At others he felt that writing involved going down into for-
bidden depths, doing service to the devil and unleashing forces that, by 
their nature, ought to remain bound up forever.22 On yet another occa-
sion, he felt that the movement of writing was merely a form of vanity, 
as the mind of the writer circled, moth-like, around its own reflection 
(MB, 2:384). In conversation with Max Brod, Kafka is reported to have 
said that when he wrote the last sentence of “The Judgment” (“At this 
moment a virtually endless [flow of] traffic went across the bridge”) he 
was thinking of “eine starke ejakulation” (“a powerful ejaculation”),23 
which suggests that the source of the energy pulsing through the story 
could be understood as intensely physical rather than metaphysical or 
transcendent. One could also argue that the movement of Kafka’s narra-
tives is part of a “psycho-poetics,”24 serving, for example, as a means of 
exercising power, in imagination at least, over particular kinds of figure 
(sons, fathers, women), or indeed the world in general, calling them into 
being and disposing of them more or less capriciously in order to create 
an outlet for private psychological impulsions. Whatever the source and 
nature of the creative restlessness that took over his life periodically, Kaf-
ka’s narratives could only convince him of their “inner truth” for as long 
as he sensed that strange, dynamic impulse carrying him forward from 
word to word, sentence to sentence. That, at all costs, had to be “brought 
to the surface.” The interpretations of that impulse may multiply, but, to 
paraphrase Kafka’s version of the Prometheus myth: “There remains the 
inexplicable movement.”25
notes
 1. The secondary literature listed below identifies and interprets a range of dif-
ferent manifestations of movement in Kafka’s fiction, from the “failure to arrive” 
stressed by Beißner (1958) to the “stehender Sturmlauf ” (“charging on the spot”) 
discussed by Allemann (1998), Corngold (1988), Ramm (1971, 1979), and others, 
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the patterns of reversal and deviation identified by Neumann (1973), the “temporal 
space” discussed by Rolleston (1978), the link between movement and the search 
for knowledge discussed by Thiher (1987), the attempts to escape or find the self 
considered by Zilcosky (2003), and multifarious approaches taken by the contribu-
tors to the volume edited by Scheuer and others. While most commentaries focus 
on the limitations of movement, this chapter seeks to identify the exceptional con-
ditions under which movement, both narrative and narrated, is achieved successfully.
 2. Although Contemplation is available in english translation (published by Twist-
ed Spoon Press, Prague), I have chosen to use my own translations throughout so as 
to follow as closely as possible the german original, regardless of whether the result 
makes for attractive english. In other cases (such as Kafka’s diaries or letters) I have 
generally used published translations where available, supplying my own where they 
are not.
 3. See Kurz (1994) and Rolleston (1984).
 4. “Die ungeheuere Welt, die ich im Kopfe habe. Aber wie mich befreien und sie 
befreien ohne zu zerreißen. Und tausendmal lieber zerreißen, als sie in mir zurück-
halten oder begraben. Dazu bin ich ja hier, das ist mir ganz klar” (KAF, 10:179) 
(“The monstrous world I have in my head. But how to free myself and free it with-
out being torn to pieces. And a thousand times rather be torn apart rather than re-
tain it in me or bury it. That indeed is why I am here, that is quite clear to me” [KD, 
222]).
 5. Der Verschollene, more commonly known as Amerika, the title given to the 
fragmentary novel by its first editor, Max Brod.
 6. “Doch sah ich letzthin auf der Freitreppe selbst einen ganz einfältigen ge-
richtsdiener mit dem Fachblick des kleinen Stammgastes der Wettrennen den Ad-
vokaten bestaunen, als dieser, hoch die Schenkel hebend, mit auf dem Marmor 
aufklingendem Schritt von Stufe zu Stufe stieg” (KAF, 1:199) (“yet recently I saw 
a quite simple court usher with the knowing eye of a racetrack regular staring in 
astonishment at the lawyer as the latter, raising his flanks high in the air, mounted 
step by step with a stride that made the marble clang” [KSS, 60]).
 7. Kafka’s notebooks contain numerous passages that cast doubt on humans’ ca-
pacity for free will. One of the most vivid describes an animal seizing its master’s 
whip and whipping itself in order to become master, while unaware that this is sim-
ply an illusion created by a new knot in the master’s whip; see KAF (6:232).
 8. See, for example, Kafka’s despairing remarks in a letter to Felice from 1913: 
“Wo bin ich denn? Wer kann mich nachprüfen? Ich wünschte mir eine kräftige 
hand nur zu dem Zweck, um in diese unzusammenhängende Konstruktion, die ich 
bin, ordentlich hineinzufahren” (F, 306) (“For where am I? Who can examine me? 
I wish for a strong hand for the sole purpose of thrusting it into this incoherent 
construction that I am” [KLF, 198]).
 9. “gesellschaft” can either mean a small gathering, such as a party, or society at 
large; Kafka is probably playing on both senses of the word.
 10. The best known instance is the closing words of The Trial: “es war, als sollte 
die Scham ihn überleben” (KAF, 3:241) (“It was as if the shame were destined to 
survive him”).
 11. There is a marked contrast here between the figure’s response to music and 
Schopenhauer’s claim that music could bring solace and release from the turmoil 
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of life, since it was an aesthetically distanced and disinterested symbol of the Will; 
see Schopenhauer (1938, 2:516). If, as seems quite likely, Kafka was well acquainted 
with Schopenhauer’s world-view, he appears to offer only partial assent. Schopen-
hauer’s conception of the blind Will could only be acceptable to the later Kafka at 
any rate as a diagnosis of the post-lapsarian condition of human life, not as an ac-
count of the essence of the world; equally, Schopenhauer’s view that the spirit could 
escape domination by the Will through aesthetic experience and philosophical re-
flection was at odds with Kafka’s own speculations about the hopeless severance 
of human beings from the oneness of spiritual existence (“die geistige Welt”) as a 
result of the expulsion from Paradise, which allowed no escape, whether aesthetic or 
philosophical, for the spirit within the “sinnliche Welt” (“world apprehended by the 
senses”).
 12. Josef K. experiences a similar kind of movement in the corridor outside the 
offices of the court officials in The Trial: “er war wie seekrank. er glaubte auf ei-
nem Schiff zu sein, das sich in schwerem Seegang befand. es war ihm als stürze das 
Wasser gegen die holzwände, als komme aus der Tiefe des ganges ein Brausen 
her, wie von überschlagendem Seewasser, als schaukle der gang in der Quere und 
als würden die wartenden Parteien zu beiden Seiten gesenkt und gehoben.” (KAF, 
3:84) (“It was as if he were sea-sick. he believed he was on a ship that was in the 
midst of a heavy swell. he felt as if the water were flinging itself against the wooden 
walls, as if a roar were coming from the depths of the corridor, like that of water 
breaking, as if the corridor were rocking sideways, and the plaintiffs waiting on each 
side were being made to rise and fall”). here again there is a striking resemblance to 
Schopenhauer’s image of individual existence as a frail craft afloat on a stormy sea; 
see Schopenhauer (1938, 1:416).
 13. For a discussion of the place of this allusion in Kafka’s work, see gerhard 
Neumann, “Umkehrung und Ablenkung: Franz Kafkas ‘gleitendes Paradox.’”
 14. See, for example, the story of the hunter gracchus (KAF, 6:43) who repeat-
edly believes he is climbing some great staircase, only to find himself, on awakening, 
stuck on board ship in the same earthly waters he has been traversing for centuries 
since falling to his death.
 15. This gentle, but nonetheless disturbing rocking may be a relative of the much 
more violent “Schaukeln” experienced by Josef K. in The Trial; see note 10 above.
 16. See the introduction of this volume.
 17. “each sentence in this story, each word, each—if I may say so—music is con-
nected with ‘fear.’ On this occasion the wound broke open for the first time in one 
long night” (KLM, 191).
 18. See James Phelan’s discussion in chapter 1.
 19. See Born (1979, 89).
 20. In german “sein” is a homonym. As a verb it means “to be.” It is also a pos-
sessive adjective or pronoun, meaning “his” or “its.” Kafka detects in this ambiguity 
the possibility that “being” entails “belonging to something or someone.” The lack 
of autonomy implied by this idea may relate to the numerous involuntary forms of 
movement analyzed in this essay.
 21. “Die Vertreibung aus dem Paradies ist in ihrem hauptteil ewig” (KAF, 6:239) 
(“The expulsion from paradise is in its principal aspect eternal”).
 22. See the introduction of this volume.
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 23. See Brod (1966, 114).
 24. See, for example, Bernheimer (1984, 154–83).
 25. Cf. KAF (6:193).
Works Cited
Allemann, Beda. 1998. Stehender Sturmlauf: Zeit und geschichte im Werke Kafkas. 
In Zeit und Geschichte im Werke Kafkas, 15–36. göttingen: Wallstein Verlag.
Beißner, Friedrich. 1958. Kafka der Dichter. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag.
Bernheimer, Charles. 1984. Psychopoetik: Flaubert und Kafkas Hochzeitsvorbereitun-
gen auf dem Lande. In Der junge Kafka, ed. g. Kurz, 154–83. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhr kamp Verlag.
Born, J., ed. 1979. Franz Kafka: Kritik und Rezeption, 1912–1924. Frankfurt am 
Main: Fischer.
Brod, Max. 1966. Über Franz Kafka. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Bücherei.
Corngold, Stanley. 1988. Franz Kafka: The necessity of form. Ithaca, Ny: Cornell Univ. 
Press.
Kurz, gerhard. 1994. Lichtblicke in eine unendliche Verwirrung: Zu Kafkas Betrach-
tung. In TEXT + KRITIK Sonderband: Franz Kafka, ed. h. L. Arnold, 49–65. 
Munich: edition TeXT + KRITIK.
Neumann, gerhard. 1973. Umkehrung und Ablenkung: Franz Kafkas “gleitendes 
Paradox.” In Franz Kafka, ed. h. Politzer, 459–515. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft.
Ramm, Klaus. 1971. Reduktion als Erzählprinzip bei Kafka. Frankfurt am Main: Athen-
äum Verlag.
———. 1979. handlungsführung und gedankenführung. In Kafka-Handbuch, ed. 
hartmut Binder. Vol. 2, 93–107. Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag.
Rolleston, James. 1978. Temporal space: A reading of Kafka’s Betrachtung. Special 
Franz Kafka Issue, Modern Austrian Literature 11, nos. 3–4:123–38. 
———. 1979. Die erzählungen. In Kafka-Handbuch, ed. hartmut Binder. Vol. 2, 
249–59. Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag.
———. 1984. Betrachtung: Landschaften der Doppelgänger. In Der junge Kafka, ed. 
g. Kurz, 184–99. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Scheuer, hans Jürgen, Justus von hartlieb, Christina Salmen, georg höfner, eds. 
2003. Kafkas Betrachtung: Lektüren. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag. 
Schopenhauer, Arthur. 1938. Sämtliche Werke. Dritter Band. (Die Welt als Wille und 
Vorstellung. Zweiter Band). Leipzig: Brockhaus.
Sterne, Laurence. 1893. The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gent. London: 
george Routledge and Sons.
Thiher, Allen. 1987. The Nachlass: Metaphors of Gehen and ways towards science. In 
Kafka and the contemporary critical performance, ed. A. Udoff. Bloomington: Indiana 
Univ. Press.
Walser, Martin. 1961. Beschreibung einer Form. Munich: Carl hanser Verlag. 
Zilcosky, John. 2003. Kafka’s travels. New york: Palgrave Macmillan. 

stanley Corngold is professor emeritus of german and comparative literature 
at Princeton University. Among his major publications are The Commentators’ 
Despair: The Interpretation of Kafka’s “Metamorphosis” (Port Washington, Ny: Na-
tional Univ. Press, 1973), The Fate of the Self: German Writers and French Theo-
ry (New york: Columbia Univ. Press, 1986), Franz Kafka: The Necessity of Form 
(Ithaca, Ny: Cornell Univ. Press, 1988), Complex Pleasure: Forms of Feeling in 
German Literature (Stanford Univ. Press, 1998), and Lambent Traces: Franz Kafka 
(Princeton Univ. Press, 2004). he has translated and edited Norton Critical edi-
tions of Kafka’s The Metamorphosis (Norton, 1996) and Selected Stories (Norton, 
2007). A new book, Franz Kafka: The Ghosts in the Machine, co-written with 
Benno Wagner, is due out in 2011 (evanston, IL: Northwestern Univ. Press).
anniKen greve is associate professor of comparative literature at the University 
of Tromsø, Norway. She obtained her doctorate in philosophy in 1998 for the 
dissertation “her: et bidrag til stedets filosofi” (“here: A Contribution to the 
Philosophy of Place”). She obtained in 2009 her second doctorate with the 
dissertation “Litteraturens meddelelse: en litteraturvitenskapelig tolkningsmeto-
dikk i teoretisk, praktisk og skeptisk lys” (“The Communicative effect of Litera-
ture: A Theoretical, Practical and Skeptical Discussion of a Methodical Approach 
to the Interpretation of Literature”). She has published articles in Norwegian 
books and academic journals on issues ranging from Wittgenstein’s philosophy, 
philosophy of language and philosophical anthropology to modern Norwegian, 
Irish and english poetry, narrative theory, and especially methodological issues.
gerHard Kurz is professor emeritus of german literature, the University of 
giessen. his books include Traum Schrecken: Kafkas literarische Existenzanalyse 
233
Contributors
234  Contributors
(Stuttgart: Metzler, 1980), Metapher, Allegorie, Symbol (göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 1982), and Macharten: Über Rhythmus, Reim, Stil und Vieldeutigkeit 
(göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999). he is the author of numerous 
essays on Kafka, hölderlin, and other german authors, as well as on literary 
theory and literary history.
JaKoB lotHe is professor of english Literature at the University of Oslo. his 
books include Conrad’s Narrative Method (Oxford Univ. Press, 1989) and Nar-
rative in Fiction and Film  (Oxford Univ. Press, 2000). The author of numerous 
essays, he has edited or co-edited several volumes, including Franz Kafka: Zur 
ethischen und aesthetischen Rechtfertigung (Freiburg: Rombach Verlag, 2002; with 
Beatrice Sandberg), The Art of Brevity (Univ. of South Carolina Press, 2004), 
Literary Landscapes (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008), Joseph Conrad: Voice, Sequence, 
History, Genre (Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press, 2008; with Jeremy hawthorn 
and James Phelan), and the forthcoming After Testimony (Columbus: Ohio State 
Univ. Press; with Susan R. Suleiman and James Phelan). During the 2005–2006 
academic year he was the leader of the research project Narrative Theory and 
Analysis at the Centre for Advanced Study, Oslo.
J. Hillis miller taught for many years at the Johns hopkins University and then 
at yale University, before going to the University of California at Irvine in 1986, 
where is he now UCI Distinguished Research Professor. he is the author of 
many books and essays on nineteenth and twentieth-century english, european, 
and American literature, and on literary theory. his recent books include Zero 
Plus One (València: Biblioteca Javier Coy d’estudis nord-americans, Universitat 
de València, 2003), and Literature as Conduct: Speech Acts in Henry James (New 
york: Fordham Univ. Press, 2005). A J. Hillis Miller Reader appeared in 2005 
from edinburgh University Press and Stanford University Press. his For Derrida 
appeared from Fordham in 2009, and The Medium is the Maker: Browning, Freud, 
Derrida and the New Telepathic Technologies appeared with Sussex Academic Press, 
also in 2009. A new book, The Conflagration of Community: Fiction before and after 
Auschwitz, will be published by The University of Chicago Press in 2011. A lon-
ger and differently oriented version of his essay will appear in The Conflagration 
of Community. Miller is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 
and a member of the American Philosophical Society. he received the MLA 
Lifetime Scholarly Achievement Award in 2005.
gerHard neumann is professor emeritus of Ludwig-Maximilian-Universität 
München. his main publications include Konfiguration: Studien zu Goethes “Tor-
quato Tasso” (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1965) and “Ideenparadise”: Untersu chungen zur 
Aphoristik von Lichtenberg, Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel und Goethe (Munich:Wilhelm 
Fink, 1976). The author of many essays on various aspects of german literature, 
he has written extensively on Kafka and was one of the principal editors of the 
major new edition of Kafka’s works based on the manuscripts.
James PHelan is Distinguished University Professor of english at The Ohio State 
University. he is a founding member of Project Narrative at OSU, the editor 
Contributors  235
of the journal Narrative and co-editor (with Peter J. Rabinowitz) of the Theory 
and Interpretation of Narrative series. he has also edited or co-edited several 
collections in the field, including Joseph Conrad (Columbus: Ohio State Univ. 
Press, 2008; with Jakob Lothe and Jeremy hawthorn), Teaching Narrative The-
ory (New york: MLA, 2010; with David herman and Brian Mchale), and the 
forthcoming After Testimony (Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press; with Jakob 
Lothe and Susan R. Suleiman). Phelan has written extensively about the rhe-
torical theory of narrative, especially in Worlds from Words (Chicago: Univ. of 
Chicago Press, 1981); Reading People, Reading Plots (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago 
Press, 1989); Narrative as Rhetoric (Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1996); Liv-
ing to Tell about It (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 2005); and Experiencing Fiction 
(Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press, 2007). 
BeatriCe sandBerg is professor in german literature at the german Depart-
ment, University of Bergen, Norway. She has published widely on Swiss litera-
ture, Franz Kafka, the twentieth-century novel, and national and cultural iden-
tity. Co-author (with Ronald Speirs) of Franz Kafka (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1998), she has edited or co-edited a number of volumes, including Fascism and 
European Literature (Bern: Lang, 1991), Franz Kafka: Zur ethischen und aesthetischen 
Rechtfertigung (Freiburg: Rombach Verlag, 2002; with Jakob Lothe), Autobiogra-
phisches Schreiben: Grenzen der Identität und der Fiktionalität (Munich: Iudicium 
2006), Meldungen aus Norwegen 1940–45 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), and 
Familienbilder als Zeitbilder: Erzählte Zeitgeschichte bei Schweizer Autoren vom 18. 
Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart (Berlin: Frank & Timme, 2010).
ronald sPeirs is emeritus professor of german at the University of Birming-
ham, england. he is an editor of the journal German Life and Letters and the au-
thor of Brecht’s Early Plays (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1982), Bertolt Brecht (Basing-
stoke: Macmillan, 1987), Thomas Mann: Mario und der Zauberer (London: grant 
& Cutler, 1990), and Franz Kafka (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998; with Beatrice 
Sandberg), and of a number of essays on german literature. he has also translat-
ed and edited Max Weber’s Political Writings (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994; with 
P. Lassmann) and Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy and other Writings (Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 1999; with R. geuss), and is the editor or co-editor of several vol-
umes of essays, including Fascism and European Literature (Bern: Lang, 1991; with 
B. Sandberg and S. Larsen), Brecht’s Poetry of Political Exile (Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 2000), H. G. Adler und Hermann Broch: Zwei Schriftsteller im Exil. Briefwech-
sel (göttingen: Wallstein, 2004; with J. White), and Germany’s Two Unifications: 
Anticipations, Experiences, Responses (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005; with J. Breuilly). 
Benno Wagner is associate professor of Literary Theory and german Literature 
at the University of giessen. his main publications include Im Dickicht der poli-
tischen Kultur (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1991). he is co-editor of the S. Fischer 
Critical edition of Kafka’s “Amtliche Schriften” (“Office Writings”) and has 
published widely on various aspects of Kafka’s work. A new book, Franz Kafka: 
The Ghosts in the Machine, co-written with Stanley Corngold, is due out in 
2011 (evanston, IL: Northwestern Univ. Press).

“Abweisung, Die,” 107n5
accident, 102, 125, 126; prevention and 
insurance, 67–72, 77, 79
aesthetic, 69, 75; achievement, 37; ap-
perception, 130; autonomy, 77n22; 
cheats, 36; dimension of reading, 
11; escape, 230; experience 29, 
230; judgment, 10, 25, 34, 37, 159; 
means of narration, 64; overcom-
ing of movement, 130
aesthetics, 26, 39, 130; ethics and, 
37–38
affect, tempo of, 174
Agamben, giorgio, 86
Alexander the great, 65–66, 198
allegory/allegorical, 40, 51, 83, 97, 109, 
113, 166, 183, 190, 227
Allemann, Beda, 18n1, 136, 229
allusion, 12, 16, 75, 97–98, 102, 230n13
Amerika. See Der Verschollene
ambiguity, 27, 32, 84, 102, 135, 150, 
163, 130n20
anagnorisis, 85
analepsis, 29, 171, 223
“analogical apperception,” 113
analogy, 63, 64, 91
antithesis, 116, 142, 171–72, 181
“anti-conquest,” 164
Apuleius: The Golden Ass, 43
Aristotle, 26
art, 10, 12, 58, 66 ,74, 91, 132, 136
Aryan, conflict between Semite and, 
61, 76
association, 75, 77, 155, 156
audience, 2, 4, 10, 23–25, 28, 30, 31, 
32, 35, 36, 73, 76, 86, 104, 152 
158–59; authorial, 23–24, 28, 30, 
31–32, 35, 36, 38, 158
Aufregung (“agitation”), 205–7, 211–13
Augusterlebnis (“August experience”), 
60, 67
Austerlitz, battle of, 64
Austria, 63–65; accident prevention 
in, 68; analogy linking China 
with, 63–64; artists’ association for 
“greater Austria,” 63, 65, 73
author, 2, 4, 6, 10, 11, 13, 25, 27, 66, 
72, 76, 130, 132, 138, 152, 179, 
191, 197, 214, 221; implied, 17, 
23–25, 38, 43, 150, 159, 166n3; 
realist, 197
authorial agency, 10, 90
237
Index
238  index
authorial design, 26
autobiographical, 92, 109, 132, 142, 
174
autobiography, 173
Baetens, Jan, 27, 35
Baghdad Railway, 73
Bal, Mieke, 77n11
Barthes, Roland, 75, 92n10
“Bau, Der” (“Burrow, The”), 135, 
137–38, 165, 183
Bauer, Felice, 4, 19, 229; letters to, 187, 
213–15
“Bäume, Die” (“Trees, The”), 139; 
deviation in, 139
Beamtenwesen (“being of the bureau-
crat”), 189–90
“Before the Law.” See “Vor dem ge-
setz”
beginning (of narrative), 14–16, 19n14, 
29, 42, 51–52, 60, 82, 86, 91, 95, 
103–4, 109, 114, 116, 119, 123–26, 
128–30, 13, 136–41, 145, 145n10, 
146n14, 146n18, 149–65, 166n2, 
166n6, 167n12, 167n16, 172–75, 
184, 188–89, 202, 211, 219, 
222–26; arbitrary and ungraspable 
nature of, 151; exposition, 154–58; 
initiation, 154, 158–59; iterative 
quality of, 152; launch, 157–58; 
“pure” beginnings, 153; Said on, 
151
Beicken, Peter, 18n2, 135–36, 146n11
“Beim Bau der chinesischen Mauer.” 
See “Building the great Wall of 
China”
“Being Unhappy.” See “Unglück-
lichsein”
Beißner, Friedrich, 3–6, 13, 18n2, 136, 
228
Benjamin, Walter, 174, 194n11; Arcades 
Project, 194n7
“Bericht für eine Akademie, ein” 
(“Report to an Academy”), 92n6, 
172
Berman, Russell, 31
Beschreibung eines Kampfes (Description of 
a Struggle), 72, 100, 145n8
Betrachtung (Contemplation), 17, 139, 
225; agitation in, 205–7, 211; 
alienation in, 203; dynamics of 
narration in, 196–213; equilibrium 
in, 198; Erhebung in, 198; harmony 
with humanity in, 201, 203, 205; 
hovering/oscillation in, 209, 212; 
illusion of solidity in, 197; im-
mobility in, 199–201; isolation in, 
199–201, 203–5, 213; liberation in, 
210; nature in, 197; normality vs. 
abnormality in, 208–9, 211, 213; 
optimism in, 198–200, 213; order 
vs. disruption in, 209–11; pessimism 
in, 200, 213; reflection of themes in 
Kafka’s life in, 221; rest vs. move-
ment in, 209–11; shame in, 203; 
silence in, 202–4; social conformity 
in, 197, 200, 203; social mobility in, 
204–6; stasis in, 197, 205, 207, 211, 
221; states of mind in, 197
Bierce, Ambrose: “An Occurrence at 
Owl Creek Bridge,” 37
Binder, hartmut, 141, 143
Blanchot, Maurice, 110, 117, 152, 
166n6
Bloch, grete, 218
Blumfeld fragment, 145n10
Bohrer, Karl heinz, 12, 58, 59, 60, 68, 
71, 74, 76
Bonaparte, Napoleon, 64
Booth, Wayne C., 111; The Rhetoric of 
Fiction, 23
Borges, Jorge Luis: “The Library of 
Babel,” 118
Borovský, Karel havlíçek, 65
Brecht, Bertolt, 18n6; “street scene,” 
126
Brief an den Vater (“Letter to his 
Father”), 184
Brod, Max, 6, 14, 76n2, 109, 115, 120, 
125, 141, 143, 193n3, 228, 229, 
230; letters to, 10, 127, 139–40, 
181; “Man darf nicht sagen,” Kaf-
ka’s response to, 130; oral reading 
index  239
of “kleine Automobilgeschichte,” 
124–26
Buber, Martin, 65, 73
“Bucket Rider, The” (“Kübelreiter, 
Der”), 137
“Building the great Wall of China” 
(“Beim Bau der chinesischen 
Mauer”), 2, 12, 18, 63, 146n13. See 
also Chinese stories
“Burrow, The.” See “Bau, Der”
Carrard, Philippe: “September 1939,” 
167n12
“Castle, The.” See Schloß, Das
Cavell, Stanley, 50–51
Centre for Advanced Study (Oslo), 1
Chaplin, Charlie, 125
“Children on the Country Road.” See 
“Kinder auf der Landstraße”
China, analogy linking Austria with, 
63–64; crystallized culture of, 64; 
domestic affairs
of, 65; history of, 63–64; Ming Dy-
nasty, 64; petrifaction of culture of, 
64–65; as shorthand for cultural 
condition, 64
Chinese stories, 58–76; narrative strat-
egy of, 59
“City Coat of Arms, The.” See “Stadt-
wappen, Das”
“clash of cultures,” 61
Cleland, John: Fanny Hill, 96
Cockburn, David, 56n4
code(s), 11, 88, 90
Coetzee, J.M., 165; Waiting for the Bar-
barians, 167n16
cognitive typology, 61
coherence/connectedness, 4, 13, 15, 37, 
43, 123, 126, 128, 159, 220, 221, 
222. See also “Zusammenhang”
colonialism, european, 157, 162, 164; 
contact zone of, 164
communication, 10, 18, 24, 43, 54, 55, 
95, 119, 224; narrative progression 
and, 4; problem of, 12–14 
comparative ethnography, 67–68
composition, method of, 14
Conrad, Joseph, 156; Lord Jim, 37
consciousness, 4, 6, 23, 47, 49, 85, 99, 
104, 116, 172–73, 182, 191, 200, 
224
Constantine, David, 19n15
Contemplation. See Betrachtung
contradiction, 44, 91, 113, 115, 118, 
133, 134, 146, 192
Corngold, Stanley, 16–17, 18n1, 19n14, 
167n13, 175, 192–93, 194, 229
“Country Doctor, A.” See “Landarzt, 
ein”
cultural studies vs. literary scholarship, 
58, 74, 76
culture, 12, 58, 60,61, 64, 65, 74
“Decisions.” See “entschlüsse”
Deleuze, gilles, 19n7
Derrida, Jacques, 90, 92–93, 119–20, 
121
Descartes, René, 45, 47, 53
Description of a Struggle. See Beschreibung 
eines Kampfes
detachment (of narration or observa-
tion), 7, 13, 66–67, 109, 132, 177
deviation (of narration or thought), 16, 
44, 137, 139, 146, 171, 191, 229
Devil’s Island, 156
dialectical, 115, 116, 146; affect, 174
dialogue, 28, 32, 69, 85, 111–13
Diamant, Dora, 194n12
Dickens, Charles, 101; Kafka’s view of, 
129–30
discours indirect libre, 71. See also indirect 
discourse/speech
discursive progression, deviant, 133
dissociation vs. association, 75
distance/distancing, 6, 18n6
Dostoevsky, Fyodor: Notes from the 
Underground, 167n11
dreams, 4, 43, 51
Dreyfus affair, 156
dualism, philosophical, 44–45, 47, 
49–51; temptation of, 53–55
dynamics, of audience response, 25; 
240  index
of instability, 24–25, 26, 27–29, 
152–61; of narration, 196–228; of 
tension, 24–25, 26, 152–61; textual 
and readerly, 25–27, 32, 156
“each person is unique . . . ” See “Jeder 
Mensch ist eigentümlich . . . ”
eco, Umberto, 137
“ein altes Blatt.” See “Page from an old 
document”
Einfall (“inspiration”), 14, 127, 128, 
172, 219–20, 221
Einsinnigkeit 3, 6, 18, 129. See also 
perspective
ellis, John M., 29–30
empirical, 71, 132, 136, 175
emrich, Wilhelm, 166n9
ending (of narrative), 11, 23, 25, 109, 
121, 129, 146n18, 149, 153, 155, 
158, 160, 163, 172, 184, 222–24; 
and beginnings, 16; open, 15; 
surprise, 34–37; un- or not-ending, 
108, 141, 210, 219
“entlarvung eines Bauernfängers” 
(“Unmasking of a Confidence 
Trickster, The”), 201–4; alienation 
in, 203; harmonious life in, 203; 
isolation in, 203; shame in, 203; 
silence in, 202–4; social condition-
ing in, 203; social mobility in, 204
entrance, narrative, 159–60
“entschlüsse” (“Decisions”), 199–201; 
immobility in, 199–200; isolation 
in, 199–200; loneliness in, 200; op-
timism vs. pessimism in, 200; social 
awareness in, 200; social interaction 
in, 200–201; stasis in, 200
Erhebung (“elevation”), 8, 15, 128, 198, 
218, 221, 227,
Erlebnis (“experience”), 60, 67, 70, 72, 
78, 186
essentialist typology, 61–62, 75
ethics, 11, 16, 23; aesthetics and, 37–38; 
ontology and, 49–50; of telling, 26, 
27; of told, 26
eventum tantum, 71
exposition, narrative, 29, 154–60
exteriority, and multiplicity, 66
fairy tale, 11, 43
fiction, 1–6, 12–13, 16–17, 23, 24, 27, 
35, 37, 38n1, 52, 55, 60, 117, 134, 
138, 149, 151–53, 156, 162, 164, 
165, 166n3 and n6, 167n15, 190, 
228n1; modernist, 23, 152
figurative, 76, 140, 166n9, 193
Flaubert, gustave, 19n8
“Forschungen eines hundes” (“Inves-
tigations/Researches of a Dog”), 
16–17, 137, 170–93; childhood, 
loss of in, 183; control, loss of in, 
178; as drive toward beginnings, 
175; first-person narration in, 177–
78; freedom in, 189, 190; homol-
ogy between dog’s life and Kafka’s 
in, 170; imperial first person in, 
172; impersonal pronouns in, 177–
78; joy vs. despair in, 183; as mem-
oir, 173; “musical dogs” in, 175–78, 
184–85; musical indirections in, 
170–93; narrative, temporal rhythm 
of, 173, 178; narrative duplicity in, 
173–74; narrative precision in, 178; 
nourishment/nutrition in, 183, 
186–88, 190; opening sentence of, 
171–73; past vs. present in, 172–74, 
175; philosophy in, 172, 181–84, 
189–90; as report, 173; skepticism 
in, 171; title of, 173; “traumatic 
knowledge” in, 171
Forster, e. M., 56n5
Fowles, John: The French Lieutenant’s 
Woman, 37
fragment, 14, 15, 52, 63, 66, 69, 72, 73, 
76n2, 76n3, 108–9, 132–33, 134n8, 
145n10, 147n23, 229n5
free indirect speech/discourse, 18, 71, 
104, 110–12, 115, 117, 120
free indirect thought, 43
Freud, Sigmund, 31; Oedipal themes 
of, 31–33
Frost, Robert: “home Burial,” 37
index  241
gap(s), hermeneutic, 11, 17; interpre-
tive, 24, 27–29, 32–35, 38, 225; vs. 
continuous narration, 126
“gassenfenster, Das” (“Window onto 
the Street, The”), 201, 205; har-
mony (Eintracht) with humanity 
in, 201; immobility in, 201; ironic 
twist in, 201; isolation in, 201; rest-
lessness in, 201; tiredness in, 201
gehlen, Arnold, 64
generic affiliation, 11
genette, gérard, 75, 77n11, 92n10; 
Discours du récit, 77n22
german Reich: accident prevention 
in, 68
“gib’s auf !” (“give Up!”), 130; flaws 
in, 130
“give Up!” See “gib’s auf!”
goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 173
gray, Richard T., 162, 166n9
greimas, A. J., 92n14
greve, Anniken, 10, 11, 12, 40–57, 140, 
166n6
guattari, Félix, 19n7
guntermann, georg, 145n6
gütling, Alois, 69
habermas, Jürgen, 90
hapsburg empire, 62; constitutional 
culture of, 65
hargraves, John, 185
hartman, geoffrey, 193n2
hegel, g. W. F., 61; Lectures on the Phi-
losophy of History, 64, 66
heidegger, Martin: Sein und Zeit, 46
“heimkehr” (“homecoming”), 
143–45; shift from third-person to 
first-person narrative, 144
heindl, Robert, 167n15
“heizer, Der” (“Stoker, The”), 12–13, 
128, 140, 145n4; authorial narra-
tor in, 87–89; indirect speech in, 
85–86, 88; as life-narrative, 82–83; 
as metanarrative, 81–91; narra-
tive beginning in, 123; narrative 
process, alternation within, 89; as 
novel of individual development, 
82; recognition scene in, 85; sexual 
initiation in, 82–83; stream of 
consciousness in, 85; vicarious nar-
ration in, 84, 88
henel, Ingeborg, 19n6, 166n9
hermeneutic gaps, 11, 17
hero, 121, 140. See also protagonist
heroes vs. traders, 62, 71
herzl, Theodor, 73; The Jewish State, 73
heterodiegetic narrator, 104; vs. ho-
modiegetic narrator, 66. See also 
narrator
hilberg, Raul, 164
historiography, visual form of, 61
“hochzeitsvorbereitungen auf dem 
Lande” (“Wedding Preparations in 
the Country”), 52, 72; autobiog-
raphy in, 132; authorial perspec-
tive in, 133; beginning of, 130–33; 
language in, 132; as metatext, 133; 
narrative perspective in, 132; per-
sonal pronouns in, 132
hoffmann, e. T. A., 134
höfle, Peter, 133
hofmannsthal, hugo von: A Letter, 60
hölderlin, Friedrich, 54
“homecoming.” See “heimkehr”
homeric epic, 4
honold, Alexander, 163, 166n8
hugo, Victor, 101
hume, Katherine, 27, 35
“hunger Artist, A,” 137
husserl, edmund, 113
hypotext vs. hypertext, 75
imitation, 26, 55n2, 66; secular, 117–19
“In der Strafkolonie” (“In the Penal 
Colony”), 16, 76n7, 146n14, 
149–65, 193; colonialism in, 157, 
162, 164; complication in, 160; 
crime and punishment in, 156, 
162; deportation in, 155–56, 162; 
entrance in, 159–60; europe and, 
156–57; exposition in, 154–58; first 
paragraph of, 152; historical and 
242  index
cultural context of, 155–57; initia-
tion in, 158; interpretive sugges-
tiveness of, 161; intertextuality in, 
156, 161; narrative beginning in, 
149–65; narrative movement and 
progression in, 158–61; narrative 
uncertainty in, 160, 163; peripety 
in, 160; power in, 150–51, 156, 
160; prejudice in, 159; semantic 
associations in, 155; stasis and 
deadlock in, 160; suspense in, 
160; tensions and instabilities in, 
152–61; thematic import of, 161; 
third-person narration in, 158–59, 
165; title of, 154–57, 161; Wind-
stille in, 159–60; Zögern in, 160
indirect discourse/speech, 85–86, 88, 
121; free, 71, 104, 110–12, 115, 
117, 120; indirect thought, free, 43. 
See also speech, reported
industrial accident insurance. See ac-
cident
initiation, narrative, 154, 158–59
in medias res, 16, 52, 104, 140, 152, 155, 
163
instability, dynamics of, 24–25, 26, 
27–29, 152–61
insurance. See accident
intellectualism, 47
intention/intend(ed), 10, 12, 13, 31, 47, 
47, 71, 76, 83, 89, 105, 112, 120, 
140, 225. See also purpose
intercommunication, 89
interpretation, 11, 14, 26, 38n6, 39, 
53, 55n2, 83, 111, 113–15, 117, 
119, 121, 134, 149, 166, 169, 
174, 228; acts of, 113; figurative, 
166n9; impossibility of verifiable, 
115; literalistic, 166n9; opposed to 
commentary, 111; thematic, 11, 26; 
uncertainty of, 113. See also reader; 
reading
interpretive gaps, 24, 27–29, 32–35, 
38, 225
intertextuality, 10, 16, 156, 161.
“In the Penal Colony.” See “In der 
Strafkolonie”
intimacy, code of, 90
intradiegesis, 71
intratextuality, 10
“Investigations of a Dog.” See “For-
schungen eines hundes”
involvement vs. detachment, 66–67
inwardness, 64; and identity, 66
Ireland, 65
ironic, 6, 17, 31, 42, 96, 111, 114, 115, 
125, 200, 201, 223
irony, 6, 13, 17, 42, 110–11, 163, 224
Iser, Wolfgang, 23–24; gaps, 24; phe-
nomenological approach, 23
isolated/isolation, 4–5, 14, 17, 48, 199, 
201–5, 216
Jagow, Bettina von, 18n2
Jahrhaus, Oliver, 18n2
James, henry, 109; The Portrait of a 
Lady, 121
“Jeder Mensch ist eigentümlich . . . ” 
(“each person is unique . . . ”), 
92n11
Jesenská, Milena, 77n8, 180, 191–92
Jew(s), 61, 62, 65, 73
Jewish narrative tradition, 133
Jewish scripture, 117
Jewry, 73, 75. See also Semite/Semitic
“Josefine, die Sängerin oder das Volk 
der Mäuse” (“Josefine, the Singer 
or the Mouse People”), 170, 180, 
189
“Journey home, The.” See “Nach-
hauseweg, Der”
Joyce, James, 77n20
judgment, 4, 10, 11, 16, 35, 110, 115, 
158, 159, 171, 193, 225, 226; narra-
tive, 22–38
“Judgment, The.” See “Urteil, Das”
Kafka, Franz, absolute beginnings, 
technique of, 152; Accident Insur-
ance Institute, work at, 66–72; 
anti-normative qualities of narra-
tives of, 59; antitheses, penchant 
index  243
for, 116; aphorisms of, 120, 142, 
227; argumentation, incoherence 
of, 128–29, 130, 133, 134; artists’ 
association for “greater Austria,” 
63, 65; autobiographical elements, 
109, 132, 142, 174; “bachelor” 
fragment, 76n2; Chinese stories, 
58–76; coherence, struggle for, 
220–21, 222; conclusion, lack of, 
130; continuity, struggle for, 123, 
126–27, 130, 220–21; creative 
restlessness of, 228; creativity, new 
period of, 141; creativity and in-
spiration of, 215–16, 219–20, 227; 
critical and facsimile editions of, 
123, 138; diaries of, 59, 60, 77n16, 
116, 138, 145n8, 171–72, 178–79, 
213–21; diegetic frame of narra-
tive of, 64–72; difficulties of texts 
of, 40; direction, recognition of, 
213–14; dreams, 4; dynamic im-
pulse vs. conscious will, 217; Einfall 
and, 14, 128, 219–20; Erhebung and, 
221, 227; as Erzähler, 128; existen-
tialism and, 152, 220; “fourth per-
son” narrative of, 72; fragmentary 
nature of work, 14–16, 109, 133; 
“great swimmer” fragment, 76n2; 
greek myths and, 141; Grenzland 
(“borderland”) and, 213; happi-
ness, expressions of in writing, 
137–38, 189–90; inability of to 
write, 127–29; Institute speeches 
of, 68; as insurance clerk, 66–72; 
isolation of, 4–5, 216; “die kleinen 
Winkelzüge” of, 139; language of, 
59, 132; letters of, 180–81, 184, 
187, 191–92, 213–21; literalistic vs. 
figurative interpretation of, 166n9; 
literary conventions and, 136–37; 
logic, lack of, 128–29, 130, 133–35; 
mauscheln in, 62; metanarratives, 
81–91; middle, starting narra-
tives in, 140, 219–20; momentum, 
maintaining, 213–14; multi- 
occupancy of self, 6; multi-vocality 
of, 69, 71–72, 74, 76; music and, 
170, 175, 179–85, 188–90, 192; as 
narrative artist in “The Judgment,” 
22–38; narrative beginnings in, 
123–45, 149–65; narrative com-
plexity, 90, 152; narrative dynam-
ics in views on writing, 213–21; 
narrative instance, 66–72; narrative 
organization in, 136; narrative 
perspective in, 103–5; narrative 
progression in, 22–39, 123–45; nar-
rative stance, 5–7; narrative voice, 
arrangement of, 69–72, 81–91; 
navigational aids for readers, 
134–35; new beginnings, doubts 
about, 152; non-narrative works of, 
139; non-traditional narrative of, 
136; obstacles to writing, elimina-
tion of, 138; “obstinate” manner 
of story-telling, 90; Oktavhefte 
(Journals), 146n13; orientation, loss 
of, 130; perspective, singularity of, 
6; philosophy of, 130; post-1920 
manuscripts of, 142; referentiality 
of language of, 58–60; Reiseberichte 
(“journeys”), 145n8; resistance of 
texts of, 133; rhetorical theory 
and, 34–37; rhizome, metaphor of, 
91; at sanatorium, 139; Schrift-
stellersein and Beamtenwesen in, 
189–90; self, inner vs. non-writing, 
215; self comments of, 126, 128, 
145n6, 152, 192; sense of self, 9, 
10, 192, 215–17; short prose of, 
139; silence, fascination with, 180, 
189; society, separation of from, 
216; stasis and, 221; “swimming” 
as cipher for condition of writer, 
59–60; tiredness in narratives of, 
130; tuberculosis, 139, 141, 143; 
unmusicality of, 170, 180–81, 
183–84, 190, 192; unreliable nar-
rators in, 133; Vertreibung and, 227; 
writing, barriers to, 218–19; writ-
ing, cessation of as form of death, 
214; writing, as self-referential 
allegory, 227; writing, as travers-
ing space, 215; writing, as vanity, 
244  index
228; writing, views on, 5, 8–10, 68, 
138–39, 145n6, 171, 179–80, 183–
84, 187–90, 197, 213–21; writing, 
views on his own, 124–28; writing 
desk of, 128; writing process and, 
138–39, 150, 192, 213–21, 222; 
writing self, connection between 
writing and, 220–21; Zusammen-
hang of, 123, 220–21.
Karl, Frederick, 22
“Kaufmann, Der” (“The Shopkeeper”), 
205–6; Aufregung in, 205–6; social 
hierarchy in, 206
Kaufmann, Paul: “Social Welfare and 
the german Will to Victory,” 72
“Kinder auf der Landstraße” (“Chil-
dren on the Country Road”), 
209–11; liberation in, 210; order 
vs. disruption in, 209–11; rest vs. 
movement in, 209–11
Kittler, Friedrich, 60
Kjellén, Rudolf, 73
“kleine Automobilgeschichte,” 124–27; 
flaws in, 126–27
Kobs, Jörgen, 19n6, 166
Koelb, Clayton, 19n14
Kraus, Karl, 62; “Sprachlehre” (“gram-
mar”), 179
Kresh, Joseph, 179
“Kübelreiter, Der,” 137
Kurz, gerhard, 12, 13, 18, 94–107, 139, 
166n4, 183, 229n3
Lagarde, Paul de: Deutsche Schriften, 
73; “The Religion of the Future,” 
73–74
“Landarzt, ein” (“Country Doctor, 
A”), 135
language, 54, 58–60, 62, 64, 92n10, 
117, 132, 141, 146n17, 151, 156, 
166n2, 174, 191, 208
launch, narrative, 154, 157–59
Laurentian hill, wish on, 187, 191
legend, 11
Letter to his Father. See Brief an den 
Vater
Levine, Michael, 175–78
literary models, 43
literary scholarship vs. cultural studies, 
58, 74, 76
literature, 58–60, 74–76, 92n5, 119, 
138, 146n16, 170, 190, 213, 228n1; 
great War and, 68; industrial 
accident insurance and, 68–72; 
reality displayed in language of, 
58; referentiality of, 58; theory of, 
77n22; vs. culture, 58; vs. history 
and reality, 58
logic, 22, 25, 26, 33, 34, 42, 43, 46, 47, 
49, 54, 69, 128, 130, 133–36, 139, 
142, 145, 151, 208
Lothe, Jakob, 1, 16, 19n13, 146n14, 
149–69
Luhmann, Niklas, 90, 92
Mann, Thomas, 89, 196
manuscript(s), 14–15, 63, 106, 110, 138, 
142, 146, 147n2
Man Who Disappeared, The. See Der 
Verschollene
Matliary, sanatorium at, 139
Matt, Peter von, 136–37
mauscheln, 62
Mcewan, Ian: Atonement, 37
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 47
metafiction, 88
metahistory, 61
metalanguage, 88
“Metamorphosis, The.” See “Verwand-
lung, Die”
metanarrative, 69, 81–91, 92n10
metatext, 133
Midrash, secular imitation of, 117–19
middle (of narrative), 14, 16, 109, 114, 
119, 123, 127, 140–41, 13, 146n18, 
152–53, 184, 219
Miller, J. hillis, 12, 13–14, 18n4, 92n11, 
108–22
mimetic, 10, 26, 33, 37, 42, 44, 55n2
Mirbeau, Octave: Le Jardin des Supplices 
(Torture Garden), 63
Missing Person, The. See Der Verschollene
index  245
modern, 4, 18n2, 45, 59, 61, 65, 90, 
157. See also fiction, modernist
Morrison, Toni: Beloved, 37
Müller-Seidel, Walter, 155, 166n9
multiplicity, exteriority and, 66
multi-vocality, 69, 71–72, 74, 76
music, 17, 58, 194, 204, 222, 230n17; in 
“Forschungen eines hundes,” 170–
93; Kafka and, 170, 175, 179–85, 
188–90; origin of, 184; philosophy 
and, 181–84, 189–90; Schopen-
hauer and, 205, 229n11; separation 
of, 182, 184; writing and, 179–85, 
189–90
Musil, Robert, 85
myth, 11, 16, 65, 72, 82, 96, 98, 141, 
142, 227, 228
“Nachhauseweg, Der” (“Journey 
home, The”), 204–5; human 
harmony in, 205; isolation in, 205; 
Schopenhauer’s Will and, 204–5; 
social progress/success in, 205; 
stasis in, 205
narratability, negation of, 133
narrated speech, 104
narration,1–4, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18n5, 
19n11, 28–29, 74, 82, 85, 89, 99, 
101–5, 110, 119, 133, 142, 155, 
178, 193n2, 194n9, 218, 222, 
224, 226; act of, 19n14, 162, 227; 
aesthetic means of, 64; blended, 
101–5; continuous, 126; defini-
tion of, 1–2, 9; digressive, 113–15; 
disembodied power of, 12; 111; 
dynamics of, 224; elusiveness of 
meaning generated by, 19n10; 
embedded, 100; flow of, 129, 138; 
form of, 208; impossibility of, 133; 
indirect, 84; internal acts of, 12; 
local texture of, 112; method of, 
19n8, 213; movement as focus, 
motive and mode of, 196, 225; 
paradigmatic, 91; pauses in, 35; 
present-tense, 110; process of, 87; 
progress of, 19n12, 214; reliable vs. 
unreliable, 23, 25; self-creating path 
of, 222–23; self-referentiality of, 
17; third-person, 104, 159; time of, 
165; traditional vs. that of Kafka, 
135–36; as unfolding of dilemma, 
16; vicarious, 84, 88. See also tell-
ing; storytelling; narrative; narrator; 
rhetoric/rhetorical; specific titles
narrative: analysis, 2; authority, 14; 
complexity, 90, 152; definition of, 
1–2, 9–11, 22–26; diegetic frame 
of, 64–72; duplicity, 173–74; dyna-
mism of, 17; embedded, 99–100; 
enigmatic, 10; as event, 23, 152; 
“fourth person,” 72; “grand,” 12, 
87; heterodiegetic vs. homodieget-
ic, 66; hypo-, 66–67; Jewish tradi-
tion of, 133; matrix, 66; narrated, 
99–100; organization, 136; pattern, 
16, 17; as rhetorical communica-
tion, 1–2, 9–11, 22–38; syntagmatic 
vs. paradigmatic, 91; third-person, 
103–4, 110; uncertainty, 103, 160, 
163. See also narration; narrator; 
specific titles
narrative beginnings. See beginning
narrative closure. See ending
narrative judgment, in “The Judg-
ment,” 22–38
narrative movement, 158, 196–228; as 
focus, motive, and mode of narra-
tion, 196
narrative perspective. See perspective
narrative theory, 2; use of term, 1. See 
also narratology
Narrative Theory and Analysis project, 
1
narrative voice. See voice
narrativity, 56, 145n6
narratology, challenges to, 1–2, 17–18, 
34, 37–38, 108–21; “meaning” vs. 
“production of effect” in, 108. See 
also narrative theory
narrator, 2–3, 5–6, 13, 17, 19n6, 25–26, 
28, 31, 36, 43–44, 55, 66–68, 71, 
73, 84, 86–87, 117, 120, 126, 32, 
134, 140, 142, 144, 152, 158–60, 
246  index
164–65, 170–78, 180, 182, 184–85, 
190, 192, 197–202, 204–5, 207, 
209, 211, 226; anonymous, 111; 
authorial, 23, 87–89, 133; commu-
nication of, 24; distance between 
protagonist and, 134, 177; effaced, 
110, 121; external, 105; first-
person, 16–17, 24, 45, 72, 103, 
110, 113, 135, 138, 144, 146n11, 
166, 172, 196; heterodiegetic, 66, 
104; homodiegetic, 66; identifica-
tion of with protagonist, 3, 4, 6, 
138; impersonal, 110–111; indirect 
discourse of, 121; initiation and, 
158–59; intra-diegetic, 12; modern, 
18n2; objective, 97; as observer, 
126; omniscient, 91, 132; perspec-
tive of, 133; and reader, 4; reliable 
vs. unreliable, 110, 133; third-
person, 150, 158, 161, 163, 165, 
166n3. See also narration; narrative
narrator-protagonist, 197, 198, 199, 
204, 205, 212
Native American Indian, motif of, 
107n5
naturalization, 42–43, 53
“Negierung der erzählbarkeit” (“nega-
tion of narratability”), 133
Neumann, gerhard, 12–13, 18n1, 
18n4, 19n7, 19n10, 77n15, 81–93, 
106n1, 106n3, 128, 134, 137, 139, 
145n19, 146n15, 193n2, 229n3, 
230n13
Nietzsche, Friedrich: The Birth of 
Tragedy, 65, 181; The Gay Science, 
64; Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 74; 
Unfashionable Observation, 65–66; 
writings on Wagner, 174
nourishment/nutrition, writing as, 183, 
186–88, 190
“On the gallery” (“Auf der galerie”), 
136
ontological fuzziness, 11, 42, 44, 50
ontology, ethics and, 49–50
origin, 13, 16, 18n1, 59, 82, 86, 91, 97, 
141–42, 171, 174–75, 181, 183–84, 
188, 190–91, 193n2, 194n11, 198, 
200, 219, 227, 228; haunting point 
of, 17
“Page from an Old Document, A” 
(“ein altes Blatt”), 63. See also 
Chinese stories
parable/parabolic, 33, 34, 102, 105, 143
paradox, 3, 19n10, 60, 62, 86, 115, 137, 
139, 163, 207–8, 221, 230n13
Pascal, Roy, 19n6, 38n4
Pasley, Malcolm, 14, 19n12, 138
pattern, 6, 16–18, 27, 31, 36, 39–42, 
45, 89–90, 92, 94–96, 98, 120, 134, 
136, 140, 145–46, 160, 175, 197, 
206, 208, 216, 220–21, 229
Pegasus, 196
performative, effect, 108–9; language, 
116–17
peripety, 160
perspective, 3–4, 6, 18, 18n5, 19n7, 
19n13, 24–25, 27, 29, 31, 38, 
44–45, 65, 67, 70, 83, 91, 92n9, 98, 
103–4, 108, 132–33, 146n11, 150, 
155–56, 158–59, 165, 167n11; au-
thorial, 38, 133; co-extensive with 
protagonist’s perspective, 3; nar-
rative progression, 14–16, 22–39, 
123–45; deviation and, 139; in 
“In der Strafkolonie,” 158, 161; in 
“The Judgment,” 22–38; in “kleine 
Automobilgeschichte,” 126; at level 
of communication, 4; at level of 
event, 3
Phelan, James, 1–2, 9–12, 14, 22–38, 
55n2, 56, 77n19, 152, 154, 157–59, 
166n3, 167n13, 225, 230n18; 
definition of narrative, 1–2, 9–11, 
22–26; Experiencing Fiction, 35, 37
philosophy, music and, 181–84, 189–90
“plötzliche Spaziergang, Der” (“Sud-
den Walk, The”), 197–99, 200, 212; 
equilibrium in, 198; Erhebung in, 
198; hypothetical clauses in, 197; 
indicative, use of in, 197; optimism 
index  247
in, 198–99; social conformity in, 
197; stasis in, 200
point of view, 8, 44, 132, 137. See also 
perspective
Politzer, heinz, 19n10
Pollak, Oscar, 145n7
“Poseidon,” 141
post-structuralism, 74
Prague, 6, 69, 72, 73, 93, 142, 143
Pratt, Mary Louise: Imperial Eyes, 164
private/familial existence, code of, 90
Proceß, Der ( Trial, The), 4, 15, 82, 92n2, 
100, 133, 140, 145n10, 154, 193n5, 
230n12, 230n15; ambiguity in, 
150; argumentation, lack of in, 129; 
deviant discursive progression in, 
133; end of, 229n10; first sentence 
of, 149–50, 161; implied author in, 
150; journeying in, 95; oral reading 
of, Kafka’s, 6; subjunctive, use of in, 
149–50; suspense in, 150; third-
person narrator in, 150, 158; title 
of, 150; unfinished nature of, 150
prodigal son, parable of, 143–45
progression, 14–16, 22–39, 123–45; 
definition of, 10; deviation and, 
139; in “In der Strafkolonie,” 158, 
161; in “The Judgment,” 22–38; 
in “kleine Automobil-geschichte,” 
126; at level of communication, 4; 
at level of event, 3; readerly, 45, 51
prolepsis, 171
“Prometheus,” 141, 228
propaganda, cultural form of, 59; na-
tional identity and, 74–75; war, 59, 
62, 64, 71, 72
protagonist, 3–4, 6, 11, 13, 17, 18–19, 
32, 43, 52, 82, 92, 95, 108, 110–11, 
129, 132–34, 136, 138, 140, 144, 
146, 152, 175, 177, 201–3, 208, 
209, 211, 213–14; as author’s alter 
ego, 132; distance between reader 
and, 3; narrator and, 3–4, 6, 134, 
138, 177
Proust, Marcel, 92n14
“psycho-poetics,” 228
public existence, code of, 90
purpose, 2, 9–12, 14, 17, 23–26, 30, 
36–37, 68, 74–75, 102–3, 105, 142, 
146n16, 157, 159, 163, 192, 219, 
228, 229n8; ethical, 11; Kafka’s 
views about, 8–10; philosophical, 
11; and reader, 18
Pyrrhonism, 171
Rabinowitz, Peter J., 23–24, 165
Ramm, Klaus, 18n1, 18n2, 19n14, 136, 
152
reader, 4, 7, 10, 12–13, 16–17, 25, 38n4, 
40, 42–45, 52, 54, 56n5, 65, 67, 69, 
76, 103–4, 110–14, 118, 124, 126, 
130, 132–35, 140–41, 144, 146, 
150, 154–56, 158, 160–65, 166n3, 
170–71, 175, 179, 193, 196, 208, 
221, 223–24; actual, 2, 24; affected 
by textual dynamics, 25; attention 
of, 84, 95; communication between 
author/narrator and, 4; distance 
between protagonist and, 3; effect 
on, 117; flesh-and-blood, 35, 158; 
empirical, 35; ideal, 23; as imagi-
nary observers, 155; implied, 2, 
23, 35, 43; mind of, 11; Nietzsche 
as Kafka’s first, 77n9; perceptions 
and preconceptions of, 18; and 
protagonist, 3; situation of, 117. See 
also interpretation; reading
readerly interest, 26, 33
reading, 14, 18n2, 19n15, 22, 24, 28, 
33, 38n4, 40–42, 61, 75, 77n12, 
92n3, 108–9, 113, 115–17, 123–24, 
126–27, 150, 155, 173, 175, 179, 
194n8, 227; act of, 113, 163; al-
legorical, 40, 51; and exegesis, 121; 
consecutive and consequential, 
51–52; different kinds of, 109; 
dimensions of, 11; first, 149, 160; 
impossibility of verifiably cor-
rect, 121; and interpretation, 38n6; 
as matter of multiple acts, 75; no 
globally unified, 111; performa-
tive effects of, 108–9; process of, 
56n5; and rereading, 153; second, 
248  index
156, 163; strategy of, 55n2, 133; 
thematic, 34. See also interpreta-
tion; reader
Rechtfertigung (“justification”), 16
recognition, 82, 85, 87, 92
repetition, 91, 166n5; patterns of, 18n6
“Report to an Academy, A.” See “Beri-
cht für eine Akademie, ein”
rereading. See reading
res cogitans vs. res extensa, 45
“Researches of a Dog.” See “For-
schungen eines hundes”
return, theme of, 143–45, 147n23
rhythm, textual, 35
rhetoric/rhetorical, 1–2, 10–12, 22–27, 
31, 34–36, 38n3, 40, 44, 56n2, 67, 
72, 86, 154, 158–60, 179; design, 
12, 40, 44; theory of narrative, 1–2, 
9–11, 22–38
Richardson, Brian, 152
Rimmon-Kenan, Shlomith, 43, 56n5
Roethe, gustav, 60
Rolleston, James, 19n11, 132, 140, 
166n6
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques: Confessions, 
173–74
Said, edward W., 151
Sandberg, Beatrice, 1, 15, 19n13, 
19n15, 40, 55, 106n1, 123–48, 150, 
166n6, 167n13
Scheffel, Michael, 146n15
Schillemeit, Jost, 15, 19n12
Schloß, Das (Castle, The), 12, 14, 95, 100, 
103, 140; challenges to narratology, 
108–21; change from first-person 
to third-person narrative in, 110; 
contradictions in, 115–16; dialogue 
in, 111–13; digressive narration in, 
113–15; discontinuous nature of, 
109, 121; donnée of, 109; effaced 
narrator in, 121; enigmatic irony 
in, 110; exegesis in, 113; focaliza-
tion in, 110; free indirect discourse 
in, 110–12; happiness in, 189; 
interpretation, acts of in, 113–15, 
119; interpretation, impossibility of 
in, 115–16, 117, 121; interpretive 
speeches in, 111; language of, 117; 
linguistic energy in, 111; linguistic 
registers in, 111–13; mediation, 
rejection of in, 119–20; Muir 
translation of, 115; narration, forms 
of in, 111–13; narrative beginning 
in, 166n6; narrative texture of, 111; 
narratological presuppositions of, 
108–9; narrator of, 109–11; opacity 
in, 115–16; passage, failed attempts 
at in, 119–20; performative naming 
in, 116–17; resistance to narra-
tive closure in, 108–21; run-on 
sentences in, 115; secular imitation 
of Talmud and Midrash in, 117–19; 
third-person narration in, 158; 
unfinished nature of, 109, 119, 121; 
Verbindung in, 120
Schmidt, Friedrich, 19n15, 146n12, 
n14
Schnitzler, Arthur: “Der Reigen,” 92n5
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 230n12; Will of, 
204–5, 229n11
Schriftstellersein (“being of the writer”), 
189–90
Schütterle, Annette, 146n13
“Schweigen der Sirenen, Das” (“Si-
lence of the Sirens, The”), 141
Second International Congress for 
Rescue Service and Accident Pre-
vention, 68, 72
Selbmann, Rolf, 145n3
Semite, conflict between Aryan and, 61
Semitic culture, petrifaction of, 65
Seurat, georges, 132
Sextus empiricus, 171
Sheppard, Richard, 18n6
“Shopkeeper, The.” See “Kaufmann, 
Der”
showing, 23, 33, 36
“Silence of the Sirens, The.” See “Sch-
weigen der Sirenen, Das”
Slavic people, 64
Sokel, Walter, 18n5, 28
solidity, illusion of, 197
index  249
Sombart, Werner: Händler und Helden, 
62, 71
“Something for Jockeys to Think 
About.” See “Zum Nachdenken für 
herrenreiter”
speech, reported, 104
speed, narrative, 22–38
Speirs, Ronald, 1, 16, 17, 19n7, 19n15, 
33, 40, 55, 106n1, 145n1, 150, 
167n13, 191–93, 196–231
“Stadtwappen, Das” (“City Coat of 
Arms, The”), 141
stasis, 3, 14, 17, 136, 145, 155, 160, 197, 
200, 205–7, 219, 221, 226
Sterne, Laurence: Tristram Shandy, 196
“Stoker, The.” See “heizer, Der”
storytelling, 23, 38, 90, 91, 103, 196. 
See also narration; telling
storyline, 117
stubbornness, textual, 29, 32–33, 37, 
38n6, 74
subject-body, 47
subjectivity, history of modern, 90; 
isolated, 4; multiple, 71
“Sudden Walk, The.” See “plötzliche 
Spaziergang, Der”
suspense, 150, 160
Sussman, henry, 26–27
synthetic aspect, 26, 33
Talleyrand(-Périgord), Charles Maurice 
de, 64
Talmud, secular imitation of, 117–19
Taylor, Charles Frederick: Principles of 
Scientific Management, 69
telling, 1–2 , 2, 13, 23–24, 26–28, 83, 
84, 86–91, 101, 103, 105, 113, 
143, 149, 158, 161, 173, 175, 178, 
182, 206, 207. See also narration; 
storytelling
tension, dynamics of, 24–25, 26, 
152–61
thematic aspect, 26, 33
title, importance of, 149–51, 154–57, 
161, 173; narrative dimension of, 
149
Tower of Babel, 141–42, 145, 193
traders, heroes vs., 62
transdiegesis, 72
transmediality, 72
transposed speech, 104
transtextuality, 72
Trial, The. See Proceß, Der
Trial, The (Welles), 165n2
typologies, 61–62, 75; cognitive, 61; 
essentialist, 61–62
“Unglücklichsein” (“Being Unhappy”), 
211–13; familiar vs. abnormal in, 
211, 213; loneliness/abandonment 
in, 213; Luftzug in, 212; optimism 
vs. pessimism in, 213; oscillation in, 
212; static agitation in, 211
“Unmasking of a Confidence Trick-
ster, The.” See “entlarvung eines 
Bauernfängers”
“Urteil, Das” (“The Judgment”), 4, 
10–11, 221–28; activity and passiv-
ity in writing of, 221; ambivalence 
in, 224; analepsis in, 29; circularity 
of, 223; constraints (social, moral, 
psychological) in, 226; deficien-
cies and inconsistencies in, 123–24; 
dynamics of narration in, 221–28; 
end of, 225–27; enigmatic obscu-
rity of, 124; ethical judgments in, 
31; ethics of telling in, 27; finality 
of, 223; happiness in, 137; instabil-
ity in, 27–29, 223–24; interpretive 
gaps in, 27–29, 32–33, 35, 38, 225; 
irony in, 224; judgment in, 22–38; 
Kafka’s joy in writing, 191–92; 
Kafka’s view of, 38, 124; logic, lack 
of in, 129; music of, 222; narrative 
beginning in, 123, 134; narrative 
consequence, lack of in, 22 –38, 
137; opening paragraph of, 222–25; 
patriarchy in, 33; progression in, 
22–38; psychological interpretation 
of, 225–26; realism in, 33; restless-
ness of, 223; self-creating narrative 
in, 222–23, 226; sense of achieve-
250  index
ment in writing of, 221; sentence 
structure of, 224; speed in, 22–38; 
stasis in, 226; strangeness of, 22, 27, 
29; temporality in, 28; textual stub-
bornness in, 29, 32–33
Verbindung (“connection”), 120, 153, 
175, 176
Verschollene, Der (Amerika; The Man 
Who Disappeared; The Missing Per-
son), 8, 12–13, 14–15, 220, 229n4; 
allegory in, 97; America, percep-
tion of in, 95; blended narration 
in, 101–5; embedded narrative in, 
99–100; expulsion vs. inclusion in, 
95–98; journeying in, 94–95; nar-
rative pattern of, 94–95; narrative 
uncertainty in, 103; perception in, 
97; seduction in, 95–98; Statue of 
Liberty in, 97, 101, 142; Therese’s 
story in, 94–106; third-person nar-
rative in, 103–4
“Verwandlung, Die” (“Metamor-
phosis, The”), 6, 11, 82, 130, 132, 
140; allegorical reading of, 40, 51; 
consecutive vs. consequentialist 
reading of, 51–52; contradictions 
of, 44; dreams in, 43, 51; dualism 
in, 44–45, 47, 49–51, 53–55; as 
escape fantasy, 52; ethics in, 49–50; 
existentialism in, 55; face-value ap-
proach to, 40–42, 53, 55; as family 
drama, 40–42; happiness in, 137; 
human body and human being in, 
40–55; human conversation in, 54; 
implied author and reader in, 43; 
morality in, 50; narrative beginning 
in, 123, 166n6; narrator, attitude of 
in, 43–44; naturalization in, 42–43, 
53; objectification of body in, 46; 
ontological fuzziness in, 42, 44, 50, 
52; ontology in, 45, 49, 51, 53–55; 
rhetorical design of, 44; as risky act 
of communication, 55
Vetlesen, Arne Johan: Evil and Human 
Agency, 164
Vogl, Joseph, 70–72
Vogt, Jochen, 76
voice, 62, 66–77, 85–91, 101–4, 108, 
110–11, 117, 171, 173, 178, 186
“Vor dem gesetz” (“Before the Law”), 
95, 100, 136
Wagner, Benno, 2, 10, 12, 58–80
Wagner, Richard, 96, 174, 194n6
Wahrmund, Adolf: Das Gesetz des 
Nomadentums und die heutige Juden-
herrschaft, 61, 65
Walser, Martin, 18n2
Walser, Robert, 146n19
war, 12, 59–78 passim, 167; iconogra-
phy of, 60; propaganda, 59, 62, 64, 
71, 72
Warning, Rainer, 92n146
wars of unification, german, 60
Weber, Max: Protestant Ethic, 62, 64
“Wedding Preparations in the Coun-
try.” See “hochzeitsvorbereitungen 
auf dem Lande”
Welles, Orson: The Trial, 165n2
Wharton, edith: “Roman Fever,” 
35–37
Wilhelm Meister, 92n3, 92n4
“Window onto the Street, The.” See 
“gassenfenster, Das”
Wir-Gefühl (“We feeling”), 72
“Wish to Become a Red Indian.” See 
“Wunsch, Indianer zu werden”
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 50
World War I, 60, 167n12; propaganda, 
59, 62, 64, 71, 72; stories of, 58–76
World War II, 167n12
writing, barriers to, 218–19; as calling 
or mission, 9; cessation of as form 
of death, 214; Kafka’s views on, 
5, 8–10, 68, 138–39, 145n6, 171, 
179–80, 183–84, 187–90, 197, 
213–21; Kafka’s views on his own, 
124–28; movement and, 8, 16,17, 
27, 28, 66, 75, 137–39, 145–46, 
152, 158, 196–230 passim; linear 
method of, 15; music and, 179–85, 
index  251
189–90; nourishment/nutrition 
and, 183, 186–88; perversion of, 
187; pure vs. impure, 187–91; 
and politics, 12; as self-referential 
allegory, 227; as “service to the 
devil,” 8; as traversing space, 215; as 
vanity, 228
writing desk, 13–14, 27, 81–93, 128
writing process, 128, 138–39, 150, 
192, 219, 231–32. See also writing, 
movement and
“Wunsch, Indianer zu werden” (“Wish 
to Become a Red Indian”), 17, 
107n5, 198, 207–9, 210–11; ab-
normal experienced as reality in, 
208–9; agitation vs. stasis in, 207; 
familiar life vs. eruption of energy 
in, 208; normality, escape from in, 
208; sense of achievement in writ-
ing of, 221
Zeno, 207
Zimmermann, hans Dieter, 123, 
146n19, 157, 159
Zionism, 73; cultural, 65
Zögern (“hesitation”), 120, 145, 152, 
160
Zola, Émile, 167n10
“Zum Nachdenken für herrenreiter” 
(“Something for Jockeys to Think 
About”), 204; circularity of life in, 
204; isolation in, 204
Zusammenhang (“connectedness”/ “co-
herence”), 15; Kafka’s struggle for, 
123, 220–21, lack of, 229
